darwin and modern science-第114章

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ychological　views　were　greatly　influenced　by　French　naturalists　and　philosophers；　especially　by　Cabanis　and　Lamarck。　　He　praises　the　〃ever　memorable　Lamarck；〃　because　he　laid　so　much　stress　on　the　〃will　to　live。〃　　But　he　repudiates　as　a　〃wonderful　error〃　the　idea　that　the　organs　of　animals　should　have　reached　their　present　perfection　through　a　development　in　time；　during　the　course　of　innumerable　generations。　　It　was；　he　said；　a　consequence　of　the　low　standard　of　contemporary　French　philosophy；　that　Lamarck　came　to　the　idea　of　the　construction　of　living　beings　in　time　through　succession！　　（〃Ueber　den　Willen　in　der　Natur〃　（2nd　edition）；　Frankfurt　a。　M。；　1854；　pages　41…43。）

The　positivistic　stream　of　thought　was　not　more　in　favour　of　a　real　evolution　than　was　the　Romantic　school。　　Its　aim　was　to　adhere　to　positive　facts：　　it　looked　with　suspicion　on　far…reaching　speculation。　　Comte　laid　great　stress　on　the　discontinuity　found　between　the　different　kingdoms　of　nature；　as　well　as　within　each　single　kingdom。　　As　he　regarded　as　unscientific　every　attempt　to　reduce　the　number　of　physical　forces；　so　he　rejected　entirely　the　hypothesis　of　Lamarck　concerning　the　evolution　of　species；　the　idea　of　species　would　in　his　eyes　absolutely　lose　its　importance　if　a　transition　from　species　to　species　under　the　influence　of　conditions　of　life　were　admitted。　　His　disciples　（Littre；　Robin）　continued　to　direct　against　Darwin　the　polemics　which　their　master　had　employed　against　Lamarck。　　Stuart　Mill；　who；　in　the　theory　of　knowledge；　represented　the　empirical　or　positivistic　movement　in　philosophylike　his　English　forerunners　from　Locke　to　Humefounded　his　theory　of　knowledge　and　morals　on　the　experience　of　the　single　individual。　　He　sympathised　with　the　theory　of　the　original　likeness　of　all　individuals　and　derived　their　differences；　on　which　he　practically　and　theoretically　laid　much　stress；　from　the　influence　both　of　experience　and　education；　and；　generally；　of　physical　and　social　causes。　　He　admitted　an　individual　evolution；　and；　in　the　human　species；　an　evolution　based　on　social　progress；　but　no　physiological　evolution　of　species。　　He　was　afraid　that　the　hypothesis　of　heredity　would　carry　us　back　to　the　old　theory　of　〃innate〃　ideas。

Darwin　was　more　empirical　than　Comte　and　Mill；　experience　disclosed　to　him　a　deeper　continuity　than　they　could　find；　closer　than　before　the　nature　and　fate　of　the　single　individual　were　shown　to　be　interwoven　in　the　great　web　binding　the　life　of　the　species　with　nature　as　a　whole。　　And　the　continuity　which　so　many　idealistic　philosophers　could　find　only　in　the　world　of　thought；　he　showed　to　be　present　in　the　world　of　reality。

III。

Darwin's　energetic　renewal　of　the　old　idea　of　evolution　had　its　chief　importance　in　strengthening　the　conviction　of　this　real　continuity　in　the　world；　of　continuity　in　the　series　of　form　and　events。　　It　was　a　great　support　for　all　those　who　were　prepared　to　base　their　conception　of　life　on　scientific　grounds。　　Together　with　the　recently　discovered　law　of　the　conservation　of　energy；　it　helped　to　produce　the　great　realistic　movement　which　characterises　the　last　third　of　the　nineteenth　century。　　After　the　decline　of　the　Romantic　movement　people　wished　to　have　firmer　ground　under　their　feet　and　reality　now　asserted　itself　in　a　more　emphatic　manner　than　in　the　period　of　Romanticism。　　It　was　easy　for　Hegel　to　proclaim　that　〃the　real〃　was　〃the　rational；〃　and　that　〃the　rational〃　was　〃the　real〃：　　reality　itself　existed　for　him　only　in　the　interpretation　of　ideal　reason；　and　if　there　was　anything　which　could　not　be　merged　in　the　higher　unity　of　thought；　then　it　was　only　an　example　of　the　〃impotence　of　nature　to　hold　to　the　idea。〃　　But　now　concepts　are　to　be　founded　on　nature　and　not　on　any　system　of　categories　too　confidently　deduced　a　priori。　　The　new　devotion　to　nature　had　its　recompense　in　itself；　because　the　new　points　of　view　made　us　see　that　nature　could　indeed　〃hold　to　ideas；〃　though　perhaps　not　to　those　which　we　had　cogitated　beforehand。

