criminal psychology-第48章

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ous　work　of　art；　a　storm　at　sea；　etc。　The　most　insignificant　thing　ever　seen　but　variously　pictured　in　imagination　will　be　greeted　at　first　sight　with　the　words：　‘‘But　I　imagined　it　quite　different！''　Hence　the　tremendous　importance　of　every　local　and　material　characteristic　which　the　criminal　court　deals　with。　Every　one　of　us　knows　how　differently　he　has；　as　a　rule；　imagined　the　place　of　the　crime　to　be；　how　difficult　it　is　to　arrive　at　an　understanding　with　the　witness　concerning　some　unseen；　local　characteristic；　and　how　many　mistakes　false　images　of　the　unseen　have　caused。　Whenever　I　ciceroned　anybody　through　the　Graz　Criminal　Museum；　I　was　continually　assailed　with　‘‘Does　this　or　that　look　so？　But　I　thought　it　looked　quite　different！''　And　the　things　which　evoke　these　exclamations　are　such　as　the　astonished　visitors　have　spoken　and　written　about　hundreds　of　times　and　often　passed　judgments　upon。　The　same　situation　occurs　when　witnesses　narrate　some　observation。　When　the　question　involves　the　sense　of　hearing　some　misunderstanding　may　be　popularly　assumed。　But　the　people　know　little　of　optical　illusions　and　false　visual　perceptions；　though　they　are　aware　that　incorrect　auditions　are　frequent　matters　of　fact。　Moreover；　to　the　heard　object　　a　large　number　of　more　or　less　certain　precautionary　judgments　are　attached。　If　anybody；　e。　g。；　has　_*heard_　a　shot；　stealthy　footsteps；　crackling　flames；　we　take　his　experience　always　to　be　_*approximate_。　We　do　not　do　so　when　he　assures　us　he　has　_*seen_　these　things　or　their　causes。　Then　we　take　thembarring　certain　mistakes　in　observation；to　be　indubitable　perceptions　in　which　misunderstanding　is　impossible。

In　this；　again；　is　the　basis　for　the　distrust　with　which　we　meet　testimony　concerning　hearsay。　For　we　feel　uncertain　in　the　mere　absence　of　the　person　whose　conversation　is　reported；　since　his　value　can　not　be　determined。　But　a　part　of　the　mistrust　lies　in　the　fact　that　it　is　not　vision　but　the　perennially　half…doubted　hearing　that　is　in　issue。　Lies　are　assigned　mainly　to　words；　but　there　are　lies　which　are　visual　（deceptions；　maskings；　illusions；　etc。）。　Visual　lies　are；　however；　a　diminishing　minority　in　comparison　with　the　lies　that　are　heard。

The　certainty　of　the　correctness　of　vision　lies　in　its　being　tested　with　the　sense　of　touch；i。　e。　in　the　adaptation　of　our　bodily　sense　to　otherwise　existing　things。　As　Helmholtz　says；　‘‘The　agreement　between　our　visual　perceptions　and　the　external　world；　rests；　at　least　in　the　most　important　matters；　on　the　same　ground　that　all　our　knowledge　of　the　actual　world　rests　on；　upon　the　experience　and　the　lasting　test　of　their　correctness　by　means　of　experiments；　i。　e。；　of　the　movements　of　our　bodies。''　This　would　almost　make　it　seem　that　the　supreme　judge　among　the　senses　is　the　touch。　But　that　is　not　intended；　we　know　well　enough　to　what　illusions　we　are　subject　if　we　trust　the　sense　of　touch　alone。　At　the　same　time　we　must　suppose　that　the　question　here　is　one　of　the　nature　of　the　body；　and　this　can　be　measured　only　by　something　similar；　i。e。；　by　our　own　physical　characteristics；　but　always　under　the　control　of　some　other　sense；　especially　the　sense　of　sight。

The　visual　process　itself　consists；　according　to　Fischer；　‘‘of　a　compounded　series　of　results　which　succeed　each　other　with　extraordinary　rapidity　and　are　causally　related。　In　this　series　the　following　elements　may　principally　be　distinguished。


（1）　The　physico…chemical　process。

（2）　The　physiologico…sensory。

（3）　The　psychological。

（4）　The　physiologico…motor。

（5）　The　process　of　perception。''

