democracy in america-1-第34章

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of　the　executive　power　from　being　elected　a　second　time。　　The　influence　which　the　talents　and　the　character　of　a　single　individual　may　exercise　upon　the　fate　of　a　whole　people；　in　critical　circumstances　or　arduous　times；　is　well　known：　a　law　preventing　the　re…election　of　the　chief　magistrate　would　deprive　the　citizens　of　the　surest　pledge　of　the　prosperity　and　the　security　of　the　commonwealth；　and；　by　a　singular　inconsistency；　a　man　would　be　excluded　from　the　government　at　the　very　time　when　he　had　shown　his　ability　in　conducting　its　affairs。

But　if　these　arguments　are　strong；　perhaps　still　more　powerful　reasons　may　be　advanced　against　them。　　Intrigue　and　corruption　are　the　natural　defects　of　elective　government；　but　when　the　head　of　the　State　can　be　re…elected　these　evils　rise　to　a　great　height；　and　compromise　the　very　existence　of　the　country。　　When　a　simple　candidate　seeks　to　rise　by　intrigue；　his　manoeuvres　must　necessarily　be　limited　to　a　narrow　sphere；　but　when　the　chief　magistrate　enters　the　lists；　he　borrows　the　strength　of　the　government　for　his　own　purposes。　　In　the　former　case　the　feeble　resources　of　an　individual　are　in　action；　in　the　latter；　the　State　itself；　with　all　its　immense　influence；　is　busied　in　the　work　of　corruption　and　cabal。　　The　private　citizen；　who　employs　the　most　immoral　practices　to　acquire　power；　can　only　act　in　a　manner　indirectly　prejudicial　to　the　public　prosperity。　　But　if　the　representative　of　the　executive　descends　into　the　combat；　the　cares　of　government　dwindle　into　second…rate　importance；　and　the　success　of　his　election　is　his　first　concern。　All　laws　and　all　the　negotiations　he　undertakes　are　to　him　nothing　more　than　electioneering　schemes；　places　become　the　reward　of　services　rendered；　not　to　the　nation；　but　to　its　chief；　and　the　influence　of　the　government；　if　not　injurious　to　the　country；　is　at　least　no　longer　beneficial　to　the　community　for　which　it　was　created。　

It　is　impossible　to　consider　the　ordinary　course　of　affairs　in　the　United　States　without　perceiving　that　the　desire　of　being　re…　elected　is　the　chief　aim　of　the　President；　that　his　whole　administration；　and　even　his　most　indifferent　measures；　tend　to　this　object；　and　that；　as　the　crisis　approaches；　his　personal　interest　takes　the　place　of　his　interest　in　the　public　good。　　The　principle　of　re…eligibility　renders　the　corrupt　influence　of　elective　government　still　more　extensive　and　pernicious。

In　America　it　exercises　a　peculiarly　fatal　influence　on　the　sources　of　national　existence。　　Every　government　seems　to　be　afflicted　by　some　evil　which　is　inherent　in　its　nature；　and　the　genius　of　the　legislator　is　shown　in　eluding　its　attacks。　　A　State　may　survive　the　influence　of　a　host　of　bad　laws；　and　the　mischief　they　cause　is　frequently　exaggerated；　but　a　law　which　encourages　the　growth　of　the　canker　within　must　prove　fatal　in　the　end；　although　its　bad　consequences　may　not　be　immediately　perceived。　

The　principle　of　destruction　in　absolute　monarchies　lies　in　the　excessive　and　unreasonable　extension　of　the　prerogative　of　the　crown；　and　a　measure　tending　to　remove　the　constitutional　provisions　which　counterbalance　this　influence　would　be　radically　bad；　even　if　its　immediate　consequences　were　unattended　with　evil。　　By　a　parity　of　reasoning；　in　countries　governed　by　a　democracy；　where　the　people　is　perpetually　drawing　all　authority　to　itself；　the　laws　which　increase　or　accelerate　its　action　are　the　direct　assailants　of　the　very　principle　of　the　government。

