criminal psychology-第36章

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nd　the　whole　work　has　gone　for　nothing。　Such　occurrences　convince　one　that　no　judge　would　have　been　guilty　of　them　if　the　few　difficulties　concerning　the　fact　in　question　were　not；　because　treated　in　the　light　of　the　effort　required　by　the　logical　work；　quite　neglected。　Nor　does　this　occur　unconsciously；　or　as　a　consequence　of　a　sort　of　lapse　of　memory　concerning　the　meaning　or　the　importance　of　an　empirical　problem；　it　also　happens　at　least　half　consciously　by　way　of　a　characteristic　psychic　process　which　everybody　may　identify　in　his　own　experience：　i。　e。；　the　idea　occurs；　in　some　degree　subconsciously；　that　the　overgreatness　of　the　work　done　in　one　direction　ought　to　be　corrected　by　the　inadequacy　of　the　work　done　in　the　other　direction。　And　this　happens　in　lawyer's　work　often；　and　being　frequently　justifiable；　becomes　habitual。　If　I；　for　example；　have　examined　ten　unanimous　witnesses　concerning　the　same　event　and　have　completely　demonstrated　　the　status　of　the　case；　I　ought；　in　examining　the　last　two　witnesses；　who　are　perhaps　no　longer　needed　but　have　been　summoned　and　appear；　certainly　to　proceed　in　a　rapid　manner。　This　justifiable　neglect　is　then　half　unconsciously　transferred　to　other　procedures　where　there　is　possible　no　equalization　of　the　hypertrophy　of　work　in　one　direction　with　the　dwarfing　of　it　in　another；　and　where　the　mistake　causes　the　result　to　be　wrong。　However　I　may　have　been　bothered　by　the　multiplication　of　ten　groups　of　factors　and　whatever　accuracy　I　may　have　applied　to　a　task　can　not　permit　me　to　relax　my　attention　in　the　addition　of　the　individual　results。　If　I　do　I　am　likely　to　commit　an　error　and　the　error　renders　all　the　previous　labor　worthless。

Indeed；　it　may　be　asserted　that　all　logic　is　futile　where　the　premises　or　a　single　premise　may　be　wrong。　I　expect；　in　truth；　that　the　procedures　here　described　will　be　doubted　to　be　even　possible；　but　doubters　are　recommended　to　examine　a　few　cases　for　the　presence　of　this　sort　of　thing。


Section　27。　（e）　Analogy。

Analogy　is　the　least　negligible　of　all　methods　of　induction　because　it　rests　at　bottom　on　the　postulate　that　one　thing　which　has　a　number　of　qualities　in　common　with　another　will　agree　with　that　other　in　one　or　more　_*additional_　qualities。　In　cases　of　analogy；　identity　is　never　asserted；　indeed；　it　is　excluded；　while　a　certain　parallelism　and　agreement　in　specific　points　are　assumed；　i。　e。；　introduced　tacitly　as　a　mutatis　mutandis。　Consider　Lipps's　examples。　He　calls　analogy　the　transfer　of　judgment　or　the　transition　from　similar　to　similar；　and　he　adds　that　the　value　of　such　a　process　is　very　variable。　If　I　have　perceived　x　times　that　flowers　of　a　certain　color　have　perfume；　I　am　inclined　to　expect　perfume　from　flowers　of　the　same　color　in　x＋1　cases。　If　I　have　observed　x　times　that　clouds　of　a　certain　structure　are　followed　by　rain　I　shall　expect　rain　in　the　x＋1st　case。　The　first　analogy　is　worthless　because　there　is　no　relation　between　color　and　perfume；　the　second　is　of　great　value　because　such　a　relation　does　exist　between　rain　and　clouds。

