criminal psychology-第43章

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t。''　How　deep…rooted　such　views　are　is　indicated　by　the　circumstance　that　bankers　and　other　merchants　of　lottery　tickets　find　that　tickets　with　‘‘pretty　numbers''　are　difficult　to　sell。　A　ticket　of　series　1000；　number　100　is　altogether　unsalable；　for　such　a　number　‘‘can　not　possibly　be　sold。''　Then　again；　if　one　has　to　count　up　a　column　of　accidental　figures　and　the　sum　is　1000；　the　correctness　of　the　sum　is　always　doubted。

Here　are　facts　which　are　indubitable　and　unexplained。　We　must　therefore　agree　neither　to　distrust　so…called　round　numbers；　nor　to　place　particular　reliance　on　quite　irregular　figures。　Both　should　be　examined。

It　may　be　that　the　judgment　of　the　correctness　of　an　inference　is　made　analogously　to　that　of　numbers　and　that　the　latter　exercise　an　influence　on　the　judgment　which　is　as　much　conceded　popularly　as　it　is　actually　combated。　Since　Kant；　it　has　been　quite　discovered　that　the　judgment　that　fools　are　in　the　majority　must　lead　through　many　more　such　truths　in　judgingand　it　is　indifferent　whether　the　judgment　dealt　with　is　that　of　the　law　court　or　of　a　voting　legislature　or　mere　judgments　as　such。　

Schiel　says；　‘‘It　has　been　frequently　asserted　that　a　judgment　is　more　probably　correct　according　to　the　number　of　judges　and　jury。　Quite　apart　from　the　fact　that　the　judge　is　less　careful；　makes　less　effort；　and　feels　less　responsibility　when　he　has　associates；　this　is　a　false　inference　from　an　enormous　average　of　cases　which　are　necessarily　remote　from　any　average　whatever。　And　when　certain　prejudices　or　weaknesses　of　mind　are　added；　the　mistake　multiplies。　Whoever　accurately　follows；　if　he　can　avoid　getting　bored；　the　voting　of　bodies；　and　considers　by　themselves　individual　opinions　about　the　subject；　they　having　remained　individual　against　large　majorities　and　hence　worthy　of　being　subjected　to　a　cold　and　unprejudiced　examination；　will　learn　some　rare　facts。　It　is　especially　interesting　to　study　the　judgment　of　the　full　bench　with　regard　to　a　case　which　has　been　falsely　judged；　surprisingly　often　only　a　single　individual　voice　has　spoken　correctly。　This　fact　is　a　warning　to　the　judge　in　such　cases　carefully　to　listen　to　the　individual　opinion　and　to　consider　that　it　is　very　likely　to　deserve　study　just　because　it　is　so　significantly　in　the　minority。

The　same　thing　is　to　be　kept　in　mind　when　a　thing　is　asserted　by　a　large　number　of　witnesses。　Apart　from　the　fact　that　they　depend　upon　one　another；　that　they　suggest　to　one　another；　it　is　also　easily　possible；　especially　if　any　source　of　error　is　present；　that　the　latter　shall　have　influenced　all　the　witnesses。

Whether　a　judgment　has　been　made　by　a　single　judge　or　is　the　verdict　of　any　number　of　jurymen　is　quite　indifferent　since　the　correctness　of　a　judgment　does　not　lie　in　numbers。　Exner　says；　‘‘The　degree　of　probability　of　a　judgment's　correctness　depends　upon　the　richness　of　the　field　of　the　associations　brought　to　bear　in　establishing　it。　The　value　of　knowledge　is　judicially　constituted　in　this　fact；　for　it　is　in　essence　the　expansion　of　the　scope　of　association。　And　the　value　is　proportional　to　the　richness　of　the　associations　between　the　present　fact　and　the　knowledge　required。''　This　is　one　of　the　most　important　of　the　doctrines　we　have　to　keep　in　mind；　and　it　controverts　altogether　those　who　suppose　that　we　ought　to　be　satisfied　with　the　knowledge　of　some　dozens　of　statutes；　a　few　commentaries；　and　so　and　so　many　precedents。

