democracy in america-1-第39章

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　has　invariably　occurred；　either　the　most　preponderant　of　the　allied　peoples　has　assumed　the　privileges　of　the　Federal　authority　and　ruled　all　the　States　in　its　name；　*p　or　the　Federal　Government　has　been　abandoned　by　its　natural　supporters；　anarchy　has　arisen　between　the　confederates；　and　the　Union　has　lost　all　powers　of　action。　*q

＇Footnote　p：　This　was　the　case　in　Greece；　when　Philip　undertook　to　execute　the　decree　of　the　Amphictyons；　in　the　Low　Countries；　where　the　province　of　Holland　always　gave　the　law；　and；　in　our　own　time；　in　the　Germanic　Confederation；　in　which　Austria　and　Prussia　assume　a　great　degree　of　influence　over　the　whole　country；　in　the　name　of　the　Diet。＇

＇Footnote　q：　Such　has　always　been　the　situation　of　the　Swiss　Confederation；　which　would　have　perished　ages　ago　but　for　the　mutual　jealousies　of　its　neighbors。＇

In　America　the　subjects　of　the　Union　are　not　States；　but　private　citizens：　the　national　Government　levies　a　tax；　not　upon　the　State　of　Massachusetts；　but　upon　each　inhabitant　of　Massachusetts。　　All　former　confederate　governments　presided　over　communities；　but　that　of　the　Union　rules　individuals；　its　force　is　not　borrowed；　but　self…derived；　and　it　is　served　by　its　own　civil　and　military　officers；　by　its　own　army；　and　its　own　courts　of　justice。　　It　cannot　be　doubted　that　the　spirit　of　the　nation；　the　passions　of　the　multitude；　and　the　provincial　prejudices　of　each　State　tend　singularly　to　diminish　the　authority　of　a　Federal　authority　thus　constituted；　and　to　facilitate　the　means　of　resistance　to　its　mandates；　but　the　comparative　weakness　of　a　restricted　sovereignty　is　an　evil　inherent　in　the　Federal　system。　　In　America；　each　State　has　fewer　opportunities　of　resistance　and　fewer　temptations　to　non…compliance；　nor　can　such　a　design　be　put　in　execution　（if　indeed　it　be　entertained）　without　an　open　violation　of　the　laws　of　the　Union；　a　direct　interruption　of　the　ordinary　course　of　justice；　and　a　bold　declaration　of　revolt；　in　a　word；　without　taking　a　decisive　step　which　men　hesitate　to　adopt。　

In　all　former　confederations　the　privileges　of　the　Union　furnished　more　elements　of　discord　than　of　power；　since　they　multiplied　the　claims　of　the　nation　without　augmenting　the　means　of　enforcing　them：　and　in　accordance　with　this　fact　it　may　be　remarked　that　the　real　weakness　of　federal　governments　has　almost　always　been　in　the　exact　ratio　of　their　nominal　power。　　Such　is　not　the　case　in　the　American　Union；　in　which；　as　in　ordinary　governments；　the　Federal　Government　has　the　means　of　enforcing　all　it　is　empowered　to　demand。

The　human　understanding　more　easily　invents　new　things　than　new　words；　and　we　are　thence　constrained　to　employ　a　multitude　of　improper　and　inadequate　expressions。　　When　several　nations　form　a　permanent　league　and　establish　a　supreme　authority；　which；　although　it　has　not　the　same　influence　over　the　members　of　the　community　as　a　national　government；　acts　upon　each　of　the　Confederate　States　in　a　body；　this　Government；　which　is　so　essentially　different　from　all　others；　is　denominated　a　Federal　one。　　Another　form　of　society　is　afterwards　discovered；　in　which　several　peoples　are　fused　into　one　and　the　same　nation　with　regard　to　certain　common　interests；　although　they　remain　distinct；　or　at　least　only　confederate；　with　regard　to　all　their　other　concerns。　　In　this　case　the　central　power　acts　directly　upon　those　whom　it　governs；　whom　it　rules；　and　whom　it　judges；　in　the　same　manner；　as；　but　in　a　more　limited　circle　than；　a　national　government。　　Here　the　term　Federal　Government　is　clearly　no　longer　applicable　to　a　state　of　things　which　must　be　styled　an　incomplete　national　Government：　a　form　of　government　has　been　found　out　which　is　neither　exactly　national　nor　federal；　but　no　further　progress　has　been　made；　and　the　new　word　which　will　one　day　designate　this　novel　invention　does　not　yet　exist。

