criminal psychology-第41章

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The　only　help　against　this　is　in　the　study　by　the　presiding　justice；　not　as　lawyer　but　as　psychologist；　of　the　faces　of　the　jury　while　the　contending　lawyers　make　their　addresses。　He　must　observe　very　narrowly　and　carefully　every　influence　exercised　by　the　speeches；　which　is　irrelevant　to　the　real　problem；　and　then　in　summing　up　call　it　to　the　attention　of　the　jury　and　bring　them　back　to　the　proper　point　of　view。　The　ability　to　do　this　is　very　marvelous；　but　it　again　is　an　exceedingly　difficult　performance。

Nowadays　persuadability　is　hardly　more　studied　but　anybody　who　has　empirically　attained　some　proficiency　in　it　has　acquired　the　same　tricks　that　are　taught　by　theory。　But　these　must　be　known　if　they　are　to　be　met　effectively。　Hence　the　study　of　the　proper　authors　can　not　be　too　much　recommended。　Without　considering　the　great　authors　of　the　classical　period；　especially　Aristotle　and　Cicero；　there　are　many　modern　ones　who　might　be　named。


Section　31。　（i）　Inference　and　Judgment。

The　judgment　to　be　discussed　in　the　following　section　is　not　the　judgment　of　the　court　but　the　more　general　judgment　which　occurs　in　any　perception。　If　we　pursue　our　tasks　earnestly　we　draw　from　the　simplest　cases　innumerable　inferences　and　we　receive　as　many　inferences　from　those　we　examine。　The　correctness　of　our　work　depends　upon　the　truth　of　both。　I　have　already　indicated　how　very　much　of　the　daily　life　passes　as　simple　and　invincible　sense…perception　even　into　the　determination　of　a　sentence；　although　it　is　often　no　more　than　a　very　complicated　series　of　inferences　each　of　which　may　involve　a　mistake　even　if　the　perception　itself　has　been　correct。　The　frequency　with　which　an　inference　is　made　from　sense…　perception　is　the　more　astonishing　inasmuch　as　it　exceeds　all　that　the　general　and　otherwise　valid　law　of　laziness　permits。　In　fact；　it　contradicts　that　law；　though　perhaps　it　may　not　do　so；　for　a　hasty　inference　from　insufficient　premises　may　be　much　more　comfortable　than　more　careful　observation　and　study。　Such　hasty　inference　is　made　even　with　regard　to　the　most　insignificant　things。　In　the　course　of　an　investigation　we　discover　that　we　have　been　dealing　only　with　inferences　and　that　our　work　therefore　has　been　for　nothing。　Then　again；　we　miss　that　fact；　and　our　results　are　false　and　their　falsehood　is　rarely　sought　in　these　petty　mistakes。　So　the　witness　may　have　‘‘seen''　a　watch　in　such　and　such　a　place　when　in　reality　he　has　only　heard　a　noise　that　he　took　for　the　ticking　of　a　watch　and　hence　_*inferred_　that　there　had　really　been　a　watch；　that　he　had　　seen　it；　and　finally　_*believed_　that　he　had　seen　it。　Another　witness　asserts　that　X　has　many　chickens；　as　a　matter　of　fact　he　has　heard　two　chickens　cluck　and　infers　a　large　number。　Still　another　has　seen　footprints　of　cattle　and　speaks　of　a　herd；　or　he　knows　the　exact　time　of　a　murder　because　at　a　given　time　he　heard　somebody　sigh；　etc。　There　would　be　little　difficulty　if　people　told　us　how　they　had　inferred；　for　then　a　test　by　means　of　careful　questions　would　be　easy　enoughbut　they　do　not　tell；　and　when　we　examine　ourselves　we　discover　that　we　do　exactly　the　same　thing　and　often　believe　and　assert　that　we　have　seen　or　heard　or　smelt　or　felt　although　we　have　only　inferred　these　things。＇1＇　Here　belong　all　cases　of　correct　or　partly　correct　inference　and　of　false　inference　from　false　sense　perception。　I　recall　the　oft…cited　story　in　which　a　whole　judicial　commission　smelt　a　disgusting　odor　while　a　coffin　was　being　exhumed　only　to　discover　that　it　was　empty。　If　the　coffin；　for　one　reason　or　another；　had　not　been　opened　all　those　present　would　have　taken　oath　that　they　had　an　indubitable　perception　although　the　latter　was　only　inferred　from　its　precedent　condition。


