criminal psychology-第40章

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ary。　Humboldt：　‘‘Man　sees　those　things　as　accident　which　he　can　not　explain　genetically。''　Schiel：　‘‘Whatever　may　not　be　reduced　back　to　law　is　called　accidental。''　Quetelet：　‘‘The　word　chance　serves　officiously　to　hide　our　ignorance。''　Buckle　derives　the　idea　of　chance　from　the　life　of　nomadic　tribes；　which　contains　nothing　firm　and　regulated。　According　to　Trendelenburg　chance　is　that　which　could　not　be　otherwise。　Rosenkranz　says：　Chance　is　a　reality　which　has　only　the　value　of　possibility；　while　Fischer　calls　chance　the　individualized　fact；　and　Lotze　identifies　it　　with　everything　that　is　not　valid　as　a　natural　purpose。　For　Windelband　‘‘chance　consists；　according　to　usage；　in　the　merely　factual　but　not　necessary　transition　from　a　possibility　to　an　actuality。　Chance　is　the　negation　of　necessity。　It　is　a　contradiction　to　say　‘This　happened　by　accident；'　for　the　word　‘by'　expressed　a　cause。''


＇1＇　Windelband：　Die　Lehren　vom　Zufall。　Berlin　1870。


A。　Hfler＇1＇　says　most　intelligently；　that　the　contradiction　of　the　idea　of　chance　by　the　causal　law　may　be　easily　solved　by　indicating　the　especial　relativity　of　the　concept。　（Accidental　with　regard　to　_*one_；　but　otherwise　appearing　as　a　possible　causal　series）。


＇1＇　Cf。　S。　Freud：　Psychopathologie　des　Alltagsleben。


The　lesson　of　these　definitions　is　obvious。　What　we　call　chance　plays　a　great　rle　in　our　legal　work。　On　our　recognizing　a　combination　of　circumstances　as　accidental　the　result　of　the　trial　in　most　cases　depends；　and　the　distinction　between　accident　and　law　depends　upon　the　amount　of　knowledge　concerning　the　events　of　the　daily　life　especially。　Now　the　use　of　this　knowledge　in　particular　cases　consists　in　seeking　out　the　causal　relation　in　a　series　of　events　which　are　adduced　as　proof；　and　in　turning　accident　into　order。　Or；　in　cases　where　the　law　which　unites　or　separates　the　events　can　not　be　discovered；　it　may　consist　in　the　very　cautious　interpretation　of　the　combination　of　events　on　the　principle　_simul　cum　hoc　non　est　propter　hoc_。


Section　30。　（h）　Persuasion　and　Explanation。

How　in　the　course　of　trial　are　people　convinced？　The　criminalist　has　as　presiding　officer　not　only　to　provide　the　truth　which　convinces；　it　is　his　business　as　state　official　to　convince　the　defendant　of　the　correctness　of　the　arguments　adduced；　the　witness　of　his　duty　to　tell　the　truth。　But　he　again　is　often　himself　convinced　by　a　witness　or　an　accused　personcorrectly　or　incorrectly。　Mittermaier＇2＇　calls　conviction　a　condition　in　which　our　belief…it…is…true　depends　on　full　satisfactory　grounds　of　which　we　are　aware。　But　this　state　of　conviction　is　a　goal　to　be　reached　and　our　work　is　not　done　until　the　convincing　material　has　been　provided。　Seeking　the　truth　is　not　enough。　Karl　Gerock　assures　us　that　no　philosophical　system　offers　us　the　full　and　finished　truth；　but　there　is　a　truth　for　the　idealist；　and　to　ask　Pilate's　blas　of　the　first　glance　often　takes　the　prize　from　scholarship。　All　hasty；　decisive　judgment　betrays；　when　it　becomes　habitual；　superficiality　of　observation　and　impiety　against　the　essential　character　of　particular　facts。　Children　know　as　completely　determined　and　certain　a　great　deal　which　is　doubtful　to　the　mature　man''　（V。　Volkmar）。

