the science of right-第26章

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only　rightful　constitution；　which　is　that　of　a　pure　republic。　Thus　the

old　empirical　and　statutory　forms；　which　serve　only　to　effect　the

political　subjection　of　the　people；　will　be　resolved　into　the　original

and　rational　forms　which　alone　take　freedom　as　their　principle；　and

even　as　the　condition　of　all　compulsion　and　constraint。　Compulsion

is　in　fact　requisite　for　the　realization　of　a　juridical

constitution；　according　to　the　proper　idea　of　the　state；　and　it　will

lead　at　last　to　the　realization　of　that　idea；　even　according　to　the

letter。　This　is　the　only　enduring　political　constitution；　as　in　it　the

law　is　itself　sovereign；　and　is　no　longer　attached　to　a　particular

person。　This　is　the　ultimate　end　of　all　public　right；　and　the　state　in

which　every　citizen　can　have　what　is　his　own　peremptorily　assigned

to　him。　But　so　long　as　the　form　of　the　state　has　to　be　represented；

according　to　the　letter；　by　many　different　moral　persons　invested　with

the　supreme　power；　there　can　only　be　a　provisory　internal　right；　and

not　an　absolutely　juridical　state　of　civil　society。

　　Every　true　republic　is　and　can　only　be　constituted　by　a

representative　system　of　the　people。　Such　a　representative　system　is

instituted　in　name　of　the　people；　and　is　constituted　by　all　the

citizens　being　united　together；　in　order；　by　means　of　their

deputies；　to　protect　and　secure　their　rights。　But　as　soon　as　a　supreme

head　of　the　state　in　person…　be　it　as　king；　or　nobility；　or　the

whole　body　of　the　people　in　a　democratic　union…　becomes　also

representative；　the　united　people　then　does　not　merely　represent　the

sovereignty；　but　they　are　themselves　sovereign。　It　is　in　the　people

that　the　supreme　power　originally　resides；　and　it　is　accordingly

from　this　power　that　all　the　rights　of　individual　citizens　as　mere

subjects；　and　especially　as　officials　of　the　state；　must　be　derived。

When　the　sovereignty　of　the　people　themselves　is　thus　realized；　the

republic　is　established；　and　it　is　no　longer　necessary　to　give　up

the　reins　of　government　into　the　hands　of　those　by　whom　they　have　been

hitherto　held；　especially　as　they　might　again　destroy　all　the　new

institutions　by　their　arbitrary　and　absolute　will。



　　It　was　therefore　a　great　error　in　judgement　on　the　part　of　a

powerful　ruler　in　our　time；　when　he　tried　to　extricate　himself　from

the　embarrassment　arising　from　great　public　debts；　by　transferring

this　burden　to　the　people；　and　leaving　them　to　undertake　and

distribute　them　among　themselves　as　they　might　best　think　fit。　It　thus

became　natural　that　the　legislative　power；　not　only　in　respect　of

the　taxation　of　the　subjects；　but　in　respect　of　the　government；　should

come　into　the　hands　of　the　people。　It　was　requisite　that　they　should

be　able　to　prevent　the　incurring　of　new　debts　by　extravagance　or

war；　and　in　consequence；　the　supreme　power　of　the　monarch　entirely

disappeared；　not　by　being　merely　suspended；　but　by　passing　over　in

fact　to　the　people；　to　whose　legislative　will　the　property　of　every

subject　thus　became　subjected。　Nor　can　it　be　said　that　a　tacit　and　yet

obligatory　promise　must　be　assumed　as　having；　under　such

circumstances；　been　given　by　the　national　assembly；　not　to

constitute　themselves　into　a　sovereignty；　but　only　to　administer　the

affairs　of　the　sovereign　for　the　time；　and　after　this　was　done　to

deliver　the　reins　of　the　government　again　into　the　monarch's　hands。

Such　a　supposed　contract　would　be　null　and　void。　The　right　of　the

supreme　legislation　in　the　commonwealth　is　not　an　alienable　right；　but

is　the　most　personal　of　all　rights。　Whoever　possesses　it　can　only

dispose　by　the　collective　will　of　the　people；　in　respect　of　the

people；　he　cannot　dispose　in　respect　of　the　collective　will　itself；

which　is　the　ultimate　foundation　of　all　public　contracts。　A

contract；　by　which　the　people　would　be　bound　to　give　back　their

authority　again；　would　not　be　consistent　with　their　position　as　a

legislative　power；　and　yet　it　would　be　made　binding　upon　the　people；

which；　on　the　principle　that　〃No　one　can　serve　two　masters；〃　is　a

contradiction。



　　　　　　　　II。　The　Right　of　Nations　and　International　Law。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Gentium）。

