democracy in america-1-第26章

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ution；　the　supreme　power　would　in　fact　be　placed　in　their　hands；　since　they　alone　would　have　the　right　of　interpreting　a　constitution；　the　clauses　of　which　can　be　modified　by　no　authority。　　They　would　therefore　take　the　place　of　the　nation；　and　exercise　as　absolute　a　sway　over　society　as　the　inherent　weakness　of　judicial　power　would　allow　them　to　do。　　Undoubtedly；　as　the　French　judges　are　incompetent　to　declare　a　law　to　be　unconstitutional；　the　power　of　changing　the　constitution　is　indirectly　given　to　the　legislative　body；　since　no　legal　barrier　would　oppose　the　alterations　which　it　might　prescribe。　　But　it　is　better　to　grant　the　power　of　changing　the　constitution　of　the　people　to　men　who　represent　（however　imperfectly）　the　will　of　the　people；　than　to　men　who　represent　no　one　but　themselves。

It　would　be　still　more　unreasonable　to　invest　the　English　judges　with　the　right　of　resisting　the　decisions　of　the　legislative　body；　since　the　Parliament　which　makes　the　laws　also　makes　the　constitution；　and　consequently　a　law　emanating　from　the　three　powers　of　the　State　can　in　no　case　be　unconstitutional。　　But　neither　of　these　remarks　is　applicable　to　America。

In　the　United　States　the　constitution　governs　the　legislator　as　much　as　the　private　citizen；　as　it　is　the　first　of　laws　it　cannot　be　modified　by　a　law；　and　it　is　therefore　just　that　the　tribunals　should　obey　the　constitution　in　preference　to　any　law。　　This　condition　is　essential　to　the　power　of　the　judicature；　for　to　select　that　legal　obligation　by　which　he　is　most　strictly　bound　is　the　natural　right　of　every　magistrate。

In　France　the　constitution　is　also　the　first　of　laws；　and　the　judges　have　the　same　right　to　take　it　as　the　ground　of　their　decisions；　but　were　they　to　exercise　this　right　they　must　perforce　encroach　on　rights　more　sacred　than　their　own；　namely；　on　those　of　society；　in　whose　name　they　are　acting。　In　this　case　the　State…　motive　clearly　prevails　over　the　motives　of　an　individual。　　In　America；　where　the　nation　can　always　reduce　its　magistrates　to　obedience　by　changing　its　constitution；　no　danger　of　this　kind　is　to　be　feared。　　Upon　this　point；　therefore；　the　political　and　the　logical　reasons　agree；　and　the　people　as　well　as　the　judges　preserve　their　privileges。

Whenever　a　law　which　the　judge　holds　to　be　unconstitutional　is　argued　in　a　tribunal　of　the　United　States　he　may　refuse　to　admit　it　as　a　rule；　this　power　is　the　only　one　which　is　peculiar　to　the　American　magistrate；　but　it　gives　rise　to　immense　political　influence。　　Few　laws　can　escape　the　searching　analysis　of　the　judicial　power　for　any　length　of　time；　for　there　are　few　which　are　not　prejudicial　to　some　private　interest　or　other；　and　none　which　may　not　be　brought　before　a　court　of　justice　by　the　choice　of　parties；　or　by　the　necessity　of　the　case。　　But　from　the　time　that　a　judge　has　refused　to　apply　any　given　law　in　a　case；　that　law　loses　a　portion　of　its　moral　cogency。　The　persons　to　whose　interests　it　is　prejudicial　learn　that　means　exist　of　evading　its　authority；　and　similar　suits　are　multiplied；　until　it　becomes　powerless。　One　of　two　alternatives　must　then　be　resorted　to：　the　people　must　alter　the　constitution；　or　the　legislature　must　repeal　the　law。　　The　political　power　which　the　Americans　have　intrusted　to　their　courts　of　justice　is　therefore　immense；　but　the　evils　of　this　power　are　considerably　diminished　by　the　obligation　which　has　been　imposed　of　attacking　the　laws　through　the　courts　of　justice　alone。　　If　the　judge　had　been　empowered　to　contest　the　laws　on　the　ground　of　theoretical　generalities；　if　he　had　been　enabled　to　open　an　attack　or　to　pass　a　censure　on　the　legislator；　he　would　have　played　a　prominent　part　in　the　political　sphere；　and　as　the　champion　or　the　antagonist　of　a　party；　he　would　have　arrayed　the　hostile　passions　of　the　nation　in　the　conflict。　　But　when　a　judge　contests　a　law　applied　to　some　particular　case　in　an　obscure　proceeding；　the　importance　of　his　attack　is　concealed　from　the　public　gaze；　his　decision　bears　upon　the　interest　of　an　individual；　and　if　the　law　is　slighted　it　is　only　collaterally。　　Moreover；　although　it　is　censured；　it　is　not　abolished；　its　moral　force　may　be　diminished；　but　its　cogency　is　by　no　means　suspended；　and　its　final　destruction　can　only　be　accomplished　by　the　reiterated　attacks　of　judicial　functionaries。　　It　will　readily　be　understood　that　by　connecting　the　censorship　of　the　laws　with　the　private　interests　of　members　of　the　community；　and　by　intimately　uniting　the　prosecution　of　the　law　with　the　prosecution　of　an　individual；　legislation　is　protected　from　wanton　assailants；　and　from　the　daily　aggressions　of　party　spirit。　　The　errors　of　the　legislator　are　exposed　whenever　their　evil　consequences　are　most　felt；　and　it　is　always　a　positive　and　appreciable　fact　which　serves　as　the　basis　of　a　prosecution。　

