democracy in america-1-第37章

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exerts　its　influence　not　upon　a　refractory　State；　but　upon　the　private　taxpayer；　and；　like　the　judicial　power　of　other　nations；　it　is　opposed　to　the　person　of　an　individual。　　It　is　to　be　observed　that　the　Union　chose　its　own　antagonist；　and　as　that　antagonist　is　feeble；　he　is　naturally　worsted。


But　the　difficulty　increases　when　the　proceedings　are　not　brought　forward　by　but　against　the　Union。　　The　Constitution　recognizes　the　legislative　power　of　the　States；　and　a　law　so　enacted　may　impair　the　privileges　of　the　Union；　in　which　case　a　collision　in　unavoidable　between　that　body　and　the　State　which　has　passed　the　law：　and　it　only　remains　to　select　the　least　dangerous　remedy；　which　is　very　clearly　deducible　from　the　general　principles　I　have　before　established。　*k

＇Footnote　k：　See　Chapter　VI。　on　〃Judicial　Power　in　America。〃＇　

It　may　be　conceived　that；　in　the　case　under　consideration；　the　Union　might　have　used　the　State　before　a　Federal　court；　which　would　have　annulled　the　act；　and　by　this　means　it　would　have　adopted　a　natural　course　of　proceeding；　but　the　judicial　power　would　have　been　placed　in　open　hostility　to　the　State；　and　it　was　desirable　to　avoid　this　predicament　as　much　as　possible。　The　Americans　hold　that　it　is　nearly　impossible　that　a　new　law　should　not　impair　the　interests　of　some　private　individual　by　its　provisions：　these　private　interests　are　assumed　by　the　American　legislators　as　the　ground　of　attack　against　such　measures　as　may　be　prejudicial　to　the　Union；　and　it　is　to　these　cases　that　the　protection　of　the　Supreme　Court　is　extended。

Suppose　a　State　vends　a　certain　portion　of　its　territory　to　a　company；　and　that　a　year　afterwards　it　passes　a　law　by　which　the　territory　is　otherwise　disposed　of；　and　that　clause　of　the　Constitution　which　prohibits　laws　impairing　the　obligation　of　contracts　violated。　　When　the　purchaser　under　the　second　act　appears　to　take　possession；　the　possessor　under　the　first　act　brings　his　action　before　the　tribunals　of　the　Union；　and　causes　the　title　of　the　claimant　to　be　pronounced　null　and　void。　*l　Thus；　in　point　of　fact；　the　judicial　power　of　the　Union　is　contesting　the　claims　of　the　sovereignty　of　a　State；　but　it　only　acts　indirectly　and　upon　a　special　application　of　detail：　it　attacks　the　law　in　its　consequences；　not　in　its　principle；　and　it　rather　weakens　than　destroys　it。

＇Footnote　l：　See　Kent's　〃Commentaries；〃　vol。　i。　p。　387。＇

The　last　hypothesis　that　remained　was　that　each　State　formed　a　corporation　enjoying　a　separate　existence　and　distinct　civil　rights；　and　that　it　could　therefore　sue　or　be　sued　before　a　tribunal。　　Thus　a　State　could　bring　an　action　against　another　State。　　In　this　instance　the　Union　was　not　called　upon　to　contest　a　provincial　law；　but　to　try　a　suit　in　which　a　State　was　a　party。　　This　suit　was　perfectly　similar　to　any　other　cause；　except　that　the　quality　of　the　parties　was　different；　and　here　the　danger　pointed　out　at　the　beginning　of　this　chapter　exists　with　less　chance　of　being　avoided。　　The　inherent　disadvantage　of　the　very　essence　of　Federal　constitutions　is　that　they　engender　parties　in　the　bosom　of　the　nation　which　present　powerful　obstacles　to　the　free　course　of　justice。

High　Rank　Of　The　Supreme　Court　Amongst　The　Great　Powers　Of　State　　No　nation　ever　constituted　so　great　a　judicial　power　as　the　Americans　…　Extent　of　its　prerogative　…　Its　political　influence　…　The　tranquillity　and　the　very　existence　of　the　Union　depend　on　the　discretion　of　the　seven　Federal　Judges。

