democracy in america-1-第25章

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n　great　affairs？　　What　resistance　can　be　offered　to　tyranny　in　a　country　where　every　private　individual　is　impotent；　and　where　the　citizens　are　united　by　no　common　tie？　Those　who　dread　the　license　of　the　mob；　and　those　who　fear　the　rule　of　absolute　power；　ought　alike　to　desire　the　progressive　growth　of　provincial　liberties。

On　the　other　hand；　I　am　convinced　that　democratic　nations　are　most　exposed　to　fall　beneath　the　yoke　of　a　central　administration；　for　several　reasons；　amongst　which　is　the　following。　　The　constant　tendency　of　these　nations　is　to　concentrate　all　the　strength　of　the　Government　in　the　hands　of　the　only　power　which　directly　represents　the　people；　because　beyond　the　people　nothing　is　to　be　perceived　but　a　mass　of　equal　individuals　confounded　together。　　But　when　the　same　power　is　already　in　possession　of　all　the　attributes　of　the　Government；　it　can　scarcely　refrain　from　penetrating　into　the　details　of　the　administration；　and　an　opportunity　of　doing　so　is　sure　to　present　itself　in　the　end；　as　was　the　case　in　France。　　In　the　French　Revolution　there　were　two　impulses　in　opposite　directions；　which　must　never　be　confounded　…　the　one　was　favorable　to　liberty；　the　other　to　despotism。　Under　the　ancient　monarchy　the　King　was　the　sole　author　of　the　laws；　and　below　the　power　of　the　sovereign　certain　vestiges　of　provincial　institutions；　half　destroyed；　were　still　distinguishable。　　These　provincial　institutions　were　incoherent；　ill　compacted；　and　frequently　absurd；　in　the　hands　of　the　aristocracy　they　had　sometimes　been　converted　into　instruments　of　oppression。　The　Revolution　declared　itself　the　enemy　of　royalty　and　of　provincial　institutions　at　the　same　time；　it　confounded　all　that　had　preceded　it　…despotic　power　and　the　checks　to　its　abuses　…　in　indiscriminate　hatred；　and　its　tendency　was　at　once　to　overthrow　and　to　centralize。　　This　double　character　of　the　French　Revolution　is　a　fact　which　has　been　adroitly　handled　by　the　friends　of　absolute　power。　　Can　they　be　accused　of　laboring　in　the　cause　of　despotism　when　they　are　defending　that　central　administration　which　was　one　of　the　great　innovations　of　the　Revolution？　*v　In　this　manner　popularity　may　be　conciliated　with　hostility　to　the　rights　of　the　people；　and　the　secret　slave　of　tyranny　may　be　the　professed　admirer　of　freedom。

＇Footnote　v：　See　Appendix　K。＇

I　have　visited　the　two　nations　in　which　the　system　of　provincial　liberty　has　been　most　perfectly　established；　and　I　have　listened　to　the　opinions　of　different　parties　in　those　countries。　　In　America　I　met　with　men　who　secretly　aspired　to　destroy　the　democratic　institutions　of　the　Union；　in　England　I　found　others　who　attacked　the　aristocracy　openly；　but　I　know　of　no　one　who　does　not　regard　provincial　independence　as　a　great　benefit。　　In　both　countries　I　have　heard　a　thousand　different　causes　assigned　for　the　evils　of　the　State；　but　the　local　system　was　never　mentioned　amongst　them。　　I　have　heard　citizens　attribute　the　power　and　prosperity　of　their　country　to　a　multitude　of　reasons；　but　they　all　placed　the　advantages　of　local　institutions　in　the　foremost　rank。　Am　I　to　suppose　that　when　men　who　are　naturally　so　divided　on　religious　opinions　and　on　political　theories　agree　on　one　point　（and　that　one　of　which　they　have　daily　experience）；　they　are　all　in　error？　　The　only　nations　which　deny　the　utility　of　provincial　liberties　are　those　which　have　fewest　of　them；　in　other　words；　those　who　are　unacquainted　with　the　institution　are　the　only　persons　who　pass　a　censure　upon　it。