Simply　stated；　the　difference　between　these　two　examples　does　not　consist　in　the　existence　of　a　relationship　in　the　one　case　and　the　absence　of　a　relationship　in　the　other；　it　consists　in　the　fact　that　in　the　case　of　the　flowers　the　relationship　occurs　now　and　then　but　is　not　permanently　knowable。　It　is　possible　that　there　is　a　natural　law　controlling　the　relation　between　color　and　odor；　and　if　　that　law　were　known　there　would　be　no　question　of　accident　or　of　analogy；　but　of　law。　Our　ignorance　of　such　a　law；　in　spite　of　the　multiplicity　of　instances；　lies　in　the　fact　that　we　are　concerned　only　with　the　converse　relationships　and　not　with　the　common　cause　of　perfume　and　color。　Suppose　I　see　on　the　street　a　large　number　of　people　with　winter　over…coats　and　a　large　number　of　people　with　skates　in　their　hands；　I　would　hardly　ask　whether　the　coats　are　conditioned　or　brought　out　by　the　skates　or　the　skates　by　the　coats。　If　I　do　not　conclude　that　the　cold　weather　is　the　condition　both　of　the　need　of　over…coats　and　the　utility　of　skates；　I　will　suppose　that　there　is　some　unintelligible　reflexive　relation　between　over…coats　and　skates。　If　I　observe　that　on　a　certain　day　every　week　there　regularly　appear　many　well…dressed　people　and　no　workingmen　on　the　street；　if　I　am　ignorant　of　the　fact　that　Sunday　is　the　cause　of　the　appearance　of　the　one　and　the　disappearance　of　the　other；　I　shall　try　in　vain　to　find　out　how　it　happens　that　the　working　people　are　crowded　out　by　the　well…dressed　ones　or　conversely。

The　danger　of　analogy　lies　in　the　fact　that　we　prefer　naturally　to　depend　on　something　already　known；　and　that　the　preference　is　the　greater　in　proportion　to　our　feeling　of　the　strangeness　and　ominousness　of　the　particular　intellectual　or　natural　regions　in　which　we　find　ourselves。　I　have　already　once　demonstrated＇1＇　how　disquieting　it　is　to　notice；　during　the　examination　of　the　jury；　that　the　jurymen　who　ask　questions　try　to　find　some　relation　to　their　own　trades　even　though　this　requires　great　effort；　and　seek　to　bring　the　case　they　are　asking　about　under　the　light　of　their　particular　profession。　So；　however　irrelevant　the　statement　of　a　witness　may　be；　the　merchant　juryman　will　use　it　to　explain　Saldo…Conti；　the　carpenter　juryman　to　explain　carpentry；　the　agriculturist　to　notice　the　farming　of　cattle；　and　then　having　set　the　problem　in　his　own　field　construct　the　most　daring　analogies；　for　use　in　determining　the　guilt　of　the　accused。　And　we　lawyers　are　no　better。　The　more　difficult　and　newer　a　case　is　the　more　are　we　inclined　to　seek　analogies。　We　want　supports；　for　we　do　not　find　firm　natural　laws；　and　in　our　fear　we　reach　out　after　analogies；　not　of　course　in　law；　because　that　is　not　permitted；　but　certainly　in　matters　of　fact。　Witness　X　has　given　difficult　testimony　in　a　certain　case。　We　seek　an　analogy　in　witness　Y　of　an　older　case；　and　we　observe　the　present　issue　thus　analogically；　without　the　least　justification。　We　have　never　yet　seen　drops　of　blood　on　colored　carpets；　yet　we　believe　in　applying　　our　experience　of　blood　stains　on　clothes　and　boots　analogically。　We　have　before　us　a　perfectly　novel　deed　rising　from　perverted　sexual　impulseand　we　presuppose　that　the　accused　is　to　be　treated　altogether　analogously　to　another　in　a　different　case；　although　indeed　the　whole　event　was　different。


＇1＇　Manual　for　Examining　Justices。


Moreover　the　procedure；　where　the　analogy　is　justified；　is　complex。　‘‘With　insight；''　says　Trendelenburg；　‘‘did　the　ancients　regard　analogy　as　important。　The　power　of　analogy　lies　in　the　construction　and　induction　of　a　general　term　which　binds　the　subconcept　with　regard　to　which　a　conclusion　is　desired；　together　with　the　individual　object　which　is　compared　with　the　first；　and　which　is　to　appear　as　a　mediating　concept　but　can　not。　This　new　general　term　is　not；　however；　the　highest　concept　among　the　three　termini　of　the　conclusion；　it　is　the　middle　one　and　is　nothing　else　than　the　terminus　medius　of　the　first　figure。''　This　clear　statement　shows　not　only　how　circumstantial　every　conclusion　from　analogy　is；　but　also　how　little　it　achieves。　There　is　hardly　any　doubt　of　the　well…known　fact　that　science　has　much　to　thank　analogy　for；　since　analogy　is　the　simplest　and　easiest　means　for　progress　in　thought。　If　anything　is　established　in　any　one　direction　but　progress　is　desired　in　another；　then　the　attempt　is　made　to　adapt　what　is　known　to　the　proximate　unknown　and　to　draw　the　possible　inference　by　analogy。　Thousands　upon　thousands　of　analogies　have　been　attempted　and　have　failed；　but　no　matter；　one　successful　one　became　a　hypothesis　and　finally　an　important　natural　law。　In　our　work；　however；　the　case　is　altogether　different；　for　we　are　not　concerned　with　the　construction　of　hypotheses；　we　are　concerned　with　the　discovering　of　truth；　or　with　the　recognition　that　it　cannot　be　discovered。