When　we　have　successively　examined　in　detail　the　organization　of　the　Supreme　Court；　and　the　entire　prerogatives　which　it　exercises；　we　shall　readily　admit　that　a　more　imposing　judicial　power　was　never　constituted　by　any　people。　　The　Supreme　Court　is　placed　at　the　head　of　all　known　tribunals；　both　by　the　nature　of　its　rights　and　the　class　of　justiciable　parties　which　it　controls。　

In　all　the　civilized　countries　of　Europe　the　Government　has　always　shown　the　greatest　repugnance　to　allow　the　cases　to　which　it　was　itself　a　party　to　be　decided　by　the　ordinary　course　of　justice。　　This　repugnance　naturally　attains　its　utmost　height　in　an　absolute　Government；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　the　privileges　of　the　courts　of　justice　are　extended　with　the　increasing　liberties　of　the　people：　but　no　European　nation　has　at　present　held　that　all　judicial　controversies；　without　regard　to　their　origin；　can　be　decided　by　the　judges　of　common　law。

In　America　this　theory　has　been　actually　put　in　practice；　and　the　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　is　the　sole　tribunal　of　the　nation。　　Its　power　extends　to　all　the　cases　arising　under　laws　and　treaties　made　by　the　executive　and　legislative　authorities；　to　all　cases　of　admiralty　and　maritime　jurisdiction；　and　in　general　to　all　points　which　affect　the　law　of　nations。　It　may　even　be　affirmed　that；　although　its　constitution　is　essentially　judicial；　its　prerogatives　are　almost　entirely　political。　　Its　sole　object　is　to　enforce　the　execution　of　the　laws　of　the　Union；　and　the　Union　only　regulates　the　relations　of　the　Government　with　the　citizens；　and　of　the　nation　with　Foreign　Powers：　the　relations　of　citizens　amongst　themselves　are　almost　exclusively　regulated　by　the　sovereignty　of　the　States。

A　second　and　still　greater　cause　of　the　preponderance　of　this　court　may　be　adduced。　　In　the　nations　of　Europe　the　courts　of　justice　are　only　called　upon　to　try　the　controversies　of　private　individuals；　but　the　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　summons　sovereign　powers　to　its　bar。　　When　the　clerk　of　the　court　advances　on　the　steps　of　the　tribunal；　and　simply　says；　〃The　State　of　New　York　versus　the　State　of　Ohio；〃　it　is　impossible　not　to　feel　that　the　Court　which　he　addresses　is　no　ordinary　body；　and　when　it　is　recollected　that　one　of　these　parties　represents　one　million；　and　the　other　two　millions　of　men；　one　is　struck　by　the　responsibility　of　the　seven　judges　whose　decision　is　about　to　satisfy　or　to　disappoint　so　large　a　number　of　their　fellow…citizens。

The　peace；　the　prosperity；　and　the　very　existence　of　the　Union　are　vested　in　the　hands　of　the　seven　judges。　　Without　their　active　co…operation　the　Constitution　would　be　a　dead　letter：　the　Executive　appeals　to　them　for　assistance　against　the　encroachments　of　the　legislative　powers；　the　Legislature　demands　their　protection　from　the　designs　of　the　Executive；　they　defend　the　Union　from　the　disobedience　of　the　States；　the　States　from　the　exaggerated　claims　of　the　Union；　the　public　interest　against　the　interests　of　private　citizens；　and　the　conservative　spirit　of　order　against　the　fleeting　innovations　of　democracy。　　Their　power　is　enormous；　but　it　is　clothed　in　the　authority　of　public　opinion。　　They　are　the　all…　powerful　guardians　of　a　people　which　respects　law；　but　they　would　be　impotent　against　popular　neglect　or　popular　contempt。　　The　force　of　public　opinion　is　the　most　intractable　of　agents；　because　its　exact　limits　cannot　be　defined；　and　it　is　not　less　dangerous　to　exceed　than　to　remain　below　the　boundary　prescribed。

The　Federal　judges　must　not　only　be　good　citizens；　and　men　possessed　of　that　information　and　integrity　which　are　indispensable　to　magistrates；　but　they　must　be　statesmen　…　politicians；　not　unread　in　the　signs　of　the　times；　not　afraid　to　brave　the　obstacles　which　can　be　subdued；　nor　slow　to　turn　aside　such　encroaching　elements　as　may　threaten　the　supremacy　of　the　Union　and　the　obedience　which　is　due　to　the　laws。