Chapter　VI：　Judicial　Power　In　The　United　States

Chapter　Summary

The　Anglo…Americans　have　retained　the　characteristics　of　judicial　power　which　are　common　to　all　nations　…　They　have；　however；　made　it　a　powerful　political　organ　…　How　…　In　what　the　judicial　system　of　the　Anglo…Americans　differs　from　that　of　all　other　nations　…　Why　the　American　judges　have　the　right　of　declaring　the　laws　to　be　unconstitutional　…　How　they　use　this　right　…Precautions　taken　by　the　legislator　to　prevent　its　abuse。

Judicial　Power　In　The　United　States　And　Its　Influence　On　Political　Society

I　have　thought　it　essential　to　devote　a　separate　chapter　to　the　judicial　authorities　of　the　United　States；　lest　their　great　political　importance　should　be　lessened　in　the　reader's　eyes　by　a　merely　incidental　mention　of　them。　Confederations　have　existed　in　other　countries　beside　America；　and　republics　have　not　been　established　upon　the　shores　of　the　New　World　alone；　the　representative　system　of　government　has　been　adopted　in　several　States　of　Europe；　but　I　am　not　aware　that　any　nation　of　the　globe　has　hitherto　organized　a　judicial　power　on　the　principle　now　adopted　by　the　Americans。　The　judicial　organization　of　the　United　States　is　the　institution　which　a　stranger　has　the　greatest　difficulty　in　understanding。　　He　hears　the　authority　of　a　judge　invoked　in　the　political　occurrences　of　every　day；　and　he　naturally　concludes　that　in　the　United　States　the　judges　are　important　political　functionaries；　nevertheless；　when　he　examines　the　nature　of　the　tribunals；　they　offer　nothing　which　is　contrary　to　the　usual　habits　and　privileges　of　those　bodies；　and　the　magistrates　seem　to　him　to　interfere　in　public　affairs　of　chance；　but　by　a　chance　which　recurs　every　day。

When　the　Parliament　of　Paris　remonstrated；　or　refused　to　enregister　an　edict；　or　when　it　summoned　a　functionary　accused　of　malversation　to　its　bar；　its　political　influence　as　a　judicial　body　was　clearly　visible；　but　nothing　of　the　kind　is　to　be　seen　in　the　United　States。　　The　Americans　have　retained　all　the　ordinary　characteristics　of　judicial　authority；　and　have　carefully　restricted　its　action　to　the　ordinary　circle　of　its　functions。　　　The　first　characteristic　of　judicial　power　in　all　nations　is　the　duty　of　arbitration。　　But　rights　must　be　contested　in　order　to　warrant　the　interference　of　a　tribunal；　and　an　action　must　be　brought　to　obtain　the　decision　of　a　judge。　　As　long；　therefore；　as　the　law　is　uncontested；　the　judicial　authority　is　not　called　upon　to　discuss　it；　and　it　may　exist　without　being　perceived。　　When　a　judge　in　a　given　case　attacks　a　law　relating　to　that　case；　he　extends　the　circle　of　his　customary　duties；　without　however　stepping　beyond　it；　since　he　is　in　some　measure　obliged　to　decide　upon　the　law　in　order　to　decide　the　case。　　But　if　he　pronounces　upon　a　law　without　resting　upon　a　case；　he　clearly　steps　beyond　his　sphere；　and　invades　that　of　the　legislative　authority。

The　second　characteristic　of　judicial　power　is　that　it　pronounces　on　special　cases；　and　not　upon　general　principles。　　If　a　judge　in　deciding　a　particular　point　destroys　a　general　principle；　by　passing　a　judgment　which　tends　to　reject　all　the　inferences　from　that　principle；　and　consequently　to　annul　it；　he　remains　within　the　ordinary　limits　of　his　functions。　　But　if　he　directly　attacks　a　general　principle　without　having　a　particular　case　in　view；　he　leaves　the　circle　in　which　all　nations　have　agreed　to　confine　his　authority；　he　assumes　a　more　important；　and　perhaps　a　more　useful；　influence　than　that　of　the　magistrate；　but　he　ceases　to　be　a　representative　of　the　judicial　power。


