the science of right-第11章

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each　other；　and　this　necessity　is　in　accordance　with　the　juridical

laws　of　pure　reason。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　25。　The　Rational　Right　of　Marriage。



　　For；　this　natural　commercium…　as　a　usus　membrorum　sexualium

alterius…　is　an　enjoyment　for　which　the　one　person　is　given　up　to

the　other。　In　this　relation　the　human　individual　makes　himself　a

res；　which　is　contrary　to　the　right　of　humanity　in　his　own　person。

This；　however；　is　only　possible　under　the　one　condition；　that　as　the

one　person　is　acquired　by　the　other　as　a　res；　that　same　person　also

equally　acquires　the　other　reciprocally；　and　thus　regains　and

reestablishes　the　rational　personality。　The　acquisition　of　a　part　of

the　human　organism　being；　on　account　of　its　unity；　at　the　same　time

the　acquisition　of　the　whole　person；　it　follows　that　the　surrender　and

acceptation　of；　or　by；　one　sex　in　relation　to　the　other；　is　not　only

permissible　under　the　condition　of　marriage；　but　is　further　only

really　possible　under　that　condition。　But　the　personal　right　thus

acquired　is；　at　the　same　time；　real　in　kind；　and　this　characteristic

of　it　is　established　by　the　fact　that　if　one　of　the　married　persons

run　away　or　enter　into　the　possession　of　another；　the　other　is

entitled；　at　any　time；　and　incontestably；　to　bring　such　a　one　back

to　the　former　relation；　as　if　that　person　were　a　thing。



　　　　　　　　　　　　26。　Monogamy　and　Equality　in　Marriage。



　　For　the　same　reasons；　the　relation　of　the　married　persons　to　each

other　is　a　relation　of　equality　as　regards　the　mutual　possession　of

their　persons；　as　well　as　of　their　goods。　Consequently　marriage　is

only　truly　realized　in　monogamy；　for　in　the　relation　of　polygamy　the

person　who　is　given　away　on　the　one　side；　gains　only　a　part　of　the　one

to　whom　that　person　is　given　up；　and　therefore　becomes　a　mere　res。　But

in　respect　of　their　goods；　they　have　severally　the　right　to　renounce

the　use　of　any　part　of　them；　although　only　by　a　special　contract。



　　From　the　principle　thus　stated；　it　also　follows　that　concubinage

is　as　little　capable　of　being　brought　under　a　contract　of　right　as　the

hiring　of　a　person　on　any　one　occasion；　in　the　way　of　a　pactum

fornicationis。　For；　as　regards　such　a　contract　as　this　latter　relation

would　imply；　it　must　be　admitted　by　all　that　any　one　who　might　enter

into　it　could　not　be　legally　held　to　the　fulfillment　of　their

promise　if　they　wished　to　resile　from　it。　And　as　regards　the　former；　a

contract　of　concubinage　would　also　fall　as　a　pactum　turpe；　because

as　a　contract　of　the　hire　（locatio；　conductio）；　of　a　part　for　the

use　of　another；　on　account　of　the　inseparable　unity　of　the　members