If　we　add　that　‘‘every　judgment　is　an　identification　and　that　in　every　judgment　we　assert　that　the　content　represented　is　identical　in　spite　of　two　different　associative　relationships；''＇1＇　it　must　become　clear　what　dangers　we　undergo　if　the　associative　relationships　of　　a　judge　are　too　poor　and　narrow。　As　Mittermaier　said　seventy　years　ago：　‘‘There　are　enough　cases　in　which　the　weight　of　the　evidence　is　so　great　that　all　judges　are　convinced　of　the　truth　in　the　same　way。　But　in　itself　what　determines　the　judgment　is　the　essential　character　of　him　who　makes　it。''　What　he　means　by　essential　character　has　already　been　indicated。


＇1＇　H。　Mnsterberg：　Beitrge　zur　experimentellen　Psychologie；　III。　Freiburg。


We　have　yet　to　consider　the　question　of　the　value　of　inferences　made　by　a　witness　from　his　own　combinations　of　facts；　or　his　descriptions。　The　necessity；　in　such　cases；　of　redoubled　and　numerous　examinations　is　often　overlooked。　Suppose；　for　example；　that　the　witness　does　not　know　a　certain　important　date；　but　by　combining　what　he　does　know；　infers　it　to　have　been　the　second　of　June；　on　which　day　the　event　under　discussion　took　place。　He　makes　the　inference　because　at　the　time　he　had　a　call　from　A；　who　was　in　the　habit　of　coming　on　Wednesdays；　but　there　could　be　no　Wednesday　after　June　seventh　because　the　witness　had　gone　on　a　long　journey　on　that　day；　and　it　could　not　have　been　May　26　because　this　day　preceded　a　holiday　and　the　shop　was　open　late；　a　thing　not　done　on　the　day　A　called。　Nor；　moreover；　could　the　date　have　been　May　20；　because　it　was　very　warm　on　the　day　in　question；　and　the　temperature　began　to　rise　only　after　May　20。　In　view　of　these　facts　the　event　under　discussion　must　have　occurred　upon　June　2nd　and　only　on　that　day。

As　a　rule；　such　combinations　are　very　influential　because　they　appear　cautious；　wise　and　convincing。　They　impose　upon　people　without　inclination　toward　such　processes。　More　so　than　they　have　a　right　to；　inasmuch　as　they　present　little　difficulty　to　anybody　who　is　accustomed　to　them　and　to　whom　they　occur　almost　spontaneously。　As　usually　a　thing　that　makes　a　great　impression　upon　us　is　not　especially　examined；　but　is　accepted　as　astounding　and　indubitable；　so　here。　But　how　very　necessary　it　is　carefully　to　examine　such　things　and　to　consider　whether　the　single　premises　are　sound；　the　example　in　question　or　any　other　example　will　show。　The　individual　dates；　the　facts　and　assumptions　may　easily　be　mistaken；　and　the　smallest　oversight　may　render　the　result　false；　or　at　least　not　convincing。

The　examination　of　manuscripts　is　still　more　difficult。　What　is　written　has　a　certain　convincing　power；　not　only　on　others　but　on　the　writer；　and　much　as　we　may　be　willing　to　doubt　and　to　improve　what　has　been　written　immediately　or　at　most　a　short　time　ago；　a　manuscript　of　some　age　has　always　a　kind　of　authority　and　we　　give　it　correctness　cheaply　when　that　is　in　question。　In　any　event　there　regularly　arises　in　such　a　case　the　problem　whether　the　written　description　is　quite　correct；　and　as　regularly　the　answer　is　a　convinced　affirmative。　It　is　impossible　to　give　any　general　rule　for　testing　such　affirmation。　Ordinarily　some　clearness　may　be　attained　by　paying　attention　to　the　purpose　of　the　manuscript；　especially　in　order　to　ascertain　its　sources　and　the　personality　of　the　writer。　There　is　much　in　the　external　form　of　the　manuscript。　Not　that　especial　care　and　order　in　the　notes　are　particularly　significant；　I　once　published　the　accounts　of　an　old　peasant　who　could　neither　read　nor　write；　and　his　accounts　with　a　neighbor　were　done　in　untrained　but　very　clear　fashion；　and　were　accepted　as　indubitable　in　a　civil　case。　The　purposiveness；　order；　and　continuity　of　a　manuscript　indicate　that　it　was　not　written　after　the　event；　and　are　therefore；　together　with　the　reason　for　having　written　it　and　obviously　with　the　personality　of　the　writer；　determinative　of　its　value。


