criminal psychology-第54章

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　ground　a　little　to　the　west。　If　the　adherents　of　Copernicus　had　made　the　experiment　they　would　have　discovered　that　the　stone　does　fall　as　the　theory　requires。　Similar　oversights　occur　in　the　lawyer's　work　hundreds　of　times。　We　are　impressed　with　exceptions　that　are　made　by　others　or　by　ourselves；　and　give　up　some　already　tried　approach　without　actually　testing　the　truth　of　the　exception　which　challenges　it。　I　have　frequently；　while　at　work；　thought　of　the　story　of　some　one　of　the　Georges；　who　did　not　like　scholars　and　set　the　following　problem　to　a　number　of　philosophers　and　physicists：　‘‘When　I　put　a　ten　pound　stone　into　a　hundred　pound　barrel　of　water　the　whole　weighs　a　hundred　and　ten　pounds；　but　when　I　put　a　live　fish　of　ten　pounds　into　the　barrel　the　whole　still　weighs　only　a　hundred　pounds？''　Each　one　of　the　scholars　had　his　own　convincing　explanation；　until　finally　the　king　asked　one　of　the　foot…men；　who　said　that　he　would　like　to　see　the　experiment　tried　before　he　made　up　his　mind。　I　remember　a　case　in　which　a　peasant　was　accused　of　having　committed　arson　for　the　sake　of　the　insurance。　He　asserted　that　he　had　gone　into　a　room　with　a　candle　and　that　a　long　spider's　web　which　was　hanging　down　　had　caught　fire　from　it　accidentally　and　had　inflamed　the　straw　which　hung　from　the　roof。　So　the　catastrophe　had　occurred。　Only　in　the　second　examination　did　it　occur　to　anybody　to　ask　whether　spider's　web　can　burn　at　all；　and　the　first　experiment　showed　that　that　was　impossible。

Most　experiences　of　this　kind　indicate　that　in　recognizing　events　we　must　proceed　slowly；　without　leaping；　and　that　we　may　construct　our　notions　only　on　the　basis　of　knowledge　we　already　possess。　Saint　Thomas　says；　‘‘Omnes　cognitio　fit　secundum　similitudinem　cogniti　in　cognoscente。''　If　this　bit　of　wisdom　were　kept　in　mind　in　the　examination　of　witnesses　it　would　be　an　easier　and　simpler　task　than　usual。　Only　when　the　unknown　is　connected　with　the　known　is　it　possible　to　understand　the　former。　If　it　is　not　done　the　witness　will　hardly　be　able　to　answer。　He　nowhere　finds　support；　or　he　seeks　one　of　his　own；　and　naturally　finds　the　wrong　one。　So　the　information　that　an　ordinary　traveler　brings　home　is　mainly　identical　with　what　he　carries　away；　for　he　has　ears　and　eyes　only　for　what　he　expects　to　see。　For　how　long　a　time　did　the　negro　believe　that　disease　pales　the　coral　that　he　wears？　Yet　if　he　had　only　watched　it　he　would　have　seen　how　foolish　the　notion　was。　How　long；　since　Adam　Smith；　did　people　believe　that　extravagance　helps　industry；　and　how　much　longer　have　people　called　Copernicus　a　fool　because　they　actually　saw　the　sun　rise　and　set。　So　J。　S。　Mill　puts　his　opinions　on　this　matter。　Benneke＇1＇　adds；　‘‘If　anybody　describes　to　me　an　animal；　a　region；　a　work　of　art；　or　narrates　an　event；　etc。；　I　get　no　notion　through　the　words　I　hear　of　the　appearance　of　the　subject。　I　merely　have　a　problem　set　me　by　means　of　the　words　and　signs；　in　the　conception　of　the　subject；　and　hence　it　depends　for　truth　mainly　upon　the　completeness　of　earlier　conceptions　of　similar　things　or　events；　and　upon　the　material　I　have　imaginatively　at　hand。　These　are　my　perceptual　capital　and　my　power　of　representation。''


