the science of right-第7章

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will　（facto）；　or　bilateral；　as　the　act　of　two　wills　（pacto）；　or

omnilateral；　as　the　act　of　all　the　wills　of　a　community　together

（lege）。



　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　I。　Principles　of　Real　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　11。　What　is　a　Real　Right？



　　The　usual　definition　of　real　right；　or　〃right　in　a　thing〃　（jus

reale；　jus　in　re）；　is　that　〃it　is　a　right　as　against　every　possessor

of　it。〃　This　is　a　correct　nominal　definition。　But　what　is　it　that

entitles　me　to　claim　an　external　object　from　any　one　who　may　appear　as

its　possessor；　and　to　compel　him；　per　vindicationem；　to　put　me

again；　in　place　of　himself；　into　possession　of　it？　Is　this　external

juridical　relation　of　my　will　a　kind　of　immediate　relation　to　an

external　thing？　If　so；　whoever　might　think　of　his　right　as　referring

not　immediately　to　persons　but　to　things　would　have　to　represent　it；

although　only　in　an　obscure　way；　somewhat　thus。　A　right　on　one　side

has　always　a　duty　corresponding　to　it　on　the　other；　so　that　an

external　thing；　although　away　from　the　hands　of　its　first　possessor；

continues　to　be　still　connected　with　him　by　a　continuing　obligation；

and　thus　it　refuses　to　fall　under　the　claim　of　any　other　possessor；

because　it　is　already　bound　to　another。　In　this　way　my　right；　viewed

as　a　kind　of　good　genius　accompanying　a　thing　and　preserving　it　from

all　external　attack；　would　refer　an　alien　possessor　always　to　me！　It

is；　however；　absurd　to　think　of　an　obligation　of　persons　towards

things；　and　conversely；　although　it　may　be　allowed　in　any　particular

case　to　represent　the　juridical　relation　by　a　sensible　image　of　this

kind；　and　to　express　it　in　this　way。

　　The　real　definition　would　run　thus：　〃Right　in　a　thing　is　a　right

to　the　private　use　of　a　thing；　of　which　I　am　in　possession…　original

or　derivative…　in　common　with　all　others。〃　For　this　is　the　one

condition　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　that　I　can　exclude　every

