the science of right-第12章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



kind　must　necessarily　be　added；　in　the　science　of　right；　to　the　titles

of　real　right　and　personal　right；　the　division　of　rights　into　these

two　being　not　complete。　For；　if　the　right　of　the　parents　to　the

children　were　treated　as　if　it　were　merely　a　real　right　to　a　part　of

what　belongs　to　their　house；　they　could　not　found　only　upon　the　duty

of　the　children　to　return　to　them　in　claiming　them　when　they　run　away；

but　they　would　be　then　entitled　to　seize　them　and　impound　them　like

things　or　runaway　cattle。



　　　　　　　　　TITLE　III。　Household　Right。　（Master　and　Servant）

　　　　　　　30。　Relation　and　Right　of　the　Master　of　a　Household。



　　The　children　of　the　house；　who；　along　with　the　parents；　constitute　a

family；　attain　majority；　and　become　masters　of　themselves　（majorennes；

sui　juris）；　even　without　a　contract　of　release　from　their　previous

state　of　dependence；　by　their　actually　attaining　to　the　capability

of　self…maintenance。　This　attainment　arises；　on　the　one　hand；　as　a

state　of　natural　majority；　with　the　advance　of　years　in　the　general

course　of　nature；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　it　takes　form；　as　a　state　in

accordance　with　their　own　natural　condition。　They　thus　acquire　the

right　of　being　their　own　masters；　without　the　interposition　of　any

special　juridical　act；　and　therefore　merely　by　law　（lege）；　and　they

owe　their　parents　nothing　by　way　of　legal　debt　for　their　education；

just　as　the　parents；　on　their　side；　are　now　released　from　their

obligations　to　the　children　in　the　same　way。　Parents　and　children　thus

gain　or　regain　their　natural　freedom；　and　the　domestic　society；

which　was　necessary　according　to　the　law　of　right；　is　thus　naturally

dissolved。

　　Both　parties；　however；　may　resolve　to　continue　the　household；　but

under　another　mode　of　obligation。　It　may　assume　the　form　of　a　relation

between　the　bead　of　the　house；　as　its　master；　and　the　other　members　as

domestic　servants；　male　or　female；　and　the　connection　between　them

in　this　new　regulated　domestic　economy　（societas　herilis）　may　be

determined　by　contract。　The　master　of　the　house；　actually　or

virtually；　enters　into　contract　with　the　children；　now　become　major

and　masters　of　themselves；　or；　if　there　be　no　children　in　the

family；　with　other　free　persons　constituting　the　membership　of　the

household；　and　thus　there　is　established　domestic　relationship　not

founded　on　social　equality；　but　such　that　one　commands　as　master；

and　another　obeys　as　servant　（imperantis　et　subjecti　domestici）。

　　The　domestics　or　servants　may　then　be　regarded　by　the　master　of

the　household　as　thus　far　his。　As　regards　the　form　or　mode　of　his

possession　of　them；　they　belong　to　him　as　if　by　a　real　right；　for　if

any　of　them　run　away；　he　is　entitled　to　bring　them　again　under　his

power　by　a　unilateral　act　of　his　will。　But　as　regards　the　matter　of

his　right；　or　the　use　he　is　entitled　to　make　of　such　persons　as　his

domestics；　he　is　not　entitled　to　conduct　himself　towards　them　as　if　he

was　their　proprietor　or　owner　（dominus　servi）；　because　they　are　only

subjected　to　his　power　by　contract；　and　by　a　contract　under　certain

definite　restrictions。　For　a　contract　by　which　the　one　party　renounced

his　whole　freedom　for　the　advantage　of　the　other；　ceasing　thereby　to

be　a　person　and　consequently　having　no　duty　even　to　observe　a

contract；　is　self　contradictory；　and　is　therefore　of　itself　null　and

void。　The　question　as　to　the　right　of　property　in　relation　to　one

who　has　lost　his　legal　personality　by　a　crime　does　not　concern　us

here。

　　This　contract；　then；　of　the　master　of　a　household　with　his

domestics；　cannot　be　of　such　a　nature　that　the　use　of　them　could

ever　rightly　become　an　abuse　of　them；　and　the　judgement　as　to　what

constitutes　use　or　abuse　in　such　circumstances　the　is　not　left

merely　to　the　master；　but　is　also　competent　to　the　servants；　who　ought

never　to　be　held　in　bondage　or　bodily　servitude　as　slaves　or　serfs。

Such　a　contract　cannot；　therefore；　be　concluded　for　life；　but　in　all

cases　only　for　a　definite　period；　within　which　one　party　may

intimate　to　the　other　a　termination　of　their　connection。　Children；

however；　including　even　the　children　of　one　who　has　become　enslaved

owing　to　a　crime；　are　always　free。　For　every　man　is　born　free；　because

he　has　at　birth　as　yet　broken　no　law；　and　even　the　cost　of　his

education　till　his　maturity　cannot　be　reckoned　as　a　debt　which　he　is

bound　to　pay。　Even　a　slave；　if　it　were　in　his　power；　would　be　bound　to

educate　his　children　without　being　entitled　to　count　and　reckon　with

them　for　the　cost；　and　in　view　of　his　own　incapacity　for　discharging

this　function；　the　possessor　of　a　slave；　therefore；　enters　upon　the

obligation　which　he　has　rendered　the　slave　himself　unable　to　fulfil。



　　Here；　again；　as　under　the　first　two　titles；　it　is　clear　that　there

is　a　personal　right　of　a　real　kind；　in　the　relation　of　the　master　of　a

house　to　his　domestics。　For　he　can　legally　demand　them　as　belonging　to

what　is　externally　his；　from　any　other　possessor　of　them；　and　he　is

entitled　to　fetch　them　back　to　his　house；　even　before　the　reasons　that

may　have　led　them　to　run　away；　and　their　particular　right　in　the

circumstances；　have　been　juridically　investigated。



　　　　　　　　　SYSTEMATIC　DIVISION　OF　ALL　THE　RIGHTS　CAPABLE　OF

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　BEING　ACQUIRED　BY　CONTRACT。



