the science of right-第4章

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could　I　call　the　apple　or　the　spot　mine。

　　B。　I　cannot　call　the　performance　of　something　by　the　action　of　the

will　of　another　〃mine；〃　if　I　can　only　say　〃it　has　come　into　my

possession　at　the　same　time　with　a　promise〃　（pactum　re　initum）；　but

only　if　I　am　able　to　assert　〃I　am　in　possession　of　the　will　of　the

other；　so　as　to　determine　him　to　the　performance　of　a　particular

act；　although　the　time　for　the　performance　of　it　has　not　yet　come。〃　In

the　latter　case；　the　promise　belongs　to　the　nature　of　things

actually　held　as　possessed；　and　as　an　active　obligation　I　can　reckon

it　mine；　and　this　holds　good　not　only　if　I　have　the　thing　promised…　as

in　the　first　case…　already　in　my　possession；　but　even　although　I　do

not　yet　possess　it　in　fact。　Hence；　I　must　be　able　to　regard　myself

in　thought　as　independent　of　that　empirical　form　of　possession　that　is

limited　by　the　condition　of　time　and　as　being；　nevertheless；　in

possession　of　the　object。

　　C。　I　cannot　call　a　wife；　a　child；　a　domestic；　or；　generally；　any

other　person　〃mine〃　merely　because　I　command　them　at　present　as

belonging　to　my　household；　or　because　I　have　them　under　control；　and

in　my　power　and　possession。　But　I　can　call　them　mine；　if；　although

they　may　have　withdrawn　themselves　from　my　control　and　I　do　not

therefore　possess　them　empirically；　I　can　still　say　〃I　possess　them　by

my　mere　will；　provided　they　exist　anywhere　in　space　or　time；　and；

consequently；　my　possession　of　them　is　purely　juridical。〃　They　belong；

in　fact；　to　my　possessions；　only　when　and　so　far　as　I　can　assert

this　as　a　matter　of　right。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5。　Definition　of　the　Conception　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　External　Mine　and　Thine。



　　Definitions　are　nominal　or　real。　A　nominal　definition　is

sufficient　merely　to　distinguish　the　object　defined　from　all　other

objects；　and　it　springs　out　of　a　complete　and　definite　exposition　of

its　conception。　A　real　definition　further　suffices　for　a　deduction

of　the　conception　defined；　so　as　to　furnish　a　knowledge　of　the　reality

of　the　object。　The　nominal　definition　of　the　external　〃mine〃　would

thus　be：　〃The　external　mine　is　anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that

any　hindrance　of　my　use　of　it　at　will　would　be　doing　me　an　injury　or

wrong　as　an　infringement　of　that　freedom　of　mine　which　may　coexist

with　the　freedom　of　all　others　according　to　a　universal　law。〃　The　real

definition　of　this　conception　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　external　mine　is

anything　outside　of　myself；　such　that　any　prevention　of　my　use　of　it

would　be　a　wrong；　although　I　may　not　be　in　possession　of　it　so　as　to

be　actually　holding　it　as　an　object。〃　I　must　be　in　some　kind　of

possession　of　an　external　object；　if　the　object　is　to　be　regarded　as

mine；　for；　otherwise；　anyone　interfering　with　this　object　would　not；

in　doing　so；　affect　me；　nor；　consequently；　would　he　thereby　do　me

any　wrong。　Hence；　according　to　SS　4；　a　rational　possession

（possessio　noumenon）　must　be　assumed　as　possible；　if　there　is　to　be

rightly　an　external　mine　and　thine。　Empirical　possession　is　thus

only　phenomenal　possession　or　holding　（detention）　of　the　object　in　the

sphere　of　sensible　appearance　（possessio　phenomenon）；　although　the

object　which　I　possess　is　not　regarded　in　this　practical　relation　as

itself　a　phenomenon…　according　to　the　exposition　of　the　Transcendental

Analytic　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason…　but　as　a　thing　in　itself。　For

in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　the　interest　of　reason　turns　upon　the