So；　frequently；　the　simplest　thing　we　are　told　gets　its　value　from　the　manner　of　telling；　or　from　the　person　of　the　narrator。　And　inasmuch　as　we　ourselves　are　much　more　experienced　and　skilful　in　arranging　and　grouping　facts　than　are　our　witnesses　and　the　accused；　it　often　happens　that　we　persuade　these　people　and　that　is　the　matter　which　wants　consideration。

Nobody　will　assert　that　it　will　occur　to　any　judge　to　persuade　a　witness　to　anything　which　he　does　not　thoroughly　believe；　but　we　know　how　often　we　persuade　ourselves　to　some　matter；　and　nothing　is　more　conceivable　than　that　we　might　like　to　see　other　people　agree　with　us　about　it。　I　believe　that　the　criminalist；　because；　let　us　say；　of　his　power；　as　a　rule　takes　his　point　of　view　too　lightly。　Every　one　of　us；　no　doubt；　has　often　begun　his　work　in　a　small　and　inefficient　manner；　has　brought　it　along　with　mistakes　and　scantiness　and　when　finally　he　has　reached　a　somewhat　firm　ground；　he　has　been　convinced　by　his　failures　and　mistakes　of　his　ignorance　and　inadequacy。　Then　he　expected　that　this　conviction　would　be　obvious　also　to　other　people　whom　he　was　examining。　But　this　obviousness　　is　remarkably　absent；　and　all　the　mistakes；　cruelties；　and　miscarriages　of　justice；　have　not　succeeded　in　robbing　it　of　the　dignity　it　possesses　in　the　eyes　of　the　nation。　Perhaps　the　goodwill　which　may　be　presupposed　ought　to　be　substituted　for　the　result；　but　it　is　a　fact　that　the　layman　presupposes　much　more　knowledge；　acuteness；　and　power　in　the　criminalist　than　he　really　possesses。　Then　again；　it　is　conceivable　that　a　single　word　spoken　by　the　judge　has　more　weight　than　it　should　have；　and　then　when　a　real　persuasion　evidently　in　the　best　sense　of　the　wordis　made　use　of；　it　must　be　influential。　I　am　certain　that　every　one　of　us　has　made　the　frightful　observation　that　by　the　end　of　the　examination　the　witness　has　simply　taken　the　point　of　view　of　the　examiner；　and　the　worst　thing　about　this　is　that　the　witness　still　thinks　that　he　is　thinking　in　his　own　way。

The　examiner　knows　the　matter　in　its　relation　much　better；　knows　how　to　express　it　more　beautifully；　and　sets　pretty　theories　going。　The　witness；　to　whom　the　questions　are　suggestive；　becomes　conceited；　likes　to　think　that　he　himself　has　brought　the　matter　out　so　excellently；　and　therefore　is　pleased　to　adopt　the　point　of　view　and　the　theories　of　the　examiner　who　has；　in　reality；　gone　too　far　in　his　eagerness。　There　is　less　danger　of　this　when　educated　people　are　examined　for　these　are　better　able　to　express　themselves；　or　again　when　women　are　examined　for　these　are　too　obstinate　to　be　persuaded；　but　with　the　great　majority　the　danger　is　great；　and　therefore　the　criminalist　can　not　be　told　too　often　how　necessary　it　is　that　he　shall　meet　his　witness　with　the　least　conceivable　use　of　eloquence。