　　　　　　　　　31。　Division　of　Contracts　Juridical　Conceptions

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　of　Money　and　a　Book。



　　It　is　reasonable　to　demand　that　a　metaphysical　science　of　right

shall　completely　and　definitely　determine　the　members　of　a　logical

division　of　its　conceptions　a　priori；　and　thus　establish　them　in　a

genuine　system。　All　empirical　division；　on　the　other　hand；　is　merely

fragmentary　partition；　and　it　leaves　us　in　uncertainty　as　to　whether

there　may　not　be　more　members　still　required　to　complete　the　whole

sphere　of　the　divided　conception。　A　division　that　is　made　according　to

a　principle　a　priori　may　be　called；　in　contrast　to　all　empirical

partitions；　a　dogmatic　division。

　　Every　contract；　regarded　in　itself　objectively；　consists　of　two

juridical　acts：　the　promise　and　its　acceptance。　Acquisition　by　the

latter；　unless　it　be　a　pactum　re　initum　which　requires　delivery；　is

not　a　part；　but　the　juridically　necessary　consequence　of　the　contract。

Considered　again　subjectively；　or　as　to　whether　the　acquisition；　which

ought　to　happen　as　a　necessary　consequence　according　to　reason；　will

also　follow；　in　fact；　as　a　physical　consequence；　it　is　evident　that

I　have　no　security　or　guarantee　that　this　will　happen　by　the　mere

acceptance　of　a　promise。　There　is；　therefore；　something　externally

required　connected　with　the　mode　of　the　contract；　in　reference　to

the　certainty　of　acquisition　by　it；　and　this　can　only　be　some

element　completing　and　determining　the　means　necessary　to　the

attainment　of　acquisition　as　realizing　the　purpose　of　the　contract。

And　in　his　connection　and　behoof；　three　persons　are　required　to

intervene…　the　promiser；　the　acceptor；　and　the　cautioner　or　surety。

The　importance　of　the　cautioner　is　evident；　but　by　his　intervention

and　his　special　contract　with　the　promiser；　the　acceptor　gains　nothing

in　respect　of　the　object　but　the　means　of　compulsion　that　enable　him

to　obtain　what　is　his　own。

　　According　to　these　rational　principles　of　logical　division；　there

are　properly　only　three　pure　and　simple　modes　of　contract。　There

are；　however；　innumerable　mixed　and　empirical　modes；　adding

statutory　and　conventional　forms　to　the　principles　of　mine　and　thine

that　are　in　accordance　with　rational　laws。　But　they　lie　outside　of　the

circle　of　the　metaphysical　science　of　right；　whose　rational　modes　of

contract　can　alone　be　indicated　here。

　　All　contracts　are　founded　upon　a　purpose　of　acquisition；　and　are

either：

　　A。　Gratuitous　contracts；　with　unilateral　acquisition；　or

　　B。　Onerous　contracts；　with　reciprocal　acquisition；　or

　　C。　Cautionary　contracts；　with　no　acquisition；　but　only　guarantee

of　what　has　been　already　acquired。　These　contracts　may　be　gratuitous

on　the　one　side；　and　yet；　at　the　same　time；　onerous　on　the　other。



