criminal psychology-第42章

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sion。　Evidently　such　an　impression　may　be　correct。　It　will　be　correct　often；　inasmuch　as　impressions　occur　only　when　inferences　have　been　made　and　tested　repeatedly。　But　it　is　necessary　in　any　case　to　review　the　sequence　of　inferences　which　led　to　this　impression　and　to　examine　their　correctness。　Unfortunately　the　witness　is　rarely　aware　whether　he　has　perceived　or　merely　inferred。


＇1＇　Cf。　Gross's　Archiv；　I；　93；　II；　140；　III；　250；　VII；　155。


Examination　is　especially　important　when　the　impression　has　been　made　after　the　observation　of　a　few　marks　or　only　a　single　one　and　not　very　essential　one　at　that。　In　the　example　of　the　team　the　impression　may　have　been　attained　by　inference；　but　frequently　it　will　have　been　attained　through　some　unessential；　purely　personal；　determinative　characteristic。　‘‘Just　as　the　ancient　guest　recognizes　his　friend　by　fitting　halves　of　the　ring；　so　we　recognize　the　object　and　its　constitution　from　one　single　characteristic；　and　hence　the　whole　vision　of　it　is　vivified　by　that　characteristic。''＇2＇


＇2＇　H。　Aubert：　Physiologie　der　Netzhaut。　Breslau　1865。


All　this　is　very　well　if　no　mistakes　are　made。　When　Tertullian　said；　‘‘Credo　quia　impossibile　est；''　we　will　allow　honesty　of　statement　to　this　great　scholar；　especially　as　he　was　speaking　about　matters　of　religion；　but　when　Socrates　said　of　the　works　of　Heraclitus　the　Obscure：　‘‘What　I　understand　of　it　is　good；　I　think　that　what　I　do　not　understand　is　also　good''he　was　not　in　earnest。　Now　the　case　of　many　people　who　are　not　as　wise　as　Tertullian　and　Socrates　is　identical　with　theirs。　Numerous　examinations　of　witnesses　made　me　think　of　Tertullian's　maxim；　for　the　testimonies　presented　the　most　improbable　things　as　facts。　And　when　they　even　explained　the　most　unintelligible　things　I　thought：　‘‘And　what　you　do　not　understand　is　also　good。''

This　belief　of　uncultured　people　in　their　own　intelligence　has　been　most　excellently　portrayed　by　Wieland　in　his　immortal　‘‘Abderites。''　The　fourth　philosopher　says：　‘‘What　you　call　the　world　　is　essentially　an　infinite　series　of　worlds　which　envelop　one　another　like　the　skin　of　an　onion。''　‘‘Very　clear；''　said　the　Abderites；　and　thought　they　understood　the　philosopher　because　they　knew　perfectly　well　what　an　onion　looked　like。　The　inference　which　is　drawn　from　the　comprehension　of　one　term　in　a　comparison　to　the　comprehension　of　the　other　is　one　of　the　most　important　reasons　for　the　occurrence　of　so　many　misunderstandings。　The　example；　as　such；　is　understood；　but　its　application　to　the　assertion　and　the　question　whether　the　latter　is　also　made　clear　by　the　example　are　forgotten。　This　explains　the　well　known　and　supreme　power　of　examples　and　comparisons；　and　hence　the　wise　of　all　times　have　used　comparisons　in　speaking　to　the　poor　in　spirit。　Hence；　too；　the　great　effect　of　comparisons；　and　also　the　numerous　and　coarse　misunderstandings　and　the　effort　of　the　untrained　and　unintelligent　to　clarify　those　things　they　do　not　understand　by　means　of　comparisons。　Fortunately　they　have；　in　trying　to　explain　the　thing　to　other　people；　the　habit　of　making　use　of　these　difficultly　discovered　comparisons　so　that　the　others；　if　they　are　only　sufficiently　observant；　may　succeed　in　testing　the　correctness　of　the　inference　from　one　term　in　a　comparison　to　the　other。　We　do　this　frequently　in　examining　witnesses；　and　we　discover　that　the　witness　has　made　use　of　a　figure　to　clarify　some　unintelligible　point　and　that　he　necessarily　understands　it　since　it　lies　within　the　field　of　his　instruments　of　thought。　But　what　is　compared　remains　as　confused　to　him　as　before。　The　test　of　it；　therefore；　is　very　tiring　and　mainly　without　results；　because　one　rarely　succeeds　in　liberating　a　man　from　some　figure　discovered　with　difficulty。　He　always　returns　to　it　because　he　understands　it；　though　really　not　what　he　compares。　But　what　is　gained　in　such　a　case　is　not　little；　for　the　certainty　that；　so　revealed；　the　witness　does　not　understand　the　matter　in　hand；　easily　determines　the　value　of　his　testimony。

