criminal psychology-第46章

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＇1＇　For　a　general　consideration　of　perception　see　James；　Principles　of　Psychology。　Angell；　Psychology。



The　importance　of　sense…perception　need　not　be　demonstrated。　‘‘If　we　ask；''　says　Mittermaier；　‘‘for　the　reason　of　our　conviction　of　the　truth　of　facts　even　in　very　important　matters；　and　the　basis　of　every　judgment　concerning　existence　of　facts；　we　find　that　the　evidence　of　the　senses　is　final　and　seems；　therefore；　the　only　true　source　of　certainty。''

There　has　always；　of　course；　been　a　quarrel　as　to　the　objectivity　and　reliability　of　sense…perception。　That　the　senses　do　not　lie；　‘‘not　because　they　are　always　correct；　but　because　they　do　not　judge；''　is　a　frequently　quoted　sentence　of　Kant's；　the　Cyrenaics　have　already　suggested　this　in　asserting　that　pleasure　and　pain　alone　are　indubitable。　Aristotle　narrows　the　veracity　of　sensation　to　its　essential　content；　as　does　Epicurus。　Descartes；　Locke　and　Leibnitz　have　suggested　that　no　image　may　be　called；　as　mere　change　of　feeling；　true　or　false。　Sensationalism　in　the　work　of　Gassendi；　Condillac；　and　Helvetius　undertook　for　this　reason　the　defense　of　the　senses　against　the　reproach　of　deceit；　and　as　a　rule　did　it　by　invoking　the　infallibility　of　the　sense　of　touch　against　the　reproach　of　the　contradictions　in　the　other　senses。　Reid　went　back　to　Aristotle　in　distinguishing　specific　objects　for　each　sense　and　in　assuming　the　truth　of　each　sense　within　its　own　field。

That　these　various　theories　can　be　adjusted　is　doubtful；　even　if；　from　a　more　conservative　point　of　view；　the　subject　may　be　treated　quantitatively。　The　modern　quantification　of　psychology　was　begun　by　Herbart；　who　developed　a　mathematical　system　of　psychology　by　introducing　certain　completely　unempirical　postulates　concerning　the　nature　of　representation　and　by　applying　certain　simple　premises　in　all　deductions　concerning　numerical　extent。　Then　came　Fechner；　who　assumed　the　summation　of　stimuli。　And　finally　these　views　were　determined　and　fixed　by　the　much…discussed　Weber's　Law；　according　to　which　the　intensity　of　the　stimulus　must　increase　in　the　proportion　that　the　intensity　of　the　sensation　is　to　increase；　i。　e。；　if　a　stimulus　of　20　units　requires　the　addition　of　3　before　it　can　be　perceived；　a　stimulus　of　60　units　would　require　the　addition　of　9。　This　law；　which　is　of　immense　importance　to　criminalists　who　are　discussing　the　sense…perceptions　of　witnesses；　has　been　thoroughly　and　conclusively　dealt　with　by　A。　Meinong。＇1＇


＇1＇　Meinong：　ber　die　Bedeutung　der　Weberschen　Gesetzes。　Hamburg　and　Leipzig；　1896。


‘‘Modern　psychology　takes　qualities　perceived　externally　to　be　in　themselves　subjective　but　capable　of　receiving　objectivity　through　　our　relation　to　the　outer　world。。。。　The　qualitative　character　of　our　sensory　content　produced　by　external　stimuli　depends　primarily　on　the　organization　of　our　senses。　This　is　the　fundamental　law　of　perception；　of　modern　psychology；　variously　expressed；　but　axiomatic　in　all　physiological　psychology。''＇1＇　In　this　direction　Helmholtz＇2＇　has　done　pioneer　work。　He　treats　particularly　the　problem　of　optics；　and　physiological　optics　is　the　study　of　perception　by　means　of　the　sense　of　sight。　We　see　things　in　the　external　world　through　the　medium　of　light　which　they　direct　upon　our　eyes。　The　light　strikes　the　retina；　and　causes　a　sensation。　The　sensation　brought　to　the　brain　by　means　of　the　optic　nerve　becomes　the　condition　of　the　representation　in　consciousness　of　certain　objects　distributed　in　space。。。。　We　make　use　of　the　sensation　which　the　light　stimulates　in　the　mechanism　of　the　optic　nerve　to　construct　representations　concerning　the　existence；　form；　and　condition　of　external　objects。　Hence　we　call　images　perceptions　of　sight。　（Our　sense…perception；　according　to　this　theory；　consists；　therefore；　entirely　of　sensations；　the　latter　constitute　the　stuff　or　the　content　from　which　the　other　is　constructed）。　Our　sensations　are　effects　caused　in　our　organs；　externally；　and　the　manifestation　of　such　an　effect　depends　essentially　upon　the　nature　of　the　apparatus　which　has　been　stimulated。


