criminal psychology-第4章

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m；　which　Goldschmidt　defines　as　the　affair　of　the　higher　institutions　of　learning；　and　which　is　also　the　ideal　of　our　own　business　in　life。　And　this　task　is　not　too　great。　‘‘Life　is　movement；''　cried　Alois　von　Brinz；＇1＇　in　his　magnificent　inaugural　address。　‘‘Life　is　not　the　thought；　but　the　thinking　which　comes　in　the　fullness　of　action。''

It　may　be　announced　with　joy　and　satisfaction；　that　since　the　publication　of　the　first　edition　of　this　book；　and　bearing　upon　it；　there　came　to　life　a　rich　collection　of　fortuitous　works　which　have　brought　together　valuable　material。　Concerning　the　testimony　of　witnesses；　its　nature　and　value；　concerning　memory；　and　the　types　of　reproduction；　there　is　now　a　considerable　literature。　Everywhere　industrious　hands　are　raised；hands　of　psychologists；　physicians；　and　lawyers；　to　share　in　the　work。　Should　they　go　on　unhurt　we　may　perhaps　repair　the　unhappy　faults　committed　by　our　ancestors　through　stupid　ignorance　and　destructive　use　of　uncritically　collected　material。

＇1＇　A。　v。　Brinz：　ber　Universalitt。　Rektorsrede　1876。




PART　I。

THE　SUBJECTIVE　CONDITIONS　OF　EVIDENCE：　THE　MENTAL　ACTIVITIES　OF　THE　JUDGE。

TITLE　A。　THE　CONDITIONS　OF　TAKING　EVIDENCE。

Topic　I。　METHOD。

Section　I。　（a）　General　Considerations。


SOCRATES；　dealing　in　the　Meno　with　the　teachability　of　virtue；　sends　for　one　of　Meno's　slaves；　to　prove　by　him　the　possibility　of　absolutely　certain　a　priori　knowledge。　The　slave　is　to　determine　the　length　of　a　rectangle；　the　contents　of　which　is　twice　that　of　one　measuring　two　feet；　but　he　is　to　have　no　previous　knowledge　of　the　matter；　and　is　not　to　be　directly　coached　by　Socrates。　He　is　to　discover　the　answer　for　himself。　Actually　the　slave　first　gives　out　an　incorrect　answer。　He　answers　that　the　length　of　a　rectangle　having　twice　the　area　of　the　one　mentioned　is　four　feet；　thinking　that　the　length　doubles　with　the　area。　Thereupon　Socrates　triumphantly　points　out　to　Meno　that　the　slave　does　as　a　matter　of　fact　not　yet　quite　know　the　truth　under　consideration；　but　that　he　really　thinks　he　knows　it；　and　then　Socrates；　in　his　own　Socratic　way；　leads　the　slave　to　the　correct　solution。　This　very　significant　procedure　of　the　philosopher　is　cited　by　Guggenheim＇1＇　as　an　illustration　of　the　essence　of　a　priori　knowledge；　and　when　we　properly　consider　what　we　have　to　do　with　a　witness　who　has　to　relate　any　fact；　we　may　see　in　the　Socratic　method　the　simplest　example　of　our　task。　We　must　never　forget　_that　the　majority　of　mankind　dealing　with　any　subject　whatever　always　believe　that　they　know　and　repeat　the　truth_；　and　even　when　they　say　doubtfully：　‘‘I　believe。　It　seems　to　me；''　there　is；　in　this　tentativeness；　more　meant　than　meets　the　ear。　When　anybody　says：　‘‘I　believe　that''　it　merely　means　that　he　intends　to　insure　himself　against　the　event　of　being　contradicted　by　better　informed　persons；　but　he　certainly　has　not

＇1＇　M。　Guggenheim：　Die　Lehre　vom　aprioristischen　Wissen。　Berlin　1885。

　the　doubt　his　expression　indicates。　When；　however；　the　report　of　some　bare　fact　is　in　question　（‘‘It　rained；''　‘‘It　was　9　o'clock；''　‘‘His　beard　was　brown；''　or　‘‘It　was　8　o'clock；''）　it　does　not　matter　to　the　narrator；　and　if　he　imparts　_*such_　facts　with　the　introduction；　‘‘I　believe；''　then　he　was　really　uncertain。　The　matter　becomes　important　only　where　the　issue　involves　partly…concealed　observations；　conclusions　and　judgments。　In　such　cases　another　factor　entersconceit；　what　the　witness　asserts　he　is　fairly　certain　of　just　because　he　asserts　it；　and　all　the　‘‘I　believes；''　‘‘Perhapses；''　and　‘‘It　seemeds；''　are　merely　insurance　against　all　accidents。

