democracy in america-1-第50章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


jority；　but　by　a　majority　of　at　least　two…thirds　of　both　houses。〃

Public　Officers　Under　The　Control　Of　The　Democracy　In　America　　Simple　exterior　of　the　American　public　officers　…　No　official　costume　…　All　public　officers　are　remunerated　…　Political　consequences　of　this　system　…　No　public　career　exists　in　America　…　Result　of　this。

Public　officers　in　the　United　States　are　commingled　with　the　crowd　of　citizens；　they　have　neither　palaces；　nor　guards；　nor　ceremonial　costumes。　This　simple　exterior　of　the　persons　in　authority　is　connected　not　only　with　the　peculiarities　of　the　American　character；　but　with　the　fundamental　principles　of　that　society。　　In　the　estimation　of　the　democracy　a　government　is　not　a　benefit；　but　a　necessary　evil。　　A　certain　degree　of　power　must　be　granted　to　public　officers；　for　they　would　be　of　no　use　without　it。　　But　the　ostensible　semblance　of　authority　is　by　no　means　indispensable　to　the　conduct　of　affairs；　and　it　is　needlessly　offensive　to　the　susceptibility　of　the　public。　　The　public　officers　themselves　are　well　aware　that　they　only　enjoy　the　superiority　over　their　fellow…citizens　which　they　derive　from　their　authority　upon　condition　of　putting　themselves　on　a　level　with　the　whole　community　by　their　manners。　　A　public　officer　in　the　United　States　is　uniformly　civil；　accessible　to　all　the　world；　attentive　to　all　requests；　and　obliging　in　his　replies。　　I　was　pleased　by　these　characteristics　of　a　democratic　government；　and　I　was　struck　by　the　manly　independence　of　the　citizens；　who　respect　the　office　more　than　the　officer；　and　who　are　less　attached　to　the　emblems　of　authority　than　to　the　man　who　bears　them。

I　am　inclined　to　believe　that　the　influence　which　costumes　really　exercise；　in　an　age　like　that　in　which　we　live；　has　been　a　good　deal　exaggerated。　　I　never　perceived　that　a　public　officer　in　America　was　the　less　respected　whilst　he　was　in　the　discharge　of　his　duties　because　his　own　merit　was　set　off　by　no　adventitious　signs。　　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　very　doubtful　whether　a　peculiar　dress　contributes　to　the　respect　which　public　characters　ought　to　have　for　their　own　position；　at　least　when　they　are　not　otherwise　inclined　to　respect　it。　　When　a　magistrate　（and　in　France　such　instances　are　not　rare）　indulges　his　trivial　wit　at　the　expense　of　the　prisoner；　or　derides　the　predicament　in　which　a　culprit　is　placed；　it　would　be　well　to　deprive　him　of　his　robes　of　office；　to　see　whether　he　would　recall　some　portion　of　the　natural　dignity　of　mankind　when　he　is　reduced　to　the　apparel　of　a　private　citizen。　

A　democracy　may；　however；　allow　a　certain　show　of　magisterial　pomp；　and　clothe　its　officers　in　silks　and　gold；　without　seriously　compromising　its　principles。　　Privileges　of　this　kind　are　transitory；　they　belong　to　the　place；　and　are　distinct　from　the　individual：　but　if　public　officers　are　not　uniformly　remunerated　by　the　State；　the　public　charges　must　be　entrusted　to　men　of　opulence　and　independence；　who　constitute　the　basis　of　an　aristocracy；　and　if　the　people　still　retains　its　right　of　election；　that　election　can　only　be　made　from　a　certain　class　of　citizens。　　When　a　democratic　republic　renders　offices　which　had　formerly　been　remunerated　gratuitous；　it　may　safely　be　believed　that　the　State　is　advancing　to　monarchical　institutions；　and　when　a　monarchy　begins　to　remunerate　such　officers　as　had　hitherto　been　unpaid；　it　is　a　sure　sign　that　it　is　approaching　toward　a　despotic　or　a　republican　form　of　government。　The　substitution　of　paid　for　unpaid　functionaries　is　of　itself；　in　my　opinion；　sufficient　to　constitute　a　serious　revolution。

