criminal psychology-第71章
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ined to think。 Choose at random； and you find surprisingly numerous words with exaggerated denotations。 If I say； ‘‘I posit the case； I press through； I jump over； the proposition； etc。；'' these phrases are all pictures； for I have posited nothing； I have pressed through no obstacle； and have jumped over no object。 My words； therefore； have not stood for anything real； but for an image； and it is impossible to determine the remoteness of the latter from the former； or the variety of direction and extent this remoteness may receive from each individual。 Wherever images are made use of； therefore； we must； if we are to know what is meant； first establish how and where the use occurred。 How frequently we hear； e。 g。； of a ‘‘four…cornered'' table instead of a square table； a ‘‘very average'' man； instead of a man who is far below the average。 In many cases this false expression is half… consciously made for the purpose of beautifying a request or making it appear more modest。 The smoker says： ‘‘May I have some light；'' although you know that it is perfectly indifferent whether much or little light is taken from the cigar。 ‘‘May I have just a little piece of roast；'' is said in order to make the request that the other fellow should pass the heavy platter seem more modest。 And again： ‘‘Please give me a little water；'' does not modify the fact that the other fellow must pass the whole water flask； and that it is indifferent to him whether afterwards you take much or little water。 So； frequently； we speak of borrowing or lending； without in the remotest thinking of returning。 The student says to his comrade； ‘‘Lend me a pen； some paper； or some ink；'' but he has not at all any intention of giving them back。 Similar things are to be discovered in accused or witnesses who think they have not behaved properly； and who then want to exhibit their misconduct in the most favorable light。 These beautifications frequently go so far and may be made so skilfully that the correct situation may not be observed for a long time。 Habitual usage offers； in this case also； the best examples。 For years uncountable it has been called a cruel job to earn your living honestly and to satisfy the absolute needs of many people by quickly and painlessly slaughtering cattle。 But； when somebody； just for the sake of killing time； because of ennui； shoots and martyrs harmless animals； or merely so wounds them that if they are not retrieved they must die terrible deaths； we call it noble sport。 I should like to see a demonstration of the difference between killing an ox and shooting a stag。 The latter does not require even superior skill； for it is much more difficult to kill an ox swiftly and painlessly than to shoot a stag badly； and even the most accurate shot requires less training than the correct slaughter of an ox。 Moreover； it requires much more courage to finish a wild ox than to destroy a tame and kindly pheasant。 But usage； once and for all； has assumed this essential distinction between men； and frequently this distinction is effective in criminal law； without our really seeing how or why。 The situation is similar in the difference between cheating in a horse trade and cheating about other commodities。 It occurs in the distinction between two duellists fighting according to rule and two peasant lads brawling with the handles of their picks according to agreement。 It recurs again in the violation of the law by somebody ‘‘nobly inspired with champagne；'' as against its violation by some ‘‘mere'' drunkard。 But usage has a favoring； excusing intent for the first series； and an accusing； rejecting intent for the latter series。 The different points of view from which various events are seen are the consequence of the varieties of the usage which first distinguished the view…points from one another。
There is； moreover； a certain dishonesty in speaking and in listening where the speaker knows that the hearer is hearing a different matter； and the hearer knows that the speaker is speaking a different matter。 As Steinthal＇1＇ has said； ‘‘While the speaker speaks about things that he does not believe； and the reality of which he takes no stock in； his auditor； at the same time； knows right well what the former has said； he understands correctly and does not blame the speaker for having expressed himself altogether unintelligibly。'' This occurs very frequently in daily routine； without causing much difficulty in human intercourse； but it ought； for this reason； to occur inversely in our conversation with witnesses and accused。 I know that the manner of speaking just described is frequently used when a witness wants to clothe some definite suspicion without expressing it explicitly。 In such cases； e。 g。； the examiner as well as the witness believes that X is the criminal。 For some reason； perhaps because X is a close relation of the witness or of ‘‘the man higher up；'' neither of them； judge nor witness； wishes to utter the truth openly； and so they feel round the subject for an interminable time。 If now； both think the same thing； there results at most only a loss of time； but no other misfortune。 When； however； each thinks of a different object； e。 g。； each thinks of another criminal； but each believes mistakenly that he agrees with the other； their separating without having made explicit what they think； may lead to harmful misunderstandings。 If the examiner then believes that the witness agrees with him and proceeds upon this only apparently certain basis； the case may become very bad。 The results are the same when a confession is discussed with a suspect； i。 e。； when the judge thinks that the suspect would like to confess； but only suggests confession； while the latter has never even thought of it。 The one thing alone our work permits of is open and clear speaking； any confused form of expression is evil。
＇1＇ Cf。 Zeitschrift fur Vlkeranthropologie。 Vol。 XIX。 1889。 ‘‘Wie denkt das yolk ber die Sprache？''
Nevertheless； confusions often occur involuntarily； and as they can not be avoided they must be understood。 Thus； it is characteristic to understand something unknown in terms of some known example； i。 e。； the Romans who first saw an elephant； called it ‘‘bos lucani。'' Similarly ‘‘wood…dog'' = wolf； ‘‘sea…cat'' = monkey； etc。 These are forms of common usage； but every individual is accustomed to make such identifications whenever he meets with any strange object。 He speaks； therefore； to some degree in images； and if his auditor is not aware of the fact he can not understand him。 His speaking so may be discovered by seeking out clearly whether and what things were new and foreign to the speaker。 When this is learned it may be assumed that he will express himself in images when considering the unfamiliar object。 Then it will not be difficult to discover the nature and source of the images。
Similar difficulties arise with the usage of foreign terms。 It is of course familiar that their incorrect use is not confined to the uneducated。 I have in mind particularly the weakening of the meaning in our own language。 The foreign word； according to Volkmar； gets its significance by robbing the homonymous native word of its definiteness and freshness； and is therefore sought out by all persons who are unwilling to call things by their right names。 The ‘‘_triste_ position'' is far from being so sad as the ‘‘sad'' position。 I should like to know how a great many people could speak； if they were not permitted to say _malheur_； _m