Generally　statements　are　made　without　such　reservations　and；　even　if　the　matter　is　not　long　certain；　with　full　assurance。　What　thus　holds　of　the　daily　life；　holds　also；　and　more　intensely；　of　court…　witnesses；　particularly　in　crucial　matters。　Anybody　experienced　in　their　conduct　comes　to　be　absolutely　convinced　that　witnesses　do　not　know　what　they　know。　A　series　of　assertions　are　made　with　utter　certainty。　Yet　when　these　are　successively　subjected　to　closer　examinations；　tested　for　their　ground　and　source；　only　a　very　small　portion　can　be　retained　unaltered。　Of　course；　one　may　here　overshoot　the　mark。　It　often　happens；　even　in　the　routine　of　daily　life；　that　a　man　may　be　made　to　feel　shaky　in　his　most　absolute　convictions；　by　means　of　an　energetic　attack　and　searching　questions。　Conscientious　and　sanguine　people　are　particularly　easy　subjects　of　such　doubts。　Somebody　narrates　an　event；　questioning　begins　as　to　the　indubitability　of　the　fact；　as　to　the　exclusion　of　possible　deception；　the　narrator　becomes　uncertain；　he　recalls　that；　because　of　a　lively　imagination；　he　has　already　believed　himself　to　have　seen　things　otherwise　than　they　actually　were；　and　finally　he　admits　that　the　matter　might　probably　have　been　different。　During　trials　this　is　still　more　frequent。　The　circumstance　of　being　in　court　of　itself　excites　most　people；　the　consciousness　that　one's　statement　is；　or　may　be；　of　great　significance　increases　the　excitement；　and　the　authoritative　character　of　the　official　subdues　very　many　people　to　conform　their　opinions　to　his。　What　wonder　then；　that　however　much　a　man　may　be　convinced　of　the　correctness　of　his　evidence；　he　may　yet　fail　in　the　face　of　the　doubting　judge　to　know　anything　certainly？

Now　one　of　the　most　difficult　tasks　of　the　criminalist　is　to　hit；　in　just　such　cases；　upon　the　truth；　neither　to　accept　the　testimony　blindly　and　uncritically；　nor　to　render　the　witness；　who　otherwise　　is　telling　the　truth；　vacillating　and　doubtful。　But　it　is　still　more　difficult　to　lead　the　witness；　who　is　not　intentionally　falsifying；　but　has　merely　observed　incorrectly　or　has　made　false　conclusions；　to　a　statement　of　the　truth　as　Socrates　leads　the　slave　in　the　Meno。　It　is　as　modern　as　it　is　comfortable　to　assert　that　this　is　not　the　judge's　businessthat　the　witness　is　to　depose；　his　evidence　is　to　be　accepted；　and　the　judge　is　to　judge。　Yet　it　is　supposed　before　everything　else　that　the　duty　of　the　court　is　to　establish　the　material　truththat　the　formal　truth　is　insufficient。　Moreover；　if　we　notice　false　observations　and　let　them　by；　then；　under　certain　circumstance；　we　are　minus　one　important　piece　of　evidence　_*pro_　and　_*con_；　and　the　whole　case　may　be　turned　topsy　turvy。　At　the　very　least　a　basis　of　development　in　the　presentation　of　evidence　is　so　excluded。　We　shall；　then；　proceed　in　the　Socratic　fashion。　But；　inasmuch　as　we　are　not　concerned　with　mathematics；　and　are　hence　more　badly　placed　in　the　matter　of　proof；　we　shall　have　to　proceed　more　cautiously　and　with　less　certainty；　than　when　the　question　is　merely　one　of　the　area　of　a　square。　On　the　one　hand　we　know　only　in　the　rarest　cases　that　we　are　not　ourselves　mistaken；　so　that　we　must　not；　without　anything　further；　lead　another　to　agree　with　us；　on　the　other　hand　we　must　beware　of　perverting　the　witness　from　his　possibly　sound　opinions。　It　is　not　desirable　to　speak　of　suggestion　in　this　matter；　since；　if　I　believe　that　the　other　fellow　knows　a　matter　better　than　I　and　conform　to　his　opinion；　there　is　as　yet　no　suggestion。　And　this　pure　form　of　change　of　opinion　and　of　openness　to　conviction　is　commonest　among　us。　Whoever　is　able　to　correct　the　witness's　apparently　false　conceptions　and　to　lead　him　to　discover　his　error　of　his　own　accord　and　then　to　speak　the　truth　whoever　can　do　this　and　yet　does　not　go　too　far；　deducing　from　the　facts　nothing　that　does　not　actually　follow　from　themthat　man　is　a　master　among　us。