I　look　upon　the　entire　absence　of　gratuitous　functionaries　in　America　as　one　of　the　most　prominent　signs　of　the　absolute　dominion　which　democracy　exercises　in　that　country。　　All　public　services；　of　whatsoever　nature　they　may　be；　are　paid；　so　that　every　one　has　not　merely　the　right；　but　also　the　means　of　performing　them。　　Although；　in　democratic　States；　all　the　citizens　are　qualified　to　occupy　stations　in　the　Government；　all　are　not　tempted　to　try　for　them。　　The　number　and　the　capacities　of　the　candidates　are　more　apt　to　restrict　the　choice　of　electors　than　the　coneitions　of　the　candidateship。

In　nations　in　which　the　principle　of　election　extends　to　every　place　in　the　State　no　political　career　can；　properly　speaking；　be　said　to　exist。　　Men　are　promoted　as　if　by　chance　to　the　rank　which　they　enjoy；　and　they　are　by　no　means　sure　of　retaining　it。　　The　consequence　is　that　in　tranquil　times　public　functions　offer　but　few　lures　to　ambition。　　In　the　United　States　the　persons　who　engage　in　the　perplexities　of　political　life　are　individuals　of　very　moderate　pretensions。　　The　pursuit　of　wealth　generally　diverts　men　of　great　talents　and　of　great　passions　from　the　pursuit　of　power；　and　it　very　frequently　happens　that　a　man　does　not　undertake　to　direct　the　fortune　of　the　State　until　he　has　discovered　his　incompetence　to　conduct　his　own　affairs。　The　vast　number　of　very　ordinary　men　who　occupy　public　stations　is　quite　as　attributable　to　these　causes　as　to　the　bad　choice　of　the　democracy。　　In　the　United　States；　I　am　not　sure　that　the　people　would　return　the　men　of　superior　abilities　who　might　solicit　its　support；　but　it　is　certain　that　men　of　this　description　do　not　come　forward。

Arbitrary　Power　Of　Magistrates　Under　The　Rule　Of　The　American　Democracy

For　what　reason　the　arbitrary　power　of　Magistrates　is　greater　in　absolute　monarchies　and　in　democratic　republics　than　it　is　in　limited　monarchies　…Arbitrary　power　of　the　Magistrates　in　New　England。

In　two　different　kinds　of　government　the　magistrates　*a　exercise　a　considerable　degree　of　arbitrary　power；　namely；　under　the　absolute　government　of　a　single　individual；　and　under　that　of　a　democracy。　　This　identical　result　proceeds　from　causes　which　are　nearly　analogous。

＇Footnote　a：　I　here　use　the　word　magistrates　in　the　widest　sense　in　which　it　can　be　taken；　I　apply　it　to　all　the　officers　to　whom　the　execution　of　the　laws　is　intrusted。＇

In　despotic　States　the　fortune　of　no　citizen　is　secure；　and　public　officers　are　not　more　safe　than　private　individuals。　　The　sovereign；　who　has　under　his　control　the　lives；　the　property；　and　sometimes　the　honor　of　the　men　whom　he　employs；　does　not　scruple　to　allow　them　a　great　latitude　of　action；　because　he　is　convinced　that　they　will　not　use　it　to　his　prejudice。　　In　despotic　States　the　sovereign　is　so　attached　to　the　exercise　of　his　power；　that　he　dislikes　the　constraint　even　of　his　own　regulations；　and　he　is　well　pleased　that　his　agents　should　follow　a　somewhat　fortuitous　line　of　conduct；　provided　he　be　certain　that　their　actions　will　never　counteract　his　desires。

In　democracies；　as　the　majority　has　every　year　the　right　of　depriving　the　officers　whom　it　has　appointed　of　their　power；　it　has　no　reason　to　fear　any　abuse　of　their　authority。　　As　the　people　is　always　able　to　signify　its　wishes　to　those　who　conduct　the　Government；　it　prefers　leaving　them　to　make　their　own　exertions　to　prescribing　an　invariable　rule　of　conduct　which　would　at　once　fetter　their　activity　and　the　popular　authority。

It　may　even　be　observed；　on　attentive　consideration；　that　under　the　rule　of　a　democracy　the　arbitrary　power　of　the　magistrate　must　be　still　greater　than　in　despotic　States。　　In　the　latter　the　sovereign　has　the　power　of　punishing　all　the　faults　with　which　he　becomes　acquainted；　but　it　would　be　vain　for　him　to　hope　to　become　acquainted　with　all　those　which　are　committed。　In　the　former　the　sovereign　power　is　not　only　supreme；　but　it　is　universally　present。　　The　American　functionaries　are；　in　point　of　fact；　much　more　independent　in　the　sphere　of　action　which　the　law　traces　out　for　them　than　any　public　officer　in　Europe。　　Very　frequently　the　object　which　they　are　to　accomplish　is　simply　pointed　out　to　them；　and　the　choice　of　the　means　is　left　to　their　own　discretion。