of　a　person；　any　one　entering　into　such　a　contract　would　be　actually

surrendering　as　a　res　to　the　arbitrary　will　of　another。　Hence　any

party　may　annul　a　contract　like　this　if　entered　into　with　any　other；

at　any　time　and　at　pleasure；　and　that　other　would　have　no　ground；　in

the　circumstances；　to　complain　of　a　lesion　of　his　right。　The　same

holds　likewise　of　a　morganatic　or　〃left…hand〃　marriage；　contracted

in　order　to　turn　the　inequality　in　the　social　status　of　the　two

parties　to　advantage　in　the　way　of　establishing　the　social　supremacy

of　the　one　over　the　other；　for；　in　fact；　such　a　relation　is　not　really

different　from　concubinage；　according　to　the　principles　of　natural

right；　and　therefore　does　not　constitute　a　real　marriage。　Hence　the

question　may　be　raised　as　to　whether　it　is　not　contrary　to　the

equality　of　married　persons　when　the　law　says　in　any　way　of　the

husband　in　relation　to　the　wife；　〃he　shall　be　thy　master；〃　so　that

he　is　represented　as　the　one　who　commands；　and　she　is　the　one　who

obeys。　This；　however；　cannot　be　regarded　as　contrary　to　the　natural

equality　of　a　human　pair；　if　such　legal　supremacy　is　based　only　upon

the　natural　superiority　of　the　faculties　of　the　husband　compared

with　the　wife；　in　the　effectuation　of　the　common　interest　of　the

household；　and　if　the　right　to　command　is　based　merely　upon　this　fact。

For　this　right　may　thus　be　deduced　from　the　very　duty　of　unity　and

equality　in　relation　to　the　end　involved。



　　　　　　　　27。　Fulfillment　of　the　Contract　of　Marriage。



　　The　contract　of　marriage　is　completed　only　by　conjugal　cohabitation。

A　contract　of　two　persons　of　different　sex；　with　the　secret

understanding　either　to　abstain　from　conjugal　cohabitation　or　with　the

consciousness　on　either　side　of　incapacity　for　it；　is　a　simulated

contract；　it　does　not　constitute　a　marriage；　and　it　may　be　dissolved

by　either　of　the　parties　at　will。　But　if　the　incapacity　only　arises

after　marriage；　the　right　of　the　contract　is　not　annulled　or

diminished　by　a　contingency　that　cannot　be　legally　blamed。

　　The　acquisition　of　a　spouse；　either　as　a　husband　or　as　a　wife；　is

therefore　not　constituted　facto…　that　is；　by　cohabitation…　without　a

preceding　contract；　nor　even　pacto…　by　a　mere　contract　of　marriage；

without　subsequent　cohabitation；　but　only　lege；　that　is；　as　a

juridical　consequence　of　the　obligation　that　is　formed　by　two

persons　entering　into　a　sexual　union　solely　on　the　basis　of　a

reciprocal　possession　of　each　other；　which　possession　at　the　same　time

is　only　effected　in　reality　by　the　reciprocal　usus　facultatum

sexualium　alterius。



　　　　　　　　　　Title　II。　Parental　Right。　（Parent　and　Child）。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　28。　The　Relation　of　Parent　and　Child。