Forensic　persuasion　is　of　especial　importance　and　has　been　considered　so　since　classical　days；　whether　rightly；　is　another　question。　The　orations　of　state　prosecutors　and　lawyers　for　the　defense；　when　made　before　scholarly　judges；　need　not　be　held　important。　If　individuals　are　ever　asked　whether　they　were　persuaded　or　made　doubtful　by　the　prosecutor　or　his　opponent　they　indicate　very　few　instances。　A　scholarly　and　experienced　judge　who　has　not　drawn　any　conclusions　about　the　case　until　the　evidence　was　all　in　need　hardly　pay　much　attention　to　the　pleaders。　It　may　indeed　be　that　the　prosecution　or　defense　may　belittle　or　intensify　one　or　another　bit　of　evidence　which　the　bench　might　not　have　thought　of；　or　they　may　call　attention　to　some　reason　for　severity　or　mercy。　But　on　the　one　hand　if　this　is　important　it　will　already　have　been　touched　in　the　adduction　of　evidence；　and　on　the　other　hand　such　points　are　　generally　banal　and　indifferent　to　the　real　issue　in　the　case。　If　this　be　not　so　it　would　only　indicate　that　either　we　need　a　larger　number　of　judges；　or　even　when　there　are　many　judges　that　one　thing　or　another　may　be　overlooked。

But　with　regard　to　the　jury　the　case　is　quite　different；　it　is　easily　influenced　and　more　than　makes　up　for　the　indifference　of　the　bench。　Whoever　takes　the　trouble　to　study　the　faces　of　the　jury　during　trial；　comes　to　the　conclusion　that　the　speeches　of　the　prosecution　and　defense　are　the　most　important　things　in　the　trial；　that　they　absorb　most　of　the　attention　of　the　jury；　and　that　the　question　of　guilt　or　innocence　does　not　depend　upon　the　number　and　weight　of　the　testimony　but　upon　the　more　or　less　skilful　interpretation　of　it。　This　is　a　reproach　not　to　the　jury　but　to　those　who　demand　from　it　a　service　it　can　not　render。　It　is　first　necessary　to　understand　how　difficult　the　conduct　of　a　trial　is。　In　itself　the　conduct　of　a　jury　trial　is　no　art；　and　when　compared　with　other　tasks　demanded　of　the　criminalist　may　be　third　or　fourth　in　difficulty。　What　is　difficult　is　the　determination　of　the　chronological　order　in　which　to　present　evidence；　i。　e。；　the　drawing　of　the　brief。　If　the　brief　is　well　drawn；　everything　develops　logically　and　psychologically　in　a　good　way　and　the　case　goes　on　well；　but　it　is　a　great　and　really　artistic　task　to　draw　this　brief　properly。　There　are　only　two　possibilities。　If　the　thing　is　not　done；　or　the　brief　is　of　no　use；　the　case　goes　on　irrelevantly；　illogically　and　unintelligibly　and　the　jury　can　not　understand　what　is　happening。　If　the　trick　is　turned；　however；　then　like　every　art　it　requires　preparation　and　intelligence。　And　the　jury　do　not　possess　these；　so　that　the　most　beautiful　work　of　art　passes　by　them　without　effect。　They　therefore　must　turn　their　attention；　to　save　what　can　be　saved；　upon　the　orations　of　the　prosecution　and　defense。　These　reproduce　the　evidence　for　them　in　some　intelligible　fashion　and　the　verdict　will　be　innocence　or　guilt　according　to　the　greater　intelligence　of　one　or　the　other　of　the　contending　parties。　Persuasiveness　at　its　height；　Hume　tells　us；　leaves　little　room　for　intelligence　and　consideration。　It　addresses　itself　entirely　to　the　imagination　and　the　affections；　captures　the　well…inclined　auditors；　and　dominates　their　understanding。　Fortunately　this　height　is　rarely　reached。　In　any　event；　this　height；　which　also　dominates　those　who　know　the　subject；　will　always　be　rare；　yet　the　jury　are　not　people　of　knowledge　and　hence　dominations　ensue；　even　through　attempts　at　persuasiveness　which　have　attained　no　height　whatever。　Hence　the　great　danger。　

The　only　help　against　this　is　in　the　study　by　the　presiding　justice；　not　as　lawyer　but　as　psychologist；　of　the　faces　of　the　jury　while　the　contending　lawyers　make　their　ad