Section　32。　（j）　Mistaken　Inferences。

It　is　true；　as　Huxley　says；　that　human　beings　would　have　made　fewer　mistakes　if　they　had　kept　in　mind　their　tendency　to　false　judgments　which　depend　upon　extraordinary　combinations　of　real　experiences。　When　people　say：　I　felt；　I　heard；　I　saw　this　or　that；　in　99　cases　out　of　100　they　mean　only　that　they　have　been　aware　of　some　kind　of　sensation　the　nature　of　which　they　determine　in　a　_*judgment_。　Most　erroneous　inferences　ensue　in　this　fashion。　They　are　rarely　formal　and　rarely　arise　by　virtue　of　a　failure　to　use　logical　principles；　their　ground　is　the　inner　paucity　of　a　premise；　which　itself　is　erroneous　because　of　an　erroneous　perception　or　conception。＇1＇　As　Mill　rightly　points　out；　a　large　portion　of　mankind　make　mistakes　because　of　tacit　assumptions　that　the　order　of　nature　and　the　order　of　knowledge　are　identical　and　that　things　must　exist　as　they　are　thought；　so　that　when　two　things　can　not　be　thought　together　they　are　supposed　not　to　exist　together；　and　the　inconceivable　is　supposed　to　be　identical　with　the　non…existent。　But　what　they　do　not　succeed　in　conceiving　must　not　be　confused　with　the　absolutely　inconceivable。　The　difficulty　or　impossibility　of　conceiving　may　be　subjective　and　conditional；　and　may　prevent　us　from　understanding　the　relation　of　a　series　of　events　only　because　some　otherwise　proxi…　　mate　condition　is　unknown　or　overlooked。　Very　often　in　criminal　cases　when　I　can　make　no　progress　in　some　otherwise　simple　matter；　I　recall　the　well　known　story　of　an　old　peasant　woman　who　saw　the　tail　of　a　horse　through　an　open　stable　door　and　the　head　of　another　through　another　door　several　yards　away；　and　because　the　colors　of　both　head　and　tail　were　similar；　was　moved　to　cry　out：　‘‘Dear　Lord；　what　a　long　horse！''　The　old　lady　started　with　the　presupposition　that　the　rump　and　the　head　of　the　two　horses　belonged　to　one；　and　could　make　no　use　of　the　obvious　solution　of　the　problem　of　the　inconceivably　long　horse　by　breaking　it　in　two。

＇1＇　Cf。　O。　Gross：　Soziale　Hemmungsvorstellungen。　II　Gross's　Archiv：　VII；　123。


Such　mistakes　may　be　classified　under　five　heads。＇1＇


＇1＇　A　paragraph　is　here　omitted。　Translator。


（1）　Aprioristic　mistakes。　（Natural　prejudices）。

（2）　Mistakes　in　observation。

（3）　Mistakes　in　generalization。　（When　the　facts　are　right　and　the　inferences　wrong）。

（4）　Mistakes　of　confusion。　（Ambiguity　of　terms　or　mistakes　by　association）。

（5）　Logical　fallacies。

All　five　fallacies　play　important　rles　in　the　lawyer's　work。

We　have　very　frequently　to　fight　natural　prejudices。　We　take　certain　classes　of　people　to　be　better　and　others　to　be　worse　than　the　average；　and　without　clearly　expressing　it　we　expect　that　the　first　class　will　not　easily　do　evil　nor　the　other　good。　We　have　prejudices　about　some　one　or　another　view　of　life；　some　definition　of　justice；　or　point　of　view；　although　we　have　sufficient　opportunity　to　be　convinced　of　their　incorrectness。　We　have　a　similar　prejudice　in　trusting　our　human　knowledge；　judgment　of　impressions；　facts；　etc。；　far　too　much；　so　far　indeed；　that　certain　relations　and　accidents　occurring　to　any　person　we　like　or　dislike　will　determine　his　advantage　or　disadvantage　at　our　hands。

Of　importance　under　this　heading；　too；　are　those　inferences　which　are　made　in　spite　of　the　knowledge　that　the　case　is　different；　the　power　of　sense　is　more　vigorous　than　that　of　reflection。　As　Hartmann　expresses　it：　‘‘The　prejudices　arising　from　sensation；　are　not　conscious　judgments　of　the　understanding　but　instinctively　practical　postulates；　and　are；　therefore；　very　difficult　to　destroy；　or　even　set　aside　by　means　of　conscious　consideration。　You　may　tell　yourself　a　thousand　times　that　the　moon　at　the　horizon　is　as　big　as　at　the　zenithnevertheless　you　see　it　smaller　at　the　zenith。''　Such　fixed　　impressions　w