democracy in america-1-第30章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
bers of the lower House of Congress； and 9 for the States at large； making in all 292 members。 The old States have of course lost the representatives which the new States have gained。 … Translator's Note。＇＇
These facts show how rare and how difficult it is rationally and logically to combine all the several parts of legislation。 In the course of time different interests arise； and different principles are sanctioned by the same people； and when a general constitution is to be established； these interests and principles are so many natural obstacles to the rigorous application of any political system； with all its consequences。 The early stages of national existence are the only periods at which it is possible to maintain the complete logic of legislation； and when we perceive a nation in the enjoyment of this advantage； before we hasten to conclude that it is wise； we should do well to remember that it is young。 When the Federal Constitution was formed； the interests of independence for the separate States； and the interest of union for the whole people； were the only two conflicting interests which existed amongst the Anglo…Americans； and a compromise was necessarily made between them。
It is； however； just to acknowledge that this part of the Constitution has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been feared。 All the States are young and contiguous； their customs； their ideas； and their exigencies are not dissimilar； and the differences which result from their size or inferiority do not suffice to set their interests at variance。 The small States have consequently never been induced to league themselves together in the Senate to oppose the designs of the larger ones； and indeed there is so irresistible an authority in the legitimate expression of the will of a people that the Senate could offer but a feeble opposition to the vote of the majority of the House of Representatives。
It must not be forgotten； on the other hand； that it was not in the power of the American legislators to reduce to a single nation the people for whom they were making laws。 The object of the Federal Constitution was not to destroy the independence of the States； but to restrain it。 By acknowledging the real authority of these secondary communities （and it was impossible to deprive them of it）； they disavowed beforehand the habitual use of constraint in enforcing g the decisions of the majority。 Upon this principle the introduction of the influence of the States into the mechanism of the Federal Government was by no means to be wondered at； since it only attested the existence of an acknowledged power； which was to be humored and not forcibly checked。
A Further Difference Between The Senate And The House Of Representatives
The Senate named by the provincial legislators； the Representatives by the people … Double election of the former； single election of the latter … Term of the different offices … Peculiar functions of each House。
The Senate not only differs from the other House in the principle which it represents； but also in the mode of its election； in the term for which it is chosen； and in the nature of its functions。 The House of Representatives is named by the people； the Senate by the legislators of each State； the former is directly elected； the latter is elected by an elected body； the term for which the representatives are chosen is only two years； that of the senators is six。 The functions of the House of Representatives are purely legislative； and the only share it takes in the judicial power is in the impeachment of public officers。 The Senate co…operates in the work of legislation； and tries those political offences which the House of Representatives submits to its decision。 It also acts as the great executive council of the nation； the treaties which are concluded by the President must be ratified by the Senate； and the appointments he may make must be definitely approved by the same body。 *o
＇Footnote o： See 〃The Federalist；〃 Nos。 52…56； inclusive； Story； pp。 199…314； Constitution of the United States； sects。 2 and 3。＇ The Executive Power *p
＇Footnote p： See 〃The Federalist；〃 Nos。 67…77； Constitution of the United States； art。 2； Story； p。 315； pp。 615…780； Kent's 〃Commentaries；〃 p。 255。＇
Dependence of the President … He is elective and responsible … He is free to act in his own sphere under the inspection； but not under the direction； of the Senate … His salary fixed at his entry into office … Suspensive veto。
The American legislators undertook a difficult task in attempting to create an executive power dependent on the majority of the people； and nevertheless sufficiently strong to act without restraint in its own sphere。 It was indispensable to the maintenance of the republican form of government that the representative of the executive power should be subject to the will of the nation。
The President is an elective magistrate。 His honor； his property； his liberty； and his life are the securities which the people has for the temperate use of his power。 But in the exercise of his authority he cannot be said to be perfectly independent； the Senate takes cognizance of his relations with foreign powers； and of the distribution of public appointments； so that he can neither be bribed nor can he employ the means of corruption。 The legislators of the Union acknowledged that the executive power would be incompetent to fulfil its task with dignity and utility； unless it enjoyed a greater degree of stability and of strength than had been granted to it in the separate States。