The　fullness　of　the　possibilities　under　which　anything　may　be　asserted　is　also　of　importance　in　this　matter。　The　inference　that　a　thing　is　impossible　is　generally　made　by　most　people　in　such　wise　that　they　first　consider　the　details　of　the　eventualities　they　already　know；　or　immediately　present。　Then；　when　these　are　before　them；　they　infer　that　the　matter　is　quite　impossibleand　whether　one　or　more　different　eventualities　have　missed　of　consideration；　is　not　studied　at　all。　Our　kindly　professor　of　physics　once　told　us：　‘‘Today　I　intended　to　show　you　the　beautiful　experiments　in　the　interference　of　lightbut　it　can　not　be　observed　in　daylight　and　when　　I　draw　the　curtains　you　raise　rough…house。　The　demonstration　is　therefore　impossible　and　I　take　the　instruments　away。''　The　good　man　did　not　consider　the　other　eventuality；　that　we　might　be　depended　upon　to　behave　decently　even　if　the　curtains　were　drawn。

Hence　the　rule　that　a　witness's　assertion　that　a　thing　is　impossible　must　never　be　trusted。　Take　the　simplest　example。　The　witness　assures　us　that　it　is　impossible　for　a　theft　to　have　been　committed　by　some　stranger　from　outside。　If　you　ask　him　why；　he　will　probably　tell　you：　‘‘Because　the　door　was　bolted　and　the　windows　barred。''　The　eventuality　that　the　thief　might　have　entered　by　way　of　the　chimney；　or　have　sent　a　child　between　the　bars　of　the　window；　or　have　made　use　of　some　peculiar　instrument；　etc。；　are　not　considered；　and　would　not　be　if　the　question　concerning　the　ground　of　the　inference　had　not　been　put。

We　must　especially　remember　that　we　criminalists　‘‘must　not　dally　with　mathematical　truth　but　must　seek　historical　truth。　We　start　with　a　mass　of　details；　unite　them；　and　succeed　by　means　of　this　union　and　test　in　attaining　a　result　which　permits　us　to　judge　concerning　the　existence　and　the　characteristics　of　past　events。''　The　material　of　our　work　lies　in　the　mass　of　details；　and　the　manner　and　reliability　of　its　presentation　determines　the　certainty　of　our　inferences。

Seen　more　closely　the　winning　of　this　material　may　be　described　as　Hume　describes　it：＇1＇　‘‘If　we　would　satisfy　ourselves；　therefore；　concerning　the　nature　of　that　evidence　which　assures　us　of　matters　of　fact；　we　must　inquire　how　we　arrive　at　the　knowledge　of　cause　and　effect。　I　shall　venture　to　affirm　as　a　general　proposition　which　admits　of　no　exception；　that　the　knowledge　of　this　relation　is　not；　in　any　instance；　attained　by　reasonings　a　priori；　but　arises　entirely　from　experience；　when　we　find　that　any　particular　objects　are　constantly　conjoined　with　each　other；　。　。　。　nor　can　our　reason；　unassisted　by　experience；　ever　draw　any　inference　concerning　real　existence　and　matter　of　fact。''


＇1＇　David　Hume：　Enquiry；　p。　33　（Open　Court　Ed。）。


In　the　course　of　his　explanation　Hume　presents　two　propositions；

（1）　I　have　found　that　such　an　object　has　always　been　attended　with　such　an　effect。

（2）　I　foresee　that　other　objects　which　are　in　appearance　similar；　will　be　attended　with　similar　effects。

He　goes　on：　‘‘I　shall　allow；　if　you　please；　that　the　one　proposition　may　justly　be　inferred　from　the　other；　I　know　in　fact　that　it　always　　is　inferred。　But　if　you　insist　that　the　inference　is　made　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　I　desire　you　to　produce　that　chain　of　reasoning。　The　connection　between　these　propositions　is　not　intuitive。　There　is　required　a　medium　which　may　enable　the　mind　to　draw　such　an　inference；　if；　indeed；　it　be　drawn　by　reasoning　and　argument。　What　the　medium　is；　I　must　confess；　passes　my　comprehension；　and　it　is　incumbent　on　those　to　produce　it　who　assert　that　it　exists；　and　is　the　origin　of　all　our　conclusions　concerning　matters　of　fact。''