I　am　inclined　to　believe　this　practice　of　the　American　courts　to　be　at　once　the　most　favorable　to　liberty　as　well　as　to　public　order。　　If　the　judge　could　only　attack　the　legislator　openly　and　directly；　he　would　sometimes　be　afraid　to　oppose　any　resistance　to　his　will；　and　at　other　moments　party　spirit　might　encourage　him　to　brave　it　at　every　turn。　　The　laws　would　consequently　be　attacked　when　the　power　from　which　they　emanate　is　weak；　and　obeyed　when　it　is　strong。　　That　is　to　say；　when　it　would　be　useful　to　respect　them　they　would　be　contested；　and　when　it　would　be　easy　to　convert　them　into　an　instrument　of　oppression　they　would　be　respected。　　But　the　American　judge　is　brought　into　the　political　arena　independently　of　his　own　will。　　He　only　judges　the　law　because　he　is　obliged　to　judge　a　case。　　The　political　question　which　he　is　called　upon　to　resolve　is　connected　with　the　interest　of　the　suitors；　and　he　cannot　refuse　to　decide　it　without　abdicating　the　duties　of　his　post。　　He　performs　his　functions　as　a　citizen　by　fulfilling　the　precise　duties　which　belong　to　his　profession　as　a　magistrate。　　It　is　true　that　upon　this　system　the　judicial　censorship　which　is　exercised　by　the　courts　of　justice　over　the　legislation　cannot　extend　to　all　laws　indiscriminately；　inasmuch　as　some　of　them　can　never　give　rise　to　that　exact　species　of　contestation　which　is　termed　a　lawsuit；　and　even　when　such　a　contestation　is　possible；　it　may　happen　that　no　one　cares　to　bring　it　before　a　court　of　justice。　　The　Americans　have　often　felt　this　disadvantage；　but　they　have　left　the　remedy　incomplete；　lest　they　should　give　it　an　efficacy　which　might　in　some　cases　prove　dangerous。　　Within　these　limits　the　power　vested　in　the　American　courts　of　justice　of　pronouncing　a　statute　to　be　unconstitutional　forms　one　of　the　most　powerful　barriers　which　has　ever　been　devised　against　the　tyranny　of　political　assemblies。

Other　Powers　Granted　To　American　Judges

The　United　States　all　the　citizens　have　the　right　of　indicting　public　functionaries　before　the　ordinary　tribunals　…　How　they　use　this　right　…　Art。　75　of　the　French　Constitution　of　the　An　VIII　…　The　Americans　and　the　English　cannot　understand　the　purport　of　this　clause。