Section　2。　（b）　The　Method　of　Natural　Science。＇1＇

If　now　we　ask　how　we　are　to　plan　our　work；　what　method　we　are　to　follow；　we　must　agree　that　to　establish　scientifically　the　principles　of　our　discipline　alone　is　not　sufficient。　If　we　are　to　make　progress；　the　daily　routine　also　must　be　scientifically　administered。　Every　sentence；　every　investigation；　every　official　act　must　satisfy　the　same　demand　as　that　made　of　the　entire　juristic　science。　In　this　way　only

＇1＇　Cf。　H。　Gross's　Archiv　VI；　328　and　VIII；　84。

　can　we　rise　above　the　mere　workaday　world　of　manual　labor；　with　its　sense…dulling　disgust；　its　vexatious　monotony；　and　its　frightful　menace　against　law　and　justice。　While　jurists　merely　studied　the　language　of　dead　laws；　expounding　them　with　effort　unceasing；　and；　one　may　complain；　propounding　more；　we　must　have　despaired　of　ever　being　scientific。　And　this　because　law　as　a　science　painfully　sought　justification　in　deduction　from　long　obsolete　norms　and　in　the　explanation　of　texts。　To　jurisprudence　was　left　only　the　empty　shell；　and　a　man　like　Ihering＇1＇　spoke　of　a　‘‘circus　for　dialectico…　acrobatic　tricks。''

Yet　the　scientific　quality　is　right　to　hand。　We　need　only　to　take　hold　of　the　method；　that　for　nearly　a　century　has　shown　itself　to　us　the　most　helpful。　Since　Warnknig　（1819）＇2＇　told　us；　‘‘Jurisprudence　must　become　a　natural　science；''　men　have　rung　changes　upon　this　battle　cry　（cf。　Spitzer＇3＇）。　And　even　if；　because　misunderstood；　it　led　in　some　directions　wrongly；　it　does　seem　as　if　a　genuinely　scientific　direction　might　be　given　to　our　doctrines　and　their　application。　We　know　very　well　that　we　may　not　hurry。　Wherever　people　delayed　in　establishing　the　right　thing　and　then　suddenly　tried　for　it；　they　went　in　their　haste　too　far。　This　is　apparent　not　only　in　the　situations　of　life；　it　is　visible；　in　the　very　recent　hasty　conclusions　of　the　Lombrosists；　in　their　very　good；　but　inadequate　observations；　and　unjustified　and　strained　inferences。　We　are　not　to　figure　the　scientific　method　from　these。＇4＇　It　is　for　us　to　gather　facts　and　to　study　them。　The　drawing　of　inferences　we　may　leave　to　our　more　fortunate　successors。　But　in　the　daily　routine　we　may　vary　this　procedure　a　little。　We　draw　there　_*particular_　inferences　from　correct　and　simple　observations。　‘‘From　facts　to　ideas；''　says　ttingen。＇5＇　‘‘The　world　has　for　several　millenniums　tried　to　subdue　matter　to　preconceptions　and　the　world　has　failed。　Now　the　procedure　is　reversed。''　‘‘From　facts　to　ideas''there　lies　our　road；　let　us　for　once　observe　the　facts　of　life　without　prejudice；　without　maxims　built　on　preconceptions；　let　us　establish　them；　strip　them　of　all　alien　character。　Then　finally；　when　we　find　nothing　more　in　the　least　doubtful；　we　may　theorize　about　them；　and　draw　inferences；　modestly　and　with　caution。

Every　fundamental　investigation　must　first　of　all　establish　the

＇1＇　R。　v。　Ihering：　Scherz　und　Ernst　in　der　Jurisprudenz。　Leipzig　1885。

＇2＇　Warnkonig。　Versuch　einer　Begrndung　des　Rechtes。　Bonn　1819。

＇3＇　H。　Spitzer：　ber　das　Verhltnis　der　Philosophie　zu　den　organischen　Naturwissensehaften。　Leipzig　1883。

＇4＇　Cf。　Gross's　Archiv　VIII　89。

＇5＇　A。　v。　ttingen：　Moralstatistik。　Erlangen　1882。

　nature　of　its　subject　matter。　This　is　the　maxim　of　a　book；　‘‘ber　die　Dummheit''＇1＇　（1886）；　one　of　the　wisest　ever　written。　The　same　axiomatic　proposition　must　dominate　every　legal　task；　but　especially　every　task　of　criminal　law。　It　is　possible　to　read　thousands　upon　thousands　of　testimonies　and　to　make　again　this　identical；　fatiguing；　contrary　observation：　The　two；　witness　and　judge；　have　not　defined　the　nature　of　this　subject；　they　have　no