The　only　place　where　our　problems　permit　of　the　use　of　analogy　is　in　the　making　of　so…called　constructions；　i。　e。；　when　we　aim　to　clarify　or　to　begin　the　explanation　of　a　case　which　is　at　present　unintelligible；　by　making　some　assumption。　The　construction　then　proceeds　in　analogy　to　some　already　well　known　earlier　case。　We　say：　‘‘Suppose　the　case　to　have　been　so　and　so；''　and　then　we　begin　to　test　the　assumption　by　applying　it　to　the　material　before　us；　eliminating　and　constructing　progressively　until　we　get　a　consistent　result。　There　is　no　doubt　that　success　is　frequently　attained　in　this　way　and　that　it　is　often　the　only　way　in　which　a　work　may　be　begun。　At　the　same　time；　it　must　be　recognized　how　dangerous　this　is；　for　in　the　eagerness　of　the　work　it　is　easy　to　forget　that　so　far；　one　is　working　only　according　to　analogy　by　means　of　an　assumption　　still　to　be　proved。　This　assumption　is　in　such　cases　suddenly　considered　as　something　already　proved　and　is　counted　as　such　with　the　consequence　that　the　result　must　be　false。　If　you　add　the　variability　in　value　of　analogy；　a　variability　not　often　immediately　recognized；　the　case　becomes　still　worse。　We　have　never　been　on　the　moon；　have　therefore　apparently　no　right　to　judge　the　conditions　thereand　still　we　knowonly　by　way　of　analogy　that　if　we　jumped　into　the　air　there　we　should　fall　back　to　the　ground。　But　still　further：　we　conclude　again；　by　analogy；　that　there　are　intelligent　beings　on　Mars；　if；　however；　we　were　to　say　how　these　people　might　look；　whether　like　us　or　like　cubes　or　like　threads；　whether　they　are　as　large　as　bees　or　ten　elephants；　we　should　have　to　give　up　because　we　have　not　the　slightest　basis　for　analogy。

In　the　last　analysis；　analogy　depends　upon　the　recurrence　of　similar　conditions。　Therefore　we　tacitly　assume　when　we　judge　by　analogy　that　the　similarity　of　conditions　contains　an　equivalence　of　ultimately　valid　circumstance。　The　certainty　of　analogy　is　as　great　as　the　certainty　of　this　postulate；　and　its　right　as　great　as　the　right　of　this　postulate。

If；　then；　the　postulate　is　little　certain；　we　have　gained　nothing　and　reach　out　into　the　dark；　if　its　certainty　is　great　we　no　longer　have　an　analogy；　we　have　a　natural　law。　Hence；　Whately　uses　the　term　analogy　as　an　expression　for　the　similarity　of　relation；　and　in　this　regard　the　use　of　analogy　for　our　real　work　has　no　special　significance。　Concerning　so…called　false　analogies　and　their　importance　cf。　J。　Schiel's　Die　Methode　der　induktiven　Forschung　（Braunschweig　1868）。


Section　28。　（f）　Probability。

Inasmuch　as　the　work　of　the　criminal　judge　depends　upon　the　proof　of　evidence；　it　is　conceivable　that　the　thing　for　him　most　important　is　that　which　has　evidential　character　or　force。＇1＇　A　sufficient　definition　of　evidence　or　proof　does　not　exist　because　no　bounds　have　been　set　to　the　meaning　of　‘‘Proved。''　All　disciplines　furnish　examples　of　the　fact　that　things　for　a　long　time　had　probable　validity；　later　indubitable　validity；　that　again　some　things　were　considered　proved　and　were　later　shown　to　be　incorrect；　and　that　many　things　at　one　time　wobbly　are　in　various　places；　and　even　among　particular　persons；　supposed　to　be　at　the　limits　of　probability　and　proof。　Es…　　pecially　remarkable　is　the　fact　that　the　concept　of　_*the　proved_　is　very　various