The　greatest　proof　of　the　ability　of　the　American　legislators　is；　that　they　clearly　discerned　this　truth；　and　that　they　had　the　courage　to　act　up　to　it。　　They　conceived　that　a　certain　authority　above　the　body　of　the　people　was　necessary；　which　should　enjoy　a　degree　of　independence；　without；　however；　being　entirely　beyond　the　popular　control；　an　authority　which　would　be　forced　to　comply　with　the　permanent　determinations　of　the　majority；　but　which　would　be　able　to　resist　its　caprices；　and　to　refuse　its　most　dangerous　demands。　To　this　end　they　centred　the　whole　executive　power　of　the　nation　in　a　single　arm；　they　granted　extensive　prerogatives　to　the　President；　and　they　armed　him　with　the　veto　to　resist　the　encroachments　of　the　legislature。

But　by　introducing　the　principle　of　re…election　they　partly　destroyed　their　work；　and　they　rendered　the　President　but　little　inclined　to　exert　the　great　power　they　had　vested　in　his　hands。　　If　ineligible　a　second　time；　the　President　would　be　far　from　independent　of　the　people；　for　his　responsibility　would　not　be　lessened；　but　the　favor　of　the　people　would　not　be　so　necessary　to　him　as　to　induce　him　to　court　it　by　humoring　its　desires。　　If　re…　eligible　（and　this　is　more　especially　true　at　the　present　day；　when　political　morality　is　relaxed；　and　when　great　men　are　rare）；　the　President　of　the　United　States　becomes　an　easy　tool　in　the　hands　of　the　majority。　　He　adopts　its　likings　and　its　animosities；　he　hastens　to　anticipate　its　wishes；　he　forestalls　its　complaints；　he　yields　to　its　idlest　cravings；　and　instead　of　guiding　it；　as　the　legislature　intended　that　he　should　do；　he　is　ever　ready　to　follow　its　bidding。　　Thus；　in　order　not　to　deprive　the　State　of　the　talents　of　an　individual；　those　talents　have　been　rendered　almost　useless；　and　to　reserve　an　expedient　for　extraordinary　perils；　the　country　has　been　exposed　to　daily　dangers。

Federal　Courts　*b

＇Footnote　b：　See　chap。　　VI；　entitled　〃Judicial　Power　in　the　United　States。〃　This　chapter　explains　the　general　principles　of　the　American　theory　of　judicial　institutions。　　See　also　the　Federal　Constitution；　Art。　3。　　See　〃The　Federalists；〃　Nos。　　78…83；　inclusive；　and　a　work　entitled　〃Constitutional　Law；〃　being　a　view　of　the　practice　and　jurisdiction　of　the　courts　of　the　United　States；　by　Thomas　Sergeant。　　See　Story；　pp。　134；　162；　489；　511；　581；　668；　and　the　organic　law　of　September　24；　1789；　in　the　〃Collection　of　the　Laws　of　the　United　States；〃　by　Story；　vol。　i。　p。　53。＇

Political　importance　of　the　judiciary　in　the　United　States　…　Difficulty　of　treating　this　subject　…　Utility　of　judicial　power　in　confederations　…　What　tribunals　could　be　introduced　into　the　Union　…　Necessity　of　establishing　federal　courts　of　justice　…　Organization　of　the　national　judiciary　…　The　Supreme　Court　…　In　what　it　differs　from　all　known　tribunals。

I　have　inquired　into　the　legislative　and　executive　power　of　the　Union；　and　the　judicial　power　now　remains　to　be　examined；　but　in　this　place　I　cannot　conceal　my　fears　from　the　reader。　　Their　judicial　institutions　exercise　a　great　influence　on　the　condition　of　the　Anglo…Americans；　and　they　occupy　a　prominent　place　amongst　what　are　probably　called　political　institutions：　in　this　respect　they　are　peculiarly　deserving　of　our　attention。　　But　I　am　at　a　loss　to　explain　the　political　action　of　the　American　tribunals　without　entering　into　some　technical　details　of　their　constitution　and　their　forms　of　proceeding；　and　I　know　not　how　to　descend　to　these　minutiae　without　wearying　the　curiosity　of　the　reader　by　the　natural　aridity　of　the　subject；　or　without　risking　to　fall　into　obscurity　through　a　desire　to　be　succinct。　I　can　scarcely　hope　to　escape　these　various　evils；　for　if　I　appear　too　lengthy　to　a　man　of　the　world；　a　lawyer　may　on　the　other　hand　complain　of　my　brevity。　　But　these　are　the　natural　disadvantages　of　my　subject；　and　more　especially　of　the　point　which　I　am　about　to　discuss。