In　New　England；　for　instance；　the　selectmen　of　each　township　are　bound　to　draw　up　the　list　of　persons　who　are　to　serve　on　the　jury；　the　only　rule　which　is　laid　down　to　guide　them　in　their　choice　is　that　they　are　to　select　citizens　possessing　the　elective　franchise　and　enjoying　a　fair　reputation。　*b　In　France　the　lives　and　liberties　of　the　subjects　would　be　thought　to　be　in　danger　if　a　public　officer　of　any　kind　was　entrusted　with　so　formidable　a　right。　　In　New　England　the　same　magistrates　are　empowered　to　post　the　names　of　habitual　drunkards　in　public…houses；　and　to　prohibit　the　inhabitants　of　a　town　from　supplying　them　with　liquor。　*c　A　censorial　power　of　this　excessive　kind　would　be　revolting　to　the　population　of　the　most　absolute　monarchies；　here；　however；　it　is　submitted　to　without　difficulty。

＇Footnote　b：　See　the　Act　of　February　27；　1813。　　〃General　Collection　of　the　Laws　of　Massachusetts；〃　vol。　ii。　p。　331。　　It　should　be　added　that　the　jurors　are　afterwards　drawn　from　these　lists　by　lot。＇　

＇Footnote　c：　See　Act　of　February　28；　1787。　　〃General　Collection　of　the　Laws　of　Massachusetts；〃　vol。　i。　p。　302。＇

Nowhere　has　so　much　been　left　by　the　law　to　the　arbitrary　determination　of　the　magistrate　as　in　democratic　republics；　because　this　arbitrary　power　is　unattended　by　any　alarming　consequences。　　It　may　even　be　asserted　that　the　freedom　of　the　magistrate　increases　as　the　elective　franchise　is　extended；　and　as　the　duration　of　the　time　of　office　is　shortened。　　Hence　arises　the　great　difficulty　which　attends　the　conversion　of　a　democratic　republic　into　a　monarchy。　　The　magistrate　ceases　to　be　elective；　but　he　retains　the　rights　and　the　habits　of　an　elected　officer；　which　lead　directly　to　despotism。

It　is　only　in　limited　monarchies　that　the　law；　which　prescribes　the　sphere　in　which　public　officers　are　to　act；　superintends　all　their　measures。　The　cause　of　this　may　be　easily　detected。　　In　limited　monarchies　the　power　is　divided　between　the　King　and　the　people；　both　of　whom　are　interested　in　the　stability　of　the　magistrate。　　The　King　does　not　venture　to　place　the　public　officers　under　the　control　of　the　people；　lest　they　should　be　tempted　to　betray　his　interests；　on　the　other　hand；　the　people　fears　lest　the　magistrates　should　serve　to　oppress　the　liberties　of　the　country；　if　they　were　entirely　dependent　upon　the　Crown；　they　cannot　therefore　be　said　to　depend　on　either　one　or　the　other。　　The　same　cause　which　induces　the　king　and　the　people　to　render　public　officers　independent　suggests　the　necessity　of　such　securities　as　may　prevent　their　independence　from　encroaching　upon　the　authority　of　the　former　and　the　liberties　of　the　latter。　　They　consequently　agree　as　to　the　necessity　of　restricting　the　functionary　to　a　line　of　conduct　laid　down　beforehand；　and　they　are　interested　in　confining　him　by　certain　regulations　which　he　cannot　evade。　

Chapter　XIII：　Government　Of　The　Democarcy　In　America　…　Part　II　　Instability　Of　The　Administration　In　The　United　States

In　America　the　public　acts　of　a　community　frequently　leave　fewer　traces　than　the　occurrences　of　a　family　…　Newspapers　the　only　historical　remains　…Instability　of　the　administration　prejudicial　to　the　art　of　government。

The　authority　which　public　men　possess　in　America　is　so　brief；　and　they　are　so　soon　commingled　with　the　ever…changing　population　of　the　country；　that　the　acts　of　a　community　frequently　leave