It　is　not　our　task　to　examine　the　first　four　elements。　In　order

　clearly　to　understand　the　variety　of　perception；　we　have　to　deal　with　the　last　only。　I　once　tried　to　explain　this　by　means　of　the　phenomenon　of　instantaneous　photographs　（cinematographs）。　If　we　examine　one　such　representing　an　instant　in　some　quick　movement；　we　will　assert　that　we　never　could　have　perceived　it　in　the　movement　itself。　This　indicates　that　our　vision　is　slower　than　that　of　the　photographic　apparatus；　and　hence；　that　we　do　not　apprehend　the　smallest　particular　conditions；　but　that　we　each　time　unconsciously　compound　a　group　of　the　smallest　conditions　and　construct　in　that　way　the　so…called　instantaneous　impressions。　If　we　are　to　compound　a　great　series　of　instantaneous　impressions　in　one　galloping　step；　we　must　have　condensed　and　compounded　a　number　of　them　in　order　to　get　the　image　that　we　see　with　our　eyes　as　instantaneous。　We　may　therefore　say　that　the　least　instantaneous　image　we　ever　see　with　our　eyes　contains　many　parts　which　only　the　photographic　apparatus　can　grasp。　Suppose　we　call　these　particular　instances　a；　b；　c；　d；　e；　f；　g；　h；　i；　j；　k；　l；　m；　it　is　self…evident　that　the　manner　of　their　composition　must　vary　with　each　individual。　One　man　may　compound　his　elements　in　groups　of　three：　a；　b；　c；d；　e；　f；g；　h；　i；　etc。；　another　may　proceed　in　dyads：　a；　b；c；　d；e；　f；g；　h；etc。；　a　third　may　have　seen　an　unobservable　instant　later；　but　constructs　his　image　like　the　first　man：　b；　c；　d；l；　m；　n；　etc。；　a　fourth　works　slowly　and　rather　inaccurately；　getting：　a；　c；　d；f；　h；　i；etc。　Such　variations　multiply；　and　when　various　observers　of　the　same　event　describe　it　they　do　it　according　to　their　different　characteristics。　And　the　differences　may　be　tremendous。　Substitute　numerals　for　letters　and　the　thing　becomes　clear。　The　relative　slowness　of　our　apprehension　of　visual　elements　has　the　other　consequence　that　we　interpolate　objects　in　the　lacun　of　vision　_*according　to　our　expectations_。　The　best　example　of　this　sort　of　thing　would　be　the　perception　of　assault　and　battery。　When　ten　people　in　an　inn　see　how　A　raises　a　beer　glass　against　B's　head；　five　expect：　‘‘Now　he'll　pound　him；''　and　five　others：　‘‘Now　he'll　throw　it。''　If　the　glass　has　reached　B's　head　none　of　the　ten　observers　have　seen　how　it　reached　there；　but　the　first　five　take　their　oath　that　A　pounded　B　with　the　glass；　and　the　other　five　that　he　threw　it　at　B's　head。　And　all　ten　have　really　seen　it；　so　firmly　are　they　convinced　of　the　correctness　of　their　swift　judgment　of　expectation。　Now；　before　we　treat　the　witness　to　some　reproach　like　untruth；　inattention；　silliness；　or　something　equally　nice；　_*we_　had　better　consider　whether　his　story　is　not　true；　　and　whether　the　difficulty　might　not　really　lie　in　the　imperfection　of　our　own　sensory　processes。　This　involves　partly　what　Liebmann　has　called　‘‘anthropocentric　vision；''　i。　e。；　seeing　with　man　as　the　center　of　things。　Liebmann　further　asserts；　‘‘that　we　see　things　only　in　perspective　sizes；　i。　e。；　only　from　an　angle　of　vision　varying　with　their　approach；　withdrawal　and　change　of　position；　but　in　no　sense　as　definite　cubical；　linear；　or　surface　sizes。　The　apparent　size　of　an　object　we　call　an　angle　of　vision　at　a　certain　distance。　But；　what　indeed　is　the　different；　true　size？　We　know　only　relations　of　magnitude。''　This　description　is　important　when　we　are　dealing　with　testimony　concerning　size。　It　seems　obvious　that　each　witness　who　speaks　of　size　is　to　be　asked　whence　he　had　observed　it；　but　at　the　same　time　a　great　many　unexpected　errors　occur；　especially　when　what　is　involved　is　the　determination　of　the　size　of　an　object　in　the　same　plane。　One　need　only　to　recall　the　meeting　of　railway　tracks；　streets；　alleys；　etc。；　and　to　remember　how　different　in　size；　according　to　the　point　of　view　of　the　witness；　various　objects　in　such　places　must　appear。　Everybody　knows　that　distant　things　seem　smaller　than　near　ones；　but　almost　nobody　knows　what　the　difference　amounts　to。　For　examples　see　Lotze；　‘‘Medical　Psychology；''　Leipzig；　1852。