The　absence　of　this　new　species　of　confederation　has　been　the　cause　which　has　brought　all　Unions　to　Civil　War；　to　subjection；　or　to　a　stagnant　apathy；　and　the　peoples　which　formed　these　leagues　have　been　either　too　dull　to　discern；　or　too　pusillanimous　to　apply　this　great　remedy。　　The　American　Confederation　perished　by　the　same　defects。

But　the　Confederate　States　of　America　had　been　long　accustomed　to　form　a　portion　of　one　empire　before　they　had　won　their　independence；　they　had　not　contracted　the　habit　of　governing　themselves；　and　their　national　prejudices　had　not　taken　deep　root　in　their　minds。　　Superior　to　the　rest　of　the　world　in　political　knowledge；　and　sharing　that　knowledge　equally　amongst　themselves；　they　were　little　agitated　by　the　passions　which　generally　oppose　the　extension　of　federal　authority　in　a　nation；　and　those　passions　were　checked　by　the　wisdom　of　the　chief　citizens。　　The　Americans　applied　the　remedy　with　prudent　firmness　as　soon　as　they　were　conscious　of　the　evil；　they　amended　their　laws；　and　they　saved　their　country。


Chapter　VIII：　The　Federal　Constitution　…　Part　V

Advantages　Of　The　Federal　System　In　General；　And　Its　Special　Utility　In　America

Happiness　and　freedom　of　small　nations　…　Power　of　great　nations　…　Great　empires　favorable　to　the　growth　of　civilization　…　Strength　often　the　first　element　of　national　prosperity　…　Aim　of　the　Federal　system　to　unite　the　twofold　advantages　resulting　from　a　small　and　from　a　large　territory　…Advantages　derived　by　the　United　States　from　this　system　…　The　law　adapts　itself　to　the　exigencies　of　the　population；　population　does　not　conform　to　the　exigencies　of　the　law　…　Activity；　amelioration；　love　and　enjoyment　of　freedom　in　the　American　communities　…　Public　spirit　of　the　Union　the　abstract　of　provincial　patriotism　…　Principles　and　things　circulate　freely　over　the　territory　of　the　United　States　…　The　Union　is　happy　and　free　as　a　little　nation；　and　respected　as　a　great　empire。

In　small　nations　the　scrutiny　of　society　penetrates　into　every　part；　and　the　spirit　of　improvement　enters　into　the　most　trifling　details；　as　the　ambition　of　the　people　is　necessarily　checked　by　its　weakness；　all　the　efforts　and　resources　of　the　citizens　are　turned　to　the　internal　benefit　of　the　community；　and　are　not　likely　to　evaporate　in　the　fleeting　breath　of　glory。　The　desires　of　every　individual　are　limited；　because　extraordinary　faculties　are　rarely　to　be　met　with。　　The　gifts　of　an　equal　fortune　render　the　various　conditions　of　life　uniform；　and　the　manners　of　the　inhabitants　are　orderly　and　simple。　　Thus；　if　one　estimate　the　gradations　of　popular　morality　and　enlightenment；　we　shall　generally　find　that　in　small　nations　there　are　more　persons　in　easy　circumstances；　a　more　numerous　population；　and　a　more　tranquil　state　of　society；　than　in　great　empires。

When　tyranny　is　established　in　the　bosom　of　a　small　nation；　it　is　more　galling　than　elsewhere；　because；　as　it　acts　within　a　narrow　circle；　every　point　of　that　circle　is　subject　to　its　direct　influence。　　It　supplies　the　place　of　those　great　designs　which　it　cannot　entertain　by　a　violent　or　an　exasperating　interference　in　a　multitude　of　minute　details；　and　it　leaves　the　political　world；　to　which　it　properly　belongs；　to　meddle　with　the　arrangements　of　domestic　life。　　Tastes　as　well　as　actions　are　to　be　regulated　at　its　pleasure；　and　the　families　of　the　citizens　as　well　as　the　affairs　of　the　State　are　to　be　governed　by　its　decisions。　　This　invasion　of　rights　occurs；　however；　but　seldom；　and　freedom　is　in　truth　the　natural　state　of　small　communities。　The　temptations　which　the　Government　offers　to　ambition　are　too　weak；　and　the　resources　of　private　individuals　are　too　slender；　for　the　sovereign　power　easily　to　fall　within　the　grasp　of　a　single　citizen；　and　should　such　an　event　have　occurred；　the　subjects　of　the　State　can　without　difficulty　overthrow　the　tyrant　and　his　oppression　by　a　simultaneous　effort。

