criminal psychology-第57章

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se；　indirect　memories。　The　real　thinker　will　almost　always　be　chary　of　words；　because　he　retains；　from　among　the　numberless　images　which　are　attached　to　his　idea；　only　those　most　closely　related　to　his　immediate　purpose。　Hence　good　protocols　are　almost　always　comparatively　short。　It　is　even　as　instructive　as　amusing　to　examine　certain　protocols；　with　regard　to　what　ought　to　be　omitted；　and　then　with　regard　to　the　direct　representations；　i。　e。；　to　everything　that　appertains　to　the　real　illumination　of　the　question。　It　is　astounding　how　little　of　the　latter　thing　is　indicated；　and　how　often　it　enters　blindly　because　what　was　important　has　been　forgotten　and　lost。

Of　course；　we　must　grant　that　the　essence　of　representation　involves　very　great　difficulties。　By　way　of　example　consider　so　ordinary　a　case　as　the　third　dimension。　We　are　convinced　that　according　to　its　nature　it　is　much　more　complex　than　it　seems　to　be。　We　are　compelled　to　believe　that　distance　is　not　a　matter　of　sensation　and　that　it　requires　to　be　explained。＇1＇


＇1＇　Several　sentences　are　here　omitted。


Psychologists　indicate　that　the　representation　of　the　third　dimension　would　be　tremendously　difficult　without　the　help　of　experience。　But　experience　is　something　relative；　we　do　not　know　how　much　experience　any　man　possesses；　or　its　nature。　Hence；　we　never　can　know　clearly　to　what　degree　a　man's　physical　vision　is　correct　if　　we　do　not　see　other　means　of　verification。　Consider　now　what　is　required　in　the　assumption　of　the　idea　of　the　fourth　dimension。　Since　its　introduction　by　Henry　More；　this　idea　should　quite　have　altered　our　conception　of　space。　But　we　do　not　know　how　many　cling　to　it　unconsciously；　and　we　should　make　no　mistake　if　we　said　that　nobody　has　any　knowledge　of　how　his　neighbor　perceives　space。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　E。　Storch：　ber　des　rumliche　Sehen；　in　Ztschrft。　v。　Ebbinghaus　u。　Nagel　XXIX；　22。


Movement　is　another　thing　difficult　to　represent　or　imagine。　You　can　determine　for　yourself　immediately　whether　you　can　imagine　even　a　slightly　complicated　movement。　I　can　imagine　one　individual　condition　of　a　movement　after　another；　sequentially；　but　I　can　not　imagine　the　sequence。　As　Herbart　says　somewhere；　a　successive　series　of　images　is　not　a　represented　succession。　But　if　we　can　not　imagine　this　latter；　what　do　we　imagine　is　not　what　it　ought　to　be。　According　to　Stricker；＇2＇　the　representation　of　movement　is　a　_quale_　which　can　not　be　given　in　terms　of　any　other　sensory　quality；　and　no　movement　can　be　remembered　without　the　brain's　awakening　a　muscle…movement。　Experience　verifies　this　theory。　The　awakening　of　the　muscular　sense　is　frequently　obvious　whenever　movement　is　thought　of；　and　we　may　then　perceive　how；　in　the　explanation　or　description　of　a　movement；　the　innervation　which　follows　the　image　in　question；　occurs。　This　innervation　is　always　true。　It　agrees　at　least　with　what　the　witness　has　himself　perceived　and　now　tries　to　renew　in　his　story。　When　we　have　him　explain；　for　example；　how　some　man　had　been　choked；　we　may　see　movements　of　his　hands　which；　however　slight　and　obscure；　still　definitely　indicate　that　he　is　trying　to　remember　what　he　has　seen；　and　this　irrelevantly　of　what　he　is　saying。　This　makes　it　possible　to　observe　the　alterations　of　images　in　the　individual　in　question；　an　alteration　which　always　occurs　when　the　images　are　related　to　movements。