theoretical　knowledge　of　the　nature　of　things　and　how　far　reason　can

go　in　such　knowledge。　But　here　reason　has　to　deal　with　the　practical

determination　of　the　action　of　the　will　according　to　laws　of

freedom；　whether　the　object　is　perceivable　through　the　senses　or

merely　thinkable　by　the　pure　understanding。　And　right；　as　under

consideration；　is　a　pure　practical　conception　of　the　reason　in

relation　to　the　exercise　of　the　will　under　laws　of　freedom。

　　And；　hence；　it　is　not　quite　correct　to　speak　of　〃possessing〃　a　right

to　this　or　that　object；　but　it　should　rather　be　said　that　an　object　is

possessed　in　a　purely　juridical　way；　for　a　right　is　itself　the

rational　possession　of　an　object；　and　to　〃possess　a　possession；〃　would

be　an　expression　without　meaning。



　　　　　　6。　Deduction　of　the　Conception　of　a　Purely　Juridical

　　　　　　Possession　of　an　External　Object　（Possessio　Noumenon）。



　　The　question；　〃How　is　an　external　mine　and　thine　possible？〃　resolves

itself　into　this　other　question：　〃How　is　a　merely　juridical　or

rational　possession　possible？〃　And　this　second　question　resolves

itself　again　into　a　third：　〃How　is　a　synthetic　proposition　in　right

possible　a　priori？〃

　　All　propositions　of　right…　as　juridical　propositions…　are

propositions　a　priori；　for　they　are　practical　laws　of　reason

（dictamina　rationis）。　But　the　juridical　proposition　a　priori

respecting　empirical　possession　is　analytical；　for　it　says　nothing

more　than　what　follows　by　the　principle　of　contradiction；　from　the

conception　of　such　possession；　namely；　that　if　I　am　the　holder　of　a

thing　in　the　way　of　being　physically　connected　with　it；　any　one

interfering　with　it　without　my　consent…　as；　for　instance；　in　wrenching

an　apple　out　of　my　hand…　affects　and　detracts　from　my　freedom　as

that　which　is　internally　mine；　and　consequently　the　maxim　of　his

action　is　in　direct　contradiction　to　the　axiom　of　right。　The

proposition　expressing　the　principle　of　an　empirical　rightful

possession　does　not　therefore　go　beyond　the　right　of　a　person　in

reference　to　himself。

　　On　the　other　hand；　the　proposition　expressing　the　possibility　of　the

possession　of　a　thing　external　to　me；　after　abstraction　of　all　the

conditions　of　empirical　possession　in　space　and　time…　consequently

presenting　the　assumption　of　the　possibility　of　a　possessio

noumenon…　goes　beyond　these　limiting　conditions；　and　because　this

proposition　asserts　a　possession　even　without　physical　holding；　as

necessary　to　the　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；　it　is

synthetical。　And　thus　it　becomes　a　problem　for　reason　to　show　how　such

a　proposition；　extending　its　range　beyond　the　conception　of

empirical　possession；　is　possible　a　priori。

　　In　this　manner；　for　instance；　the　act　of　taking　possession　of　a

particular　portion　of　the　soil　is　a　mode　exercising　the　private

free…will　without　being　an　act　of　usurpation。　The　possessor　founds

upon　the　innate　right　of　common　possession　of　the　surface　of　the

earth；　and　upon　the　universal　will　corresponding　a　priori　to　it；　which

allows　a　private　possession　of　the　soil；　because　what　are　mere

things　would　be　otherwise　made　in　themselves　and　by　a　law　into

unappropriable　objects。　Thus　a　first　appropriator　acquires

originally　by　primary　possession　a　particular　portion　of　the　ground；

and　by　right　（jure）　he　resists　every　other　person　who　would　hinder　him

in　the　private　use　of　it；　although；　while　the　〃state　of　nature〃

continues；　this　cannot　be　done　by　juridical　means　（de　jure）；　because　a

public　law　does　not　yet　exist。

　　And　although　a　piece　of　ground　should　be　regarded　as　free；　or

declared　to　be　such；　so　as　to　be　for　the　public　use　of　all　without

distinction；　yet　it　cannot　be　said　that　it　is　thus　free　by　nature

