democracy in america-1-第65章

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er　the　peculiar　pursuits　of　lawyers　give　an　aristocratic　turn　to　their　ideas　…　Accidental　causes　which　may　check　this　tendency　…　Ease　with　which　the　aristocracy　coalesces　with　legal　men　…　Use　of　lawyers　to　a　despot　…　The　profession　of　the　law　constitutes　the　only　aristocratic　element　with　which　the　natural　elements　of　democracy　will　combine　…　Peculiar　causes　which　tend　to　give　an　aristocratic　turn　of　mind　to　the　English　and　American　lawyers　…　The　aristocracy　of　America　is　on　the　bench　and　at　the　bar　…　Influence　of　lawyers　upon　American　society　…　Their　peculiar　magisterial　habits　affect　the　legislature；　the　administration；　and　even　the　people。

In　visiting　the　Americans　and　in　studying　their　laws　we　perceive　that　the　authority　they　have　entrusted　to　members　of　the　legal　profession；　and　the　influence　which　these　individuals　exercise　in　the　Government；　is　the　most　powerful　existing　security　against　the　excesses　of　democracy。　　This　effect　seems　to　me　to　result　from　a　general　cause　which　it　is　useful　to　investigate；　since　it　may　produce　analogous　consequences　elsewhere。

The　members　of　the　legal　profession　have　taken　an　important　part　in　all　the　vicissitudes　of　political　society　in　Europe　during　the　last　five　hundred　years。　　At　one　time　they　have　been　the　instruments　of　those　who　were　invested　with　political　authority；　and　at　another　they　have　succeeded　in　converting　political　authorities　into　their　instrument。　　In　the　Middle　Ages　they　afforded　a　powerful　support　to　the　Crown；　and　since　that　period　they　have　exerted　themselves　to　the　utmost　to　limit　the　royal　prerogative。　　In　England　they　have　contracted　a　close　alliance　with　the　aristocracy；　in　France　they　have　proved　to　be　the　most　dangerous　enemies　of　that　class。　　It　is　my　object　to　inquire　whether；　under　all　these　circumstances；　the　members　of　the　legal　profession　have　been　swayed　by　sudden　and　momentary　impulses；　or　whether　they　have　been　impelled　by　principles　which　are　inherent　in　their　pursuits；　and　which　will　always　recur　in　history。　　I　am　incited　to　this　investigation　by　reflecting　that　this　particular　class　of　men　will　most　likely　play　a　prominent　part　in　that　order　of　things　to　which　the　events　of　our　time　are　giving　birth。　

Men　who　have　more　especially　devoted　themselves　to　legal　pursuits　derive　from　those　occupations　certain　habits　of　order；　a　taste　for　formalities；　and　a　kind　of　instinctive　regard　for　the　regular　connection　of　ideas；　which　naturally　render　them　very　hostile　to　the　revolutionary　spirit　and　the　unreflecting　passions　of　the　multitude。

The　special　information　which　lawyers　derive　from　their　studies　ensures　them　a　separate　station　in　society；　and　they　constitute　a　sort　of　privileged　body　in　the　scale　of　intelligence。　　This　notion　of　their　superiority　perpetually　recurs　to　them　in　the　practice　of　their　profession：　they　are　the　masters　of　a　science　which　is　necessary；　but　which　is　not　very　generally　known；　they　serve　as　arbiters　between　the　citizens；　and　the　habit　of　directing　the　blind　passions　of　parties　in　litigation　to　their　purpose　inspires　them　with　a　certain　contempt　for　the　judgment　of　the　multitude。　　To　this　it　may　be　added　that　they　naturally　constitute　a　body；　not　by　any　previous　understanding；　or　by　an　agreement　which　directs　them　to　a　common　end；　but　the　analogy　of　their　studies　and　the　uniformity　of　their　proceedings　connect　their　minds　together；　as　much　as　a　common　interest　could　combine　their　endeavors。　

A　portion　of　the　tastes　and　of　the　habits　of　the　aristocracy　may　consequently　be　discovered　in　the　characters　of　men　in　the　profession　of　the　law。　　They　participate　in　the　same　instinctive　love　of　order　and　of　formalities；　and　they　entertain　the　same　repugnance　to　the　actions　of　the　multitude；　and　the　same　secret　contempt　of　the　government　of　the　people。　　I　do　not　mean　to　say　that　the　natural　propensities　of　lawyers　are　sufficiently　strong　to　sway　them　irresistibly；　for　they；　like　most　other　men；　are　governed　by　their　private　interests　and　the　advantages　of　the　moment。　

