the science of right-第16章

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restore　the　very　same　thing　to　the　power　of　the　lender；　But　the

receiver　of　the　loan　（commodatarius）　cannot；　at　the　same　time；

assume　that　the　owner　of　the　thing　lent　（commodans）　will　take　upon

himself　all　risk　（casus）　of　any　possible　loss　of　it；　or　of　its

useful　quality；　that　may　arise　from　having　given　it　into　the

possession　of　the　receiver。　For　it　is　not　to　be　understood　of　itself

that　the　owner；　besides　the　use　of　the　thing；　which　he　has　granted

to　the　receiver；　and　the　detriment　that　is　inseparable　from　such

use；　also　gives　a　guarantee　or　warrandice　against　all　damage　that

may　arise　from　such　use。　On　the　contrary；　a　special　accessory　contract

would　have　to　be　entered　into　for　this　purpose。　The　only　question；

then；　that　can　be　raised　is　this：　〃Is　it　incumbent　on　the　lender　or

the　borrower　to　add　expressly　the　condition　of　undertaking　the　risk

that　may　accrue　to　the　thing　lent；　or；　if　this　is　not　done；　which　of

the　parties　is　to　be　presumed　to　have　consented　and　agreed　to

guarantee　the　property　of　the　lender；　up　to　restoration　of　the　very

same　thing　or　its　equivalent？〃　Certainly　not　the　lender；　because　it

cannot　be　presumed　that　he　has　gratuitously　agreed　to　give　more　than

the　mere　use　of　the　thing；　so　that　he　cannot　be　supposed　to　have

also　undertaken　the　risk　of　loss　of　his　property。　But　this　may　be

assumed　on　the　side　of　the　borrower；　because　he　thereby　undertakes　and

performs　nothing　more　than　what　is　implied　in　the　contract。

　　For　example；　I　enter　a　house；　when　overtaken　by　a　shower　of　rain；

and　ask　the　loan　of　a　cloak。　But　through　accidental　contact　with

colouring　matter；　it　becomes　entirely　spoiled　while　in　my

possession；　or　on　entering　another　house；　I　lay　it　aside　and　it　is

stolen。　Under　such　circumstances；　everybody　would　think　it　absurd

for　me　to　assert　that　I　had　no　further　concern　with　the　cloak　but　to

return　it　as　it　was；　or；　in　the　latter　case；　only　to　mention　the

fact　of　the　theft；　and　that；　in　any　case；　anything　more　required　would

be　but　an　act　of　courtesy　in　expressing　sympathy　with　the　owner　on

account　of　his　loss；　seeing　he　can　claim　nothing　on　the　ground　of

right。　It　would　be　otherwise；　however；　if；　on　asking　the　use　of　an

article；　I　discharged　myself　beforehand　from　all　responsibility；　in

case　of　its　coming　to　grief　while　in　my　hands；　on　the　ground　of　my

being　poor　and　unable　to　compensate　any　incidental　loss。　No　one

could　find　such　a　condition　superfluous　or　ludicrous；　unless　the

borrower　were；　in　fact；　known　to　be　a　well…to…do　and　well…disposed

man；　because　in　such　a　case　it　would　almost　be　an　insult　not　to　act　on

the　presumption　of　generous　compensation　for　any　loss　sustained。



　　Now　by　the　very　nature　of　this　contract；　the　possible　damage　（casus）

which　the　thing　lent　may　undergo　cannot　be　exactly　determined　in　any

agreement。　Commodate　is　therefore　an　uncertain　contract　（pactum

incertum）；　because　the　consent　can　only　be　so　far　presumed。　The

judgement；　in　any　case；　deciding　upon　whom　the　incidence　of　any　loss

must　fall；　cannot　therefore　be　determined　from　the　conditions　of　the

contract　in　itself；　but　only　by　the　principle　of　the　court　before

which　it　comes；　and　which　can　only　consider　what　is　certain　in　the

contract；　and　the　only　thing　certain　is　always　the　fact　as　to　the

possession　of　the　thing　as　property。　Hence　the　judgement　passed　in　the

state　of　nature　will　be　different　from　that　given　by　a　court　of

justice　in　the　civil　state。　The　judgement　from　the　standpoint　of

natural　right　will　be　determined　by　regard　to　the　inner　rational

quality　of　the　thing；　and　will　run　thus：　〃Loss　arising　from　damage

accruing　to　a　thing　lent　falls　upon　the　borrower〃　（casum　sentit

commodatarius）；　whereas　the　sentence　of　a　court　of　justice　in　the

civil　state　will　run　thus：　〃The　loss　falls　upon　the　lender〃　（casum

sentit　dominus）。　The　latter　judgement　turns　out　differently　from　the

former　as　the　sentence　of　the　mere　sound　reason；　because　a　public

judge　cannot　found　upon　presumptions　as　to　what　either　party　may

have　thought；　and　thus　the　one　who　has　not　obtained　release　from　all

loss　in　the　thing；　by　a　special　accessory　contract；　must　bear　the

loss。　Hence　the　difference　between　the　judgement　as　the　court　must

deliver　it　and　the　form　in　which　each　individual　is　entitled　to　hold

it　for　himself；　by　his　private　reason；　is　a　matter　of　importance；

and　is　not　to　be　overlooked　in　the　consideration　of　juridical

judgements。



　　　　　　　39。　III。　The　Revindication　of　what　has　been　Lost。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Vindicatio）。



