meditations on first philosophy-第7章

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he　less　true　that　I　desire　them。　Thus　there　remains　no　more　than　the　judgments　which　we　make；　in　which　I　must　take　the　greatest　care　not　o　deceive　myself。　But　the　principal　error　and　the　commonest　which　we　may　meet　with　in　them；　consists　in　my　judging　that　the　ideas　which　are　in　me　are　similar　or　conformable　to　the　things　which　are　outside　me；　for　without　doubt　if　I　considered　the　ideas　only　as　certain　modes　of　my　thoughts；　without　trying　to　relate　them　to　anything　beyond；　they　could　scarcely　give　me　material　for　error。　　　　　　But　among　these　ideas；　some　appear　to　me　to　be　innate；　some　adventitious；　and　others　to　be　formed　＇or　invented＇　by　myself；　for；　as　I　have　the　power　of　understanding　what　is　called　a　thing；　or　a　truth；　or　a　thought；　it　appears　to　me　that　I　hold　this　power　from　no　other　source　than　my　own　nature。　　But　if　I　now　hear　some　sound；　if　I　see　the　sun；　or　feel　heat；　I　have　hitherto　judged　that　these　sensations　proceeded　from　certain　things　that　exist　outside　of　me；　and　finally　it　appears　to　me　that　sirens；　hippogryphs；　and　the　like；　are　formed　out　of　my　own　mind。　　But　again　I　may　possibly　persuade　myself　that　all　these　ideas　are　of　the　nature　of　those　which　I　term　adventitious；　or　else　that　they　are　all　innate；　or　all　fictitious：　　for　I　have　not　yet　clearly　discovered　their　true　origin。　　　　　　And　my　principal　task　in　this　place　is　to　consider；　in　respect　to　those　ideas　which　appear　to　me　to　proceed　from　certain　objects　that　are　outside　me；　what　are　the　reasons　which　cause　me　to　think　them　similar　to　these　objects。　　It　seems　indeed　in　the　first　place　that　I　am　taught　this　lesson　by　nature；　and；　secondly；　I　experience　in　myself　that　these　ideas　do　not　depend　on　my　will　nor　therefore　on　myself￥for　they　often　present　themselves　to　my　mind　in　spite　of　my　will。　Just　now；　for　instance；　whether　I　will　or　whether　I　do　not　will；　I　feel　heat；　and　thus　I　persuade　myself　that　this　feeling；　or　at　least　this　idea　of　heat；　is　produced　in　me　by　something　which　is　different　from　me；　i。e。　by　the　heat　of　the　fire　near　which　I　sit。　　And　nothing　seems　to　me　more　obvious　than　to　judge　that　this　object　imprints　its　likeness　rather　than　anything　else　upon　me。　　　　　　Now　I　must　discover　whether　these　proofs　are　sufficiently　strong　and　convincing。　　When　I　say　that　I　am　so　instructed　by　nature；　I　merely　mean　a　certain　spontaneous　inclination　which　impels　me　to　believe　in　this　connection；　and　not　a　natural　light　which　makes　me　recognise　that　it　is　true。　　But　these　two　things　are　very　different；　for　I　cannot　doubt　that　which　the　natural　light　causes　me　to　believe　to　be　true；　as；　for　example；　it　has　shown　me　that　I　am　from　the　fact　that　I　doubt；　or　other　facts　of　the　same　kind。　　And　I　possess　no　other　faculty　whereby　to　distinguish　truth　from　falsehood；　which　can　teach　me　that　what　this　light　shows　me　to　be　true　is　not　really　true；　and　no　other　faculty　that　is　equally　trustworthy。　But　as　far　as　＇apparently＇　natural　impulses　are　concerned；　I　have　frequently　remarked；　when　I　had　to　make　active　choice　between　virtue　and　vice；　that　they　often　enough　led　me　to　the　part　that　was　worse；　and　this　is　why　I　do　not　see　any　reason　for　following　them　in　what　regards　truth　and　error。　　　　　　And　as　to　the　other　reason；　which　is　that　these　ideas　must　proceed　from　objects　outside　me；　since　they　do　not　depend　on　my　will；　I　do　not　find　it　any　the　more　convincing。　　For　just　as　these　impulses　of　which　I　have　spoken　are　found　in　me；　notwithstanding　that　they　do　not　always　concur　with　my　will；　so　perhaps　there　is　in　me　some　faculty　fitted　to　produce　these　ideas　without　the　assistance　of　any　external　things；　even　though　it　is　not　yet　known　by　me；　just　as；　apparently；　they　have　hitherto　always　been　found　in　me　during　sleep　without　the　aid　of　any　external　objects。　　　　　　