It　is　perfectly　natural　that　in　a　free　country　like　America　all　the　citizens　should　have　the　right　of　indicting　public　functionaries　before　the　ordinary　tribunals；　and　that　all　the　judges　should　have　the　power　of　punishing　public　offences。　　The　right　granted　to　the　courts　of　justice　of　judging　the　agents　of　the　executive　government；　when　they　have　violated　the　laws；　is　so　natural　a　one　that　it　cannot　be　looked　upon　as　an　extraordinary　privilege。　Nor　do　the　springs　of　government　appear　to　me　to　be　weakened　in　the　United　States　by　the　custom　which　renders　all　public　officers　responsible　to　the　judges　of　the　land。　　The　Americans　seem；　on　the　contrary；　to　have　increased　by　this　means　that　respect　which　is　due　to　the　authorities；　and　at　the　same　time　to　have　rendered　those　who　are　in　power　more　scrupulous　of　offending　public　opinion。　　I　was　struck　by　the　small　number　of　political　trials　which　occur　in　the　United　States；　but　I　had　no　difficulty　in　accounting　for　this　circumstance。　　A　lawsuit；　of　whatever　nature　it　may　be；　is　always　a　difficult　and　expensive　undertaking。　　It　is　easy　to　attack　a　public　man　in　a　journal；　but　the　motives　which　can　warrant　an　action　at　law　must　be　serious。　　A　solid　ground　of　complaint　must　therefore　exist　to　induce　an　individual　to　prosecute　a　public　officer；　and　public　officers　are　careful　not　to　furnish　these　grounds　of　complaint　when　they　are　afraid　of　being　prosecuted。

This　does　not　depend　upon　the　republican　form　of　American　institutions；　for　the　same　facts　present　themselves　in　England。　　These　two　nations　do　not　regard　the　impeachment　of　the　principal　officers　of　State　as　a　sufficient　guarantee　of　their　independence。　　But　they　hold　that　the　right　of　minor　prosecutions；　which　are　within　the　reach　of　the　whole　community；　is　a　better　pledge　of　freedom　than　those　great　judicial　actions　which　are　rarely　employed　until　it　is　too　late。

In　the　Middle　Ages；　when　it　was　very　difficult　to　overtake　offenders；　the　judges　inflicted　the　most　dreadful　tortures　on　the　few　who　were　arrested；　which　by　no　means　diminished　the　number　of　crimes。　　It　has　since　been　discovered　that　when　justice　is　more　certain　and　more　mild；　it　is　at　the　same　time　more　efficacious。　　The　English　and　the　Americans　hold　that　tyranny　and　oppression　are　to　be　treated　like　any　other　crime；　by　lessening　the　penalty　and　facilitating　conviction。

In　the　year　VIII　of　the　French　Republic　a　constitution　was　drawn　up　in　which　the　following　clause　was　introduced：　〃Art。　75。　　All　the　agents　of　the　government　below　the　rank　of　ministers　can　only　be　prosecuted　for　offences　relating　to　their　several　functions　by　virtue　of　a　decree　of　the　Conseil　d'Etat；　in　which　the　case　the　prosecution　takes　place　before　the　ordinary　tribunals。〃　This　clause　survived　the　〃Constitution　de　l'An　VIII；〃　and　it　is　still　maintained　in　spite　of　the　just　complaints　of　the　nation。　　I　have　always　found　the　utmost　difficulty　in　explaining　its　meaning　to　Englishmen　or　Americans。　　They　were　at　once　led　to　conclude　that　the　Conseil　d'Etat　in　France　was　a　great　tribunal；　established　in　the　centre　of　the　kingdom；　which　exercised　a　preliminary　and　somewhat　tyrannical　jurisdiction　in　all　political　causes。　　But　when　I　told　them　that　the　Conseil　d'Etat　was　not　a　judicial　body；　in　the　common　sense　of　the　term；　but　an　administrative　council　composed　of　men　dependent　on　the　Crown；　so　that　the　king；　after　having　ordered　one　of　his　servants；　called　a　Prefect；　to　commit　an　injustice；　has　the　power　of　commanding　another　of　his　servants；　called　a　Councillor　of　State；　to　prevent　the　former　from　being　punished；　when　I　demonstrated　to　them　that　the　citizen　who　has　been　injured　by　the　order　of　the　sovereign　is　obliged　to　solicit　from　the　sovereign　permission　to　obtain　redress；　they　refused　to　credit　so　flagrant　an　abuse；　and　were　tempted　to　accuse　me　of　falsehood　or　of　ignorance。　　It　frequently　happened　before　the　Revolution　that　a　Parliament　issued　a　warrant　against　a　public　officer　who　had　committed　an　offence；　and　sometimes　the　proceedings　were　stopped　by　the　authority　of　the　Crown；　which　enforced　compliance　with　its　absolute　and　despotic　will。　　It　is　painful　to　perceive　how　much　lower　we　are　sunk　than　our　forefathers；　since　we　allow　things　to　pass　under