personal memoirs-2-第4章

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the　right　of　the　Manassas　Gap　railroad　in　plain　view　of　the

Confederate　works；　and　confronting　a　commanding　point　where　much　of

Early's　artillery　was　massed。　　Soon　after　General　Wright　had

established　this　line　I　rode　with　him　along　it　to　the　westward；　and

finding　that　the　enemy　was　still　holding　an　elevated　position　further

to　our　right；　on　the　north　side　of　Tumbling　Run；　I　directed　this　also

to　be　occupied。　　Wright　soon　carried　the　point；　which　gave　us　an

unobstructed　view　of　the　enemy's　works　and　offered　good　ground　for

our　artillery。　　It　also　enabled　me　to　move　the　whole　of　the　Sixth

Corps　to　the　front　till　its　line　was　within　about　seven　hundred　yards

of　the　enemy's　works；　the　Nineteenth　Corps；　on　the　morning　of　the

22d；　covering　the　ground　vacated　by　the　Sixth　by　moving　to　the　front

and　extending　to　the　right；　but　still　keeping　its　reserves　on　the

railroad。



In　the　darkness　of　the　night　of　the　gist；　Crook　was　brought　across

Cedar　Creek　and　hidden　in　a　clump　of　timber　behind　Hupp's　Hill　till

daylight　of　the　22d；　when；　under　cover　of　the　intervening　woods　and

ravines；　he　was　marched　beyond　the　right　of　the　Sixth　Corps　and　again

concealed　not　far　from　the　Back　road。　　After　Crook　had　got　into　this

last　position；　Ricketts's　division　was　pushed　out　until　it　confronted

the　left　of　the　enemy's　infantry；　the　rest　of　the　Sixth　Corps

extending　from　Ricketts's　left　to　the　Manassas　Gap　railroad；　while

the　Nineteenth　Corps　filled　in　the　space　between　the　left　of　the

Sixth　and　the　North　Fork　of　the　Shenandoah。



When　Ricketts　moved　out　on　this　new　line；　in　conjunction　with

Averell's　cavalry　on　his　right；　the　enemy　surmising；　from　information

secured　from　his　signal…station；　no　doubt；　that　my　attack　was　to　be

made　from　Ricketts's　front；　prepared　for　it　there；　but　no　such

intention　ever　existed。　　Ricketts　was　pushed　forward　only　that　he

might　readily　join　Crook's　turning…column　as　it　swung　into　the

enemy's　rear。　　To　ensure　success；　all　that　I　needed　now　was　enough

daylight　to　complete　my　arrangements；　the　secrecy　of　movement　imposed

by　the　situation　consuming　many　valuable　hours。



While　Ricketts　was　occupying　the　enemy's　attention；　Crook；　again

moving　unobserved　into　the　dense　timber　on　the　eastern　face　of　Little

North　Mountain；　conducted　his　command　south　in　two　parallel　columns

until　he　gained　the　rear　of　the　enemy's　works；　when；　marching　his

divisions　by　the　left　flank；　he　led　them　in　an　easterly　direction

down　the　mountain…side。　　As　he　emerged　from　the　timber　near　the　base

of　the　mountain；　the　Confederates　discovered　him；　of　course；　and

opened　with　their　batteries；　but　it　was　too　latethey　having　few

troops　at　hand　to　confront　the　turning…column。　　Loudly　cheering；

Crook's　men　quickly　crossed　the　broken　stretch　in　rear　of　the　enemy's

left；　producing　confusion　and　consternation　at　every　step。



About　a　mile　from　the　mountain's　base　Crook's　left　was　joined　by

Ricketts；　who　in　proper　time　had　begun　to　swing　his　division　into　the

action；　and　the　two　commands　moved　along　in　rear　of　the　works　so

rapidly　that；　with　but　slight　resistance；　the　Confederates　abandoned

the　guns　massed　near　the　centre。　　The　swinging　movement　of　Ricketts

was　taken　up　successively　from　right　to　left　throughout　my　line；　and

in　a　few　minutes　the　enemy　was　thoroughly　routed；　the　action；　though

brief；　being　none　the　less　decisive。　　Lomax's　dismounted　cavalry　gave

way　first；　but　was　shortly　followed　by　all　the　Confederate　infantry

in　an　indescribable　panic；　precipitated　doubtless　by　fears　of　being

caught　and　captured　in　the　pocket　formed　by　Tumbling　Run　and　the

