criminal psychology-第32章

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ience。　Nobody；　again；　has　the　desire　to　deceive　himself　into　believing　that　the　force　of　burning　powder　or　the　attraction　of　a　magnet　could　have　been　discovered　a　priori。　But　this　truth　does　not　seem　to　have　the　same　validity　with　regard　to　such　processes　as　we　observed　almost　since　breath　began。　With　regard　to　them；　it　is　supposed　that　the　understanding；　by　its　own　activity；　without　the　help　of　experience　can　discover　causal　connections。　It　is　supposed　that　anybody　who　is　suddenly　sent　into　the　world　will　be　able　at　once　to　deduce　that　a　billiard　ball　will　pass　its　motion　on　to　another　by　a　push。

But　that　this　is　impossible　to　derive　a　priori　is　shown　through　the　fact　that　elasticity　is　not　an　externally　recognizable　quality；　so　that　we　may　indeed　say　that　perhaps　no　effect　can　be　recognized　unless　it　is　experienced　at　least　once。　It　can　not　be　deduced　a　priori　that　contact　with　water　makes　one　wet；　or　that　an　object　responds　to　gravity　when　held　in　the　hand；　or　that　it　is　painful　to　keep　a　finger　in　the　fire。　These　facts　have　first　to　be　experienced　either　by　ourselves　or　some　other　person。　Every　cause；　Hume　argues　therefore；　is　different　from　its　effect　and　hence　can　not　be　found　in　the　latter；　and　every　discovery　or　representation　of　it　a　priori　must　remain　voluntary。　All　that　the　understanding　can　do　is　to　simplify　　the　fundamental　causes　of　natural　phenomena　and　to　deduce　the　individual　effects　from　a　few　general　sources；　and　that；　indeed；　only　with　the　aid　of　analogy；　experience；　and　observation。

But　then；　what　is　meant　by　trusting　the　inference　of　another　person；　and　what　in　the　other　person's　narrative　is　free　from　inference？　Such　trust　means；　to　be　convinced　that　the　other　has　made　the　correct　analogy；　has　made　the　right　use　of　experience；　and　has　observed　events　without　prejudice。　That　is　a　great　deal　to　presuppose；　and　whoever　takes　the　trouble　of　examining　however　simple　and　short　a　statement　of　a　witness　with　regard　to　analogy；　experience；　and　observation；　must　finally　perceive　with　fear　how　blindly　the　witness　has　been　trusted。　Whoever　believes　in　knowledge　a　priori　will　have　an　easy　job：　‘‘The　man　has　perceived　it　with　his　mind　and　reproduced　it　therewith；　no　objection　may　be　raised　to　the　soundness　of　his　understanding；　ergo；　everything　may　be　relied　upon　just　as　he　has　testified　to　it。''　But　he　who　believes　in　the　more　uncomfortable；　but　at　least　more　conscientious；　skeptical　doctrine；　has；　at　the　minimum；　some　fair　reason　for　believing　himself　able　to　trust　the　intelligence　of　a　witness。　Yet　he　neither　is　spared　the　task　of　testing　the　correctness　of　the　witness's　analogy；　experience　and　observation。

Apriorism　and　skepticism　define　the　great　difference　in　the　attitude　toward　the　witness。　Both　skeptic　and　apriorist　have　to　test　the　desire　of　the　witness　to　lie；　but　only　the　skeptic　needs　to　test　the　witness's　ability　to　tell　the　truth　and　his　possession　of　sufficient　understanding　to　reproduce　correctly；　to　examine　closely　his　innumerable　inferences　from　analogy；　experience　and　observation。　That　only　the　skeptic　can　be　right　everybody　knows　who　has　at　all　noticed　how　various　people　differ　in　regard　to　analogies；　how　very　different　the　experiences　of　a　single　man　are；　both　in　their　observation　and　interpretation。　To　distinguish　these　differences　clearly　is　the　main　task　of　our　investigation。