Small　nations　have　therefore　ever　been　the　cradle　of　political　liberty；　and　the　fact　that　many　of　them　have　lost　their　immunities　by　extending　their　dominion　shows　that　the　freedom　they　enjoyed　was　more　a　consequence　of　the　inferior　size　than　of　the　character　of　the　people。

The　history　of　the　world　affords　no　instance　of　a　great　nation　retaining　the　form　of　republican　government　for　a　long　series　of　years；　*r　and　this　has　led　to　the　conclusion　that　such　a　state　of　things　is　impracticable。　　For　my　own　part；　I　cannot　but　censure　the　imprudence　of　attempting　to　limit　the　possible　and　to　judge　the　future　on　the　part　of　a　being　who　is　hourly　deceived　by　the　most　palpable　realities　of　life；　and　who　is　constantly　taken　by　surprise　in　the　circumstances　with　which　he　is　most　familiar。　　But　it　may　be　advanced　with　confidence　that　the　existence　of　a　great　republic　will　always　be　exposed　to　far　greater　perils　than　that　of　a　small　one。

＇Footnote　r：　I　do　not　speak　of　a　confederation　of　small　republics；　but　of　a　great　consolidated　Republic。＇

All　the　passions　which　are　most　fatal　to　republican　institutions　spread　with　an　increasing　territory；　whilst　the　virtues　which　maintain　their　dignity　do　not　augment　in　the　same　proportion。　　The　ambition　of　the　citizens　increases　with　the　power　of　the　State；　the　strength　of　parties　with　the　importance　of　the　ends　they　have　in　view；　but　that　devotion　to　the　common　weal　which　is　the　surest　check　on　destructive　passions　is　not　stronger　in　a　large　than　in　a　small　republic。　　It　might；　indeed；　be　proved　without　difficulty　that　it　is　less　powerful　and　less　sincere。　　The　arrogance　of　wealth　and　the　dejection　of　wretchedness；　capital　cities　of　unwonted　extent；　a　lax　morality；　a　vulgar　egotism；　and　a　great　confusion　of　interests；　are　the　dangers　which　almost　invariably　arise　from　the　magnitude　of　States。　　But　several　of　these　evils　are　scarcely　prejudicial　to　a　monarchy；　and　some　of　them　contribute　to　maintain　its　existence。　　In　monarchical　States　the　strength　of　the　government　is　its　own；　it　may　use；　but　it　does　not　depend　on；　the　community；　and　the　authority　of　the　prince　is　proportioned　to　the　prosperity　of　the　nation；　but　the　only　security　which　a　republican　government　possesses　against　these　evils　lies　in　the　support　of　the　majority。　　This　support　is　not；　however；　proportionably　greater　in　a　large　republic　than　it　is　in　a　small　one；　and　thus；　whilst　the　means　of　attack　perpetually　increase　both　in　number　and　in　influence；　the　power　of　resistance　remains　the　same；　or　it　may　rather　be　said　to　diminish；　since　the　propensities　and　interests　of　the　people　are　diversified　by　the　increase　of　the　population；　and　the　difficulty　of　forming　a　compact　majority　is　constantly　augmented。　　It　has　been　observed；　moreover；　that　the　intensity　of　human　passions　is　heightened；　not　only　by　the　importance　of　the　end　which　they　propose　to　attain；　but　by　the　multitude　of　individuals　who　are　animated　by　them　at　the　same　time。　Every　one　has　had　occasion　to　remark　that　his　emotions　in　the　midst　of　a　sympathizing　crowd　are　far　greater　than　those　which　he　would　have　felt　in　solitude。　　In　great　republics　the　impetus　of　political　passion　is　irresistible；　not　only　because　it　aims　at　gigantic　purposes；　but　because　it　is　felt　and　shared　by　millions　of　men　at　the　same　time。

It　may　therefore　be　asserted　as　a　general　proposition　that　nothing　is　more　opposed　to　the　well…being　and　the　freedom　of　man　than　vast　empires。　Nevertheless　it　is　im