the science of right-第5章

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under　consideration；　the　procedure　is　just　the　converse　of　the

theoretical　process；　so　that　all　the　conditions　of　perception　which

form　the　foundation　of　empirical　possession　must　be　abstracted　or

taken　away　in　order　to　extend　the　range　of　the　juridical　conception

beyond　the　empirical　sphere；　and　in　order　to　be　able　to　apply　the

postulate；　that　every　external　object　of　the　free　activity　of　my　will；

so　far　as　I　have　it　in　my　power；　although　not　in　the　possession　of　it；

may　be　reckoned　as　juridically　mine。

　　The　possibility　of　such　a　possession；　with　consequent　deduction　of

the　conception　of　a　nonempirical　possession；　is　founded　upon　the

juridical　postulate　of　the　practical　reason；　that　〃It　is　a　juridical

duty　so　to　act　towards　others　that　what　is　external　and　useable　may

come　into　the　possession　or　become　the　property　of　some　one。〃　And　this

postulate　is　conjoined　with　the　exposition　of　the　conception　that　what

is　externally　one's　own　is　founded　upon　a　possession；　that　is　not

physical。　The　possibility　of　such　a　possession；　thus　conceived；

cannot；　however；　be　proved　or　comprehended　in　itself；　because　it　is

a　rational　conception　for　which　no　empirical　perception　can　be

furnished；　but　it　follows　as　an　immediate　consequence　from　the

postulate　that　has　been　enunciated。　For；　if　it　is　necessary　to　act

according　to　that　juridical　principle；　the　rational　or　intelligible

condition　of　a　purely　juridical　possession　must　also　be　possible。　It

need　astonish　no　one；　then；　that　the　theoretical　aspect　of　the

principles　of　the　external　mine　and　thine　is　lost　from　view　in　the

rational　sphere　of　pure　intelligence　and　presents　no　extension　of

knowledge；　for　the　conception　of　freedom　upon　which　they　rest　does　not

admit　of　any　theoretical　deduction　of　its　possibility；　and　it　can　only

be　inferred　from　the　practical　law　of　reason；　called　the　categorical

imperative；　viewed　as　a　fact。



　　　　　7。　Application　of　the　Principle　of　the　Possibility　of

　　　　　an　External　Mine　and　Thine　to　Objects　of　Experience。



　　The　conception　of　a　purely　juridical　possession　is　not　an

empirical　conception　dependent　on　conditions　of　space　and　time；　and

yet　it　has　practical　reality。　As　such　it　must　be　applicable　to　objects

of　experience；　the　knowledge　of　which　is　independent　of　the　conditions

of　space　and　time。　The　rational　process　by　which　the　conception　of

right　is　brought　into　relation　to　such　objects　so　as　to　constitute　a

possible　external　mine　and　thine；　is　as　follows。　The　conception　of

right；　being　contained　merely　in　reason；　cannot　be　immediately　applied

to　objects　of　experience；　so　as　to　give　the　conception　of　an　empirical

possession；　but　must　be　applied　directly　to　the　mediating

conception；　in　the　understanding；　of　possession　in　general；　so　that；

instead　of　physical　holding　（detentio）　as　an　empirical

representation　of　possession；　the　formal　conception　or　thought　of

having；　abstracted　from　all　conditions　of　space　and　time；　is　conceived

by　the　mind；　and　only　as　implying　that　an　object　is　in　my　power　and　at

my　disposal　（in　potestate　mea　positum　esse）。　In　this　relation；　the

term　external　does　not　signify　existence　in　another　place　than　where　I

am；　nor　my　resolution　and　acceptance　at　another　time　than　the　moment

in　which　I　have　the　offer　of　a　thing：　it　signifies　only　an　object

different　from　or　other　than　myself。　Now　the　practical　reason　by　its

law　of　right　wills；　that　I　shall　think　the　mine　and　thine　in

application　to　objects；　not　according　to　sensible　conditions；　but

apart　from　these　and　from　the　possession　they　indicate；　because　they

refer　to　determinations　of　the　activity　of　the　will　that　are　in

accordance　with　the　laws　of　freedom。　For　it　is　only　a　conception　of

the　understanding　that　can　be　brought　under　the　rational　conception　of

right。　I　may　therefore　say　that　I　possess　a　field；　although　it　is　in