＇2＇　S。　Stricker：　Studien　ber　die　Bewegungsvorstellungen。　Tbingen　1868。


It　follows　further　from　the　fact　that　movements　are　difficult　to　represent　that　the　witness　ought　not　to　be　expected　accurately　to　recall　them。　Stricker　says　that　for　a　long　time　he　could　not　image　a　snow…fall；　and　succeeded　only　in　representing　one　single　instant　of　it。　Now　what　is　not　capable　of　representation；　can　not　well　be　recalled；　and　so　we　discover　that　it　merely　causes　trouble　to　ask　the　witness　to　describe　point　by　point　even　a　simple　sequence。　The　witness　has　only　successive　images；　and　even　if　the　particular　images　are　correct；　　he　has　nothing　objective　for　the　succession　itself；　nothing　rooted　in　the　sequence。　He　is　helped；　merely；　by　the　logic　of　events　and　his　memoryif　these　are　scanty；　the　succession　of　images　is　scanty；　and　therefore　the　reproduction　of　the　event　is　inadequate。　Hence　this　scantiness　is　as　little　remarkable　as　the　variety　of　description　in　various　witnesses；　a　variety　due　to　the　fact　that　the　sequentialization　is　subjective。

Drawing　is　a　confirmation　of　the　fact　that　we　represent　only　a　single　instant　of　motion；　for　a　picture　can　never　give　us　a　movement；　but　only　a　single　state　within　that　movement。　At　the　same　time　we　are　content　with　what　the　picture　renders；　even　when　our　image　contains　only　this　simple　moment　of　movement。　‘‘What　is　seen　or　heard；　is　immediately；　in　all　its　definiteness；　content　of　consciousness''　（Schuppe）but　its　movement　is　not。

The　influence　of　time　upon　images　is　hardly　indifferent。　We　have　to　distinguish　the　time　necessary　for　the　construction　of　an　image；　and　the　time　during　which　an　image　lasts　with　uniform　vividness。　Maudsley　believes　the　first　question　difficult　to　answer。　He　leans　on　Darwin；　who　points　out　that　musicians　play　as　quickly　as　they　can　apprehend　the　notes。　The　question　will　affect　the　lawyer　in　so　far　as　it　is　necessary　to　determine　whether；　after　some　time；　an　image　of　an　event　may　ensue　from　which　it　is　possible　to　infer　back　to　the　individuality　of　the　witness。　No　other　example　can　be　used　here；　because　on　the　rocky　problem　of　the　occurrence　of　images　are　shattered　even　the　regulative　arts　of　most　modern　psychophysics。

The　second　problem　is　of　greater　significance。　Whether　any　practical　use　of　its　solution　can　be　made；　I　can　not　say；　but　it　urges　consideration。　Exner　has　observed　that　the　uniform　vividness　of　an　image　lasts　hardly　a　second。　The　image　as　a　whole　does　not　disappear　in　this　time；　but　its　content　endures　unchanged　for　so　long　at　most。　Then　it　fades　in　waves。　The　correctness　of　this　description　may　be　tested　by　anybody。　But　I　should　like　to　add　that　my　observations　of　my　own　images　indicate　that　in　the　course　of　a　progressive　repetition　of　the　recall　of　an　image　its　content　is　not　equally　capable　of　reproduction。　I　believe；　further；　that　no　essential　leaps　occur　in　this　alteration　of　the　content　of　an　idea；　but　that　the　alteration　moves　in　some　definite　direction。　If；　then；　I　recall　the　idea　of　some　object　successively；　I　will　imagine　it　not　at　one　time　bigger；　then　smaller；　then　again　bigger；　etc。；　on　the　contrary；　the　series　of　images　will　be　such　that　each　new　image　will　be　either　progressively　bigger　or　progressively　smaller。　

If　this　observation　of　mine　is　correct　and　the　phenomenon　is　not　purely　personal；　Exner's　description　becomes　of　great　value　in　examination；　which　because　of　its　length；　requires　the　repeated　recall　of　standardizing　images；　and　this　in　its　turn　causes　an　alteration　in　the　ideational　content。　We　frequently　observe　that　a　witness　persuades　himself　into　the　belief　of　some　definite　idea　in　the　course　of　his　examination；　inasmuch　as　with　regard　to　some　matter　he　says　more　and　more　definite　things　at　the　end　than　at　the　beginning。　This　may　possibly　be　contingent　on　the　alteration　of　frequently　recalled　ideas。　One　could　make　use　of　the　process　which　is　involved　in　the　reproduction　of　the　idea；　by　implying　it；　and　so　not　being　compelled　to　return　endlessly　to　something　already　explained。

How　other　people　construct　their　ideas；　we　do　not；　as　we　have　seen；　know；　and　the　difficulty　of　apprehending　the　ideas　or　images　of　other　people；　many　authorities　clearly　indicate。＇1＇