others　possessor　from　the　private　use　of　the　thing　（jus　contra

quemlibet　hujus　rei　possessorem）。　For；　except　by　presupposing　such　a

common　collective　possession；　it　cannot　be　conceived　how；　when　I　am

not　in　actual　possession　of　a　thing；　I　could　be　injured　or　wronged

by　others　who　are　in　possession　of　it　and　use　it。　By　an　individual　act

of　my　own　will　I　cannot　oblige　any　other　person　to　abstain　from　the

use　of　a　thing　in　respect　of　which　he　would　otherwise　be　under　no

obligation；　and；　accordingly；　such　an　obligation　can　only　arise　from

the　collective　will　of　all　united　in　a　relation　of　common

possession。　Otherwise；　I　would　have　to　think　of　a　right　in　a　thing；　as

if　the　thing　has　an　obligation　towards　me；　and　as　if　the　right　as

against　every　possessor　of　it　had　to　be　derived　from　this　obligation

in　the　thing；　which　is　an　absurd　way　of　representing　the　subject。

　　Further；　by　the　term　real　right　（jus　reale）　is　meant　not　only　the

right　in　a　thing　（jus　in　re）；　but　also　the　constitutive　principle　of

all　the　laws　which　relate　to　the　real　mine　and　thine。　It　is；

however；　evident　that　a　man　entirely　alone　upon　the　earth　could

properly　neither　have　nor　acquire　any　external　thing　as　his　own；

because；　between　him　as　a　person　and　all　external　things　as　material

objects；　there　could　be　no　relations　of　obligation。　There　is

therefore；　literally；　no　direct　right　in　a　thing；　but　only　that

right　is　to　be　properly　called　〃real〃　which　belongs　to　any　one　as

constituted　against　a　person；　who　is　in　common　possession　of　things

with　all　others　in　the　civil　state　of　society。



　　　　　　　　12。　The　First　Acquisition　of　a　Thing　can　only

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　be　that　of　the　Soil。



　　By　the　soil　is　understood　all　habitable　Land。　In　relation　to

everything　that　is　moveable　upon　it；　it　is　to　be　regarded　as　a

substance；　and　the　mode　of　the　existence　of　the　moveables　is　viewed　as

an　inherence　in　it。　And　just　as；　in　the　theoretical　acceptance；

accidents　cannot　exist　apart　from　their　substances；　so；　in　the

practical　relation；　moveables　upon　the　soil　cannot　be　regarded　as

belonging　to　any　one　unless　he　is　supposed　to　have　been　previously

in　juridical　possession　of　the　soil；　so　that　it　is　thus　considered

to　be　his。

　　For；　let　it　be　supposed　that　the　soil　belongs　to　no　one。　Then　I

would　be　entitled　to　remove　every　moveable　thing　found　upon　it　from

its　place；　even　to　total　loss　of　it；　in　order　to　occupy　that　place；

without　infringing　thereby　on　the　freedom　of　any　other；　there　being；

by　the　hypothesis；　no　possessor　of　it　at　all。　But　everything　that

can　be　destroyed；　such　as　a　tree；　a　house；　and　such　like…　as　regards

its　matter　at　least…　is　moveable；　and　if　we　call　a　thing　which

cannot　be　moved　without　destruction　of　its　form　an　immoveable；　the

mine　and　thine　in　it　is　not　understood　as　applying　to　its　substance；

but　to　that　which　is　adherent　to　it　and　which　does　not　essentially

constitute　the　thing　itself。



　　　　　13。　Every　Part　of　the　Soil　may　be　Originally　Acquired；　and

　　　　　　　　the　Principle　of　the　Possibility　of　such　Acquisition

　　　　　　　　　is　the　Original　Community　of　the　Soil　Generally。



　　The　first　clause　of　this　proposition　is　founded　upon　the　postulate

of　the　practical　reason　（SS　2）；　the　second　is　established　by　the

following　proof。

　　All　men　are　originally　and　before　any　juridical　act　of　will　in

rightful　possession　of　the　soil；　that　is；　they　have　a　right　to　be

wherever　nature　or　chance　has　placed　them　without　their　will。

Possession　（possessio）；　which　is　to　be　distinguished　from

residential　settlement　（sedes）　as　a　voluntary；　acquired；　and　permanent

possession；　becomes　common　possession；　on　account　of　the　connection

with　each　other　of　all　the　places　on　the　surface　of　the　earth　as　a

globe。　For；　had　the　surface　of　the　earth　been　an　infinite　plain；　men

could　have　been　so　dispersed　upon　it　that　they　might　not　have　come

into　any　necessary　communion　with　each　other；　and　a　state　of　social

community　would　not　have　been　a　necessary　consequence　of　their

existence　upon　the　earth。　Now　that　possession　proper　to　all　men　upon

the　earth；　which　is　prior　to　all　their　particular　juridical　acts；

constitutes　an　original　possession　in　common　（communio　possessionis

originaria）。　The　conception　of　such　an　original；　common　possession

of　things　is　not　derived　from　experience；　nor　is　it　dependent　on

conditions　of　time；　as　is　the　case　with　the　imaginary　and

indemonstrable　fiction　of　a　primaeval　community　of　possession　in

actual　history。　Hence　it　is　a　practical　conception　of　reason；