＇1＇　E。　Benneke：　Pragmatische　Psychologie。


It　naturally　is　not　necessary　to　ask　whether　a　narrator　has　ever　seen　the　things　he　speaks　of；　nor　to　convince　oneself　in　examination　that　the　person　in　question　knows　accurately　what　he　is　talking　about。　At　the　same　time；　the　examiner　ought　to　be　clear　on　the　matter　and　know　what　attitude　to　take　if　he　is　going　to　deal　intelligibly　with　the　other。　I　might　say　that　all　of　us；　educated　and　uneducated；　have　apprehended　and　remember　definite　and　distinct　images　of　all　things　we　have　seen；　heard；　or　learned　from　descriptions。　　When　we　get　new　information　we　simply　attach　the　new　image　to　the　old；　or　extinguish　a　part　of　the　old　and　put　the　new　in　its　place；　or　we　retain　only　a　more　or　less　vigorous　breath　of　the　old　with　the　new。　Such　images　go　far　back；　even　animals　possess　them。　One　day　my　small　son　came　with　his　exciting　information　that　his　guinea　pig；　well　known　as　a　stupid　beast；　could　count。　He　tried　to　prove　this　by　removing　the　six　young　from　their　mother　and　hiding　them　so　that　she　could　not　see　what　happened　to　them。　Then　he　took　one　of　the　six；　hid　it；　and　brought　the　remaining　five　back　to　the　old　lady。　She　smelled　them　one　after　the　other　and　then　showed　a　good　deal　of　excitement；　as　if　she　missed　something。　Then　she　was　again　removed　and　the　sixth　pig　brought　back；　when　she　was　restored　to　her　brood；　she　sniffed　all　six　and　showed　a　great　deal　of　satisfaction。　‘‘She　could　count　at　least　six。''　Naturally　the　beast　had　only　a　fixed　collective　image　of　her　brood；　and　as　one　was　missing　the　image　was　disturbed　and　incorrect。　At　the　same　time；　the　image　was　such　as　is　created　by　the　combination　of　events　or　circumstances。　It　is　not　far　from　the　images　of　low…browed　humanity　and　differs　only　in　degree　from　those　of　civilized　people。

The　fact　that　a　good　deal　of　what　is　said　is　incorrect　and　yet　not　consciously　untrue；　depends　upon　the　existence　of　these　images　and　their　association　with　the　new　material。　The　speaker　and　the　auditor　have　different　sets　of　images；　the　first　relates　the　new　material　differently　from　a　second；　and　so　of　course　they　can　not　agree。＇1＇　It　is　the　difficult　task　of　the　examiner　so　to　adapt　what　is　said　as　to　make　it　appropriate　to　the　right　images　without　making　it　possible　for　incorrect　interpretations　to　enter。　When　we　have　a　well…known　money…lender　as　witness　concerning　some　unspeakable　deal；　a　street…walker　concerning　some　brawling　in　a　peasant　saloon；　a　clubman　concerning　a　duel；　a　game…warden　concerning　poaching；　the　set　of　images　of　each　one　of　these　persons　will　be　a　bad　foundation　for　new　perceptions。　On　the　other　hand；　it　will　not　be　difficult　to　abstract　from　them　correctly。　But　cases　of　this　sort　are　not　of　constant　occurrence　and　the　great　trouble　consists　in　once　for　all　discovering　what　memory…images　were　present　before　the　witness　perceived　the　event　in　question。　The　former　have　a　great　influence　upon　the　perception　of　the　latter。


＇1＇　Cf。　H。　Gross's　Archiv；　XV；　125。


In　this　connection　it　should　not　be　forgotten　that　the　retention　of　these　images　is　somewhat　pedantic　and　depends　upon　unimportant　things。　In　the　city　hall　of　Graz　there　is　a　secretary　with　thirty…six　　sections　for　the　thirty…six　different　papers。　The　name　of　the　appropriate　journal　was　written　clearly　over　each　section　and　in　spite　of　the　clearness　of　the　script　the　depositing　and　removing　of　the　papers　required　certain　effort；　inasmuch　as　the　script　had　to　be　read　and　could　not　be　apprehended。　Later　the　name　of　the　paper　was　cut　out　of　each　and　pasted　on　the　secretary　instead　of　the　script；　and　then；　in　spite　of　the　various　curly　and　twisted　letters；　the　habitual　images　of　the　titles　were　easily　apprehended　and　their　removal　and　return　became　mechanical。　The　customary　and　identical　things　are　so　habitual　that　they　are　apprehended　with　greater　ease　than　more　distinct　objects。

Inasmuch　as　we　can　conceive　only　on　the　basis　of　the　constancy　and　similarity　of　forms；　we　make　these　forms　the　essence　of　experience。　On　the　other　hand；　what　is　constant　and　similar　for　one　individual　is　not　so　for　another；　and　essences　of　experience　vary　with　the　experiencer。

