criminal psychology-第7章

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　at　this　or　that　point。''　This　deliverance　is　generally　followed　by　a　pause　during　which　he　obviously　reviews　and　sets　aside　the　part　of　his　prepared　speech　dealing　with　the　events　preliminary　to　the　required　points。　If；　however；　the　setting　of　a　starting　point　does　not　work　and　the　witness　says　he　must　begin　at　the　earlier　stage；　let　him　do　so。　Otherwise　he　tries　so　hard　to　begin　according　to　request　that；　unable　to　go　his　own　way；　he　confuses　everything。

The　patience　required　for　taking　testimony　is　needful　also　in　　cross…examination。　Not　only　children　and　slow…witted　folk；　but　also　bright　persons　often　answer　only　‘‘yes''　and　‘‘no；''＇1＇　and　these　bare　answers　demand　a　patience　most　necessary　with　just　this　bareness；　if　the　answers　are　to　be　pursued　for　some　time　and　consecutively。　The　danger　of　impatience　is　the　more　obvious　inasmuch　as　everyone　recognizes　more　or　less　clearly　that　he　is　likely　to　set　the　reserved　witness　suggestive　questions　and　so　to　learn　things　that　the　witness　never　would　have　said。　Not　everybody；　indeed；　who　makes　monosyllabic　replies　in　court　has　this　nature；　but　in　the　long　run；　this　common　characteristic　is　manifest；　and　these　laconic　people　are　really　not　able　to　deliver　themselves　connectedly　in　long　speeches。　If；　then；　the　witness　has　made　only　the　shortest　replies　and　a　coherent　well…composed　story　be　made　of　them；　the　witness　will；　when　his　testimony　is　read　to　him；　often　not　notice　the　untruths　it　might　contain。　He　is　so　little　accustomed　to　his　own　prolonged　discourse　that　at　most　he　wonders　at　his　excellent　speech　without　noticing　even　coarse　falsehoods。　If；　contrary　to　expectation；　he　does　notice　them；　he　is　too　chary　of　words　to　call　attention　to　them；　assents；　and　is　glad　to　see　the　torture　coming　to　an　end。　Hence；　nothing　but　endless　patience　will　do　to　bring　the　laconic　witness　to　say　at　least　enough　to　make　his　information　coherent；　even　though　brief。　It　may　be　presented　in　this　form　for　protocol。


Section　6。　（d）　Presuppositions　of　Evidence…Taking。


One　of　the　most　important　rules　of　evidence…taking　is　not　to　suppose　that　practically　any　witness　is　skilled　in　statement　of　what　he　remembers。　Even　of　child　training；　Frbel＇2＇　says；　‘‘Men　must　be　drawn　out；　not　probed。''　And　this　is　the　more　valid　in　jurisprudence；　and　the　more　difficult；　since　the　lawyers　have　at　most　only　as　many　hours　with　the　individual　as　the　teacher　has　years。　However；　we　must　aim　to　draw　the　witness　out；　and　if　it　does　not　work　at　first；　we　must　nevertheless　not　despair　of　succeeding。

The　chief　thing　is　to　determine　the　witness's　level　and　then　meet　him　on　it。　We　certainly　can　not　succeed；　in　the　short　time　allowed　us；　to　raise　him　to　ours。　‘‘The　object　of　instruction''　（says　Lange＇3＇）　‘‘is　to　endow　the　pupil　with　more　apperceptive　capacity；　i。　e。；　to

＇1＇　Pathological　conditions；　if　at　all　distinct；　are　easily　recognizable；　but　there　is　a　very　broad　and　fully　occupied　border　country　between　pathological　and　normal　conditions。　（Cf。　O。　Gross：　Die　Affeklage　der　Ablehnung。　Monatschrift　fr　Psychiatrie　u。　Neurologie；　1902；　XII；　359。）