North　Fork　of　the　Shenandoah　River。　　The　stampede　was　complete；　the

enemy　leaving　the　field　without　semblance　of　organization；　abandoning

nearly　all　his　artillery　and　such　other　property　as　was　in　the　works；

and　the　rout　extending　through　the　fields　and　over　the　roads　toward

Woodstock；　Wright　and　Emory　in　hot　pursuit。



Midway　between　Fisher's　Hill　and　Woodstock　there　is　some　high　ground；

where　at　night…fall　a　small　squad　endeavored　to　stay　us　with　two

pieces　of　artillery；　but　this　attempt　at　resistance　proved　fruitless；

and；　notwithstanding　the　darkness；　the　guns　were　soon　captured。　　The

chase　was　then　taken　up　by　Devin's　brigade　as　soon　as　it　could　be

passed　to　the　front；　and　continued　till　after　daylight　the　next

morning；　but　the　delays　incident　to　a　night　pursuit　made　it

impossible　for　Devin　to　do　more　than　pick　up　stragglers。



Our　success　was　very　great；　yet　I　had　anticipated　results　still　more

pregnant。　　Indeed；　I　had　high　hopes　of　capturing　almost　the　whole　of

Early's　army　before　it　reached　New　Market；　and　with　this　object　in

view；　during　the　manoeuvres　of　the　21st　I　had　sent　Torbert　up　the

Luray　Valley　with　Wilson's　division　and　two　of　Merritt's　brigades；　in

the　expectation　that　he　would　drive　Wickham　out　of　the　Luray　Pass　by

Early's　right；　and　by　crossing　the　Massanutten　Mountain　near　New

Market；　gain　his　rear。　　Torbert　started　in　good　season；　and　after

some　slight　skirmishing　at　Gooney　Run；　got　as　far　as　Milford；　but

failed　to　dislodge　Wickham。　　In　fact；　he　made　little　or　no　attempt　to

force　Wickham　from　his　position；　and　with　only　a　feeble　effort

withdrew。　　I　heard　nothing　at　all　from　Torbert　during　the　22d；　and

supposing　that　everything　was　progressing　favorably；　I　was　astonished

and　chagrined　on　the　morning　of　the　23d；　at　Woodstock；　to　receive　the

intelligence　that　he　had　fallen　back　to　Front　Royal　and　Buckton　ford。

My　disappointment　was　extreme；　but　there　was　now　no　help　for　the

situation　save　to　renew　and　emphasize　Torbert's　orders；　and　this　was

done　at　once；　notwithstanding　that　I　thought；　the　delay；　had　so　much

diminished　the　chances　of　his　getting　in　the　rear　of　Early　as　to　make

such　a　result　a　very　remote　possibility；　unless；　indeed；　far　greater

zeal　was　displayed　than　had　been　in　the　first　attempt　to　penetrate

the　Luray　Valley。



The　battle　of　Fisher's　Hill　was；　in　a　measure；　a　part　of　the　battle

of　the　Opequon；　that　is　to　say；　it　was　an　incident　of　the　pursuit

resulting　from　that　action。　　In　many　ways；　however；　it　was　much　more

satisfactory；　and　particularly　so　because　the　plan　arranged　on　the

evening　of　the　20th　was　carried　out　to　the　very　letter　by　Generals

Wright；　Crook；　and　Emory；　not　only　in　all　their　preliminary

manoeuvres；　but　also　during　the　fight　itself。　　The　only　drawback　was

with　the　cavalry；　and　to　this　day　I　have　been　unable　to　account

satisfactorily　for　Torbert's　failure。　　No　doubt；　Wickham's　position

near　Milford　was　a　strong　one；　but　Torbert　ought　to　have　made　a

fight。　　Had　he　been　defeated　in　this；　his　withdrawal　then　to　await

the　result　at　Fisher's　Hill　would　have　been　justified；　but　it　does

not　appear　that　he　made　any　serious　effort　of　all　to　dislodge　the

Confederate　cavalry：　his　impotent　attempt　not　only　chagrined　me　very

much；　but　occasioned　much　unfavorable　comment　throughout　the　army。



We　reached　Woodstock　early　on　the　morning　of　the　23d；　and　halted

there　some　little　time　to　let　the　troops　recover　their　organization；

which　had　been　broken　in　the　night　march　they　had　just　made。　　When

the　commands　had　closed　up　we　pushed　on　toward　Edinburg；　in　the　hope

of　making　more　captures　at　Narrow　Passage　Creek；　but　the