A　most　important　question　for　philosophers　to　answer　was　whether　the　new　views　were　compatible　with　an　idealistic　conception　of　life　and　existence。　Some　proclaimed　that　we　have　now　no　need　of　any　philosophy　beyond　the　principles　of　the　conservation　of　matter　and　energy　and　the　principle　of　natural　evolution：　　existence　should　and　could　be　definitely　and　completely　explained　by　the　laws　of　material　nature。　　But　abler　thinkers　saw　that　the　thing　was　not　so　simple。　　They　were　prepared　to　give　the　new　views　their　just　place　and　to　examine　what　alterations　the　old　views　must　undergo　in　order　to　be　brought　into　harmony　with　the　new　data。

The　realistic　character　of　Darwin's　theory　was　shown　not　only　in　the　idea　of　natural　continuity；　but　also；　and　not　least；　in　the　idea　of　the　cause　whereby　organic　life　advances　step　by　step。　　This　ideathe　idea　of　the　struggle　for　lifeimplied　that　nothing　could　persist；　if　it　had　no　power　to　maintain　itself　under　the　given　conditions。　　Inner　value　alone　does　not　decide。　　Idealism　was　here　put　to　its　hardest　trial。　　In　continuous　evolution　it　could　perhaps　still　find　an　analogy　to　the　inner　evolution　of　ideas　in　the　mind；　but　in　the　demand　for　power　in　order　to　struggle　with　outward　conditions　Realism　seemed　to　announce　itself　in　its　most　brutal　form。　　Every　form　of　Idealism　had　to　ask　itself　seriously　how　it　was　going　to　〃struggle　for　life〃　with　this　new　Realism。

We　will　now　give　a　short　account　of　the　position　which　leading　thinkers　in　different　countries　have　taken　up　in　regard　to　this　question。

I。　　Herbert　Spencer　was　the　philosopher　whose　mind　was　best　prepared　by　his　own　previous　thinking　to　admit　the　theory　of　Darwin　to　a　place　in　his　conception　of　the　world。　　His　criticism　of　the　arguments　which　had　been　put　forward　against　the　hypothesis　of　Lamarck；　showed　that　Spencer；　as　a　young　man；　was　an　adherent　to　the　evolution　idea。　　In　his　〃Social　Statics〃　（1850）　he　applied　this　idea　to　human　life　and　moral　civilisation。　　In　1852　he　wrote　an　essay　on　〃The　Development　Hypothesis〃；　in　which　he　definitely　stated　his　belief　that　the　differentiation　of　species；　like　the　differentiation　within　a　single　organism；　was　the　result　of　development。　　In　the　first　edition　of　his　〃Psychology〃　（1855）　he　took　a　step　which　put　him　in　opposition　to　the　older　English　school　（from　Locke　to　Mill）：　　he　acknowledged　〃innate　ideas〃　so　far　as　to　admit　the　tendency　of　acquired　habits　to　be　inherited　in　the　course　of　generations；　so　that　the　nature　and　functions　of　the　individual　are　only　to　be　understood　through　its　connection　with　the　life　of　the　species。　　In　1857；　in　his　essay　on　〃Progress〃；　he　propounded　the　law　of　differentiation　as　a　general　law　of　evolution；　verified　by　examples　from　all　regions　of　experience；　the　evolution　of　species　being　only　one　of　these　examples。　　On　the　effect　which　the　appearance　of　〃The　Origin　of　Species〃　had　on　his　mind　he　writes　in　his　〃Autobiography〃：　　〃Up　to　that　time。。。I　held　that　the　sole　cause　of　organic　evolution　is　the　inheritance　of　functionally…produced　modifications。　　The　〃Origin　of　Species〃　made　it　clear　to　me　that　I　was　wrong；　and　that　the　larger　part　of　the　facts　cannot　be　due　to　any　such　cause。。。To　have　the　theory　of　organic　evolution　justified　was　of　course　to　get　further　support　for　that　theory　of　evolution　at　large　with　which。。。all　my　conceptions　were　bound　up。〃　　（Spencer；　〃Autobiography〃；　Vol。　II。　page　50；　London；　1904。）　　Instead　of　the　metaphorical　expression　〃natural　selection；〃　Spencer　introduced　the　term　〃survival　of　the　fittest；〃　which　found　favour　with　Darwin　as　well　as　with　Wallace。

