criminal psychology-第60章

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　I　must　stop　playing；　for　absolutely　without　attention；　even　unconscious　attention；　nothing　can　be　done。

This　very　frequent　and　well…known　phenomenon；　shows　us；　first　of　all；　the　unconscious　activities　in　their　agreement　with　the　conscious；　inasmuch　as　we　behave　in　the　same　way　when　both　are　interrupted　by　the　demand　of　another　thing　on　our　attention。　If　a　row　suddenly　breaks　out　before　my　window　I　will　interrupt　an　unconscious　drumming　with　the　fingers　as　well　as　a　conscious　reading；　so　that　it　would　be　impossible　to　draw　any　conclusion　concerning　the　nature　of　these　activities　from　the　mere　interruption　or　the　manner　of　that　interruption。　This　similarity　is　an　additional　ground　for　the　fact　that　what　is　done　unconsciously　may　be　very　complex。　No　absolute　boundary　may　be　drawn；　and　hence　we　can　derive　no　proof　of　the　incorrectness　of　an　assertion　from　the　performance　itself；　i。　e。；　from　_*what_　has　been　done　unconsciously。　Only　human　nature；　its　habits；　idiosyncrasies；　and　its　contemporary　environment　can　give　us　any　norm。


Section　49。　（d）　Subjective　Conditions。

We　have　already　seen　that　our　ideation　has　the　self　for　center　and　point　of　reference。　And　we　shall　later　see　that　the　kind　of　thinking　which　exclusively　relates　all　events　to　itself；　or　the　closest　relations　of　the　self；　is；　according　to　Erdmann；　the　essence　of　stupidity。　There　is；　however；　a　series　of　intellectual　processes　in　which　the　thinker　pushes　his　self　into　the　foreground　with　more　or　less　　justification；　judging　everything　else　and　studying　everything　else　in　the　light　of　it；　presupposing　in　others　what　he　finds　in　himself；　and　exhibiting　a　greater　interest　in　himself　than　may　be　his　proper　share。　Such　ideations　are　frequently　to　be　found　in　high…minded　natures。　I　know　a　genial　high…school　teacher；　the　first　in　his　profession；　who　is　so　deeply　absorbed　in　his　thinking；　that　he　never　carries　money；　watch；　or　keys　because　he　forgets　and　loses　them。　When　in　the　examination　of　some　critical　case　he　needs　a　coin　he　turns　to　his　auditors　with　the　question：　‘‘Perhaps　one　of　you　gentlemen　may　_*by　some　chance_　have　a　quarter　with　you？''　He　judges　from　his　habit　of　not　carrying　money　with　him；　that　to　carry　it　is　to　be　presupposed　as　a　‘‘perhaps；''　and　the　appearance　of　a　quarter　in　this　crowded　auditorium　must　be　‘‘by　chance。''

The　same　thing　is　true　with　some　of　the　most　habitual　processes　of　some　of　the　most　ordinary　people。　If　a　man　sees　a　directory　in　which　his　name　must　be　mentioned；　he　looks　it　up　and　studies　it。　If　he　sees　a　group　photograph　in　which　he　also　occurs　he　looks　up　his　own　picture；　and　when　the　most　miserable　cheater　who　is　traveling　under　a　false　name　picks　that　out；　he　will　seek　it　out　of　his　_*own_　relationships；　will　either　alter　his　real　name　or　slightly　vary　the　maiden　name　of　his　mother；　or　deduce　it　from　his　place　of　birth；　or　simply　make　use　of　his　christian　name。　But　he　will　not　be　likely　to　move　far　from　his　precious　self。

That　similar　things　are　true　for　readers；　Goethe　told　us　when　he　showed　us　that　everything　that　anybody　reads　interests　him　only　when　he　finds　himself　or　his　activities　therein。　So　Goethe　explains　that　business　men　and　men　of　the　world　apprehend　a　scientific　dissertation　better　than　the　really　learned；　‘‘who　habitually　hear　no　more　of　it　than　what　they　have　learned　or　taught　and　with　which　they　meet　their　equals。''

It　is　properly　indicated　that　every　language　has　the　largest　number　of　terms　for　those　things　which　are　most　important　to　those　who　speak　it。　Thus　we　are　told　that　the　Arabians　have　as　many　as　6000　words　for　camel；　2000　for　horse；　and　50　for　lion。　Richness　of　form　and　use　always　belong　together；　as　is　shown　in　the　fact　that　the　auxiliaries　and　those　verbs　most　often　used　are　everywhere　the　most　irregular　This　fact　may　be　very　important　in　examinations；　for　definite　inferences　concerning　the　nature　and　affairs　of　the　witness　may　be　drawn　from　the　manner　and　frequency　with　which　he　uses　words；　and　whether　he　possesses　an　especially　large　number　of　forms　in　any　particular　direction。　