In　a　state　of　society　in　which　the　members　of　the　legal　profession　are　prevented　from　holding　that　rank　in　the　political　world　which　they　enjoy　in　private　life；　we　may　rest　assured　that　they　will　be　the　foremost　agents　of　revolution。　　But　it　must　then　be　inquired　whether　the　cause　which　induces　them　to　innovate　and　to　destroy　is　accidental；　or　whether　it　belongs　to　some　lasting　purpose　which　they　entertain。　　It　is　true　that　lawyers　mainly　contributed　to　the　overthrow　of　the　French　monarchy　in　1789；　but　it　remains　to　be　seen　whether　they　acted　thus　because　they　had　studied　the　laws；　or　because　they　were　prohibited　from　co…operating　in　the　work　of　legislation。

Five　hundred　years　ago　the　English　nobles　headed　the　people；　and　spoke　in　its　name；　at　the　present　time　the　aristocracy　supports　the　throne；　and　defends　the　royal　prerogative。　　But　aristocracy　has；　notwithstanding　this；　its　peculiar　instincts　and　propensities。　　We　must　be　careful　not　to　confound　isolated　members　of　a　body　with　the　body　itself。　　In　all　free　governments；　of　whatsoever　form　they　may　be；　members　of　the　legal　profession　will　be　found　at　the　head　of　all　parties。　　The　same　remark　is　also　applicable　to　the　aristocracy；　for　almost　all　the　democratic　convulsions　which　have　agitated　the　world　have　been　directed　by　nobles。

A　privileged　body　can　never　satisfy　the　ambition　of　all　its　members；　it　has　always　more　talents　and　more　passions　to　content　and　to　employ　than　it　can　find　places；　so　that　a　considerable　number　of　individuals　are　usually　to　be　met　with　who　are　inclined　to　attack　those　very　privileges　which　they　find　it　impossible　to　turn　to　their　own　account。

I　do　not；　then；　assert　that　all　the　members　of　the　legal　profession　are　at　all　times　the　friends　of　order　and　the　opponents　of　innovation；　but　merely　that　most　of　them　usually　are　so。　　In　a　community　in　which　lawyers　are　allowed　to　occupy；　without　opposition；　that　high　station　which　naturally　belongs　to　them；　their　general　spirit　will　be　eminently　conservative　and　anti…democratic。　When　an　aristocracy　excludes　the　leaders　of　that　profession　from　its　ranks；　it　excites　enemies　which　are　the　more　formidable　to　its　security　as　they　are　independent　of　the　nobility　by　their　industrious　pursuits；　and　they　feel　themselves　to　be　its　equal　in　point　of　intelligence；　although　they　enjoy　less　opulence　and　less　power。　　But　whenever　an　aristocracy　consents　to　impart　some　of　its　privileges　to　these　same　individuals；　the　two　classes　coalesce　very　readily；　and　assume；　as　it　were；　the　consistency　of　a　single　order　of　family　interests。

I　am；　in　like　manner；　inclined　to　believe　that　a　monarch　will　always　be　able　to　convert　legal　practitioners　into　the　most　serviceable　instruments　of　his　authority。　　There　is　a　far　greater　affinity　between　this　class　of　individuals　and　the　executive　power　than　there　is　between　them　and　the　people；　just　as　there　is　a　greater　natural　affinity　between　the　nobles　and　the　monarch　than　between　the　nobles　and　the　people；　although　the　higher　orders　of　society　have　occasionally　resisted　the　prerogative　of　the　Crown　in　concert　with　the　lower　classes。

Lawyers　are　attached　to　public　order　beyond　every　other　consideration；　and　the　best　security　of　public　order　is　authority。　　It　must　not　be　forgotten　that；　if　they　prize　the　free　institutions　of　their　country　much；　they　nevertheless　value　the　legality　of　those　institutions　far　more：　they　are　less　afraid　of　tyranny　than　of　arbitrary　power；　and　provided　that　the　legislature　take　upon　itself　to　deprive　men　of　their　independence；　they　are　not　dissatisfied。