The　third　characteristic　of　the　judicial　power　is　its　inability　to　act　unless　it　is　appealed　to；　or　until　it　has　taken　cognizance　of　an　affair。　This　characteristic　is　less　general　than　the　other　two；　but；　notwithstanding　the　exceptions；　I　think　it　may　be　regarded　as　essential。　　The　judicial　power　is　by　its　nature　devoid　of　action；　it　must　be　put　in　motion　in　order　to　produce　a　result。　　When　it　is　called　upon　to　repress　a　crime；　it　punishes　the　criminal；　when　a　wrong　is　to　be　redressed；　it　is　ready　to　redress　it；　when　an　act　requires　interpretation；　it　is　prepared　to　interpret　it；　but　it　does　not　pursue　criminals；　hunt　out　wrongs；　or　examine　into　evidence　of　its　own　accord。　A　judicial　functionary　who　should　open　proceedings；　and　usurp　the　censorship　of　the　laws；　would　in　some　measure　do　violence　to　the　passive　nature　of　his　authority。

The　Americans　have　retained　these　three　distinguishing　characteristics　of　the　judicial　power；　an　American　judge　can　only　pronounce　a　decision　when　litigation　has　arisen；　he　is　only　conversant　with　special　cases；　and　he　cannot　act　until　the　cause　has　been　duly　brought　before　the　court。　　His　position　is　therefore　perfectly　similar　to　that　of　the　magistrate　of　other　nations；　and　he　is　nevertheless　invested　with　immense　political　power。　　If　the　sphere　of　his　authority　and　his　means　of　action　are　the　same　as　those　of　other　judges；　it　may　be　asked　whence　he　derives　a　power　which　they　do　not　possess。　　The　cause　of　this　difference　lies　in　the　simple　fact　that　the　Americans　have　acknowledged　the　right　of　the　judges　to　found　their　decisions　on　the　constitution　rather　than　on　the　laws。　　In　other　words；　they　have　left　them　at　liberty　not　to　apply　such　laws　as　may　appear　to　them　to　be　unconstitutional。　

I　am　aware　that　a　similar　right　has　been　claimed　…　but　claimed　in　vain　…by　courts　of　justice　in　other　countries；　but　in　America　it　is　recognized　by　all　authorities；　and　not　a　party；　nor　so　much　as　an　individual；　is　found　to　contest　it。　　This　fact　can　only　be　explained　by　the　principles　of　the　American　constitution。　　In　France　the　constitution　is　（or　at　least　is　supposed　to　be）　immutable；　and　the　received　theory　is　that　no　power　has　the　right　of　changing　any　part　of　it。　　In　England　the　Parliament　has　an　acknowledged　right　to　modify　the　constitution；　as；　therefore；　the　constitution　may　undergo　perpetual　changes；　it　does　not　in　reality　exist；　the　Parliament　is　at　once　a　legislative　and　a　constituent　assembly。　　The　political　theories　of　America　are　more　simple　and　more　rational。　　An　American　constitution　is　not　supposed　to　be　immutable　as　in　France；　nor　is　it　susceptible　of　modification　by　the　ordinary　powers　of　society　as　in　England。　It　constitutes　a　detached　whole；　which；　as　it　represents　the　determination　of　the　whole　people；　is　no　less　binding　on　the　legislator　than　on　the　private　citizen；　but　which　may　be　altered　by　the　will　of　the　people　in　predetermined　cases；　according　to　established　rules。　　In　America　the　constitution　may　therefore　vary；　but　as　long　as　it　exists　it　is　the　origin　of　all　authority；　and　the　sole　vehicle　of　the　predominating　force。　*a

＇Footnote　a：　＇The　fifth　article　of　the　original　Constitution　of　the　United　States　provides　the　mode　in　which　amendments　of　the　Constitution　may　be　made。　Amendments　must　be　proposed　by　two…thirds　of　both　Houses　of　Congress；　and　ratified　by　the　Legislatures　of　three…fourths　of　the　several　States。　　Fifteen　amendments　of　the　Constitution　have　been　made　at　different　times　since　1789；　the　most　important　of　which　are　the　Thirteenth；　Fourteenth；　and　Fifteenth；　framed　and　ratified　after　the　Civil　War。　　The　original　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　followed　by　these　fifteen　amendments；　is　printed　at　the　end　of　this　edition。　…　Translator's　Note；　1874。＇＇　

It　is　easy　to　perceive　in　what　manner　these　differences　must　act　upon　the　position　and　the　rights　of　the　judicial　bodies　in　the　three　countries　I　have　cited。　　If　in　France　the　tribunals　were　authorized　to　disobey　the　laws　on　the　ground　of　their　being　opposed　to　the　constitution；　the　supreme　power　would　in　fact　be　placed　in　their　hands；　since　they　alone　would　have　the　rig