The　great　difficulty　was；　not　to　devise　the　Constitution　to　the　Federal　Government；　but　to　find　out　a　method　of　enforcing　its　laws。　　Governments　have　in　general　but　two　means　of　overcoming　the　opposition　of　the　people　they　govern；　viz。；　the　physical　force　which　is　at　their　own　disposal；　and　the　moral　force　which　they　derive　from　the　decisions　of　the　courts　of　justice。

A　government　which　should　have　no　other　means　of　exacting　obedience　than　open　war　must　be　very　near　its　ruin；　for　one　of　two　alternatives　would　then　probably　occur：　if　its　authority　was　small　and　its　character　temperate；　it　would　not　resort　to　violence　till　the　last　extremity；　and　it　would　connive　at　a　number　of　partial　acts　of　insubordination；　in　which　case　the　State　would　gradually　fall　into　anarchy；　if　it　was　enterprising　and　powerful；　it　would　perpetually　have　recourse　to　its　physical　strength；　and　would　speedily　degenerate　into　a　military　despotism。　　So　that　its　activity　would　not　be　less　prejudicial　to　the　community　than　its　inaction。

The　great　end　of　justice　is　to　substitute　the　notion　of　right　for　that　of　violence；　and　to　place　a　legal　barrier　between　the　power　of　the　government　and　the　use　of　physical　force。　　The　authority　which　is　awarded　to　the　intervention　of　a　court　of　justice　by　the　general　opinion　of　mankind　is　so　surprisingly　great　that　it　clings　to　the　mere　formalities　of　justice；　and　gives　a　bodily　influence　to　the　shadow　of　the　law。　　The　moral　force　which　courts　of　justice　possess　renders　the　introduction　of　physical　force　exceedingly　rare；　and　is　very　frequently　substituted　for　it；　but　if　the　latter　proves　to　be　indispensable；　its　power　is　doubled　by　the　association　of　the　idea　of　law。

A　federal　government　stands　in　greater　need　of　the　support　of　judicial　institutions　than　any　other；　because　it　is　naturally　weak　and　exposed　to　formidable　opposition。　*c　If　it　were　always　obliged　to　resort　to　violence　in　the　first　instance；　it　could　not　fulfil　its　task。　　The　Union；　therefore；　required　a　national　judiciary　to　enforce　the　obedience　of　the　citizens　to　the　laws；　and　to　repeal　the　attacks　which　might　be　directed　against　them。　　The　question　then　remained　as　to　what　tribunals　were　to　exercise　these　privileges；　were　they　to　be　entrusted　to　the　courts　of　justice　which　were　already　organized　in　every　State？　or　was　it　necessary　to　create　federal　courts？　　It　may　easily　be　proved　that　the　Union　could　not　adapt　the　judicial　power　of　the　States　to　its　wants。　　The　separation　of　the　judiciary　from　the　administrative　power　of　the　State　no　doubt　affects　the　security　of　every　citizen　and　the　liberty　of　all。　　But　it　is　no　less　important　to　the　existence　of　the　nation　that　these　several　powers　should　have　the　same　origin；　should　follow　the　same　principles；　and　act　in　the　same　sphere；　in　a　word；　that　they　should　be　correlative　and　homogeneous。　　No　one；　I　presume；　ever　suggested　the　advantage　of　trying　offences　committed　in　France　by　a　foreign　court　of　justice；　in　order　to　secure　the　impartiality　of　the　judges。　　The　Americans　form　one　people　in　relation　to　their　Federal　Government；　but　in　the　bosom　of　this　people　divers　political　bodies　have　been　allowed　to　subsist　which　are　dependent　on　the　national　Government　in　a　few　points；　and　independent　in　all　the　rest；　which　have　all　a　distinct　origin；　maxims　peculiar　to　themselves；　and　special　means　of　carrying　on　their　affairs。　　To　entrust　the　execution　of　the　laws　of　the　Union　to　tribunals　instituted　by　these　political　bodies　would　be　to　allow　foreign　judges　to　preside　over　the　nation。　　Nay；　more；　not　only　is　each　State　foreign　to　the　Union　at　large；　but　it　is　in　perpetual　opposition　to　the　common　interests；　since　whatever　authority　the　Union　loses　turns　to　the　advantage　of　the　States。　　Thus　to　enforce　the　laws　of　the　Union　by　means　of　the　tribunals　of　the　States　would　be　to　allow　not　only　foreign　but　pa