There　are　two　conditions　to　consider。　One　is　the　strict　difference　between　what　is　causally　related　and　its　accidental　concomitants；　a　difference　with　regard　to　which　experience　is　so　often　misleading；　for　two　phenomena　may　occur　together　at　the　same　time　without　being　causally　connected。　When　a　man　is　ninety　years　old　and　has　observed；　every　week　in　his　life；　that　in　his　part　of　the　country　there　is　invariably　a　rainfall　every　Tuesday；　this　observation　is　richly　and　often　tested；　yet　nobody　will　get　the　notion　of　causally　connecting　Tuesday　and　rainbut　only　because　such　connection　would　　be　regarded　as　generally　foolish。　If　the　thing；　however；　may　be　attributed　to　coincidence　with　a　little　more　difficulty；　then　it　becomes　easier　to　suppose　a　causal　connection；　e。　g。；　as　when　it　rains　on　All…　souls　day；　or　at　the　new　moon。　If　the　accidental　nature　of　the　connection　is　still　less　obvious；　the　observation　becomes　a　much…　trusted　and　energetically　defended　meteorological　law。　This　happens　in　all　possible　fields；　and　not　only　our　witnesses　but　we　ourselves　often　find　it　very　difficult　to　distinguish　between　causation　and　accident。　The　only　useful　rule　to　follow　is　to　presuppose　accident　wherever　it　is　not　indubitably　and　from　the　first　excluded；　and　carefully　to　examine　the　problem　for　whatever　causal　connection　it　may　possibly　reveal。　‘‘Whatever　is　united　in　any　perception　must　be　united　according　to　a　general　rule；　but　a　great　deal　more　may　be　present　without　having　any　causal　relation。''

The　second　important　condition　was　mentioned　by　Schopenhauer：＇1＇　‘‘As　soon　as　we　have　assigned　causal　force　to　any　great　influence　and　thereby　recognized　that　it　is　efficacious；　then　its　intensification　in　the　face　of　any　resistance　according　to　the　intensity　of　the　resistance　will　produce　finally　the　appropriate　effect。　Whoever　cannot　be　bribed　by　ten　dollars；　but　vacillates；　will　be　bribed　by　twenty…five　or　fifty。''

This　simple　example　may　be　generalized　into　a　golden　rule　for　lawyers　and　requires　them　to　test　the　effect　of　any　force　on　the　accused　at　an　earlier　time　in　the　latter's　life　or　in　other　cases；　i。　e。；　the　early　life　of　the　latter　can　never　be　studied　with　sufficient　care。　This　study　is　of　especial　importance　when　the　question　is　one　of　determining　the　culpability　of　the　accused　with　regard　to　a　certain　crime。　We　have　then　to　ask　whether　he　had　the　motive　in　question；　or　whether　the　crime　could　have　been　of　interest　to　him。　In　this　investigation　the　problem　of　the　necessary　intensity　of　the　influence　in　question　need　not；　for　the　time；　be　considered；　only　its　presence　needs　to　be　determined。　That　it　may　have　disappeared　without　any　demonstrable　special　reason　is　not　supposable；　for　inclinations；　qualities；　and　passions　are　rarely　lost；　they　need　not　become　obvious　so　long　as　opportunity　and　stimulus　are　absent；　and　they　may　be　in　some　degree　suppressed；　but　they　manifest　themselves　as　soon　asSchopenhauer's　twenty…five　or　fifty　dollars　appear。　The　problem　is　most　difficult　when　it　requires　the　conversion　of　certain　related　properties；　e。　g。；　when　the　problem　is　one　of　suspecting　a　person　of　murderous　inclination；　and　all　that

＇1＇　Schopenhauer：　Die　beiden　Grundprobleme　der　Ethik。

　can　be　shown　in　his　past　life　is　the　maltreatment　of　animals。　Or　again；　when　cruelty　has　to　be　shown　and　all　that　is　established　is　great　sensuality。　Or　when　there　is　no　doubt　about　cruelty　and　the　problem　is　one　of　supposing　intense　avarice。　These　questions　of　conversion　are　not　especially　difficult；　but　when　it　must　be　explained　to　what　such　qualities　as　very　exquisite　egoism；　declared　envy；　abnormal　desire　for　honor；　exaggerated　conceit；　and　great　idleness　may　lead　to；　the　problem　requires　great　caution　and　intensive　study。


Section　25。　（c）　Skepticism。


Hume's　skepticism　is　directly　connected　with　the　subject　of　the　preceding　chapter；　but　wants　still　a　few　words　for　itself。　Though　it　is　not　the　lawyer's　problem　to　take　an　attitude　with　regard　to　philosophical　skepticism；　his　work　becomes　essentially　easier　through　the　study　of　Hume's　doctrines。

