meditations on first philosophy-第13章

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magining。　　But　if　I　desire　to　think　of　a　chiliagon；　I　certainly　conceive　truly　that　it　is　a　figure　composed　of　a　thousand　sides；　just　as　easily　as　I　conceive　of　a　triangle　that　it　is　a　figure　of　three　sides　only；　but　I　cannot　in　any　way　imagine　the　thousand　sides　of　a　chiliagon　＇as　I　do　the　three　sides　of　a　triangle＇；　nor　do　I；　so　to　speak；　regard　them　as　present　＇with　the　eyes　of　my　mind＇。　　And　although　in　accordance　with　the　habit　I　have　formed　of　always　employing　the　aid　of　my　imagination　when　I　think　of　corporeal　things；　it　may　happen　that　in　imagining　a　chiliagon　I　confusedly　represent　to　myself　some　figure；　yet　it　is　very　evident　that　this　figure　is　not　a　chiliagon；　since　it　in　no　way　differs　from　that　which　I　represent　to　myself　when　I　think　of　a　myriagon　or　any　other　many…sided　figure；　nor　does　it　serve　my　purpose　in　discovering　the　properties　which　go　to　form　the　distinction　between　a　chiliagon　and　other　polygons。　But　if　the　question　turns　upon　a　pentagon；　it　is　quite　true　that　I　can　conceive　its　figure　as　well　as　that　of　a　chiliagon　without　the　help　of　my　imagination；　but　I　can　also　imagine　it　by　applying　the　attention　of　my　mind　to　each　of　its　five　sides；　and　at　the　same　time　to　the　space　which　they　enclose。　And　thus　I　clearly　recognise　that　I　have　need　of　a　particular　effort　of　mind　in　order　to　effect　the　act　of　imagination；　such　as　I　do　not　require　in　order　to　understand；　and　this　particular　effort　of　mind　clearly　manifests　the　difference　which　exists　between　imagination　and　pure　intellection。26　　　　　　I　remark　besides　that　this　power　of　imagination　which　is　in　one；　inasmuch　as　it　differs　from　the　power　of　understanding；　is　in　no　wise　a　necessary　element　in　my　nature；　or　in　＇my　essence；　that　is　to　say；　in＇　the　essence　of　my　mind；　for　although　I　did　not　possess　it　I　should　doubtless　ever　remain　the　same　as　I　now　am；　from　which　it　appears　that　we　might　conclude　that　it　depends　on　something　which　differs　from　me。　　And　I　easily　conceive　that　if　some　body　exists　with　which　my　mind　is　conjoined　and　united　in　such　a　way　that　it　can　apply　itself　to　consider　it　when　it　pleases；　it　may　be　that　by　this　means　it　can　imagine　corporeal　objects；　so　that　this　mode　of　thinking　differs　from　pure　intellection　only　inasmuch　as　mind　in　its　intellectual　activity　in　some　manner　turns　on　itself；　and　considers　some　of　the　ideas　which　it　possesses　in　itself；　while　in　imagining　it　turns　towards　the　body；　and　there　beholds　in　it　something　conformable　to　the　idea　which　it　has　either　conceived　of　itself　or　perceived　by　the　senses。　　I　easily　understand；　I　say；　that　the　imagination　could　be　thus　constituted　if　it　is　true　that　body　exists；　and　because　I　can　discover　no　other　convenient　mode　of　explaining　it；　I　conjecture　with　probability　that　body　does　exist；　but　this　is　only　with　probability；　and　although　I　examine　all　things　with　care；　I　nevertheless　do　not　find　that　from　this　distinct　idea　of　corporeal　nature；　which　I　have　in　my　imagination；　I　can　derive　any　argument　from　which　there　will　necessarily　be　deduced　the　existence　of　body。　　　　　　But　I　am　in　the　habit　of　imagining　many　other　things　besides　this　corporeal　nature　which　is　the　object　of　pure　mathematics；　to　wit；　the　colours；　sounds；　scents；　pain；　and　other　such　things；　although　less　distinctly。　　And　inasmuch　as　I　perceive　these　things　much　better　through　the　senses；　by　the　medium　of　which；　and　by　the　memory；　they　seem　to　have　reached　my　imagination；　I　believe　that；　in　order　to　examine　them　more　conveniently；　it　is　right　that　I　should　at　the　same　time　investigate　the　nature　of　sense　perception；　and　that　I　should　see　if　from　the　ideas　which　I　apprehend　by　this　mode　of　thought；　which　I　call　feeling；　I　cannot　derive　some　certain　proof　of　the　existence　of　corporeal　objects。　　　　　　