And　finally；　though　they　did　proceed　from　objects　different　from　myself；　it　is　not　a　necessary　consequence　that　they　should　resemble　these。　　On　the　contrary；　I　have　noticed　that　in　many　cases　there　was　a　great　difference　between　the　object　and　its　idea。　　I　find；　for　example；　two　completely　diverse　ideas　of　the　sun　in　my　mind；　the　one　derives　its　origin　from　the　senses；　and　should　be　placed　in　the　category　of　adventitious　ideas；　according　to　this　idea　the　sun　seems　to　be　extremely　small；　but　the　other　is　derived　from　astronomical　reasonings；　i。e。　is　elicited　from　certain　notions　that　are　innate　in　me；　or　else　it　is　formed　by　me　in　some　other　manner；　in　accordance　with　it　the　sun　appears　to　be　several　times　greater　than　the　earth。　　These　two　ideas　cannot；　indeed；　both　resemble　the　same　sun；　and　reason　makes　me　believe　that　the　one　which　seems　to　have　originated　directly　from　the　sun　itself；　is　the　one　which　is　most　dissimilar　to　it。　　　　　　All　this　causes　me　to　believe　that　until　the　present　time　it　has　not　been　by　a　judgment　that　was　certain　＇or　premeditated＇；　but　only　by　a　sort　of　blind　impulse　that　I　believed　that　things　existed　outside　of；　and　different　from　me；　which；　by　the　organs　of　my　senses；　or　by　some　other　method　whatever　it　might　be；　conveyed　these　ideas　or　images　to　me　＇and　imprinted　on　me　their　similitudes＇。　　　　　　But　there　is　yet　another　method　of　inquiring　whether　any　of　the　objects　of　which　I　have　ideas　within　me　exist　outside　of　me。　　If　ideas　are　only　taken　as　certain　modes　of　thought；　I　recognise　amongst　them　no　difference　or　inequality；　and　all　appear　to　proceed　from　me　in　the　same　manner；　but　when　we　consider　them　as　images；　one　representing　one　thing　and　the　other　another；　it　is　clear　that　they　are　very　different　one　from　the　other。　　There　is　no　doubt　that　those　which　represent　to　me　substances　are　something　more；　and　contain　so　to　speak　more　objective　reality　within　them　＇that　is　to　say；　by　representation　participate　in　a　higher　degree　of　being　or　perfection＇　than　those　that　simply　represent　modes　or　accidents；　and　that　idea　again　by　which　I　understand　a　supreme　God；　eternal；　infinite；　＇immutable＇；　omniscient；　omnipotent；　and　Creator　of　all　things　which　are　outside　of　Himself；　has　certainly　more　objective　reality　in　itself　than　those　ideas　by　which　finite　substances　are　represented。　　　　　　Now　it　is　manifest　by　the　natural　light　that　there　must　at　least　be　as　much　reality　in　the　efficient　and　total　cause　as　in　its　effect。　　For；　pray；　whence　can　the　effect　derive　its　reality；　if　not　from　its　cause？　　And　in　what　way　can　this　cause　communicate　this　reality　to　it；　unless　it　possessed　it　in　itself？　　And　from　this　it　follows；　not　only　that　something　cannot　proceed　from　nothing；　but　likewise　that　what　is　more　perfect￥that　is　to　say；　which　has　more　reality　within　itself￥cannot　proceed　from　the　less　perfect。　　And　this　is　not　only　evidently　true　of　those　effects　which　possess　actual　or　formal　reality；　but　also　of　the　ideas　in　which　we　consider　merely　what　is　termed　objective　reality。　　To　take　an　example；　the　stone　which　has　not　yet　existed　not　only　cannot　now　commence　to　be　unless　it　has　been　produced　by　something　which　possesses　within　itself；　either　formally　or　eminently；　all　that　enters　into　the　composition　of　the　stone　＇i。e。　it　must　possess　the　same　things　or　other　more　excellent　things　than　those　which　exist　in　the　stone＇　and　heat　can　only　be　produced　in　a　subject　in　which　it　did　not　previously　exist　by　a　cause　that　is　of　an　order　＇degree　or　kind＇　at　least　as　perfect　as　heat；　and　so　in　all　other　cases。　　But　further；　the　idea　of　heat；　or　of　a　stone；　cannot　exist　in　me　unless　it　has　been　placed　within　me　by　some　cause　which　possesses　within　it　at　least　as　much　reality　as　that　which　I　conceive　to　exist　in　the　heat　or　the　stone。　　