meditations on first philosophy-第6章
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appeared formerly to be so； but only an intuition13 of the mind； which may be imperfect and confused as it was formerly； or clear and distinct as it is at present； according as my attention is more or less directed to the elements which are found in it； and of which it is composed。 Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I consider ＇the great feebleness of mind＇ and its proneness to fall ＇insensibly＇ into error； for although without giving expression to my thought I consider all this in my own mind； words often impede me and I am almost deceived by the terms of ordinary language。 For we say that we see the same wax； if it is present； and not that we simply judge that it is the same from its having the same colour and figure。 From this I should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not simply by the intuition of the mind； unless by chance I remember that； when looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street； I really do not see them； but infer that what I see is men； just as I say that I see wax。 And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines？ Yet I judge these to be men。 And similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my mind； I comprehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes。 A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above the common should be ashamed to derive the occasion for doubting from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar； I prefer to pass on and consider whether I had a more evident and perfect conception of what the wax was when I first perceived it； and when I believed I knew it by means of the external senses or at least by the common sense14 as it is called； that is to say by the imaginative faculty； or whether my present conception is clearer now that I have most carefully examined what it is； and in what way it can be known。 It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this。 For what was there in this first perception which was distinct？ What was there which might not as well have been perceived by any of the animals？ But when I distinguish the wax from its external forms； and when； just as if I had taken from it its vestments； I consider it quite naked； it is certain that although some error may still be found in my judgment； I can nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind。 But finally what shall I say of this mind； that is； of myself； for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything but mind？ What then； I who seem to perceive this piece of wax so distinctly； do I not know myself； not only with much more truth and certainty； but also with much more distinctness and clearness？ For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that I see it； it certainly follows much more clearly that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it。 For it may be that what I see is not really wax； it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything； but it cannot be that when I see； or （for I no longer take account of the distinction） when I think I see； that I myself who think am nought。 So if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it； the same thing will follow； to wit； that I am； and if I judge that my imagination； or some other cause； whatever it is； persuades me that the wax exists； I shall still conclude the same。 And what I have here remarked of wax may be applied to all other things which are external to me ＇and which are met with outside of me＇。 And further； if the ＇notion or＇ perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and more distinct； not only after the sight or the touch； but also after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me； with how much more ＇evidence＇ and distinctness must it be said that I now know myself； since all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge of wax； or any other body whatever； are yet better proofs of the nature of my mind！ And there are so many other things in the mind itself which may contribute to the elucidation of its nature； that those which depend on body such as these just mentioned； hardly merit being taken into account。 But finally here I am； having insensibly reverted to the point I desired； for； since it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination； but by the understanding only； and since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or touched； but only because they are understood； I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind。 But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly of an opinion to which one was accustomed for so long； it will be well that I should halt a little at this point； so that by the length of my meditation I may more deeply imprint on my memory this new knowledge。 Meditation III。 Of God： that He exists。 I shall now close my eyes； I shall stop my ears； I shall call away all my senses； I shall efface even from my thoughts all the images of corporeal things； or at least （for that is hardly possible） I shall esteem them as vain and false； and thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own nature； I shall try little by little to reach a better knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself。 I am a thing that thinks； that is to say； that doubts； affirms； denies； that knows a few things； that is ignorant of many ＇that loves； that hates＇； that wills； that desires； that also imagines and perceives； for as I remarked before； although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps nothing at all apart from me and in themselves； I am nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call perceptions and imaginations； inasmuch only as they are modes of thought； certainly reside ＇and are met with＇ in me。 And in the little that I have just said； I think I have summed up all that I really know； or at least all that hitherto I was aware that I knew。 In order to try to extend my knowledge further； I shall now look around more carefully and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other things which I have not hitherto perceived。 I am certain that I am a thing which thinks； but do I not then likewise know what is requisite to render me certain of a truth？ Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of its truth； excepting the clear and distinct perception of that which I state； which would not indeed suffice to assure me that what I say is true； if it could ever happen that a thing which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false； and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as a general rule that all things which I perceive15 very clearly and very distinctly are true。 At the same time I have before received and admitted many things to be very certain and manifest； which yet I afterwards recognised as being dubious。 What then were these things？ They were the earth； sky； stars and all other objects which I apprehended by means of the senses。 But what did I clearly ＇and distinctly＇ perceive in them？ Nothing more than that the ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my mind。 And not even now do I deny that these ideas are met with in me。 But there was yet another thing which I affirmed； and which； owing to the habit which I had formed of believing it； I thought I perceived very clearly； although in truth I did not perceive it at all； to wit； that there were objects outside of me from which these ideas proceeded； and to which they were entirely similar。 And it was in this that I erred； or； if perchance my judgment was correct； this was not due to any knowledge arising from my perception。 But when I took anything very simple and easy in the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration； e。g。 that two and three together made five； and other things of the sort； were not these present to my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm that they were true？ Certainly if I judged that since such matters could be doubted； this would not have been so for any other reason than that it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest。 But every time that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents itself to my thought； I am constrained to confess that it is easy to Him； if He wishes it； to cause me to err； even in matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence。 And； on the other hand； always when I direct my attention to things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly； I am so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into words such as these： Let who will deceive me； He can never cause me to be nothing while I think that I am； or some day cause it to be true to say that I have never been； it being true now to say that I am； or that two and three make more or less than five； or any such thing in which I see a manifest contradiction。 And； certainly； since I have no reason to believe that there is a God who is a deceiver； and as I have not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all； the reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very slight； and so to speak metaphysical。 But in order to be able altogether to remove it； I must inquire whether there is a God as soon as the occasion presents itself； and if I find that there is a God； I must also inquire whether He may be a deceiver； for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I can ever be certain of anything。 And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring into this in an orderly way ＇without interrupting the order of meditation which I have proposed to myself； and which is little by little to pass from the notions which I find first of all in my mind to those which I shall later on discover in it＇ it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts into certain kinds； and that I should consider in which of these kinds there is； properly speaking； truth or error to be found。 Of my thoughts some are； so to speak； images of the things； and to these alone is the title 〃idea〃 properly applied； examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera； of heaven； of an angel； or ＇even＇ of God。 But other thoughts possess other forms as well。 For example in willing； fearing； approving； denying； though I always perceive something as the subject of the action of my mind；16 yet by this action I always add something else to the idea17 which I have of that thing； and of the thoughts of this kind some are called volitions or affections； and others judgments。 Now as to what concerns ideas； if we consider them only in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond themselves； they cannot properly speaking be false； for whether I imagine a goat or a chimera； it is not less true that I imagine the one that the other。 We must not fear likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections； for although I may desire evil things； or even things that never existed； it is not the less true that I desire them。 Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make； in whi