＇2＇　Frbel：　Die。　Mensehenersiehung。　Keilhau　1826。

＇3＇　K。　Lange：　ber　Apperzeption。　Plauen　1889。

　make　him　intellectually　free。　It　is　therefore　necessary　to　discover　his　‘funded　thoughts；'　and　to　beware　of　expounding　too　much。''　This　is　not　a　little　true。　The　development　of　apperceptive　capacity　is　not　so　difficult　for　us；　inasmuch　as　our　problem　is　not　to　prepare　our　subject　for　life；　but　for　one　present　purpose。　If　we　desire；　to　this　end；　to　make　one　more　intellectually　free；　we　have　only　to　get　him　to　consider　with　independence　the　matter　with　which　we　are　concerned；　to　keep　him　free　of　all　alien　suggestions　and　inferences；　and　to　compel　him　to　see　the　case　as　if　no　influences；　personal　or　circumstantial；　had　been　at　work　on　him。　This　result　does　not　require　merely　the　setting　aside　of　special　influences；　nor　the　setting　aside　of　all　that　others　have　said　to　him　on　the　matter　under　discussion；　nor　the　elucidation　of　the　effect　of　fear；＇1＇　of　anger；　of　all　such　states　of　mind　as　might　here　have　been　operative；it　requires　the　establishment　of　his　unbiased　vision　of　the　subject　from　a　period　antecedent　to　these　above…mentioned　influences。　Opinions；　valuations；　prejudices；　superstitions；　etc。；　may　here　be　to　a　high　degree　factors　of　disturbance　and　confusion。　Only　when　the　whole　Augean　stable　is　swept　out　may　the　man　be　supposed　capable　of　apperception；　may　the　thing　he　is　to　tell　us　be　brought　to　bear　upon　him　and　he　be　permitted　to　reproduce　it。

This　necessary　preliminary　is　not　so　difficult　if　the　second　of　the　above…mentioned　rules　is　observed　and　the　‘‘funded　thought''　of　the　witness　is　studied　out。　It　may　be　said；　indeed；　that　so　long　as　two　people　converse；　unaware　of　each　other's　‘‘funded　thought；''　they　speak　different　languages。　Some　of　the　most　striking　misunderstandings　come　from　just　this　reason。　It　is　not　alone　a　matter　of　varying　verbal　values；　leading　to　incompatible　inferences；　actually　the　whole　of　a　man's　mind　is　involved。　It　is　generally　supposed　to　be　enough　to　know　the　meaning　of　the　words　necessary　for　telling　a　story。　But　such　knowledge　leads　only　to　external　and　very　superficial　comprehension；　real　clearness　can　be　attained　only　by　knowing　the　witness's　habits　of　thought　in　regard　to　all　the　circumstances　of　the　case。　I　remember　vividly　a　case　of　jealous　murder　in　which　the　most　important　witness　was　the　victim's　brother；　an　honest；　simple；　woodsman；　brought　up　in　the　wilderness；　and　in　every　sense　far…　removed　from　idiocy。　His　testimony　was　brief；　decided　and　intelligent。　When　the　motive　for　the　murder；　in　this　case　most　important；　came　under　discussion；　he　shrugged　his　shoulders　and　answered　my　questionwhether　it　was　not　committed　on　account　of

＇1＇　Dichl　in　H。　Gross's　Arehiv；　XI；　240。

　a　girlwith；　‘‘Yes；　so　they　say。''　On　further　examination　I　reached　the　astonishing　discovery　that　not　only　the　word　‘‘jealousy；''　but　the　very　notion　and　comprehension　of　it　were　totally　foreign　to　the　man。　The　single　girl　he　at　one　time　thought　of　was　won　away　from　him　without　making　him　quarrelsome；　nobody　had　ever　told　him　of　the　pangs　and　passions　of　other　people；　he　had　had　no　occasion　to　consider　the　theoretic　possibility　of　such　a　thing；　and　so　‘‘jealousy''　remained　utterly　foreign　to　him。　It　is　clear　that　his　hearing　now　took　quite　another　turn。　All　I　thought　I　heard　from　him　was　essentially　wrong；　his　‘‘funded　thought''　concerning　a　very　important；　in　this　case　a　regulative　concept；　had　been　too　poor。

The　discovery　of　the　‘‘funded　thought''　is　indubitably　not　easy。　But　its　objective　possibility　with　witness　and　accused　is　at　least　a　fact。　It　is　excluded　only　where　it　is　most　obviously　necessary　in　the　case　of　the　jury；　and　the　impossibility　in　this　case　turns　the　institution　of　trial　by　jury　into　a　Utopian　dream。　The　presiding　officer　of　a　jury　court　is　in　the　best　instances　acquainted　with　a　few　of　the　jurymen；　but　never　so　far　as　to　have　been　entrusted　with　their　‘‘funded　thought。''　Now　and　then；　when　a　juryman　asks　a　question；　one　gets　a　glimpse　of　it；　and　when　the　public　prosecutor　and　the　attorney　for　the　defence　make　their　speeches　one　catches　something　from　the　jury's　expressions；　and　then　it　is　generally　too　late。　Even　if　it　be　discovered　earlier　nothing　can　be　done　with　it。　Some　success　is　likely　in　the　case　of　single　individuals；　but　it　is　simply　impossible　to　define　the　mental　habits　of　twelve　men　with　whom　one　has　no　particular　relations。