quite　a　different　place　from　that　on　which　I　actually　find　myself。　For

the　question　here　is　not　concerning　an　intellectual　relation　to　the

object；　but　I　have　the　thing　practically　in　my　power　and　at　my

disposal；　which　is　a　conception　of　possession　realized　by　the

understanding　and　independent　of　relations　of　space；　and　it　is　mine；

because　my　will；　in　determining　itself　to　any　particular　use　of　it；　is

not　in　conflict　with　the　law　of　external　freedom。　Now　it　is　just　in

abstraction　from　physical　possession　of　the　object　of　my　free…will

in　the　sphere　of　sense；　that　the　practical　reason　wills　that　a

rational　possession　of　it　shall　be　thought；　according　to

intellectual　conceptions　which　are　not　empirical；　but　contain　a　priori

the　conditions　of　rational　possession。　Hence　it　is　in　this　fact；

that　we　found　the　ground　of　the　validity　of　such　a　rational　conception

of　possession　possessio　noumenon）　as　a　principle　of　a　universally

valid　legislation。　For　such　a　legislation　is　implied　and　contained

in　the　expression；　〃This　external　object　is　mine；〃　because　an

obligation　is　thereby　imposed　upon　all　others　in　respect　of　it；　who

would　otherwise　not　have　been　obliged　to　abstain　from　the　use　of

this　object。

　　The　mode；　then；　of　having　something　external　to　myself　as　mine；

consists　in　a　specially　juridical　connection　of　the　will　of　the

subject　with　that　object；　independently　of　the　empirical　relations

to　it　in　space　and　in　time；　and　in　accordance　with　the　conception　of　a

rational　possession。　A　particular　spot　on　the　earth　is　not

externally　mine　because　I　occupy　it　with　my　body；　for　the　question

here　discussed　refers　only　to　my　external　freedom；　and　consequently　it

affects　only　the　possession　of　myself；　which　is　not　a　thing　external

to　me；　and　therefore　only　involves　an　internal　right。　But　if　I

continue　to　be　in　possession　of　the　spot；　although　I　have　taken　myself

away　from　it　and　gone　to　another　place；　only　under　that　condition　is

my　external　right　concerned　in　connection　with　it。　And　to　make　the

continuous　possession　of　this　spot　by　my　person　a　condition　of

having　it　as　mine；　must　either　be　to　assert　that　it　is　not　possible　at

all　to　have　anything　external　as　one's　own；　which　is　contrary　to　the

postulate　in　SS　2；　or　to　require；　in　order　that　this　external

possession　may　be　possible；　that　I　shall　be　in　two　places　at　the

same　time。　But　this　amounts　to　saying　that　I　must　be　in　a　place　and

also　not　in　it；　which　is　contradictory　and　absurd。

　　This　position　may　be　applied　to　the　case　in　which　I　have　accepted

a　promise；　for　my　having　and　possession　in　respect　of　what　has　been

promised　become　established　on　the　ground　of　external　right。　This

right　is　not　to　be　annulled　by　the　fact　that　the　promiser　having

said　at　one　time；　〃This　thing　shall　be　yours；〃　again　at　a　subsequent

time　says；　〃My　will　now　is　that　the　thing　shall　not　be　yours。〃　In　such

relations　of　rational　right；　the　conditions　hold　just　the　same　as　if

the　promiser　had；　without　any　interval　of　time　between　them；　made

the　two　declarations　of　his　will；　〃This　shall　be　yours；〃　and　also

〃This　shall　not　be　yours〃；　which　manifestly　contradicts　itself。

　　The　same　thing　holds；　in　like　manner；　of　the　conception　of　the

juridical　possession　of　a　person　as　belonging　to　the　Having　of　a

subject；　whether　it　be　a　wife；　a　child；　or　a　servant。　The　relations　of

right　involved　in　a　household；　and　the　reciprocal　possession　of　all

its　members；　are　not　annulled　by　the　capability　of　separating　from

each　other　in　space；　because　it　is　by　juridical　relations　that　they

are　connected；　and　the　external　mine　and　thine；　as　in　the　former

cases；　rests　entirely　upon　the　assumption　of　the　possibility　of　a

purely　rational　possession；　without　the　accompaniment　of　physical

detention　or　holding　of　the　object。

　　Reason　is　forced　to　a　critique　of　its　juridically　practical　function

in　special　reference　to　the　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；