＇1＇　Cf。　H。　Gross；　Korrigierte　Vorstellungen；　in　the　Archiv；　X；　109。


Exner＇2＇　cites　the　excellent　example　in　which　a　mother　becomes　frightened　while　her　child　cries；　not　because　the　cry　as　such　sounds　so　terrible　as　because　of　its　combination　with　the　consciousness　that　it　comes　from　her　own　child　and　that　something　might　have　happened　to　it。　It　is　asserted；　and　I　think　rightly；　that　verbal　associations　have　a　considerable　share　in　such　cases。　As　Stricker＇3＇　expresses　it；　the　form　of　any　conceptual　complex　whatever；　brings　out　its　appropriate　word。　If　we　see　the　_*thing_　watch；　we　get　the　_*word_　watch。　If　we　see　a　man　with　a　definite　symptom　of　consumption　the　word　tuberculosis　occurs　at　once。　The　last　example　is　rather　more　significant　because　when　the　whole　complex　appears　mistakes　are　more　remote　than　when　merely　one　or　another　‘‘safe''　symptom　permits　the　appearance　of　the　word　in　question。　What　is　safe　to　one　mind　need　not　be　so　to　another；　and　the　notion　as　to　the　certainty　of　any　symptom　changes　with　time　and　place　and　person。　Mistakes　are　especially　possible　when　people　are　so　certain　of　their　‘‘safe''　symptoms　that　they　do　not　examine　how　they　inferred　from　them。　This　inference；　however；　is　directly　related　to　the　appearance　of　the　word。　Return　to　the　example　mentioned　above；　and　suppose　that　A　has　discovered　a　‘‘safe''　symptom　of　consumption　in　B　and　the　　word　tuberculosis　occurs　to　him。　But　the　occurrence　does　not　leave　him　with　the　word　merely；　there　is　a　direct　inference　‘‘B　has　tuberculosis。''　We　never　begin　anything　with　the　word　alone；　we　attach　it　immediately　to　some　fact　and　in　the　present　case　it　has　become；　as　usual；　a　judgment。　The　thought…movement　of　him　who　has　heard　this　judgment；　however；　turns　backward　and　he　supposes　that　the　judge　has　had　a　long　series　of　sense…perceptions　from　which　he　has　derived　his　inference。　And　in　fact　he　has　had　only　one　perception；　the　reliability　of　which　is　often　questionable。


＇2＇　S。　Exner：　Entwurf　zu　einer　physiologisehen　Erklrung　der　psychischen　Erscheinungen。　Leipzig　1894。

＇3＇　Studien　ber　die　Assoziation　der　Vorstellungen。　Vienna　1883。


Then　there　is　the　additional　difficulty　that　in　every　inference　there　are　leaps　made　by　each　inferer　according　to　his　character　and　training。　And　the　maker　does　not　consider　whether　the　other　fellow　can　make　similar　leaps　or　whether　his　route　is　different。　E。　g。；　when　an　English　philosopher　says；　‘‘We　really　ought　not　to　expect　that　the　manufacture　of　woolens　shall　be　perfected　by　a　nation　which　knows　no　astronomy；''we　are　likely　to　say　that　the　sentence　is　silly；　another　might　say　that　it　is　paradoxical　and　a　third　that　it　is　quite　correct；　for　what　is　missing　is　merely　the　proposition　that　the　grade　of　culture　made　possible　by　astronomy　is　such　as　to　require　textile　proficiency　also。　‘‘In　conversation　the　simplest　case　of　skipping　is　where　the　conclusion　is　drawn　directly　from　the　minor　premise。　But　many　other　inferences　are　omitted；　as　in　the　case　of　real　thinking。　In　giving　information　there　is　review　of　the　thinking　of　other　people；　women　and　untrained　people　do　not　do　this；　and　hence　the　disconnectedness　of　their　conversation。''＇1＇　In　this　fact　is　the　danger　in　examining　witnesses；　inasmuch　as　we　involuntarily　interpolate　the　missing　details　in　the　skipping　inferences；　but　do　it　according　to　our　own　knowledge　of　the　facts。　Hence；　a　test　of　the　correctness　of　the　other　man's　inference　becomes　either　quite　impossible　or　is　developed　coarsely。　In　the　careful　observation　of　leaping　inferences　made　by　witnessesand　not　merely　by　women　and　the　uneducatedit　will　be　seen　that　the　inference　one　might　oneself　make　might　either　have　been　different　or　have　proceeded　in　a　different　way。　If；　then；　all　the　premises　are　tested　a　different　result　from　that　of　the　witness　is　obtained。　It　is　well　known　how　identical　premises　permit　of　different　conclusions　by　different　people。