And　first　of　all　I　shall　recall　to　my　memory　those　matters　which　I　hitherto　held　to　be　true；　as　having　perceived　them　through　the　senses；　and　the　foundations　on　which　my　belief　has　rested；　in　the　next　place　I　shall　examine　the　reasons　which　have　since　obliged　me　to　place　them　in　doubt；　in　the　last　place　I　shall　consider　which　of　them　I　must　now　believe。　　　　　　First　of　all；　then；　I　perceived　that　I　had　a　head；　hands；　feet；　and　all　other　members　of　which　this　body￥which　I　considered　as　a　part；　or　possibly　even　as　the　whole；　of　myself￥is　composed。　　Further　I　was　sensible　that　this　body　was　placed　amidst　many　others；　from　which　it　was　capable　of　being　affected　in　many　different　ways；　beneficial　and　hurtful；　and　I　remarked　that　a　certain　feeling　of　pleasure　accompanied　those　that　were　beneficial；　and　pain　those　which　were　harmful。　　And　in　addition　to　this　pleasure　and　pain；　I　also　experienced　hunger；　thirst；　and　other　similar　appetites；　as　also　certain　corporeal　inclinations　towards　joy；　sadness；　anger；　and　other　similar　passions。　　And　outside　myself；　in　addition　to　extension；　figure；　and　motions　of　bodies；　I　remarked　in　them　hardness；　heat；　and　all　other　tactice　qualities；　and；　further；　light　and　colour；　and　scents　and　sounds；　the　variety　of　which　gave　me　the　means　of　distinguishing　the　sky；　the　earth；　the　sea；　and　generally　all　the　other　bodies；　one　from　the　other。　And　certainly；　considering　the　ideas　of　all　these　qualities　which　presented　themselves　to　my　mind；　and　which　alone　I　perceived　properly　or　immediately；　it　was　not　without　reason　that　I　believed　myself　to　perceive　objects　quite　different　from　my　thought；　to　wit；　bodies　from　which　those　ideas　proceeded；　for　I　found　by　experience　that　these　ideas　presented　themselves　to　me　without　my　consent　being　requisite；　so　that　I　could　not　perceive　any　object；　however　desirous　I　might　be；　unless　it　were　present　to　the　organs　of　sense；　and　it　was　not　in　my　power　not　to　perceive　it；　when　it　was　present。　　And　because　the　ideas　which　I　received　through　the　senses　were　much　more　lively；　more　clear；　and　even；　in　their　own　way；　more　distinct　than　any　of　those　which　I　could　of　myself　frame　in　meditation；　or　than　those　I　found　impressed　on　my　memory；　it　appeared　as　though　they　could　not　have　proceeded　from　my　mind；　so　that　they　must　necessarily　have　been　produced　in　me　by　some　other　things。　　And　having　no　knowledge　of　those　objects　excepting　the　knowledge　which　the　ideas　themselves　gave　me；　nothing　was　more　likely　to　occur　to　my　mind　than　that　the　objects　were　similar　to　the　ideas　which　were　caused。　　And　because　I　likewise　remembered　that　I　had　formerly　made　use　of　my　senses　rather　than　my　reason；　and　recognised　that　the　ideas　which　I　formed　of　myself　were　not　so　distinct　as　those　which　I　perceived　through　the　senses；　and　that　they　were　most　frequently　even　composed　of　portions　of　these　last；　I　persuaded　myself　easily　that　I　had　no　idea　in　my　mind　which　had　not　formerly　come　to　me　through　the　senses。　　Nor　was　it　without　some　reason　that　I　believed　that　this　body　（which　be　a　certain　special　right　I　call　my　own）　belonged　to　me　more　properly　and　more　strictly　than　any　other；　for　in　fact　I　could　never　be　separated　from　it　as　from　other　bodies；　I　experienced　in　it　and　on　account　of　it　all　my　appetites　and　affections；　and　finally　I　was　touched　by　the　feeling　of　pain　and　the　titillation　of　pleasure　in　its　parts；　and　not　in　the　parts　of　other　bodies　which　were　separated　from　it。　　But　when　I　inquired；　why；　from　some；　I　know　not　what；　painful　sensation；　there　follows　sadness　of　mind；　and　from　the　pleasurable　sensation　there　arises　joy；　or　why　this　mysterious　pinching　of　the　stomach　which　I　call　hunger　causes　me　to　desire　to　eat；　and　dryness　of　throat　causes　a　desire　to　drink；　and　so　on；　I　could　give　no　reason　excepting　that　nature　taught　me　so；　for　there　is　certainly　no　affinity　（that　I　at　least　can　understand）　between　the　craving　of　the　stomach　and　the　desire　to　eat；　any　more　than　between　the　perception　of　whatever　causes　pain　and　the　thought　of　sadness　which　arises　from　this　perception。　　