by　the　antinomy　of　the　propositions　enunciated　regarding　the

possibility　of　such　a　form　of　possession。　For　these　give　rise　to　an

inevitable　dialectic；　in　which　a　thesis　and　an　antithesis　set　up　equal

claims　to　the　validity　of　two　conflicting　conditions。　Reason　is　thus

compelled；　in　its　practical　function　in　relation　to　right…　as　it　was

in　its　theoretical　function…　to　make　a　distinction　between

possession　as　a　phenomenal　appearance　presented　to　the　senses；　and

that　possession　which　is　rational　and　thinkable　only　by　the

understanding。

　　Thesis。…　The　thesis；　in　this　case；　is：　〃It　is　possible　to　have

something　external　as　mine；　although　I　am　not　in　possession　of　it。〃

　　Antithesis。…　The　antithesis　is：　〃It　is　not　possible　to　have　anything

external　as　mine；　if　I　am　not　in　possession　of　it。〃

　　Solution。…　The　solution　is：　〃Both　Propositions　are　true〃；　the　former

when　I　mean　empirical　possession　（possessio　phaenomenon）；　the　latter

when　I　understand　by　the　same　term；　a　purely　rational　possession

（possessio　noumenon）。

　　But　the　possibility　of　a　rational　possession；　and　consequently　of　an

external　mine　and　thine；　cannot　be　comprehended　by　direct　insight；　but

must　be　deduced　from　the　practical　reason。　And　in　this　relation　it

is　specially　noteworthy　that　the　practical　reason　without

intuitional　perceptions；　and　even　without　requiring　such　an　element

a　priori；　can　extend　its　range　by　the　mere　elimination　of　empirical

conditions；　as　justified　by　the　law　of　freedom；　and　can　thus　establish

synthetical　propositions　a　priori。　The　proof　of　this　in　the

practical　connection；　as　will　be　shown　afterwards；　can　be　adduced　in

an　analytical　manner。



　　　　　8。　To　Have　Anything　External　as　One's　Own　is　only　Possible

　　　　　　　　　in　a　Juridical　or　Civil　State　of　Society　under　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　Regulation　of　a　Public　Legislative　Power。



　　If；　by　word　or　deed；　I　declare　my　will　that　some　external　thing

shall　be　mine；　I　make　a　declaration　that　every　other　person　is　obliged

to　abstain　from　the　use　of　this　object　of　my　exercise　of　will；　and

this　imposes　an　obligation　which　no　one　would　be　under；　without　such　a

juridical　act　on　my　part。　But　the　assumption　of　this　act　at　the　same

time　involves　the　admission　that　I　am　obliged　reciprocally　to

observe　a　similar　abstention　towards　every　other　in　respect　of　what　is

externally　theirs；　for　the　obligation　in　question　arises　from　a

universal　rule　regulating　the　external　juridical　relations。　Hence　I　am

not　obliged　to　let　alone　what　another　person　declares　to　be　externally

his；　unless　every　other　person　likewise　secures　me　by　a　guarantee　that

he　will　act　in　relation　to　what　is　mine；　upon　the　same　principle。　This

guarantee　of　reciprocal　and　mutual　abstention　from　what　belongs　to

others　does　not　require　a　special　juridical　act　for　its　establishment；

but　is　already　involved　in　the　conception　of　an　external　obligation　of

right；　on　account　of　the　universality　and　consequently　the　reciprocity

of　the　obligatoriness　arising　from　a　universal　Rule。　Now　a　single

will；　in　relation　to　an　external　and　consequently　contingent

possession；　cannot　serve　as　a　compulsory　law　for　all；　becaus