and　originally　so；　prior　to　any　juridical　act。　For　there　would　be　a

real　relation　already　incorporated　in　such　a　piece　of　ground　by　the

very　fact　that　the　possession　of　it　was　denied　to　any　particular

individual；　and　as　this　public　freedom　of　the　ground　would　be　a

prohibition　of　it　to　every　particular　individual；　this　presupposes　a

common　possession　of　it　which　cannot　take　effect　without　a　contract。　A

piece　of　ground；　however；　which　can　only　become　publicly　free　by

contract；　must　actually　be　in　the　possession　of　all　those　associated

together；　who　mutually　interdict　or　suspend　each　other；　from　any

particular　or　private　use　of　it。



　　This　original　community　of　the　soil　and　of　the　things　upon　it

（communio　fundi　originaria）；　is　an　idea　which　has　objective　and

practical　juridical　reality　and　is　entirely　different　from　the　idea　of

a　primitive　community　of　things；　which　is　a　fiction。　For　the　latter

would　have　had　to　be　founded　as　a　form　of　society；　and　must　have　taken

its　rise　from　a　contract　by　which　all　renounced　the　right　of　private

possession；　so　that　by　uniting　the　property　owned　by　each　into　a

whole；　it　was　thus　transformed　into　a　common　possession。　But　had

such　an　event　taken　place；　history　must　have　presented　some　evidence

of　it。　To　regard　such　a　procedure　as　the　original　mode　of　taking

possession；　and　to　hold　that　the　particular　possessions　of　every

individual　may　and　ought　to　be　grounded　upon　it；　is　evidently　a

contradiction。

　　Possession　（possessio）　is　to　be　distinguished　from　habitation　as

mere　residence　（sedes）；　and　the　act　of　taking　possession　of　the　soil

in　the　intention　of　acquiring　it　once　for　all；　is　also　to　be

distinguished　from　settlement　or　domicile　（incolatus）；　which　is　a

continuous　private　possession　of　a　place　that　is　dependent　on　the

presence　of　the　individual　upon　it。　We　have　not　here　to　deal　with

the　question　of　domiciliary　settlement；　as　that　is　a　secondary

juridical　act　which　may　follow　upon　possession；　or　may　not　occur　at

all；　for　as　such　it　could　not　involve　an　original　possession；　but　only

a　secondary　possession　derived　from　the　consent　of　others。

　　Simple　physical　possession；　or　holding　of　the　soil；　involves　already

certain　relations　of　right　to　the　thing；　although　it　is　certainly

not　sufficient　to　enable　me　to　regard　it　as　mine。　Relative　to

others；　so　far　as　they　know；　it　appears　as　a　first　possession　in

harmony　with　the　law　of　external　freedom；　and；　at　the　same　time；　it　is

embraced　in　the　universal　original　possession　which　contains　a

priori　the　fundamental　principle　of　the　possibility　of　a　private

possession。　Hence　to　disturb　the　first　occupier　or　holder　of　a　portion

of　the　soil　in　his　use　of　it　is　a　lesion　or　wrong　done　to　him。　The

first　taking　of　possession　has　therefore　a　title　of　right　（titulus

possessionis）　in　its　favour；　which　is　simply　the　principle　of　the

original　common　possession；　and　the　saying　that　〃It　is　well　for

those　who　are　in　possession〃　（beati　possidentes）；　when　one　is　not

bound　to　authenticate　his　possession；　is　a　principle　of　natural

right　that　establishes　the　juridical　act　of　taking　possession；　as　a

ground　of　acquisition　upon　which　every　first　possessor　may　found。

　　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　that　in　theoretical

principles　a　priori；　an　intuitional　perception　a　priori　must　be

supplied　in　connection　with　any　given　conception；　and；　consequently；

were　it　a　question　of　a　purely　theoretical　principle；　something

would　have　to　be　added　to　the　conception　of　the　possession　of　an

object　to　make　it　real。　But　in　respect　of　the　practical　principle

under　consideration；　the　procedure　is　just　the　converse　of　the

theoretical　process；　so　that　all　the　conditions　of　perception　which

form　the　foundat