And　in　the　same　way　it　appeared　to　me　that　I　had　learned　from　nature　all　the　other　judgments　which　I　formed　regarding　the　objects　of　my　senses；　since　I　remarked　that　these　judgments　were　formed　in　me　before　I　had　the　leisure　to　weigh　and　consider　any　reasons　which　might　oblige　me　to　make　them。　　　　　　But　afterwards　many　experiences　little　by　little　destroyed　all　the　faith　which　I　had　rested　in　my　senses；　for　I　from　time　to　time　observed　that　those　towers　which　from　afar　appeared　to　me　to　be　round；　more　closely　observed　seemed　square；　and　that　colossal　statues　raised　on　the　summit　of　these　towers；　appeared　as　quite　tiny　statues　when　viewed　from　the　bottom；　and　so　in　an　infinitude　of　other　cases　I　found　error　in　judgments　founded　on　the　external　senses。　　And　not　only　in　those　founded　on　the　external　senses；　but　even　in　those　founded　on　the　internal　as　well；　for　is　there　anything　more　intimate　or　more　internal　than　pain？　　And　yet　I　have　learned　from　some　persons　whose　arms　or　legs　have　been　cut　off；　that　they　sometimes　seemed　to　feel　pain　in　the　part　which　had　been　amputated；　which　made　me　think　that　I　could　not　be　quite　certain　that　it　was　a　certain　member　which　pained　me；　even　although　I　felt　pain　in　it。　　And　to　those　grounds　of　doubt　I　have　lately　added　two　others；　which　are　very　general；　the　first　is　that　I　never　have　believed　myself　to　feel　anything　in　waking　moments　which　I　cannot　also　sometimes　believe　myself　to　feel　when　I　sleep；　and　as　I　do　not　think　that　these　things　which　I　seem　to　feel　in　sleep；　proceed　from　objects　outside　of　me；　I　do　not　see　any　reason　why　I　should　have　this　belief　regarding　objects　which　I　seem　to　perceive　while　awake。　　The　other　was　that　being　still　ignorant；　or　rather　supposing　myself　to　be　ignorant；　of　the　author　of　my　being；　I　saw　nothing　to　prevent　me　from　having　been　so　constituted　by　nature　that　I　might　be　deceived　even　in　matters　which　seemed　to　me　to　be　most　certain。　　And　as　to　the　grounds　on　which　I　was　formerly　persuaded　of　the　truth　of　sensible　objects；　I　had　not　much　trouble　in　replying　to　them。　　For　since　nature　seemed　to　cause　me　to　lean　towards　many　things　from　which　reason　repelled　me；　I　did　not　believe　that　I　should　trust　much　to　the　teachings　of　nature。　　And　although　the　ideas　which　I　receive　by　the　senses　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　did　not　think　that　one　should　for　that　reason　conclude　that　they　proceeded　from　things　different　from　myself；　since　possibly　some　faculty　might　be　discovered　in　me￥though　hitherto　unknown　to　me￥which　produced　them。　　　　　　But　now　that　I　begin　to　know　myself　better；　and　to　discover　more　clearly　the　author　of　my　being；　I　do　not　in　truth　think　that　I　should　rashly　admit　all　the　matters　which　the　senses　seem　to　teach　us；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　not　think　that　I　should　doubt　them　all　universally。　　　　　　And　first　of　all；　because　I　know　that　all　things　which　I　apprehend　clearly　and　distinctly　can　be　created　by　God　as　I　apprehend　them；　it　suffices　that　I　am　able　to　apprehend　one　thing　apart　from　another　clearly　and　distinctly　in　order　to　be　certain　that　the　one　is　different　from　the　other；　since　they　may　be　made　to　exist　in　separation　at　least　by　the　omnipotence　of　God；　and　it　does　not　signify　by　what　power　this　separation　is　made　in　order　to　compel　me　to　judge　them　to　be　different：　and；　therefore；　just　because　I　know　certainly　that　I　exist；　and　that　meanwhile　I　do　not　remark　that　any　other　thing　necessarily　pertains　to　my　nature　or　essence；　excepting　that　I