＇1＇　von　Hartmann：　Philosophie　des　Unbewussten。　Berlin　1869。


In　such　inferences　certain　remarkable　things　occur　which；　as　a　rule；　have　a　given　relation　to　the　occupation　of　the　witness。　So；　e。　g。；　people　inclined　to　mathematics　make　the　greatest　leaps；　and　though　these　may　be　comparatively　and　frequently　correct；　the　　danger　of　mistake　is　not　insignificant　when　the　mathematician　deals　in　his　mathematical　fashion　with　unmathematical　things。

Another　danger　lies　in　the　testimony　of　witnesses　who　have　a　certain　sense　of　form　in　representation　and　whose　inferential　leaps　consists　in　their　omitting　the　detailed　expression　and　in　inserting　the　notion　of　form　instead。　I　learned　of　this　notable　psychosis　from　a　bookkeeper　of　a　large　factory；　who　had　to　provide　for　the　test　of　numberless　additions。　It　was　his　notion　that　if　we　were　to　add　two　and　three　are　five；　and　six　are　eleven；　and　seven　are　eighteen　we　should　never　finish　adding；　and　since　the　avoidance　of　mistakes　requires　such　adding　we　must　so　contrive　that　the　image　of　two　and　three　shall　immediately　call　forth　the　image　of　five。　Now　this　mental　image　of　five　is　added　with　the　actual　six　and　gives　eleven；　etc。　According　to　this　we　do　not　add；　we　see　only　a　series　of　images；　and　so　rapidly　that　we　can　follow　with　a　pencil　but　slowly。　And　the　images　are　so　certain　that　mistake　is　impossible。　‘‘You　know　how　9　looks？　Well；　just　as　certainly　we　know　what　the　image　of　27　and　4　is　like；　the　image　of　31　occurs　without　change。''

This；　as　it　happens；　is　a　procedure　possible　only　to　a　limited　type；　but　this　type　occurs　not　only　among　bookkeepers。　When　any　one　of　such　persons　unites　two　events　he　does　not　consider　what　may　result　from　such　a　union；　he　sees；　if　I　may　say　so；　only　a　resulting　image。　This　image；　however；　is　not　so　indubitably　certain　as　in　the　case　of　numbers；　and　it　may　take　all　kinds　of　forms；　the　correctness　of　which　is　not　altogether　probable。　E。　g。；　the　witness　sees　two　forms　in　the　dark　and　the　flash　of　a　knife　and　hears　a　cry。　If　he　belongs　to　the　type　under　discussion　he　does　not　consider　that　he　might　have　been　so　frightened　by　the　flashing　knife　as　to　have　cried　out；　or　that　he　had　himself　proceeded　to　attack　with　a　stick　and　that　the　other　fellow　did　the　yelling；　or　that　a　stab　or　cut　had　preceded　the　cryno；　he　saw　the　image　of　the　two　forms　and　the　knife　and　he　heard　the　cry　and　these　leap　together　into　an　image。　i。　e。；　one　of　the　forms　has　a　cut　above　his　brow。　And　these　leaps　occur　so　swiftly　and　with　such　assurance　that　the　witness　in　question　often　believes　himself　to　have　seen　what　he　infers　and　swears　to　it。

There　are　a　great　many　similar　processes　at　the　bottom　of　impressions　that　depend　only　upon　swift　and　unconscious　inference。　Suppose；　e。　g。；　that　I　am　shown　the　photograph　of　a　small　section　of　a　garden；　through　which　a　team　is　passing。　Although　I　observe　the　image　of　only　a　small　portion　of　the　garden　and　therefore　have　no　notion　of　its　extent；　still；　in　speaking　of　it；　I　shall　proba…　　bly　speak　of　a　very　big　garden。　I　have　inferred　swiftly　and　unconsciously　that　in　the　fact　that　a　wagon　and　horses　were　present　in　the　pictured　portion　of　the　garden；　is　implied　great　width　of　road；　for　even　gardens　of　average　size　do　not　have　such　wide　roads　as　to　admit　wagons；　the　latter　occurring　only　in　parks　and　great　gardens。　Hence　my　conclusion：　the　garden　must　be　very　big。　Such　inferences＇1＇　are　frequent；　whence　the　question　as　to　the　source　and　the　probability　of　the　witness's　information；　whether　it　is　positive　or　only　an　impression。　Evidently　such　an　imp