Confederates；　too　fleet　for　us；　got　away；　so　General　Wright　halted

the　infantry　not　far　from　Edinburg；　till　rations　could　be　brought　the

men。　　Meanwhile　I；　having　remained　at　Woodstock；　sent　Dedin's　brigade

to　press　the　enemy　under　every　favorable　opportunity；　and　if　possible

prevent　him　from　halting　long　enough　to　reorganize。　　Notwithstanding

Devin's　efforts　the　Confederates　managed　to　assemble　a　considerable

force　to　resist　him；　and　being　too　weak　for　the　rearguard；　he　awaited

the　arrival　of　Averell；　who；　I　had　informed　him；　would　be　hurried　to

the　front　with　all　possible　despatch；　for　I　thought　that　Averell　must

be　close　at　hand。　　It　turned　out；　however；　that　he　was　not　near　by　at

all；　and；　moreover；　that　without　good　reason　he　had　refrained　from

taking　any　part　whatever　in　pursuing　the　enemy　in　the　flight　from

Fisher's　Hill；　and　in　fact　had　gone　into　camp　and　left　to　the

infantry　the　work　of　pursuit。



It　was　nearly　noon　when　Averell　came　up；　and　a　great　deal　of　precious

time　had　been　lost。　　We　had　some　hot　words；　but　hoping　that　he　would

retrieve　the　mistake　of　the　night　before；　I　directed　him　to　proceed

to　the　front　at　once；　and　in　conjunction　with　Devin　close　with　the

enemy。　　He　reached　Devin's　command　about　3　o'clock　in　the　afternoon；

just　as　this　officer　was　pushing　the　Confederates　so　energetically

that　they　were　abandoning　Mount　Jackson；　yet　Averell　utterly　failed

to　accomplish　anything。　　Indeed；　his　indifferent　attack　was　not　at

all　worthy　the　excellent　soldiers　he　commanded；　and　when　I　learned

that　it　was　his　intention　to　withdraw　from　the　enemy's　front；　and

this；　too；　on　the　indefinite　report　of　a　signal…officer　that　a

〃brigade　or　division〃　of　Confederates　was　turning　his　right　flank；

and　that　he　had　not　seriously　attempted　to　verify　the　information；　I

sent　him　this　order：



〃HEADQUARTERS　MIDDLE　MILITARY　DIVISION；

〃Woodstock；　Va。；　Sept。　　23；　1864



〃BREVET　MAJOR…GENERAL　AVERELL



〃Your　report　and　report　of　signal…officer　received。　　I　do　not　want

you　to　let　the　enemy　bluff　you　or　your　command；　and　I　want　you　to

distinctly　understand　this　note。　　I　do　not　advise　rashness；　but　I　do

desire　resolution　and　actual　fighting；　with　necessary　casualties；

before　you　retire。　　There　must　now　be　no　backing　or　filling　by　you

without　a　superior　force　of　the　enemy　actually　engaging　you。



〃P。　H。　SHERIDAN；

〃Major…General　Commanding。'





Some　little　time　after　this　note　went　to　Averell；　word　was　brought　me

that　he　had　already　carried　out　the　programme　indicated　when

forwarding　the　report　of　the　expected　turning　of　his　right；　and　that

he　had　actually　withdrawn　and　gone　into　camp　near　Hawkinsburg。　　I

then　decided　to　relieve　him　from　the　command　of　his　division；　which　I

did；　ordering　him　to　Wheeling；　Colonel　William　H。　Powell　being

assigned　to　succeed　him。



The　removal　of　Averell　was　but　the　culmination　of　a　series　of　events

extending　back　to　the　time　I　assumed　command　of　the　Middle　Military

Division。　　At　the　outset；　General　Grant；　fearing　discord　on　account

of　Averell's　ranking　Torbert；　authorized　me　to　relieve　the　former

officer；　but　I　hoped　that　if　any　trouble　of　this　sort　arose；　it　could

be　allayed；　or　at　least　repressed；　during　the　campaign　against　Early；

since　the　different　commands　would　often　have　to　act　separately。

After　that；　the　dispersion　of　my　army　by　the　return　of　the　Sixth

Corps　and　Torbert's　cavalry　to　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　would　take

place；　I　thought；　and　this　would　restore　matters　to　their　normal

condition　；　but　Averell's　dissatisfaction　began　to　show　itself

immediately　after　his　arrival　at　Martinsburg；　on　the　14th　of　August；

and；　except　when　he