The President is chosen for four years； and he may be reelected； so that the chances of a prolonged administration may inspire him with hopeful undertakings for the public good； and with the means of carrying them into execution。 The President was made the sole representative of the executive power of the Union； and care was taken not to render his decisions subordinate to the vote of a council … a dangerous measure； which tends at the same time to clog the action of the Government and to diminish its responsibility。 The Senate has the right of annulling g certain acts of the President； but it cannot compel him to take any steps； nor does it participate in the exercise of the executive power。
The action of the legislature on the executive power may be direct； and we have just shown that the Americans carefully obviated this influence； but it may； on the other hand； be indirect。 Public assemblies which have the power of depriving an officer of state of his salary encroach upon his independence； and as they are free to make the laws； it is to be feared lest they should gradually appropriate to themselves a portion of that authority which the Constitution had vested in his hands。 This dependence of the executive power is one of the defects inherent in republican constitutions。 The Americans have not been able to counteract the tendency which legislative assemblies have to get possession of the government； but they have rendered this propensity less irresistible。 The salary of the President is fixed； at the time of his entering upon office； for the whole period of his magistracy。 The President is； moreover； provided with a suspensive veto； which allows him to oppose the passing of such laws as might destroy the portion of independence which the Constitution awards him。 The struggle between the President and the legislature must always be an unequal one； since the latter is certain of bearing down all resistance by persevering in its plans； but the suspensive veto forces it at least to reconsider the matter； and； if the motion be persisted in； it must then be backed by a majority of two…thirds of the whole house。 The veto is； in fact； a sort of appeal to the people。 The executive power； which； without this security； might have been secretly oppressed； adopts this means of pleading its cause and stating its motives。 But if the legislature is certain of overpowering all resistance by persevering in its plans； I reply； that in the constitutions of all nations； of whatever kind they may be； a certain point exists at which the legislator is obliged to have recourse to the good sense and the virtue of his fellow…citizens。 This point is more prominent and more discoverable in republics； whilst it is more remote and more carefully concealed in monarchies； but it always exists somewhere。 There is no country in the world in which everything can be provided for by the laws； or in which political institutions can prove a substitute for common sense and public morality。
Differences Between The Position Of The President Of The United States And That Of A Constitutional King Of France
Executive power in the Northern States as limited and as partial as the supremacy which it represents … Executive power in France as universal as the supremacy it represents … The King a branch of the legislature … The President the mere executor of the law … Other differences resulting from the duration of the two powers … The President checked in the exercise of the executive authority … The King independent in its exercise … Notwithstanding these discrepancies France is more akin to a republic than the Union to a monarchy …Comparison of the number of public officers depending upon the executive power in the two countries。
The executive power has so important an influence on the destinies of nations that I am inclined to pause for an instant at this portion of my subject； in order more clearly to explain the part it sustains in America。 In order to form an accurate idea of the position of the President of the United States； it may not be irrelevant to compare it to that of one of the constitutional kings of Europe。 In this comparison I shall pay but little attention to the external signs of power； which are more apt to deceive the eye of the observer than to guide his researches。 When a monarchy is being gradually transformed into a republic； the executive power retains the titles； the honors； the etiquette； and even the funds of royalty long after its authority has disappeared。 The English； after having cut off the head of one king and expelled another from his throne； were accustomed to accost the successor of those princes upon their knees。 On the other hand； when a republic falls under the sway of a single individual； the demeanor of the sovereign is simple and unpretending； as if his authority was not yet paramount。 When the emperors exercised an unlimited control over the fortunes and the lives of their fellow…citizens； it was customary to call them Caesar in conversation； and they were in the habit of supping without formality at their friends' houses。 It is therefore necessary to look below the surface。
The sovereignty of the United States is shared between the Union and the States； whilst in France it is undivided and compact： hence arises the first and the most notable difference which exists between the President of the United States and the King of France。 In the United States the executive power is as limited and partial as the sovereignty of the Union in whose name it acts； in France it is as universal as the authority of the State。 The Americans have a federal and the French a national Government。
Chapter VIII： T