＇1＇　T。　Pesch　Das　Weltphnomen

＇2＇　H。　Helmholtz：　Die　Tatsachen　der　Wahrnehmung。　Braunsehweig　1878。


There　are　certain　really　known　inferences；　e。　g。；　those　made　by　the　astronomer　from　the　perspective　pictures　of　the　stars　to　their　positions　in　space。　These　inferences　are　founded　upon　well…　studied　knowledge　of　the　principles　of　optics。　Such　knowledge　of　optics　is　lacking　in　the　ordinary　function　of　seeing；　nevertheless　it　is　permissible　to　conceive　the　psychical　function　of　ordinary　perception　as　unconscious　inferences；　inasmuch　as　this　name　will　completely　distinguish　them　from　the　commonly　so…called　conscious　inferences。

The　last…named　condition　is　of　especial　importance　to　us。　We　need　investigation　to　determine　the　laws　of　the　influence　of　optical　and　acoustical　knowledge　upon　perception。　That　these　laws　are　influential　may　be　verified　easily。　Whoever　is　ignorant；　e。　g。；　that　a　noise　is　reflected　back　considerably；　will　say　that　a　wagon　is　turning　from　the　side　from　which　the　noise　comes；　though　if　he　knows　the　law；　if　he　knows　that　fact；　his　answer　would　be　reversed。　So；　as　every　child　knows　that　the　reflection　of　sound　is　frequently　deceptive；　everybody　who　is　asked　in　court　will　say　that　he　believes　the　wagon　　to　be　on　the　right　side　though　it　might　as　well　have　been　on　the　left。　Again；　if　we　were　unaware　that　light　is　otherwise　refracted　in　water　than　in　air　we　could　say　that　a　stick　in　the　water　has　been　bent　obtusely；　but　inasmuch　as　everybody　knows　this　fact　of　the　relation　of　light　to　water；　he　will　declare　that　the　stick　appears　bent　but　really　is　straight。

From　these　simplest　of　sense…perceptions　to　the　most　complicated；　known　only　to　half　a　dozen　foremost　physicists；　there　is　an　infinite　series　of　laws　controlling　each　stage　of　perception；　and　for　each　stage　there　is　a　group　of　men　who　know　just　so　much　and　no　more。　We　have；　therefore；　to　assume　that　their　perceptions　will　vary　with　the　number　and　manner　of　their　accomplishments；　and　we　may　almost　convince　ourselves　that　each　examinee　who　has　to　give　evidence　concerning　his　sense…perception　should　literally　undergo　examination　to　make　clear　his　scholarly　status　and　thereby　the　value　of　his　testimony。　Of　course；　in　practice　this　is　not　required。　First　of　all　we　judge　approximately　a　man's　nature　and　nurture　and　according　to　the　impression　he　makes　upon　us；　thence；　his　intellectual　status。　This　causes　great　mistakes。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　the　testimony　is　concerned　almost　always　with　one　or　several　physical　events；　so　that　a　simple　relational　interrogation　will　establish　certainly　whether　the　witness　knows　and　attends　to　the　physical　law　in　question　or　not。　But　anyway；　too　little　is　done　to　determine　the　means　a　man　uses　to　reach　a　certain　perception。　If　instantaneous　contradictions　appear；　there　is　little　damage；　for　in　the　absence　of　anything　certain；　further　inferences　are　fortunately　made　in　rare　cases　only。　But　when　the　observation　is　that　of　one　person　alone；　or　even　when　more　testify　but　have　accidentally　the　same　amount　of　knowledge　and　hence　have　made　the　same　mistake；　and　no　contradiction　appears；　we　suppose　ourselves　to　possess　the　precise　truth；　confirmed　by　several　witnesses；　and　we　argue　merrily　on　the　basis　of　it。　In　the　meantime　we　quite　forget　that　contradictions　are　our　salvation　from　the　trusting　acceptance　of　untruth　and　that　the　absence　of　contradiction　means；　as　a　rule；　the　absence　of　a　starting　point　for　further　examination。

