democracy in america-1-第57章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


reme；　and　in　a　political　meeting　they　did　not　scruple　to　compare　him　indirectly　to　the　treacherous　Arnold。　　〃By　the　opposition；〃　says　Marshall；　〃the　friends　of　the　administration　were　declared　to　be　an　aristocratic　and　corrupt　faction；　who；　from　a　desire　to　introduce　monarchy；　were　hostile　to　France　and　under　the　influence　of　Britain；　that　they　were　a　paper　nobility；　whose　extreme　sensibility　at　every　measure　which　threatened　the　funds；　induced　a　tame　submission　to　injuries　and　insults；　which　the　interests　and　honor　of　the　nation　required　them　to　resist。〃＇

Almost　all　the　nations　which　have　ever　exercised　a　powerful　influence　upon　the　destinies　of　the　world　by　conceiving；　following　up；　and　executing　vast　designs　…　from　the　Romans　to　the　English　…　have　been　governed　by　aristocratic　institutions。　　Nor　will　this　be　a　subject　of　wonder　when　we　recollect　that　nothing　in　the　world　has　so　absolute　a　fixity　of　purpose　as　an　aristocracy。　　The　mass　of　the　people　may　be　led　astray　by　ignorance　or　passion；　the　mind　of　a　king　may　be　biased；　and　his　perseverance　in　his　designs　may　be　shaken　…　besides　which　a　king　is　not　immortal　…　but　an　aristocratic　body　is　too　numerous　to　be　led　astray　by　the　blandishments　of　intrigue；　and　yet　not　numerous　enough　to　yield　readily　to　the　intoxicating　influence　of　unreflecting　passion：　it　has　the　energy　of　a　firm　and　enlightened　individual；　added　to　the　power　which　it　derives　from　perpetuity。


Chapter　XIV：　Advantages　American　Society　Derive　From　Democracy　…　Part　I

What　The　Real　Advantages　Are　Which　American　Society　Derives　From　The　Government　Of　The　Democracy

Before　I　enter　upon　the　subject　of　the　present　chapter　I　am　induced　to　remind　the　reader　of　what　I　have　more　than　once　adverted　to　in　the　course　of　this　book。　　The　political　institutions　of　the　United　States　appear　to　me　to　be　one　of　the　forms　of　government　which　a　democracy　may　adopt；　but　I　do　not　regard　the　American　Constitution　as　the　best；　or　as　the　only　one；　which　a　democratic　people　may　establish。　　In　showing　the　advantages　which　the　Americans　derive　from　the　government　of　democracy；　I　am　therefore　very　far　from　meaning；　or　from　believing；　that　similar　advantages　can　only　be　obtained　from　the　same　laws。

General　Tendency　Of　The　Laws　Under　The　Rule　Of　The　American　Democracy；　And　Habits　Of　Those　Who　Apply　Them

Defects　of　a　democratic　government　easy　to　be　discovered　…　Its　advantages　only　to　be　discerned　by　long　observation　…　Democracy　in　America　often　inexpert；　but　the　general　tendency　of　the　laws　advantageous　…　In　the　American　democracy　public　officers　have　no　permanent　interests　distinct　from　those　of　the　majority　…　Result　of　this　state　of　things。

The　defects　and　the　weaknesses　of　a　democratic　government　may　very　readily　be　discovered；　they　are　demonstrated　by　the　most　flagrant　instances；　whilst　its　beneficial　influence　is　less　perceptibly　exercised。　　A　single　glance　suffices　to　detect　its　evil　consequences；　but　its　good　qualities　can　only　be　discerned　by　long　observation。　　The　laws　of　the　American　democracy　are　frequently　defective　or　incomplete；　they　sometimes　attack　vested　rights；　or　give　a　sanction　to　others　which　are　dangerous　to　the　community；　but　even　if　they　were　good；　the　frequent　changes　which　they　undergo　would　be　an　evil。　How　comes　it；　then；　that　the　American　republics　prosper　and　maintain　their　position？

In　the　consideration　of　laws　a　distinction　must　be　carefully　observed　between　the　end　at　which　they　aim　and　the　means　by　which　they　are　directed　to　that　end；　between　their　absolute　and　their　relative　excellence。　　If　it　be　the　intention　of　the　legislator　to　favor　the　interests　of　the　minority　at　the　expense　of　the　majority；　and　if　the　measures　he　takes　are　so　combined　as　to　accomplish　the　object　he　has　in　view　with　the　least　possible　expense　of　time　and　exertion；　the　law　may　be　well　drawn　up；　although　its　purpose　be　bad；　and　the　more　efficacious　it　is；　the　greater　is　the　mischief　which　it　causes。