In　working　out　his　ideas　of　evolution；　Spencer　found　that　differentiation　was　not　the　only　form　of　evolution。　　In　its　simplest　form　evolution　is　mainly　a　concentration；　previously　scattered　elements　being　integrated　and　losing　independent　movement。　　Differentiation　is　only　forthcoming　when　minor　wholes　arise　within　a　greater　whole。　　And　the　highest　form　of　evolution　is　reached　when　there　is　a　harmony　between　concentration　and　differentiation；　a　harmony　which　Spencer　calls　equilibration　and　which　he　defines　as　a　moving　equilibrium。　　At　the　same　time　this　definition　enables　him　to　illustrate　the　expression　〃survival　of　the　fittest。〃　　〃Every　living　organism　exhibits　such　a　moving　equilibriuma　balanced　set　of　functions　constituting　its　life；　and　the　overthrow　of　this　balanced　set　of　functions　or　moving　equilibrium　is　what　we　call　death。　　Some　individuals　in　a　species　are　so　constituted　that　their　moving　equilibria　are　less　easily　overthrown　than　those　of　other　individuals；　and　these　are　the　fittest　which　survive；　or；　in　Mr　Darwin's　language；　they　are　the　select　which　nature　preserves。〃　　（Ibid。　page　100。）　　Not　only　in　the　domain　of　organic　life；　but　in　all　domains；　the　summit　of　evolution　is；　according　to　Spencer；　characterised　by　such　a　harmonyby　a　moving　equilibrium。

Spencer's　analysis　of　the　concept　of　evolution；　based　on　a　great　variety　of　examples；　has　made　this　concept　clearer　and　more　definite　than　before。　　It　contains　the　three　elements；　integration；　differentiation　and　equilibration。　　It　is　true　that　a　concept　which　is　to　be　valid　for　all　domains　of　experience　must　have　an　abstract　character；　and　between　the　several　domains　there　is；　strictly　speaking；　only　a　relation　of　analogy。　　So　there　is　only　analogy　between　psychical　and　physical　evolution。　　But　this　is　no　serious　objection；　because　general　concepts　do　not　express　more　than　analogies　between　the　phenomena　which　they　represent。　　Spencer　takes　his　leading　terms　from　the　material　world　in　defining　evolution　（in　the　simplest　form）　as　integration　of　matter　and　dissipation　of　movement；　but　as　henot　always　quite　consistently　（Cf。　my　letter　to　him；　1876；　now　printed　in　Duncan's　〃Life　and　Letters　of　Herbert　Spencer〃；　page　178；　London；　1908。）assumed　a　correspondence　of　mind　and　matter；　he　could　very　well　give　these　terms　an　indirect　importance　for　psychical　evolution。　　Spencer　has　always；　in　my　opinion　with　full　right；　repudiated　the　ascription　of　materialism。　　He　is　no　more　a　materialist　than　Spinoza。　　In　his　〃Principles　of　Psychology〃　（paragraph　63）　he　expressed　himself　very　clearly：　　〃Though　it　seems　easier　to　translate　so…called　matter　into　so…called　spirit；　than　to　translate　so…called　spirit　into　so…called　matterwhich　latter　is　indeed　wholly　impossibleyet　no　translation　can　carry　us　beyond　our　symbols。〃　　These　words　lead　us　naturally　to　a　group　of　thinkers　whose　starting…point　was　psychical　evolution。　　But　we　have　still　one　aspect　of　Spencer's　philosophy　to　mention。

Spencer　founded　his　〃laws　of　evolution〃　on　an　inductive　basis；　but　he　was　convinced　that　they　could　be　deduced　from　the　law　of　the　conservation　of　energy。　　Such　a　deduction　is；　perhaps；　possible　for　the　more　elementary　forms　of　evolution；　integration　and　differentiation；　but　it　is　not　possible　for　the　highest　form；　the　equilibration；　which　is　a　harmony　of　integration　and　differentiation。　　Spencer　can　no　more　deduce　the　necessity　for　the　eventual　appearance　of　〃moving　equilibria〃　of　harmonious　totalities　than　Hegel　could　guarantee　the　〃higher　unities〃　in　which　all　contradictions　should　be　reconciled。　　In　Spencer's　hands　the　theory　of　evolution　acquired　a　more　decidedly　optimistic　character　than　in　D