For　this　reason　and　others　modern　psychology　requires　us　to　be　cautious。　Among　the　others　is　the　circumstance　that　perceptions　are　rarely　pure。　Their　purity　consists　in　containing　nothing　else　than　perception；　they　are　mixed　when　they　are　connected　with　imaginations；　judgments；　efforts；　and　volitions。　How　rarely　a　perception　is　pure　I　have　already　tried　to　show；　judgments　almost　　always　accompany　it。　I　repeat　too；　that　owing　to　this　circumstance　and　our　ignorance　of　it；　countless　testimonies　are　interpreted　altogether　falsely。　This　is　true　in　many　other　fields。　When；　for　example；　A。　Fick　says：　‘‘The　condition　we　call　sensation　occurs　in　the　consciousness　of　the　subject　when　his　sensory　nerves　are　stimulated；''　he　does　not　mean　that　the　nervous　stimulus　in　itself　is　capable　of　causing　the　condition　in　question。　This　one　stimulus　is　only　a　single　tone　in　the　murmur　of　countless　stimuli；　which　earlier　and　at　the　same　time　have　influenced　us　and　are　different　in　their　effect　on　each　man。　Therefore；　that　single　additional　tone　will　also　be　different　in　each　man。　Or；　when　Bernstein　says　that　‘‘Sensation；　i。　e。；　the　stimulation　of　the　sensorium　and　the　passage　of　this　stimulation　to　the　brain；　does　not　in　itself　imply　the　perception　of　an　object　or　an　event　in　the　external　world；''　we　gather　that　the　objectivity　of　the　perception　works　correctively　not　more　than　one　time　out　of　many。　So　here　again　everything　depends　upon　the　nature　and　nurture　of　the　subject。

Sensations　are；　according　to　Aubert；　still　more　subjective。　‘‘They　are　the　specific　activity　of　the　sense　organs；　（not；　therefore；　passive　as　according　to　Helmholtz；　but　active　functions　of　the　sense　organs）。　Perception　arises　when　we　combine　our　particular　sensations　with　the　pure　images　of　the　spirit　or　the　schemata　of　the　understanding；　especially　with　the　pure　image　of　space。　The　so…called　ejection　or　externalization　of　sensations　occurs　only　as　their　scheme　and　relation　to　the　unity　of　their　object。''

So　long　as　anything　is　conceived　as　passive　it　may　always　recur　more　identically　than　when　it　is　conceived　as　active。　In　the　latter　case　the　individuality　of　the　particular　person　makes　the　perception　in　a　still　greater　degree　individual；　and　makes　it　almost　the　creature　of　him　who　perceives。　Whether　Aubert　is　right　or　not　is　not　our　task　to　discover；　but　if　he　is　right　then　sense…perception　is　as　various　as　is　humanity。　The　variety　is　still　further　increased　by　means　of　the　comprehensive　activity　which　Fischer＇1＇　presupposes。　‘‘Visual　perception　has　a　comprehensive　or　compounding　activity。　We　never　see　any　absolute　simple　and　hence　do　not　perceive　the　elements　of　things。　We　see　merely　a　spatial　continuum；　and　that　is　possible　only　through　comprehensive　activityespecially　in　the　case　of　movement　in　which　the　object　of　movement　and　the　environment　must　both　be　perceived。''　But　each　individual　method　of　‘‘comprehension''　is　different。　And　it　is　uncertain　whether　this　　is　purely　physical；　whether　only　the　memory　assists　（so　that　the　attention　in　biased　by　what　has　been　last　perceived）；　whether　imagination　is　at　work　or　an　especial　psychical　activity　must　be　presupposed　in　compounding　the　larger　elements。　The　fact　is　that　men　may　perceived　an　enormous　variety　of　things　with　a　single　glance。　And　generally　the　perceptive　power　will　vary　with　the　skill　of　the　individual。　The　narrowest；　smallest；　most　particularizing　glance　is　that　of　the　most　foolish；　and　the　broadest；　most　comprehensive；　and　comparing　glance；　that　of　the　most　wise。　This　is　particularly　noticeable　when　the　time　of　observation　is　short。　The　one　has　perceived　little　and　generally　the　least　important；　the　other　has　in　the　same