　　　　　　　　53。　Nature　and　Division　of　the　Right　of　Nations。



　　The　individuals；　who　make　up　a　people；　may　be　regarded　as　natives　of

the　country　sprung　by　natural　descent　from　a　common　ancestry

（congeniti）；　although　this　may　not　hold　entirely　true　in　detail。

Again；　they　may　be　viewed　according　to　the　intellectual　and

juridical　relation；　as　born　of　a　common　political　mother；　the

republic；　so　that　they　constitute；　as　it　were；　a　public　family　or

nation　（gens；　natio）　whose　members　are　all　related　to　each　other　as

citizens　of　the　state。　As　members　of　a　state；　they　do　not　mix　with

those　who　live　beside　them　in　the　state　of　nature；　considering　such　to

be　ignoble。　Yet　these　savages；　on　account　of　the　lawless　freedom

they　have　chosen；　regard　themselves　as　superior　to　civilized

peoples；　and　they　constitute　tribes　and　even　races；　but　not　states。

The　public　right　of　states　（jus　publicum　civitatum）；　in　their

relations　to　one　another；　is　what　we　have　to　consider　under　the

designation　of　the　〃right　of　nations。〃　Wherever　a　state；　viewed　as　a

moral　person；　acts　in　relation　to　another　existing　in　the　condition　of

natural　freedom；　and　consequently　in　a　state　of　continual　war；　such

right　takes　it　rise。

　　The　right　of　nations　in　relation　to　the　state　of　war　may　be

divided　into：　1。　the　right　of　going　to　war；　2。　right　during　war；　and

3。　right　after　war；　the　object　of　which　is　to　constrain　the　nations

mutually　to　pass　from　this　state　of　war　and　to　found　a　common

constitution　establishing　perpetual　peace。　The　difference　between

the　right　of　individual　men　or　families　as　related　to　each　other　in

the　state　of　nature；　and　the　right　of　the　nations　among　themselves；

consists　in　this；　that　in　the　right　of　nations　we　have　to　consider　not

merely　a　relation　of　one　state　to　another　as　a　whole；　but　also　the

relation　of　the　individual　persons　in　one　state　to　the　individuals

of　another　state；　as　well　as　to　that　state　as　a　whole。　This

difference；　however；　between　the　right　of　nations　and　the　right　of

individuals　in　the　mere　state　of　nature；　requires　to　be　determined

by　elements　which　can　easily　be　deduced　from　the　conception　of　the

latter。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　54。　Elements　of　the　Right　of　Nations。



　　The　elements　of　the　right　of　nations　are　as　follows：

　　1。　States；　viewed　as　nations；　in　their　external　relations　to　one

another…　like　lawless　savages…　are　naturally　in　a　non…juridical

condition；

　　2。　This　natural　condition　is　a　state　of　war　in　which　the　right　of

the　stronger　prevails；　and　although　it　may　not　in　fact　be　always　found

as　a　state　of　actual　war　and　incessant　hostility；　and　although　no　real

wrong　is　done　to　any　one　therein；　yet　the　condition　is　wrong　in　itself

in　the　highest　degree；　and　the　nations　which　form　states　contiguous　to

each　other　are　bound　mutually　to　pass　out　of　it；

　　3。　An　alliance　of　nations；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　an