The　President；　who　exercises　a　limited　power；　may　err　without　causing　great　mischief　in　the　State。　　Congress　may　decide　amiss　without　destroying　the　Union；　because　the　electoral　body　in　which　Congress　originates　may　cause　it　to　retract　its　decision　by　changing　its　members。　But　if　the　Supreme　Court　is　ever　composed　of　imprudent　men　or　bad　citizens；　the　Union　may　be　plunged　into　anarchy　or　civil　war。

The　real　cause　of　this　danger；　however；　does　not　lie　in　the　constitution　of　the　tribunal；　but　in　the　very　nature　of　Federal　Governments。　　We　have　observed　that　in　confederate　peoples　it　is　especially　necessary　to　consolidate　the　judicial　authority；　because　in　no　other　nations　do　those　independent　persons　who　are　able　to　cope　with　the　social　body　exist　in　greater　power　or　in　a　better　condition　to　resist　the　physical　strength　of　the　Government。　　But　the　more　a　power　requires　to　be　strengthened；　the　more　extensive　and　independent　it　must　be　made；　and　the　dangers　which　its　abuse　may　create　are　heightened　by　its　independence　and　its　strength。　　The　source　of　the　evil　is　not；　therefore；　in　the　constitution　of　the　power；　but　in　the　constitution　of　those　States　which　render　its　existence　necessary。

In　What　Respects　The　Federal　Constitution　Is　Superior　To　That　Of　The　States

In　what　respects　the　Constitution　of　the　Union　can　be　compared　to　that　of　the　States　…　Superiority　of　the　Constitution　of　the　Union　attributable　to　the　wisdom　of　the　Federal　legislators　…　Legislature　of　the　Union　less　dependent　on　the　people　than　that　of　the　States　…　　Executive　power　more　independent　in　its　sphere　…　Judicial　power　less　subjected　to　the　inclinations　of　the　majority　…Practical　consequence　of　these　facts　…　The　dangers　inherent　in　a　democratic　government　eluded　by　the　Federal　legislators；　and　increased　by　the　legislators　of　the　States。

The　Federal　Constitution　differs　essentially　from　that　of　the　States　in　the　ends　which　it　is　intended　to　accomplish；　but　in　the　means　by　which　these　ends　are　promoted　a　greater　analogy　exists　between　them。　　The　objects　of　the　Governments　are　different；　but　their　forms　are　the　same；　and　in　this　special　point　of　view　there　is　some　advantage　in　comparing　them　together。

I　am　of　opinion　that　the　Federal　Constitution　is　superior　to　all　the　Constitutions　of　the　States；　for　several　reasons。

The　present　Constitution　of　the　Union　was　formed　at　a　later　period　than　those　of　the　majority　of　the　States；　and　it　may　have　derived　some　ameliorations　from　past　experience。　　But　we　shall　be　led　to　acknowledge　that　this　is　only　a　secondary　cause　of　its　superiority；　when　we　recollect　that　eleven　new　States　*n　have　been　added　to　the　American　Confederation　since　the　promulgation　of　the　Federal　Constitution；　and　that　these　new　republics　have　always　rather　exaggerated　than　avoided　the　defects　which　existed　in　the　former　Constitutions。

＇Footnote　n：　＇The　number　of　States　has　now　risen　to　46　（1874）；　besides　the　District　of　Columbia。＇＇

The　chief　cause　of　the　superiority　of　the　Federal　Constitution　lay　in　the　character　of　the　legislators　who　composed　it。　　At　the　time　when　it　was　formed　the　dangers　of　the　Confederation　were　imminent；　and　its　ruin　seemed　inevitable。　　In　this　extremity　the　people　chose　the　men　who　most　deserved　the　esteem；　rather　than　those　who　had　gained　the　affections；　of　the　country。　　I　have　already　observed　that　distinguished　as　almost　all　the　legislators　of　the　Union　were　for　their　intelligence；　they　were　still　more　so　for　their　patriotism。　　They　had　all　been　nurtured　at　a　time　when　the　spirit　of　liberty　was　braced　by　a　continual　struggle　against　a　powerful　and　predominant　authority。　　When　the　contest　was　terminated；　whilst　the　excited　passions　of　the　populace　persisted　in　warring　with　dangers　which　had　ceased　to　threaten　them；　these　men　stopped　short　in　their　career；　they　cast　a　calmer　and　more　penet