The　third　part　of　the　Frbelian　rule；　‘‘To　presuppose　as　little　as　possible；''　must　be　rigidly　adhered　to。　I　do　not　say　this　pessimistically；　but　simply　because　we　lawyers；　through　endless　practice；　arrange　the　issue　so　much　more　easily；　conceive　its　history　better　and　know　what　to　exclude　and　what；　with　some　degree　of　certainty；　to　retain。　In　consequence　we　often　forget　our　powers　and　present　the　unskilled　laity；　even　when　persons　of　education；　too　much　of　the　material。　Then　it　must　be　considered　that　most　witnesses　are　uneducated；　that　we　can　not　actually　descend　to　their　level；　and　their　unhappiness　under　a　flood　of　strange　material　we　can　grasp　only　with　difficulty。　Because　we　do　not　know　the　witness's　point　of　view　we　ask　too　much　of　him；　and　therefore　fail　in　our　purpose。　And　if；　in　some　exceptional　case；　an　educated　man　is　on　the　stand；　we　fail　again；　since；　having　the　habit　of　dealing　with　the　uneducated；　　we　suppose　this　man　to　know　our　own　specialties　because　he　has　a　little　education。　Experience　does　not　dispel　this　illusion。　Whether　actual　training　in　another　direction　dulls　the　natural　and　free　outlook　we　desire　in　the　witness；　or　whether；　in　our　profession；　education　presupposes　tendencies　too　ideal；　whatever　be　the　reasons；　it　is　a　fact　that　our　hardest　work　is　generally　with　the　most　highly　educated　witnesses。　I　once　had　to　write　a　protocol　based　on　the　testimony　of　a　famous　scholar　who　was　witness　in　a　small　affair。　It　was　a　slow　job。　Either　he　did　not　like　the　terms　as　I　dictated　them；　or　he　was　doubtful　of　the　complete　certainty　of　this　or　that　assertion。　Let　alone　that　I　wasted　an　hour　or　two；　that　protocol；　though　rewritten；　was　full　of　corrections　and　erasures。　And　the　thing　turned　out　to　be　nonsense　at　the　end。　The　beginning　contradicted　the　conclusion；　it　was　unintelligible；　and　still　worse；　untrue。　As　became　manifest　later；　through　the　indubitable　testimony　of　many　witnesses；　the　scholar　had　been　so　conscientious；　careful　and　accurate　that　he　simply　did　not　know　what　he　had　seen。　His　testimony　was　worthless。　I　have　had　such　experiences　repeatedly　and　others　have　confessed　them。　To　the　question：　Where　not　presuppose　too　much？　the　answer　is：　everywhere。　First　of　all；　little　must　be　presupposed　concerning　people's　powers　of　observation。　They　claim　to　have　heard；　seen　or　felt　so　and　so；　and　they　have　not　seen；　heard；　or　felt　it　at　all；　or　quite　differently。　They　assent　vigorously　that　they　have　grasped；　touched；　counted　or　examined　something；　and　on　closer　examination　it　is　demonstrated　that　it　was　only　a　passing　glance　they　threw　on　it。　And　it　is　still　worse　where　something　more　than　ordinary　perception　is　being　considered；　when　exceptionally　keen　senses　or　information　are　necessary。　People　trust　the　conventional　and　when　close　observation　is　required　often　lack　the　knowledge　proper　to　their　particular　status。　In　this　way；　by　presupposing　especial　professional　knowledge　in　a　given　witness；　great　mistakes　are　made。　Generally　he　hasn't　such　knowledge；　or　has　not　made　any　particular　use　of　it。

In　the　same　way　too　much　attention　and　interest　are　often　presupposed；　only　to　lead　later　to　the　astonishing　discovery　of　how　little　attention　men　really　pay　to　their　own　affairs。　Still　less；　therefore；　ought　knowledge　in　less　personal　things　be　presupposed；　for　in　the　matter　of　real　understanding；　the　ignorance　of　men　far　exceeds　all　presuppositions。　Most　people　know　the　looks　of　all　sorts　of　things；　and　think　they　know　their　essences；　and　when　questioned；　invariably　assert　it；　quite　in　good　faith。　But　if　you　depend　　on　such　knowledge　bad　results　arise　that　are　all　the　more　dangerous　because　there　is　rarely　later　opportunity　to　recognize　their　badness。