original　social　contract；　is　necessary　to　protect　each　other　against

external　aggression　and　attack；　but　not　involving　interference　with

their　several　internal　difficulties　and　disputes；

　　4。　This　mutual　connection　by　alliance　must　dispense　with　a

distinct　sovereign　power；　such　as　is　set　up　in　the　civil　constitution；

it　can　only　take　the　form　of　a　federation；　which　as　such　may　be

revoked　on　any　occasion；　and　must　consequently　be　renewed　from　time　to

time。

　　This　is　therefore　a　right　which　comes　in　as　an　accessory　（in

subsidium）　of　another　original　right；　in　order　to　prevent　the

nations　from　falling　from　right　and　lapsing　into　the　state　of　actual

war　with　each　other。　It　thus　issues　in　the　idea　of　a　foedus

amphictyonum。



　　　　　　　　　55。　Right　of　Going　to　War　as　related　to　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Subjects　of　the　State。



　　We　have　then　to　consider；　in　the　first　place；　the　original　right

of　free　states　to　go　to　war　with　each　other　as　being　still　in　a

state　of　nature；　but　as　exercising　this　right　in　order　to　establish

some　condition　of　society　approaching　the　juridical　And；　first　of　all；

the　question　arises　as　to　what　right　the　state　has　in　relation　to

its　own　subjects；　to　use　them　in　order　to　make　war　against　other

states；　to　employ　their　property　and　even　their　lives　for　this

purpose；　or　at　least　to　expose　them　to　hazard　and　danger；　and　all　this

in　such　a　way　that　it　does　not　depend　upon　their　own　personal

judgement　whether　they　will　march　into　the　field　of　war　or　not；　but

the　supreme　command　of　the　sovereign　claims　to　settle　and　dispose　of

them　thus。

　　This　right　appears　capable　of　being　easily　established。　It　may　be

grounded　upon　the　right　which　every　one　has　to　do　with　what　is　his　own

as　he　will。　Whatever　one　has　made　substantially　for　himself；　he

holds　as　his　incontestable　property。　The　following；　then；　is　such　a

deduction　as　a　mere　jurist　would　put　forward。

　　There　are　various　natural　products　in　a　country　which；　as　regards

the　number　and　quantity　in　which　they　exist；　must　be　considered　as

specially　produced　（artefacta）　by　the　work　of　the　state；　for　the

country　would　not　yield　them　to　such　extent　were　it　not　under　the

constitution　of　the　state　and　its　regular　administrative　government；

or　if　the　inhabitants　were　still　living　in　the　state　of　nature。　Sheep；

cattle；　domestic　fowl　the　most　useful　of　their　kind…　swine；　and　such

like；　would　either　be　used　up　as　necessary　food　or　destroyed　by　beasts

of　prey　in　the　district　in　which　I　live；　so　that　they　would　entirely

disappear；　or　be　found　in　very　scant　supplies；　were　it　not　for　the

government　securing　to　the　inhabitants　their　acquisitions　and

property。　This　holds　likewise　of　the　population　itself；　as　we　see　in

the　case　of　the　American　deserts；　and　even　were　the　greatest

industry　applied　in　those　regions…　which　is　not　yet　done…　there

might　be　but　a　scanty　population。　The　inhabitants　of　any　country　would

be　but　sparsely　sown　here　and　there　were　it　not　for　the　protection

of　government；　because　without　it　they　could　not　spread　themselves

with　their　households　upon　a　territory　which　was　always　in　danger　of

being　devastated　by　enemies　or　by　wild　beasts　of　prey；　and　further；　so

great　a　multitude　of　men　as　now　live　in　any　one　country　could　not

otherwise　obtain　sufficient　means　of　support。　Hence；　as　it　can　be　said

of　vegetable　growths；　such　as　potatoes；　as　well　as　of　domesticated

animals；　that　because　the　abundance　in　which　they　are　found　is　a

product　of　human　labour；　they　may　be　used；　destroyed；　and　consumed

by　man；　so　it　seems　that　it　may　be　said　of　the　sovereign；　as　the

supreme　power　in　the　state；　that　he　has　the　right　to　lead　his

subjects；　as　being　for　the　most　part　productions　of　his　own；　to　war；

as　if　it　were　to　the　chase；　and　even　to　march　them　to　the　field　of

battle；　as　if　it　were　on　a　pleasure　excursion。

　　This　principle　of