For　although　this　cause　does　not　transmit　anything　of　its　actual　or　formal　reality　to　my　idea；　we　must　not　for　that　reason　imagine　that　it　is　necessarily　a　less　real　cause；　we　must　remember　that　＇since　every　idea　is　a　work　of　the　mind＇　its　nature　is　such　that　it　demands　of　itself　no　other　formal　reality　than　that　which　it　borrows　from　my　thought；　of　which　it　is　only　a　mode　＇i。e。　a　manner　or　way　of　thinking＇。　　But　in　order　that　an　idea　should　contain　some　one　certain　objective　reality　rather　than　another；　it　must　without　doubt　derive　it　from　some　cause　in　which　there　is　at　least　as　much　formal　reality　as　this　idea　contains　of　objective　reality。　　For　if　we　imagine　that　something　is　found　in　an　idea　which　is　not　found　in　the　cause；　it　must　then　have　been　derived　from　nought；　but　however　imperfect　may　be　this　mode　of　being　by　which　a　thing　is　objectively　＇or　by　representation＇　in　the　understanding　by　its　idea；　we　cannot　certainly　say　that　this　mode　of　being　is　nothing；　nor　consequently；　that　the　idea　derives　its　origin　from　nothing。　　　　　　Nor　must　I　imagine　that；　since　the　reality　that　I　consider　in　these　ideas　is　only　objective；　it　is　not　essential　that　this　reality　should　be　formally　in　the　causes　of　my　ideas；　but　that　it　is　sufficient　that　it　should　be　found　objectively。　　For　just　as　this　mode　of　objective　existence　pertains　to　ideas　by　their　proper　nature；　so　does　the　mode　of　formal　existence　pertain　tot　he　causes　of　those　ideas　（this　is　at　least　true　of　the　first　and　principal）　by　the　nature　peculiar　to　them。　　And　although　it　may　be　the　case　that　one　idea　gives　birth　to　another　idea；　that　cannot　continue　to　be　so　indefinitely；　for　in　the　end　we　must　reach　an　idea　whose　cause　shall　be　so　to　speak　an　archetype；　in　which　the　whole　reality　＇or　perfection＇　which　is　so　to　speak　objectively　＇or　by　representation＇　in　these　ideas　is　contained　formally　＇and　really＇。　　Thus　the　light　of　nature　causes　me　to　know　clearly　that　the　ideas　in　me　are　like　＇pictures　or＇　images　which　can；　in　truth；　easily　fall　short　of　the　perfection　of　the　objects　from　which　they　have　been　derived；　but　which　can　never　contain　anything　greater　or　more　perfect。　　　　　　And　the　longer　and　the　more　carefully　that　I　investigate　these　matters；　the　more　clearly　and　distinctly　do　I　recognise　their　truth。　　But　what　am　I　to　conclude　from　it　all　in　the　end？　　It　is　this；　that　if　the　objective　reality　of　any　one　of　my　ideas　is　of　such　a　nature　as　clearly　to　make　me　recognise　that　it　is　not　in　me　either　formally　or　eminently；　and　that　consequently　I　cannot　myself　be　the　cause　of　it；　it　follows　of　necessity　that　I　am　not　alone　in　the　world；　but　that　there　is　another　being　which　exists；　or　which　is　the　cause　of　this　idea。　　On　the　other　hand；　had　no　such　an　idea　existed　in　me；　I　should　have　had　no　sufficient　argument　to　convince　me　of　the　existence　of　any　being　beyond　myself；　for　I　have　made　very　careful　investigation　everywhere　and　up　to　the　present　time　have　been　able　to　find　no　other　ground。　　　　　　But　of　my　ideas；　beyond　that　which　represents　me　to　myself；　as　to　which　there　can　here　be　no　difficulty；　there　is　another　which　represents　a　God；　and　there　are　others　representing　corporeal　and　inanimate　things；　others　angels；　others　animals；　and　others　again　which　represent　to　me　men　similar　to　myself。　　　　　　As　regards　the　ideas　which　represent　to　me　other　men　or　animals；　or　angels；　I　can　however　easily　conceive　that　they　might　be　formed　by　an　admixture　of　the　other　ideas　which　I　have　of　myself；　of　corporeal　things；　and　of　God；　even　although　there　were　apart　from　me　neither　men　nor　animals；　nor　angels；　in　all　the　world。　　　　　　And　in　regard　to　the　ideas　of　corporeal　objects；　I　do　not　recognise　in　them　anything　so　great　or　so　excellent　that　they　might　not　have