　　　It　is　clear　from　what　has　been　already　said　that　a　thing　of　mine

which　continues　to　exist　remains　mine；　although　I　may　not　be　in

continuous　occupation　of　it；　and　that　it　does　not　cease　to　be　mine

without　a　juridical　act　of　dereliction　or　alienation。　Further；　it　is

evident　that　a　right　in　this　thing　（jus　reale）　belongs　in

consequence　to　me　（jus　personale）；　against　every　holder　of　it；　and　not

merely　against　some　particular　person。　But　the　question　now　arises

as　to　whether　this　right　must　be　regarded　by　every　other　person　as　a

continuous　right　of　property　per　se；　if　I　have　not　in　any　way

renounced　it；　although　the　thing　is　in　the　possession　of　another。

　　A　thing　may　be　lost　（res　amissa）　and　thus　come　into　other　hands　in

an　honourable　bona　fide　way　as　a　supposed　〃find〃；　or　it　may　come　to　me

by　formal　transfer　on　the　part　of　one　who　is　in　possession　of　it；

and　who　professes　to　be　its　owner；　although　he　is　not　so。　Taking　the

latter　case；　the　question　arises　whether；　since　I　cannot　acquire　a

thing　from　one　who　is　not　its　owner　（a　non　domino）；　I　am　excluded　by

the　fact　from　all　right　in　the　thing　itself；　and　have　merely　a

personal　right　against　a　wrongful　possessor？　This　is　manifestly　so；　if

the　acquisition　is　judged　purely　according　to　its　inner　justifying

grounds　and　viewed　according　to　the　state　of　nature；　and　not　according

to　the　convenience　of　a　court　of　justice。

　　For　everything　alienable　must　be　capable　of　being　acquired　by

anyone。　The　rightfulness　of　acquisition；　however；　rests　entirely

upon　the　form　in　accordance　with　which　what　is　in　possession　of

another；　is　transferred　to　me　and　accepted　by　me。　In　other　words；

rightful　acquisition　depends　upon　the　formality　of　the　juridical　act

of　commutation　or　interchange　between　the　possessor　of　the　thing　and

the　acquirer　of　it；　without　its　being　required　to　ask　how　the　former

came　by　it；　because　this　would　itself　be　an　injury；　on　the　ground

that：　Quilibet　praesumitur　bonus。　Now　suppose　it　turned　out　that　the

said　possessor　was　not　the　real　owner；　I　cannot　admit　that　the　real

owner　is　entitled　to　hold　me　directly　responsible；　or　so　entitled　with

regard　to　any　one　who　might　be　holding　the　thing。　For　I　have　myself

taken　nothing　away　from　him；　when；　for　example；　I　bought　his　horse

according　to　the　law　（titulo　empti　venditi）　when　it　was　offered　for

sale　in　the　public　market。　The　title　of　acquisition　is　therefore

unimpeachable　on　my　side；　and　as　buyer　I　am　not　bound；　nor　even　have　I

the　right；　to　investigate　the　title　of　the　seller；　for　this　process　of

investigation　would　have　to　go　on　in　an　ascending　series　ad　infinitum。

Hence　on　such　grounds　I　ought　to　be　regarded；　in　virtue　of　a　regular

and　formal　purchase；　as　not　merely　the　putative；　but　the　real　owner　of

the　horse。

　　But　against　this　position；　there　immediately　start　up　the

following　juridical　principles。　Any　acquisition　derived　from　one　who

is　not　the　owner　of　the　thing　in　question　is　null　and　void。　I　cannot

derive　from　another　anything　more　than　what　he　himself　rightfully　has；

and　although　as　regards　the　form　of　the　acquisition　the　modus

acquirendi…　I　may　proceed　in　accordance　with　all　the　conditions　of