The　fact　is　that　we　make　our　conceptions　in　accordance　with　the　things　as　_*we_　have　seen　them；　and　so　completely　persuade　ourselves　of　the　truth　of　one　definite；　partial　definition；　that　sometimes　we　wonder　at　a　phenomenon　without　judging　that　it　might　have　been　expected　to　be　otherwise。　When　I　first　became　a　student　at　Strassbourg；　I　wondered；　subconsciously；　when　I　heard　the　ragged　gamins　talk　French　fluently。　I　knew；　indeed；　that　it　was　their　mother…　tongue；　but　I　was　so　accustomed　to　viewing　all　French　as　a　sign　of　higher　education　that　this　knowledge　in　the　gamins　made　me　marvel。　When　I　was　a　child　I　once　had　to　bid　my　grandfather　adieu　very　early；　while　he　was　still　in　bed。　I　still　recall　the　vivid　astonishment　of　my　perception　that　grandfather　awoke　without　his　habitual　spectacles　upon　his　nose。　I　must　have　known　that　spectacles　are　as　superfluous　as　uncomfortable　and　dangerous　when　one　is　sleeping；　and　I　should　not　even　with　most　cursory　thinking　have　supposed　that　he　would　have　worn　his　spectacles　during　the　night。　But　as　I　was　accustomed　always　to　see　my　grandfather　with　spectacles；　when　he　did　not　have　them　I　wondered　at　it。

Such　instances　are　of　especial　importance　when　the　judge　is　himself　making　observations；　i。　e。；　examining　the　premises　of　the　crime；　studying　corpora　delicti；　etc。；　because　we　often　suppose　ourselves　to　see　extraordinary　and　illegal　things　simply　because　we　have　been　habituated　to　seeing　things　otherwise。　We　even　construct　and　name　according　to　this　habit。　Taine　narrates　the　instructive　story　of　a　little　girl　who　wore　a　medal　around　her　throat；　of　which　she　was　told；　‘‘C'est　le　bon　Dieu。''　When　the　child　once　saw　her　uncle　with　a　lorgnon　around　his　neck　she　said；　‘‘C'est　le　bon　Dieu　de　mon　oncle。''　And　since　I　heard　the　story；　I　have　repeatedly　had　the　opportunity　to　think；　‘‘C'est　aussi　le　bon　Dieu　de　cet　homme。''　A　single　word　which　indicates　how　a　man　denotes　a　thing　defines　for　us　his　nature；　his　character；　and　his　circumstances。

For　the　same　reason　that　everything　interests　us　more　according　to　the　degree　it　involves　us　personally；　we　do　not　examine　facts　and　completely　overlook　them　though　they　are　later　shown　to　be　unshakable；　without　our　being　able　to　explain　their　causal　nexus。　If；　however；　we　know　causes　and　relationships；　these　facts　become　portions　of　our　habitual　mental　equipment。　Any　practitioner　knows　how　true　this　is；　and　how　especially　visible　during　the　examination　of　witnesses；　who　ignore　facts　which　to　us　seem；　in　the　nature　of　the　case；　important　and　definitive。　In　such　cases　we　must　first　of　all　not　assume　that　these　facts　have　not　oc…　　curred　because　the　witness　has　not　explained　them　or　has　overlooked　them；　we　must　proceed　as　suggested　in　order　to　validate　the　relevant　circumstances　by　means　of　the　witnessi。　e。；　we　must　teach　him　the　conditions　and　relationships　until　they　become　portions　of　his　habitual　mental　machinery。　I　do　not　assert　that　this　is　easy　on　the　contrary；　I　say　that　whoever　is　able　to　do　this　is　the　most　effective　of　examiners；　and　shows　again　that　the　witness　is　no　more　than　an　instrument　which　is　valueless　in　the　hands　of　the　bounder；　but　which　can　accomplish　all　sorts　of　things　in　the　hands　of　the　master。

