art of war-第14章
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20。 But if neither time nor place be known； then the left
wing will be impotent to succor the right； the right equally
impotent to succor the left； the van unable to relieve the rear；
or the rear to support the van。 How much more so if the furthest
portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart； and
even the nearest are separated by several LI！
＇The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
precision； but the mental picture we are required to draw is
probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in
separate columns； each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
date。 If the general allows the various detachments to proceed
at haphazard； without precise instructions as to the time and
place of meeting； the enemy will be able to annihilate the army
in detail。 Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here： 〃If we do
not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
day on which they will join battle； our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defense； and the positions we hold
will be insecure。 Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe； we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition； and no mutual
support will be possible between wings； vanguard or rear；
especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army。〃＇
21。 Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh
exceed our own in number； that shall advantage them nothing in
the matter of victory。 I say then that victory can be achieved。
＇Alas for these brave words！ The long feud between the two
states ended in 473 B。C。 with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien
and its incorporation in Yueh。 This was doubtless long after Sun
Tzu's death。 With his present assertion compare IV。 ss。 4。
Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy；
which he thus goes on to explain： 〃In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said； 'One may KNOW how to conquer without
being able to DO it；' whereas here we have the statement that
'victory' can be achieved。' The explanation is； that in the
former chapter； where the offensive and defensive are under
discussion； it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared； one
cannot make certain of beating him。 But the present passage
refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who； according to Sun
Tzu's calculations； will be kept in ignorance of the time and
place of the impending struggle。 That is why he says here that
victory can be achieved。〃＇
22。 Though the enemy be stronger in numbers； we may prevent
him from fighting。 Scheme so as to discover his plans and the
likelihood of their success。
＇An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is： 〃Know
beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's
failure。〃
23。 Rouse him； and learn the principle of his activity or
inactivity。
＇Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by
the enemy on being thus disturbed； we shall be able to conclude
whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse。 He instances
the action of Cho…ku Liang； who sent the scornful present of a
woman's head…dress to Ssu…ma I； in order to goad him out of his
Fabian tactics。＇
Force him to reveal himself； so as to find out his vulnerable
spots。
24。 Carefully compare the opposing army with your own； so
that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is
deficient。
＇Cf。 IV。 ss。 6。＇
25。 In making tactical dispositions； the highest pitch you
can attain is to conceal them；
＇The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation。
Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility （see supra
ss。 9） as 〃showing no sign〃 of what you mean to do； of the plans
that are formed in your brain。＇
conceal your dispositions； and you will be safe from the prying
of the subtlest spies； from the machinations of the wisest
brains。
＇Tu Mu explains： 〃Though the enemy may have clever and
capable officers； they will not be able to lay any plans against
us。〃＇
26。 How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
own tacticsthat is what the multitude cannot comprehend。
27。 All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer； but what
none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved。
＇I。e。； everybody can see superficially how a battle is won；
what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations
which has preceded the battle。＇
28。 Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one
victory； but let your methods be regulated by the infinite
variety of circumstances。
＇As Wang Hsi sagely remarks： 〃There is but one root…
principle underlying victory； but the tactics which lead up to it
are infinite in number。〃 With this compare Col。 Henderson： 〃The
rules of strategy are few and simple。 They may be learned in a
week。 They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen
diagrams。 But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an
army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to
write like Gibbon。〃＇
29。 Military tactics are like unto water； for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards。
30。 So in war； the way is to avoid what is strong and to
strike at what is weak。
＇Like water； taking the line of least resistance。＇
31。 Water shapes its course according to the nature of the
ground over which it flows； the soldier works out his victory in
relation to the foe whom he is facing。
32。 Therefore； just as water retains no constant shape； so
in warfare there are no constant conditions。
33。 He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning； may be called a heaven…
born captain。
34。 The five elements （water； fire； wood； metal； earth） are
not always equally predominant；
＇That is； as Wang Hsi says： 〃they predominate
alternately。〃＇
the four seasons make way for each other in turn。
＇Literally； 〃have no invariable seat。〃＇
There are short days and long； the moon has its periods of waning
and waxing。
＇Cf。 V。 ss。 6。 The purport of the passage is simply to
illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly
taking place in Nature。 The comparison is not very happy；
however； because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu
mentions is by no means paralleled in war。＇
＇1＇ See Col。 Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson； 1902
ed。； vol。 II； p。 490。
…
VII。 MANEUVERING
1。 Sun Tzu said： In war； the general receives his commands
from the sovereign。
2。 Having collected an army and concentrated his forces； he
must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before
pitching his camp。
＇〃Chang Yu says： 〃the establishment of harmony and
confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing
into the field；〃 and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu （chap。 1 ad
init。）： 〃Without harmony in the State； no military expedition
can be undertaken； without harmony in the army； no battle array
can be formed。〃 In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented
as saying to Wu Yuan： 〃As a general rule； those who are waging
war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding
to attack the external foe。〃＇
3。 After that； comes tactical maneuvering； than which there
is nothing more difficult。
＇I have departed slightly from the traditional
interpretation of Ts‘ao Kung； who says： 〃From the time of
receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over
against the enemy； the tactics to be pursued are most difficult。〃
It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said
to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped； and
Ch‘ien Hao's note gives color to this view： 〃For levying；
concentrating； harmonizing and entrenching an army； there are
plenty of old rules which will serve。 The real difficulty comes
when we engage in tactical operations。〃 Tu Yu also observes that
〃the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in
seizing favorable position。〃＇
The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the
devious into the direct； and misfortune into gain。
＇This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and
somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond。
This is how it is explained by Ts‘ao Kung： 〃Make it appear that
you are a long way off； then cover the distance rapidly and
arrive on the scene before your opponent。〃 Tu Mu says：
〃Hoodwink the enemy； so that he may be remiss and leisurely while
you are dashing along with utmost speed。〃 Ho Shih gives a
slightly different turn： 〃Although you may have difficult ground
to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback
which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of
movement。〃 Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the
two famous passages across the Alpsthat of Hannibal； which laid
Italy at his mercy； and that of Napoleon two thousand years
later； which resulted in the great victory of Marengo。＇
4。 Thus； to take a long and circuitous route； after
enticing the enemy out of the way； and though starting after him；
to contrive to reach the goal before him； shows knowledge of the
artifice of DEVIATION。
＇Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B。C。 to
relieve the town of O…yu； which was closely invested by a Ch‘in
army。 The King of Chao first consulted Lien P‘o on the
advisability of attempting a relief； but the latter thought the
distance too great； and the intervening country too rugged and
difficult。 His Majesty then turned to Chao She； who fully
admitted the hazardous nature of the march； but finally said：
〃We shall be like two rats fighting in a wholeand the pluckier
one will win！〃 So he left the capital with his army； but had
only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began
throwing up entrenchments。 For 28 days he continued
strengthening his fortifications； and took care that spies should
carry the intelligence to the enemy。 The Ch‘in general was
overjoyed； and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact
that the beleaguered city was in the Han State； and thus not
actually part of Chao territory。 But the spies had no sooner
departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days
and one night； and arrive on the scene of action with such
astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a comman