Democratic　laws　generally　tend　to　promote　the　welfare　of　the　greatest　possible　number；　for　they　emanate　from　the　majority　of　the　citizens；　who　are　subject　to　error；　but　who　cannot　have　an　interest　opposed　to　their　own　advantage。　　The　laws　of　an　aristocracy　tend；　on　the　contrary；　to　concentrate　wealth　and　power　in　the　hands　of　the　minority；　because　an　aristocracy；　by　its　very　nature；　constitutes　a　minority。　　It　may　therefore　be　asserted；　as　a　general　proposition；　that　the　purpose　of　a　democracy　in　the　conduct　of　its　legislation　is　useful　to　a　greater　number　of　citizens　than　that　of　an　aristocracy。　　This　is；　however；　the　sum　total　of　its　advantages。　

Aristocracies　are　infinitely　more　expert　in　the　science　of　legislation　than　democracies　ever　can　be。　　They　are　possessed　of　a　self…control　which　protects　them　from　the　errors　of　temporary　excitement；　and　they　form　lasting　designs　which　they　mature　with　the　assistance　of　favorable　opportunities。　Aristocratic　government　proceeds　with　the　dexterity　of　art；　it　understands　how　to　make　the　collective　force　of　all　its　laws　converge　at　the　same　time　to　a　given　point。　　Such　is　not　the　case　with　democracies；　whose　laws　are　almost　always　ineffective　or　inopportune。　　The　means　of　democracy　are　therefore　more　imperfect　than　those　of　aristocracy；　and　the　measures　which　it　unwittingly　adopts　are　frequently　opposed　to　its　own　cause；　but　the　object　it　has　in　view　is　more　useful。

Let　us　now　imagine　a　community　so　organized　by　nature；　or　by　its　constitution；　that　it　can　support　the　transitory　action　of　bad　laws；　and　that　it　can　await；　without　destruction；　the　general　tendency　of　the　legislation：　we　shall　then　be　able　to　conceive　that　a　democratic　government；　notwithstanding　its　defects；　will　be　most　fitted　to　conduce　to　the　prosperity　of　this　community。　　This　is　precisely　what　has　occurred　in　the　United　States；　and　I　repeat；　what　I　have　before　remarked；　that　the　great　advantage　of　the　Americans　consists　in　their　being　able　to　commit　faults　which　they　may　afterward　repair。

An　analogous　observation　may　be　made　respecting　public　officers。　　It　is　easy　to　perceive　that　the　American　democracy　frequently　errs　in　the　choice　of　the　individuals　to　whom　it　entrusts　the　power　of　the　administration；　but　it　is　more　difficult　to　say　why　the　State　prospers　under　their　rule。　　In　the　first　place　it　is　to　be　remarked；　that　if　in　a　democratic　State　the　governors　have　less　honesty　and　less　capacity　than　elsewhere；　the　governed；　on　the　other　hand；　are　more　enlightened　and　more　attentive　to　their　interests。　　As　the　people　in　democracies　is　more　incessantly　vigilant　in　its　affairs　and　more　jealous　of　its　rights；　it　prevents　its　representatives　from　abandoning　that　general　line　of　conduct　which　its　own　interest　prescribes。　　In　the　second　place；　it　must　be　remembered　that　if　the　democratic　magistrate　is　more　apt　to　misuse　his　power；　he　possesses　it　for　a　shorter　period　of　time。　　But　there　is　yet　another　reason　which　is　still　more　general　and　conclusive。　　It　is　no　doubt　of　importance　to　the　welfare　of　nations　that　they　should　be　governed　by　men　of　talents　and　virtue；　but　it　is　perhaps　still　more　important　that　the　interests　of　those　men　should　not　differ　from　the　interests　of　the　community　at　large；　for；　if　such　were　the　case；　virtues　of　a　high　order　might　become　useless；　and　talents　might　be　turned　to　a　bad　account。　　I　say　that　it　is　important　that　the　interests　of　the　persons　in　authority　should　not　conflict　with　or　oppose　the　interests　of　the　community　at　large；　but　I　do　not　insist　upon　their　having　the　same　interests　as　the　whole　population；　because　I　am　not　aware　that　such　a　state　of　things　ever　existed　in　any　country。