One　must　beware；　however；　of　too　free　use　of　the　most　comfortable　means；that　of　examples。　When　Newton　said；　‘‘In　addiscendis　scientiis　exempla　plus　prosunt；　quam　praecepta；''　he　was　not　addressing　criminalists；　but　he　might　have　been。　As　might；　also；　Kant；　when　he　proved　that　thinking　in　examples　is　dangerous　because　it　allows　the　use　of　real　thinking；　for　which　it　is　not　a　substitute；　to　lapse。　That　this　fact　is　one　reason　for　the　danger　of　examples　is　certain；　but　the　chief　reason；　at　least　for　the　lawyer；　is　the　fact　that　an　example　requires　not　equality；　but　mere　similarity。　The　degree　of　similarity　is　not　expressed　and　the　auditor　has　no　standard　for　the　degree　of　similarity　in　the　mind　of　the　speaker。　‘‘Omnis　analogia　claudicat''　is　correct；　and　it　may　happen　that　the　example　might　be　falsely　conceived；　that　similarity　may　be　mistaken　for　equality；　or　at　least；　that　there　should　be　ignorance　of　the　inequality。　Examples；　therefore；　are　to　be　used　only　in　the　most　extreme　cases；　and　only　in　such　wise；　that　the　nature　of　the　example　is　made　very　clearly　obvious　and　its　incorrectness　warned　against。

There　are　several　special　conditions；　not　to　be　overlooked。　One　of　these　is　the　influence　of　expectation。　Whoever　expects　anything；　sees；　hears；　and　constructs；　only　in　the　suspense　of　this　expectation；　and　neglects　all　competing　events　most　astoundingly。　Whoever　keenly　expects　any　person　is　sensible　only　of　the　creaking　of　the　garden　door；　he　is　interested　in　all　sounds　which　resemble　it；　and　which　he　can　immediately　distinguish　with　quite　abnormal　acuteness；　everything　else　so　disappears　that　even　powerful　sounds；　at　any　event　more　powerful　than　that　of　the　creaking　gate；　are　overlooked。　This　may　afford　some　explanation　for　the　very　different　statements　we　often　receive　from　numerous　observers　of　the　same　event；　each　one　had　expected　a　different　thing；　and　hence；　had　perceived　and　had　ignored　different　things。　

Again；　the　opposition　of　the　I　and　You　in　the　person　himself　is　a　noteworthy　thing。　According　to　Noel；　this　is　done　particularly　when　one　perceives　one's　own　foolish　management：　‘‘How　could　you　have　behaved　so　foolishly！''　Generalized　it　might　be　restated　as　the　fact　that　people　say　You　to　themselves　whenever　the　dual　nature　of　the　ego　becomes　visible；　i。　e。；　whenever　one　no　longer　entertains　a　former　opinion；　or　when　one　is　undecided　and　carries　about　contradictory　intentions；　or　whenever　one　wants　to　compel　himself　to　some　achievement。　Hence　‘‘How　could　you　have　done　this？''‘‘Should　you　do　this　or　should　you　not？''‘‘You　simply　shall　tell　the　truth。''More　nave　people　often　report　such　inner　dialogues　faithfully　and　without　considering　that　they　give　themselves　away　thereby；　inasmuch　as　the　judge　learns　at　least　that　when　this　occurred　the　practical　ego　was　a　stranger　to　the　considering　ego；　through　whom　the　subjective　conditions　of　the　circumstances　involved　may　be　explained。

What　people　call　excellent　characterizes　them。　Excellences　are　for　each　man　those　qualities　from　which　others　get　the　most　advantage。　Charity；　self…sacrifice；　mercy；　honesty；　integrity；　courage；　prudence；　assiduity；　and　however　else　anything　that　is　good　and　brave　may　be　called；　are　always　of　use　to　the　other　fellow　but　barely　and　only　indirectly　the　possessor　of　the　virtues。　Hence　we　praise　the　latter　and　spur　others　on　to　identical　qualities　（to　our　advantage）。　This　is　very　barren　and　prosaic；　but　true。　Naturally；　not　everybody　has　advantage　in　the　identical　virtues　of　other　people；　only　in　those　which　are　of　use　to　their　individual　situation　charity　is　of　no　use　to　the　rich；　and　courage　of　no　use　to　the　protected。　Hence；　people　give　themselves　away　more　frequently　than　they　seem　to；　and　even　when　no　revelation　of　their　inner　lives　can　be　attained　from　witnesses　and　accused；　they　always　express　enough　to　show　what　they　consider　to　be　virtue　and　what　not。

Hartenstein　characterizes　Hegel　as　a　person　who　made　his　opponent