According　to　these；　all　we　know　and　infer；　in　so　far　as　it　is　unmathematical；　results　from　experience；　and　our　conviction　of　it　and　our　reasoning　about　it；　means　by　which　we　pass　the　bounds　of　sense…perception；　depend　on　sensation；　memory　and　inference　from　causation。　Our　knowledge　of　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect　results　also　from　experience；　and　the　doctrine；　applied　to　the　work　of　the　criminalist；　may　be　formulated　as　follows：　‘‘Whatever　we　take　as　true　is　not　an　intellectual　deduction；　but　an　empirical　proposition。''　In　other　words；　our　presuppositions　and　inferential　knowledge　depend　only　upon　those　innumerable　repetitions　of　events　from　which　we　postulate　that　the　event　recurred　in　the　place　in　question。　This　sets　us　the　problem　of　determining　whether　the　similar　cases　with　which　we　compare　the　present　one　really　are　similar　and　if　they　are　known　in　sufficiently　large　numbers　to　exclude　everything　else。

Consider　a　simple　example。　Suppose　somebody　who　had　traveled　all　through　Europe；　but　had　never　seen　or　heard　of　a　negro；　thought　about　the　pigmentation　of　human　beings：　neither　all　his　thinking　nor　the　assistance　of　all　possible　scientific　means　can　lead　him　to　the　conclusion　that　there　are　also　black　peoplethat　fact　he　can　only　discover；　not　think　out。　If　he　depends　only　on　experience；　he　must　conclude　from　the　millions　of　examples　he　has　observed　that　all　human　beings　are　white。　His　mistake　consists　in　the　fact　that　the　immense　number　of　people　he　has　seen　belong　to　the　inhabitants　of　a　single　zone；　and　that　he　has　_*failed　to　observe_　the　inhabitants　of　other　regions。　

In　our　own　cases　we　need　no　examples；　for　I　know　of　no　inference　which　was　not　made　in　the　following　fashion：　‘‘The　situation　was　so　in　a　hundred　cases；　it　must　be　so　in　this　case。''　We　rarely　ask　whether　we　know　enough　examples；　whether　they　were　the　correct　ones；　and　whether　they　were　exhaustive。　It　will　be　no　mistake　to　assert　that　we　lawyers　do　this　more　or　less　consciously　on　the　supposition　that　we　have　an　immense　collection　of　suggestive　a　priori　inferences　which　the　human　understanding　has　brought　together　for　thousands　of　years；　and　hence　believe　them　to　be　indubitably　certain。　If　we　recognize　that　all　these　presuppositions　are　compounds　of　experience；　and　that　every　experience　may　finally　show　itself　to　be　deceptive　and　false；　if　we　recognize　how　the　actual　progress　of　human　knowledge　consists　in　the　addition　of　one　hundred　new　experiences　to　a　thousand　old　ones；　and　if　we　recognize　that　many　of　the　new　ones　contradict　the　old　ones：　if　we　recognize　the　consequence　that　there　is　no　reason　for　the　mathematical　deduction　from　the　first　to　the　hundred…and…first　case；　we　shall　make　fewer　mistakes　and　do　less　harm。　In　this　regard；　Hume＇1＇　is　very　illuminative。

According　to　Masaryk；＇2＇　the　fundamental　doctrine　of　Humian　skepticism　is　as　follows：　‘‘If　I　have　had　one　and　the　same　experience　ever　so　often；　i。　e。；　if　I　have　seen　the　sun　go　up　100　times；　I　expect　to　see　it　go　up　the　101st　time　the　next　day；　but　I　have　no　guarantee；　no　certainty；　no　evidence　for　this　belief。　Experience　looks　only　to　the　past；　not　to　the　future。　How　can　I　then　discover　the　101st　sunrise　in　the　first　100　sunrises？　Experience　reveals　in　me　the　habit　to　expect　similar　effects　from　similar　circumstances；　but　the　intellect　has　no　share　in　this　expectation。''

All　the　sciences　based　on　experience　are　uncertain　and　without　logical　foundation；　even　though　their　results；　as　a　whole　and　in　the　mass；　are　predictable。　Only　mathematics　offers　certainty　and　evidence。　Therefore；　according　to　Hume；　sciences　based　on　experience　are　unsafe　because　the　recognition　of　causal　connection　depends　on　the　facts　of　experience　and　we　can　attain　to　certain　knowledge　of　the　facts　of　experience　only　on　the　ground　of　the　evident　rel