right　when　I　deal　in　a　stolen　horse　exposed　for　sale　in　the　market；

yet　a　real　title　warranting　the　acquisition　was　awanting；　for　the

horse　was　not　really　the　property　of　the　seller　in　question。　However　I

may　be　a　bona　fide　possessor　of　a　thing　under　such　conditions；　I　am

still　only　a　putative　owner；　and　the　real　owner　has　the　right　of

vindication　against　me　（rem　suam　vindicandi）。

　　Now；　it　may　be　again　asked；　what　is　right　and　just　in　itself

regarding　the　acquisition　of　external　things　among　men　in　their

intercourse　with　one　another…　viewed　in　the　state　of　nature

according　to　the　principles　of　commutative　justice？　And　it　must　be

admitted　in　this　connection　that　whoever　has　a　purpose　of　acquiring

anything　must　regard　it　as　absolutely　necessary　to　investigate　whether

the　thing　which　he　wishes　to　acquire　does　not　already　belong　to

another　person。　For　although　he　may　carefully　observe　the　formal

conditions　required　for　appropriating　what　may　belong　to　the

property　of　another；　as　in　buying　a　horse　according　to　the　usual　terms

in　a　market；　yet　he　can；　at　the　most；　acquire　only　a　personal　right　in

relation　to　a　thing　（jus　ad　rem）　so　long　as　it　is　still　unknown　to　him

whether　another　than　the　seller　may　not　be　the　real　owner。　Hence；　if

some　other　person　were　to　come　forward　and　prove　by　documentary

evidence　a　prior　right　of　property　in　the　thing；　nothing　would

remain　for　the　putative　new　owner　but　the　advantage　which　he　has　drawn

as　a　bona　fide　possessor　of　it　up　to　that　moment。　Now　it　is　frequently

impossible　to　discover　the　absolutely　first　original　owner　of　a

thing　in　the　series　of　putative　owners；　who　derive　their　right　from

one　another。　Hence　no　mere　exchange　of　external　things；　however　well

it　may　agree　with　the　formal　conditions　of　commutative　justice；　can

ever　guarantee　an　absolutely　certain　acquisition。



　　Here；　however；　the　juridically　law…giving　reason　comes　in　again　with

the　principle　of　distributive　justice；　and　it　adopts　as　a　criterion　of

the　rightfulness　of　possession；　not　what　is　in　itself　in　reference

to　the　private　will　of　each　individual　in　the　state　of　nature；　but

only　the　consideration　of　how　it　would　be　adjudged　by　a　court　of

justice　in　a　civil　state；　constituted　by　the　united　will　of　all。　In

this　connection；　fulfillment　of　the　formal　conditions　of

acquisition；　that　in　themselves　only　establish　a　personal　right；　is

postulated　as　sufficient；　and　they　stand　as　an　equivalent　for　the

material　conditions　which　properly　establish　the　derivation　of

property　from　a　prior　putative　owner；　to　the　extent　of　making　what

is　in　itself　only　a　personal　right；　valid　before　a　court；　as　a　real

right。　Thus　the　horse　which　I　bought　when　exposed　for　sale　in　the

public　market；　under　conditions　regulated　by　the　municipal　law；

becomes　my　property　if　all　the　conditions　of　purchase　and　sale　have

been　exactly　observed　in　the　transaction；　but　always　under　the

reservation　that　the　real　owner　continues　to　have　the　right　of　a　claim

against　the　seller；　on　the　ground　of　his　prior　unalienated　possession。

My　otherwise　personal　right　is　thus　transmuted　into　a　real　right；

according　to　which　I　may　take　and　vindicate　the　object　as　mine

wherever　I　may　find　it；　without　be