＇1＇　Cf。　Ncke　in　Gross's　Archiv　VII；　340。



Topic　4。　INTELLECTUAL　PROCESSES。

Section　46。　（a）　General　Considerations。

Lichtenberg　said　somewhere；　‘‘I　used　to　know　people　of　great　scholarship；　in　whose　head　the　most　important　propositions　were　folded　up　in　excellent　order。　But　I　don't　know　what　occurred　there；　whether　the　ideas　were　all　mannikins　or　all　little　women　there　were　no　results。　In　one　corner　of　the　head；　these　gentlemen　put　away　saltpeter；　in　another　sulphur；　in　a　third　charcoal；　but　these　did　not　combine　into　gunpowder。　Then　again；　there　are　people　in　whose　heads　everything　seeks　out　and　finds　everything　else；　everything　pairs　off　with　everything　else；　and　arranges　itself　variously。''　What　Lichtenberg　is　trying　to　do　is　to　indicate　that　the　cause　of　the　happy　condition　of　the　last…named　friends　is　imagination。　That　imagination　is　influential；　is　certain；　but　it　is　equally　certain　that　the　human　understanding　is　so　different　with　different　people　as　to　permit　such　phenomena　as　Lichtenberg　describes。　I　do　not　want　to　discuss　the　quantity　of　understanding。　I　shall　deal；　this　time；　with　its　quality；　by　means　of　which　the　variety　of　its　uses　may　be　explained。　It　would　be　a　mistake　to　think　of　the　understanding　as　capable　of　assuming　different　forms。　If　it　were　it　would　be　possible　to　construct　from　the　concept　understanding　a　group　of　different　powers　whose　common　quality　would　come　to　us　off…　　hand。　But　with　regard　to　understanding　we　may　speak　only　of　more　or　less　and　we　must　think　of　the　difference　in　effect　in　terms　only　of　the　difference　of　the　forms　of　its　application。　We　see　the　effects　of　the　understanding　alone；　not　the　understanding　itself；　and　however　various　a　burning　city；　cast　iron；　a　burn；　and　steaming　water　may　be；　we　recognize　that　in　spite　of　the　difference　of　effect；　the　same　fire　has　brought　about　all　these　results。　The　difference　in　the　uses　of　the　understanding；　therefore；　lies　in　the　manner　of　its　application。　Hence　these　applications　will　help　us；　when　we　know　them；　to　judge　the　value　of　what　they　offer　us。　The　first　question　that　arises　when　we　are　dealing　with　an　important　witness　who　has　made　observations　and　inferences；　is　this：　‘‘How　intelligent　is　he？　and　what　use　does　he　make　of　his　intelligence？　That　is；　What　are　his　processes　of　reasoning？''

I　heard；　from　an　old　diplomat；　whose　historic　name　is　as　significant　as　his　experience；　that　he　made　use　of　a　specific　means　to　discover　what　kind　of　mind　a　person　had。　He　used　to　tell　his　subjects　the　following　story：　‘‘A　gentleman；　carrying　a　small　peculiarly…formed　casket；　entered　a　steam　car；　where　an　obtrusive　commercial　traveler　asked　him　at　once　what　was　contained　in　the　casket。　‘My　Mungo　is　inside！'　‘Mungo？　What　is　that？'　‘Well；　you　know　that　I　suffer　from　delirium　tremens；　and　when　I　see　the　frightful　images　and　figures；　I　let　my　Mungo　out　and　he　eats　them　up。'　‘But；　sir；　these　images　and　figures　do　not　really　exist。'　‘Of　course　they　don't　really　exist；　but　my　Mungo　doesn't　really　exist；　either；　so　it's　all　right！'　''

The　old　gentleman　asserted　that　he　could　judge　of　the　intelligence　of　his　interlocutor　by　the　manner　in　which　the　latter　received　this　story。

Of　course　it　is　impossible　to　tell　every　important　witness　the　story　of　Mungo；　but　something　similar　may　be　made　use　of　which　could　be　sought　out　of　the　material　in　the　case。　Whoever　has　anything　worthy　the　name　of　practice　will　then　be　able　to　judge　the　manner　of　the　witness's　approach；　and　especially　the　degree　of　intelligence　he　possesses。　The　mistake　must　not　be　made；　however；　that　this　requires　splendid　deductions；　it　is　best　to