In　addition　we　often　think　that　the　clearness　of　an　object　represents　its　distance　and　suppose　that　the　first　alone　determines　the　latter。　But　the　distinctness　of　objects；　i。　e。；　the　perceptibility　of　a　light…impression；　depends　also　upon　the　absolute　brightness　and　the　differences　in　brightness。　The　latter　is　more　important　than　is　supposed。　Try　to　determine　how　far　away　you　can　see　a　key…hole　when　the　wall　containing　the　door　is　in　the　shadow；　and　when　there　is　a　window　opposite　the　key…hole。　A　dark　object　of　the　size　of　a　key…hole　will　not　be　visible　at　one　hundredth　of　the　distance　at　which　the　key…hole　is　perceived。　Moreover；　the　difference　in　intensity　is　not　alone　in　consideration；　the　intensity　of　the　object　_*with　regard　to　its　background_　has　yet　to　be　considered。　Aubert　has　shown　that　the　accuracy　of　the　distinction　is　the　same　when　a　square　of　white　paper　is　looked　at　from　an　angle　of　18''；　and　when　conversely　a　square　of　black　paper　on　white　background　is　looked　at　from　an　angle　of　85''。　‘‘When　we　put　a　gray　paper　in　the　sunshine；　it　may　become　objectively　brighter　than　white　paper　in　shadow。　But　this　does　not　prevent　us　from　knowing　one　as　gray　and　the　other　as　pure　white。　We　separate　the　color　of　the　object　from　the　intensity　of　the　incident　light。''　But　this　is　not　always　so　simple；　inasmuch　as　　we　know　in　the　case　in　hand　which　paper　is　gray　and　which　white；　which　is　in　the　sunlight　and　which　in　the　shadow。　But　if　these　facts　are　not　known　mistakes　often　occur　so　that　a　man　dressed　in　dark　clothes　but　in　full　light　will　be　described　as　wearing　lighter　clothes　than　one　who　wears　light　clothes　in　the　shadow。

Differences　of　illumination　reveal　a　number　of　phenomena　difficult　to　explain。　Fechner　calls　attention　to　the　appearance　of　stars：　‘‘At　night　everybody　sees　the　stars；　in　daylight　not　even　Sirius　or　Jupiter　is　seen。　Yet　the　absolute　difference　between　those　places　in　the　heavens　where　the　stars　are　and　the　environing　places　is　just　as　great　as　in　the　nightthere　is　only　an　increase　in　illumination。''　Of　still　greater　importance　to　us　is　the　circumstance　noted　but　not　explained　by　Bernstein。　If；　in　daylight；　we　look　into　a　basement　room　from　outside；　we　can　perceive　nothing；　almost；　everything　is　dark；　even　the　windows　appear　black。　But　in　the　evening；　if　the　room　is　ever　so　slightly　illuminated；　and　we　look　into　it　from　outside；　we　can　see　even　small　articles　distinctly。　Yet　there　was　much　intenser　light　in　the　room　in　question　during　the　day　than　the　single　illumination　of　the　night　could　have　provided。　Hence；　it　is　asserted；　the　difference　in　this　case　is　a　standard　one。　In　open　day　the　eye　is　accustomed　to　the　dominating　brightness　of　daylight；　beside　which　the　subdued　illumination　of　the　room　seems　relatively　dark。　But　in　the　evening　one　is　in　the　dark；　and　hence　even　the　little　light　of　a　single　candle　is　enough　to　enable　one　to　see。　That　this　explanation　is　untrue　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　the　phenomenon　is　not　regulated　even　when　the　circumstances　in　question　are　made　identical。　If；　for　example；　you　approach　the　window　in　daylight　with　your　eyes　shut；　lean　your　forehead　against　the　pane　and　shut　out　the　light　on　the　sides　with　your　hands；　and　then　open　your　eyes；　you　see　as　little　in　the　room　as　when　you　looked　into　it　without　performing　this　ceremony。　So　again；　if　during　the　night　you　gazed　at　some　near…by　gas　lamp　and　then　glanced　into　the　room；　there　is　only　a　few　moments'　indistinctness　at　most；　after　that　the　single　candle　is　enough。　The　reason；　then；　must　be　different　from　the　assigned　onebut　whatever　it　is；　we　need　only　t