involving　in　itself　the　only　principle　according　to　which　men　may

use　the　place　they　happen　to　occupy　on　the　surface　of　the　earth；　in

accordance　with　laws　of　right。



　　　　　　　　　　　14。　The　Juridical　Act　of　this　Original

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Acquisition　is　Occupancy。



　　The　act　of　taking　possession　（apprehensio）；　being　at　its　beginning

the　physical　appropriation　of　a　corporeal　thing　in　space　（possessionis

physicae）；　can　accord　with　the　law　of　the　external　freedom　of　all；

under　no　other　condition　than　that　of　its　priority　in　respect　of　time。

In　this　relation　it　must　have　the　characteristic　of　a　first　act　in　the

way　of　taking　possession；　as　a　free　exercise　of　will。　The　activity

of　will；　however；　as　determining　that　the　thing…　in　this　case　a

definite　separate　place　on　the　surface　of　the　earth…　shall　be　mine；

being　an　act　of　appropriation；　cannot　be　otherwise　in　the　case　of

original　acquisition　than　individual　or　unilateral　（voluntas

unilateralis　s。　propria）。　Now；　occupancy　is　the　acquisition　of　an

external　object　by　an　individual　act　of　will。　The　original　acquisition

of　such　an　object　as　a　limited　portion　of　the　soil　can　therefore

only　be　accomplished　by　an　act　of　occupation。

　　The　possibility　of　this　mode　of　acquisition　cannot　be　intuitively

apprehended　by　pure　reason　in　any　way；　nor　established　by　its

principles；　but　is　an　immediate　consequence　from　the　postulate　of

the　practical　reason。　The　will　as　practical　reason；　however；　cannot

justify　external　acquisition　otherwise　than　only　in　so　far　as　it　is

itself　included　in　an　absolutely　authoritative　will；　with　which　it

is　united　by　implication；　or；　in　other　words；　only　in　so　far　as　it

is　contained　within　a　union　of　the　wills　of　all　who　come　into

practical　relation　with　each　other。　For　an　individual；　unilateral

will…　and　the　same　applies　to　a　dual　or　other　particular　will…

cannot　impose　on　all　an　obligation　which　is　contingent　in　itself。　This

requires　an　omnilateral　or　universal　will；　which　is　not　contingent；

but　a　priori；　and　which　is　therefore　necessarily　united　and

legislative。　Only　in　accordance　with　such　a　principle　can　there　be

agreement　of　the　active　free…will　of　each　individual　with　the

freedom　of　all；　and　consequently　rights　in　general；　or　even　the

possibility　of　an　external　mine　and　thine。



　　　　　15。　It　is　Only　within　a　Civil　Constitution　that　Anything　can

　　　　　　　　　be　Acquired　Peremptorily；　whereas　in　the　State　of　Nature

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Acquisition　can　only　be　Provisory。



　　A　civil　constitution　is　objectively　necessary　as　a　duty；　although

subjectively　its　reality　is　contingent。　Hence；　there　is　connected　with

it　a　real　natural　law　of　right；　to　which　all　external　acquisition　is

subjected。

　　The　empirical　title　of　acquisition　has　been　shown　to　be

constituted　by　the　taking　physical　possession　（apprehensio　physica）　as

founded　upon　an　original　community　of　right　in　all　to　the　soil。　And

because　a　possession　in　the　phenomenal　sphere　of　sense　can　only　be

subordinated　to　that　possession　which　is　in　accordance　with　rational

conceptions　of　right；　there　must　correspond　to　this　physical　act　of

possession　a　rational　mode　of　taking　possession　by　elimination　of

all　the　empirical　conditions　in　space　and　time。　This　rational　form

of　possession　establishes　the　proposition　that　〃whatever　I　bring　under

my　power　in　accordance　with　laws　of　external　freedom；　and　will　that　it

shall　be　mine；　becomes　mine。〃

　　The　rational　title　of　acquisition　can　therefore　only　lie

originally　in　the　idea　of　the　will　of　all　united　implicitly；　or

necessarily　to　be　united；　which　is　here　tacitly　assumed　as　an

indispensable　condition　（conditio　sine　qua　non）。　For　by　a　single

will　there　cannot　be　imposed　upon　others　an　obligation　by　which　they

would　not　have　been　otherwise　bound。　But　the　fact　formed　by　wills

actually　and　universally　united　in　a　legislation　constitutes　the　civil

state　of　society。　Hence；　it　is　only　in　conformity　with　the　idea　of　a

civil　state　of　society；　or　in　reference　to　it　and　its　realization；

that　anything　external　can　be　acquired。　Before　such　a　state　is

realized；　and　in　anticipation　of　it；　acquisition；　which　would

otherwise　be　derived；　is　consequently　only　provisory。　The

acquisition　which　is　peremptory　finds　place　only　in　the　civil　state。

　　Nevertheless；　such　provisory　acquisition　is　real　acquisition。　For；

according　to　the　postulate　of　the　juridically　practical　reason；　the

possibility　of　acquisition　in　whatever　state　men　may　happen　to　be

living　besid