No　political　form　has　hitherto　been　discovered　which　is　equally　favorable　to　the　prosperity　and　the　development　of　all　the　classes　into　which　society　is　divided。　　These　classes　continue　to　form；　as　it　were；　a　certain　number　of　distinct　nations　in　the　same　nation；　and　experience　has　shown　that　it　is　no　less　dangerous　to　place　the　fate　of　these　classes　exclusively　in　the　hands　of　any　one　of　them　than　it　is　to　make　one　people　the　arbiter　of　the　destiny　of　another。　　When　the　rich　alone　govern；　the　interest　of　the　poor　is　always　endangered；　and　when　the　poor　make　the　laws；　that　of　the　rich　incurs　very　serious　risks。　　The　advantage　of　democracy　does　not　consist；　therefore；　as　has　sometimes　been　asserted；　in　favoring　the　prosperity　of　all；　but　simply　in　contributing　to　the　well…being　of　the　greatest　possible　number。

The　men　who　are　entrusted　with　the　direction　of　public　affairs　in　the　United　States　are　frequently　inferior；　both　in　point　of　capacity　and　of　morality；　to　those　whom　aristocratic　institutions　would　raise　to　power。　　But　their　interest　is　identified　and　confounded　with　that　of　the　majority　of　their　fellow…citizens。　　They　may　frequently　be　faithless　and　frequently　mistaken；　but　they　will　never　systematically　adopt　a　line　of　conduct　opposed　to　the　will　of　the　majority；　and　it　is　impossible　that　they　should　give　a　dangerous　or　an　exclusive　tendency　to　the　government。

The　mal…administration　of　a　democratic　magistrate　is　a　mere　isolated　fact；　which　only　occurs　during　the　short　period　for　which　he　is　elected。　Corruption　and　incapacity　do　not　act　as　common　interests；　which　may　connect　men　permanently　with　one　another。　　A　corrupt　or　an　incapable　magistrate　will　not　concert　his　measures　with　another　magistrate；　simply　because　that　individual　is　as　corrupt　and　as　incapable　as　himself；　and　these　two　men　will　never　unite　their　endeavors　to　promote　the　corruption　and　inaptitude　of　their　remote　posterity。　　The　ambition　and　the　manoeuvres　of　the　one　will　serve；　on　the　contrary；　to　unmask　the　other。　　The　vices　of　a　magistrate；　in　democratic　states；　are　usually　peculiar　to　his　own　person。

But　under　aristocratic　governments　public　men　are　swayed　by　the　interest　of　their　order；　which；　if　it　is　sometimes　confounded　with　the　interests　of　the　majority；　is　very　frequently　distinct　from　them。　　This　interest　is　the　common　and　lasting　bond　which　unites　them　together；　it　induces　them　to　coalesce；　and　to　combine　their　efforts　in　order　to　attain　an　end　which　does　not　always　ensure　the　greatest　happiness　of　the　greatest　number；　and　it　serves　not　only　to　connect　the　persons　in　authority；　but　to　unite　them　to　a　considerable　portion　of　the　community；　since　a　numerous　body　of　citizens　belongs　to　the　aristocracy；　without　being　invested　with　official　functions。　The　aristocratic　magistrate　is　therefore　constantly　supported　by　a　portion　of　the　community；　as　well　as　by　the　Government　of　which　he　is　a　member。

The　common　purpose　which　connects　the　interest　of　the　magistrates　in　aristocracies　with　that　of　a　portion　of　their　contemporaries　identifies　it　with　that　of　future　generations；　their　influence　belongs　to　the　future　as　much　as　to　the　present。　　The　aristocratic　magistrate　is　urged　at　the　same　time　toward　the　same　point　by　the　passions　of　the　community；　by　his　own；　and　I　may　almost　add　by　those　of　his　posterity。　　Is　it；　then；　wonderful　that　he　does　not　resist　such　repeated　impulses？　　And　indeed　aristocracies　are　often　carried　away　by　the　spirit　of　their　order　without　being　corrupted　by　it；　and　they　unconsciously　fashion　society　to　their　own　ends；　and　prepare　it　for　their　own　descendants。

The　English　aristocracy　is　perhaps　the