I　am　therefore　convinced　that　the　prince　who；　in　presence　of　an　encroaching　democracy；　should　endeavor　to　impair　the　judicial　authority　in　his　dominions；　and　to　diminish　the　political　influence　of　lawyers；　would　commit　a　great　mistake。　　He　would　let　slip　the　substance　of　authority　to　grasp　at　the　shadow。　　He　would　act　more　wisely　in　introducing　men　connected　with　the　law　into　the　government；　and　if　he　entrusted　them　with　the　conduct　of　a　despotic　power；　bearing　some　marks　of　violence；　that　power　would　most　likely　assume　the　external　features　of　justice　and　of　legality　in　their　hands。


The　government　of　democracy　is　favorable　to　the　political　power　of　lawyers；　for　when　the　wealthy；　the　noble；　and　the　prince　are　excluded　from　the　government；　they　are　sure　to　occupy　the　highest　stations；　in　their　own　right；　as　it　were；　since　they　are　the　only　men　of　information　and　sagacity；　beyond　the　sphere　of　the　people；　who　can　be　the　object　of　the　popular　choice。　If；　then；　they　are　led　by　their　tastes　to　combine　with　the　aristocracy　and　to　support　the　Crown；　they　are　naturally　brought　into　contact　with　the　people　by　their　interests。　　They　like　the　government　of　democracy；　without　participating　in　its　propensities　and　without　imitating　its　weaknesses；　whence　they　derive　a　twofold　authority；　from　it　and　over　it。　　The　people　in　democratic　states　does　not　mistrust　the　members　of　the　legal　profession；　because　it　is　well　known　that　they　are　interested　in

serving　the　popular　cause；　and　it　listens　to　them　without　irritation；　because　it　does　not　attribute　to　them　any　sinister　designs。　　The　object　of　lawyers　is　not；　indeed；　to　overthrow　the　institutions　of　democracy；　but　they　constantly　endeavor　to　give　it　an　impulse　which　diverts　it　from　its　real　tendency；　by　means　which　are　foreign　to　its　nature。　　Lawyers　belong　to　the　people　by　birth　and　interest；　to　the　aristocracy　by　habit　and　by　taste；　and　they　may　be　looked　upon　as　the　natural　bond　and　connecting　link　of　the　two　great　classes　of　society。

The　profession　of　the　law　is　the　only　aristocratic　element　which　can　be　amalgamated　without　violence　with　the　natural　elements　of　democracy；　and　which　can　be　advantageously　and　permanently　combined　with　them。　　I　am　not　unacquainted　with　the　defects　which　are　inherent　in　the　character　of　that　body　of　men；　but　without　this　admixture　of　lawyer…like　sobriety　with　the　democratic　principle；　I　question　whether　democratic　institutions　could　long　be　maintained；　and　I　cannot　believe　that　a　republic　could　subsist　at　the　present　time　if　the　influence　of　lawyers　in　public　business　did　not　increase　in　proportion　to　the　power　of　the　people。

This　aristocratic　character；　which　I　hold　to　be　common　to　the　legal　profession；　is　much　more　distinctly　marked　in　the　United　States　and　in　England　than　in　any　other　country。　　This　proceeds　not　only　from　the　legal　studies　of　the　English　and　American　lawyers；　but　from　the　nature　of　the　legislation；　and　the　position　which　those　persons　occupy　in　the　two　countries。　　The　English　and　the　Americans　have　retained　the　law　of　precedents；　that　is　to　say；　they　continue　to　found　their　legal　opinions　and　the　decisions　of　their　courts　upon　the　opinions　and　the　decisions　of　their　forefathers。　　In　the　mind　of　an　English　or　American　lawyer　a　taste　and　a　reverence　for　what　is　old　is　almost　always　united　to　a　love　of　regular　and　lawful　proceedings。

This　predisposition　has　another　effect　upon　the　character　of　the　legal　profession　and　upon　the　general　course　of　society。　　The　English　and　American　lawyers　investigate　what　has　been　done；　the　French　advocate　inquires　what　should　have　been　done；　the　former　produce　precedents；　the　latter　reasons。　A　French　observer　is　surprised