‘‘When　we　behold　a　die　of　which　we　can　see　three　sides　at　a　time；　seven　corners；　and　nine　edges；　we　immediately　induce　the　image　or　schema　of　a　die；　and　we　make　our　further　sense…perception　accord　with　this　schema。　In　this　way　we　get　a　series　of　schemes　which　we　may　substitute　for　one　another''　（Aubert）。　For　the　same　reason　we　associate　in　description　things　unknown　to　the　auditor；　which　we　presuppose　in　him；　and　hence　we　can　make　him　rightly　understand　only　if　we　have　named　some　appropriate　object　in　comparison。　Conversely；　we　have　to　remember　that　everybody　takes　his　comparison　from　his　own　experience；　so　that　we　must　have　had　a　like　experience　if　we　are　to　know　what　is　compared。　It　is　disastrous　to　neglect　the　private　nature　of　this　experience。　Whoever　has　much　to　do　with　peasants；　who　like　to　make　use　of　powerful　comparisons；　must　first　comprehend　their　essential　life；　if　he　is　to　understand　how　to　reduce　their　comparisons　to　correct　meanings。　And　if　he　has　done　so　he　will　find　such　comparisons　and　images　the　most　distinct　and　the　most　intelligible。

Sense…perception　has　a　great　deal　to　do　in　apprehension　and　no　one　can　determine　the　boundary　where　the　sense　activity　ends　and　the　intellectual　begins。　I　do　not　recall　who　has　made　note　of　the　interesting　fact　that　not　one　of　twenty　students　in　an　Egyptian　museum　knew　why　the　hands　of　the　figures　of　Egyptian　was　pictures　gave　the　impression　of　being　incorrectnobody　had　observed　the　fact　that　all　the　figures　had　two　right　hands。

I　once　paid　a　great　deal　of　attention　to　card…sharping　tricks　and　　as　I　acquired　them；　either　of　myself　or　from　practiced　gamblers；　I　demonstrated　them　to　the　young　criminalists。　For　a　long　time　I　refused　to　believe　what　an　old　Greek　told　me：　‘‘The　more　foolish　and　obvious　a　trick　is；　the　more　certain　it　is；　people　never　see　anything。''　The　man　was　right。　When　I　told　my　pupils　expressly；　‘‘Now　I　am　cheating；''　I　was　able　to　make　with　safety　a　false　coup；　a　false　deal；　etc。　Nobody　saw　it。　If　only　one　has　half　a　notion　of　directing　the　eyes　to　some　other　thing；　a　card　may　be　laid　on　the　lap；　thrust　into　the　sleeve；　taken　from　the　pocket；　and　God　knows　what　else。　Now　who　can　say　in　such　a　case　whether　the　sensory　glance　or　the　intellectual　apprehension　was　unskilful　or　unpractised？　According　to　some　authorities　the　chief　source　of　error　is　the　senses；　but　whether　something　must　not　be　attributed　to　that　mysterious；　inexplicable　moment　in　which　sensory　perception　becomes　intellectual　perception；　nobody　can　say。

My　favorite　demonstration　of　how　surprisingly　little　people　perceive　is　quite　simple。　I　set　a　tray　with　a　bottle　of　water　and　several　glasses　on　the　table；　call　express　attention　to　what　is　about　to　occur；　and　pour　a　little　water　from　the　bottle　into　the　glass。　Then　the　stuff　is　taken　away　and　the　astonishing　question　asked　what　have　I　done？　All　the　spectators　reply　immediately：　you　have　poured　water　into　a　glass。　Then　I　ask　further　with　what　hand　did　I　do　it？　How　many　glasses　were　there？　Where　was　the　glass　into　which　I　poured　the　water？　How　much　did　I　pour？　How　much　water　was　there　in　the　glass？　Did　I　really　pour　or　just　pretend　to？　How　full　was　the　bottle？　Was　it　certainly　water　and　not；　perhaps；　wine？　Was　it　not　red　wine？　What　did　I　do　with　my　hand　after　pouring　the　water？　How　did　I　look　when　I　did　it？　Did　you　not　really　see　that　I　shut　my　eyes？　Did　you　not　really　see　that　I　stuck　my　tongue　out？　Was　I　pouring　the　water　while　I　did　it？　Or　before；　or　after？　Did　I　wear　a　ring　on　my　hand？　Was　my　cuff　visible？　What　was　the　position　of　my　fingers　while　I　held　the　glass？　These　questions　may　be　multiplied。　And　it　is　as　astonishing　as　amusing　to　see　how　little　correctness　there　is　in　the　answers；　and　how　people　quarrel　about　the　answers；　and　what　extraordinary　things　they　say。　Yet　what　do　we　require　of　witnesses　who　have　to　describe　much　more　complicate