　　A。　The　gratuitous　contracts　（pacta　gratuita）　are：

　　　　1。　Depositation　（depositum）；　involving　the　preservation　of　some

valuable　deposited　in　trust；

　　　　2。　Commodate　（commodatum）　a　loan　of　the　use　of　a　thing；

　　　　3。　Donation　（donatio）；　a　free　gift。

　　B。　The　onerous　contracts　are　contracts　either　of　permutation　or　of

hiring。

　　I。　Contracts　of　permutation　or　reciprocal　exchange　（permutatio

late　sic　dicta）：

　　　　1。　Barter；　or　strictly　real　exchange　（permutatio　stricte　sic

dicta）。　Goods　exchanged　for　goods。

　　　　2。　Purchase　and　sale　（emptio　venditio）。　Goods　exchanged　for　money。

　　　　3。　Loan　（mutuum）。　Loan　of　a　fungible　under　condition　of　its

being　returned　in　kind：　corn　for　corn；　or　money　for　money。

　　II。　Contracts　of　letting　and　hiring　（locatio　conductio）：

　　　　1。　Letting　of　a　thing　on　hire　to　another　person　who　is　to　make　use

of　it　（locatio　rei）。　If　the　thing　can　only　be　restored　in　specie；　it

may　be　the　subject　of　an　onerous　contract　combining　the

consideration　of　interest　with　it　（pactum　usurarium）。

　　　　2。　Letting　of　work　on　hire　（locatio　operae）。　Consent　to　the　use　of

my　powers　by　another　for　a　certain　price　（merces）。　The　worker　under

this　contract　is　a　hired　servant　（mercenarius）。

　　　　3。　Mandate　（mandatum）。　The　contract　of　mandate　is　an　engagement　to

perform　or　execute　a　certain　business　in　place　and　in　name　of

another　person。　If　the　action　is　merely　done　in　the　place　of

another；　but　not；　at　the　same　time；　in　his　name；　it　is　performance

without　commission　（gestio　negotii）；　but　if　it　is　rightfully　performed

in　name　of　the　other；　it　constitutes　mandate；　which　as　a　contract　of

procuration　is　an　onerous　contract　（mandatum　onerosum）。

　　C。　The　cautionary　contracts　（cautiones）　are：

　　　　1。　Pledge　（pignus）。　Caution　by　a　moveable　deposited　as　security。

　　　　2。　Suretyship　（fidejussio）。　Caution　for　the　fulfillment　of　the

promise　of　another。

　　　　3。　Personal　security　（praestatio　obsidis）。

　　Guarantee　of　personal　performance。

　　This　list　of　all　modes　in　which　the　property　of　one　person　may　be

transferred　or　conveyed　to　another　includes　conceptions　of　certain

objects　or　instruments　required　for　such　transference　（translatio）。

These　appear　to　be　entirely　empirical；　and　it　may　therefore　seem

questionable　whether　they　are　entitled　to　a　place　in　a　metaphysical

science　of　right。　For；　in　such　a　science；　the　divisions　must　be　made

according　to　principles　a　priori；　and　hence　the　matter　of　the

juridical　relation；　which　may　be　conventional；　ought　to　be　left　out　of

account；　and　only　its　form　should　be　taken　into　consideration。

　　Such　conceptions　may　be　illustrated　by　taking　the　instance　of　money；

in　contradistinction　from　all　other　exchangeable　things　as　wares　and

merchandise；　or　by　the　case　of　a　book。　And　considering　these　as

illustrative　examples　in　this　connection；　it　will　be　shown　that　the

con