If　we　regard　the　matter　more　closely　we　may　say　with　certainty：　This　medium　exists　not　as　a　substance　but　as　a　transition。　When　I　speak　in　the　proposition　of　‘‘such　an　object；''　I　already　have　‘‘similar''　in　mind；　inasmuch　as　there　is　nothing　absolutely　like　anything　else；　and　when　I　say　in　the　first　proposition；　‘‘such　an　object；''　I　have　already　passed　into　the　assertion　made　in　the　second　proposition。


Suppose　that　we　take　these　propositions　concretely：

（1）　I　have　discovered　that　bread　made　of　corn　has　a　nourishing　effect。

（2）　I　foresee　that　other　apparently　similar　objects；　e。　g。；　wheat；　will　have　a　like　effect。

I　could　not　make　various　experiments　with　the　same　corn　in　case　（1）。　I　could　handle　corn　taken　as　such　from　one　point　of　view；　or　considered　as　such　from　another；　i。　e。；　I　could　only　experiment　with　very　similar　objects。　I　can　therefore　make　these　experiments　with　corn　from　progressively　remoter　starting　points；　or　soils；　and　finally　with　corn　from　Barbary　and　East　Africa；　so　that　there　can　no　longer　be　any　question　of　identity　but　only　of　similarity。　And　finally　I　can　compare　two　harvests　of　corn　which　have　less　similarity　than　certain　species　of　corn　and　certain　species　of　wheat。　I　am　therefore　entitled　to　speak　of　identical　or　similar　in　the　first　proposition　as　much　as　in　the　second。　One　proposition　has　led　into　another　and　the　connection　between　them　has　been　discovered。

The　criminological　importance　of　this　‘‘connection''　lies　in　the　fact　that　the　correctness　of　our　inferences　depends　upon　its　discovery。　We　work　continuously　with　these　two　Humian　propositions；　and　we　always　make　our　assertion；　first；　that　some　things　are　related　as　cause　and　effect；　and　we　join　the　present　case　to　that　because　we　consider　it　similar。　If　it　is　really　similar；　and　the　connection　of　the　first　and　the　second　proposition　are　actually　correct；　the　truth　of　the　inference　is　attained。　We　need　not　count　the　unexplained　wonders　of　numerical　relations　in　the　result。　D'Alembert　　asserts：　‘‘It　seems　as　if　there　were　some　law　of　nature　which　more　frequently　prevents　the　occurrence　of　regular　than　irregular　combinations；　those　of　the　first　kind　are　mathematically；　but　not　physically；　more　probable。　When　we　see　that　high　numbers　are　thrown　with　some　one　die；　we　are　immediately　inclined　to　call　that　die　false。''　And　John　Stuart　Mill　adds；　that　d'Alembert　should　have　set　the　problem　in　the　form　of　asking　whether　he　would　believe　in　the　die　if；　after　having　examined　it　and　found　it　right；　somebody　announced　that　ten　sixes　had　been　cast　with　it。

We　may　go　still　further　and　assert　that　we　are　generally　inclined　to　consider　an　inference　wrong　which　indicates　that　accidental　matters　have　occurred　in　regular　numerical　relation。　Who　believes　the　hunter's　story　that　he　has　shot　100　hares　in　the　past　week；　or　the　gambler's　that　he　has　won　1000　dollars；　or　the　sick　man's；　that　he　was　sick　ten　times？　It　will　be　supposed　at　the　very　least　that　each　is　merely　indicating　an　approximately　round　sum。　Ninety…six　hares；　987　dollars；　and　eleven　illnesses　will　sound　more　probable。　And　this　goes　so　far　that　during　examinations；　witnesses　are　shy　of　naming　such　‘‘improbable　ratios；''　if　they　at　all　care　to　have　their　testimony　believed。　Then　again；　many　judges　are　in　no　wise　slow　to　jump　at　such　a　number　and　to　demand　an　‘‘accurate　statement；''　or　eves　immediately　to　decide　that　the　witness　is　talking　only　‘‘about。''　How　deep…rooted　such　views　are　is　indicated　by　the　circumstance　that　bankers　and　other　merchant