　　From　the　duty　of　man　towards　himself…　that　is；　towards　the

humanity　in　his　own　person　there　thus　arises　a　personal　right　on　the

part　of　the　members　of　the　opposite　sexes；　as　persons；　to　acquire

one　another　really　and　reciprocally　by　marriage。　In　like　manner；

from　the　fact　of　procreation　in　the　union　thus　constituted；　there

follows　the　duty　of　preserving　and　rearing　children　as　the　products　of

this　union。　Accordingly；　children；　as　persons；　have；　at　the　same　time；

an　original　congenital　right…　distinguished　from　mere　hereditary

right…　to　be　reared　by　the　care　of　their　parents　till　they　are　capable

of　maintaining　themselves；　and　this　provision　becomes　immediately

theirs　by　law；　without　any　particular　juridical　act　being　required

to　determine　it。

　　For　what　is　thus　produced　is　a　person；　and　it　is　impossible　to　think

of　a　being　endowed　with　personal　freedom　as　produced　merely　by　a

physical　process。　And　hence；　in　the　practical　relation；　it　is　quite

a　correct　and　even　a　necessary　idea　to　regard　the　act　of　generation　as

a　process　by　which　a　person　is　brought　without　his　consent　into　the

world　and　placed　in　it　by　the　responsible　free　will　of　others。　This

act；　therefore；　attaches　an　obligation　to　the　parents　to　make　their

children…　as　far　as　their　power　goes…　contented　with　the　condition

thus　acquired。　Hence　parents　cannot　regard　their　child　as；　in　a

manner；　a　thing　of　their　own　making；　for　a　being　endowed　with

freedom　cannot　be　so　regarded。　Nor；　consequently；　have　they　a　right　to

destroy　it　as　if　it　were　their　own　property；　or　even　to　leave　it　to

chance；　because　they　have　brought　a　being　into　the　world　who　becomes

in　fact　a　citizen　of　the　world；　and　they　have　placed　that　being　in　a

state　which　they　cannot　be　left　to　treat　with　indifference；　even

according　to　the　natural　conceptions　of　right。



　　We　cannot　even　conceive　how　it　is　possible　that　God　can　create

free　beings；　for　it　appears　as　if　all　their　future　actions；　being

predetermined　by　that　first　act；　would　be　contained　in　the　chain　of

natural　necessity；　and　that；　therefore；　they　could　not　be　free。　But　as

men　we　are　free　in　fact；　as　is　proved　by　the　categorical　imperative　in

the　moral　and　practical　relation　as　an　authoritative　decision　of

reason；　yet　reason　cannot　make　the　possibility　of　such　a　relation　of

cause　to　effect　conceivable　from　the　theoretical　point　of　view；

because　they　are　both　suprasensible。　All　that　can　be　demanded　of

reason　under　these　conditions　would　merely　be　to　prove　that　there　is

no　contradiction　involved　in　the　conception　of　a　creation　of　free

beings；　and　this　may　be　done　by　showing　that　contradiction　only　arises

when；　along　with　the　category　of　causality；　the　condition　of　time　is

transferred　to　the　relation　of　suprasensible　things。　This　condition；

as　implying　that　the　cause　of　an　effect　must　precede　the　effect　as　its

reason；　is　inevitable　in　thinking　the　relation　of　objects　of　sense

to　one　another；　and　if　this　conception　of　causality　were　to　have

objective　reality　given　to　it　in　the　theoretical　bearing；　it　would

also　have　to　be　referred　to　the　suprasensible　sphere。　But　the

contradiction　vanishes　when　the　pure　category；　apart　from　any　sensible

conditions；　is　applied　from　the　moral　and　practical　point　of　view；　and

consequently　as　in　a　non…sensible　relation　to　the　conception　of

creation。

　　The　philosophical　jurist　will　not　regard　this　investigation；　when

thus　carried　back　even　to　the　ultimate　principles　of　the

transcendental　philosophy；　as　an　unnecessary　subtlety　in　a

metaphysic　of　morals；　or　as　losing　itself　in　aimless　obscurity；　when

he　takes　into　consideration　the　difficulty　of　doing　justice　in　this

inquiry　to　the　ultimate　relations　of　the　principles　of　right。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　29。　The　Rights　of　the　Parent。



　　From　the　duty　thus　indicated；　there　further　necessarily　arises　the

right　of　the　parents　to　the　management　and　training　of　the　child；　so

long　as　it　is　itself　incapable　of　making　proper　use　of　its　body　as

an　organism；　and　of　its　mind　as　an　understanding。　This　involves　its

nourishment　and　the　care　of　its　education。　This　includes；　in

general；　the　function　of　forming　and　developing　it　practically；　that

it　may　be　able　in　the　future　to　maintain　and　advance　itself；　and

also　its　moral　culture　and　development；　the　guilt　of　neglecting　it

falling　upon　the　parents。　All　this　training　is　to　be　continued　till

the　child　reaches　the　period　of　emancipation　（emancipatio）；　as　the　age

of　practicable　self…support。　The　parents　then　virtually　renounce　the

parental　right　to　command；　as　well　as　all　claim　to　repayment　for　their

previous　care　and　trouble；　for　which　care　and　trouble；　after　the

process　of　education　is　complete；　they　can　only　appeal　to　the

children；　by　way　of　any　claim；　on　the　ground　of　the　obligation　of

gratitude　as　a　duty　of　virtue。

　　From　the　fact　of　personality　in　the　children；　it　further　follows

that　they　can　never　be　regarded　as　the　property　of　the　parents；　but

only　as　belonging　to　them　by　way　of　being　in　their　possession；　like

other　things　that　are　held　apart　from　the　possession　of　all　others　and

that　can　be　brought　back　even　against　the　will　of　the　subjects。

Hence　the　right　of　the　parents　is　not　a　purely　real　right；　and　it　is

not　alienable　（jus　personalissimum）。　But　neither　is　it　a　merely

personal　right；　it　is　a　personal　right　of　a　real　kind；　that　is；　a

personal　right　that　is　constituted　and　exercised　after　the　manner　of　a

real　right。

　　It　is　therefore　evident　that　the　title　of　a　personal　right　of　a　real

kind　must　necessarily　be　added；　in　the　science　of　right；　to