the science of right-第8章

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according　to　the　postulate　of　the　juridically　practical　reason；　the

possibility　of　acquisition　in　whatever　state　men　may　happen　to　be

living　beside　one　another；　and　therefore　in　the　state　of　nature　as

well；　is　a　principle　of　private　right。　And　in　accordance　with　this

principle；　every　one　is　justified　or　entitled　to　exercise　that

compulsion　by　which　it　alone　becomes　possible　to　pass　out　of　the　state

of　nature　and　to　enter　into　that　state　of　civil　society　which　alone

can　make　all　acquisition　peremptory。



　　It　is　a　question　as　to　how　far　the　right　of　taking　possession　of　the

soil　extends。　The　answer　is；　So　far　as　the　capability　of　having　it

under　one's　power　extends；　that　is；　just　as　far　as　he　who　wills　to

appropriate　it　can　defend　it；　as　if　the　soil　were　to　say：　〃If　you

cannot　protect　me；　neither　can　you　command　me。〃　In　this　way　the

controversy　about　what　constitutes　a　free　or　closed　sea　must　be

decided。　Thus；　within　the　range　of　a　cannon…shot　no　one　has　a　right　to

intrude　on　the　coast　of　a　country　that　already　belongs　to　a　certain

state；　in　order　to　fish　or　gather　amber　on　the　shore；　or　such　like。

Further；　the　question　is　put；　〃Is　cultivation　of　the　soil；　by

building；　agriculture；　drainage；　etc。；　necessary　in　order　to　its

acquisition？〃　No。　For；　as　these　processes　as　forms　of　specification

are　only　accidents；　they　do　not　constitute　objects　of　immediate

possession　and　can　only　belong　to　the　subject　in　so　far　as　the

substance　of　them　has　been　already　recognized　as　his。　When　it　is　a

question　of　the　first　acquisition　of　a　thing；　the　cultivation　or

modification　of　it　by　labour　forms　nothing　more　than　an　external

sign　of　the　fact　that　it　has　been　taken　into　possession；　and　this

can　be　indicated　by　many　other　signs　that　cost　less　trouble。　Again：

〃May　any　one　be　hindered　in　the　act　of　taking　possession；　so　that

neither　one　nor　other　of　two　competitors　shall　acquire　the　right　of

priority；　and　the　soil　in　consequence　may　remain　for　all　time　free

as　belonging　to　no　one？〃　Not　at　all。　Such　a　hindrance　cannot　be

allowed　to　take　place；　because　the　second　of　the　two；　in　order　to　be

enabled　to　do　this；　would　himself　have　to　be　upon　some　neighbouring

soil；　where　he　also；　in　this　manner；　could　be　hindered　from　being；　and

such　absolute　hindering　would　involve　a　contradiction。　It　would；

however；　be　quite　consistent　with　the　right　of　occupation；　in　the　case

of　a　certain　intervening　piece　of　the　soil；　to　let　it　lie　unused　as

a　neutral　ground　for　the　separation　of　two　neighbouring　states；　but

under　such　a　condition；　that　ground　would　actually　belong　to　them　both

in　common；　and　would　not　be　without　an　owner　（res　nullius）；　just

because　it　would　be　used　by　both　in　order　to　form　a　separation　between

them。　Again：　〃May　one　have　a　thing　as　his；　on　a　soil　of　which　no　one

has　appropriated　any　part　as　his　own？〃　Yes。　In　Mongolia；　for

example；　any　one　may　let　lie　whatever　baggage　he　has；　or　bring　back

the　horse　that　has　run　away　from　him　into　his　possession　as　his　own；

because　the　whole　soil　belongs　to　the　people　generally；　and　the　use　of

it　accordingly　belongs　to　every　individual。　But　that　any　one　can

have　a　moveable　thing　on　the　soil　of　another　as　his　own　is　only

possible　by　contract。　Finally；　there　is　the　question：　〃May　one　of

two　neighbouring　nations　or　tribes　resist　another　when　attempting　to

impose　upon　them　a　certain　mode　of　using　a　particular　soil；　as；　for

instance；　a　tribe　of　hunters　making　such　an　attempt　in　relation　to　a

pastoral　people；　or　the　latter　to　agriculturists　and　such　like？〃

Certainly。　For　the　mode　in　which　such　peoples　or　tribes　may　settle

themselves　upon　the　surface　of　the　earth；　provided　they　keep　within

their　own　boundaries；　is　a　matter　of　mere　pleasure　and　choice　on　their

own　part　（res　merae　facultatis）。

　　As　a　further　question；　it　may　be　asked　whether；　when　neither

nature　nor　chance；　but　merely　our　own　will；　brings　us　into　the

neighbourhood　of　a　people　that　gives　no　promise　of　a　prospect　of

entering　into　civil　union　with　us；　we　are　to　be　considered　entitled　in

any　case　to　proceed　with　force　in　the　intention　of　founding　such　a

union；　and　bringing　into　a　juridical　state　such　men　as　the　savage

American　Indians；　the　Hottentots；and　the　New　Hollanders；　or…　and　the

case　is　not　much　better…　whether　we　may　establish　colonies　by

deceptive　purchase；　and　so　become　owners　of　their　soil；　and；　in

general；　without　regard　to　their　first　possession；　make　use　at　will　of

our　superiority　in　relation　to　them？　Further；　may　it　not　be　held

that　Nature　herself；　as　abhorring　a　vacuum；　seems　to　demand　such　a

procedure；　and　that　large　regions　in　other　continents；　that　are　now

magnificently　peopled；　would　otherwise　have　remained　unpossessed　by

civilized　inhabitants　and　might　have　for　ever　remained　thus；　so　that

the　end　of　creation　would　have　so　far　been　frustrated？　It　is　almost

unnecessary　to　answer；　for　it　is　easy　to　see　through　all　this　flimsy

veil　of　injustice；　which　just　amounts　to　the　Jesuitism　of　making　a

good　end　justify　any　means。　This　mode　of　acquiring　the　soil　is；

therefore；　to　be　repudiated。

　　The　indefiniteness　of　external　acquirable　objects　in　respect　of

their　quantity；　as　well　as　their　quality；　makes　the　problem　of　the

sole　primary　external　acquisition　of　them　one　of　the　most　difficult　to

solve。　There　must；　however；　be　some　one　first　acquisition　of　an

external　object；　for　every　Acquisition　cannot　be　derivative。　Hence；

the　problem　is　not　to　be　given　up　as　insoluble　or　in　itself　as

impossible。　If　it　is　solved　by　reference　to　the　original　contract；

unless　this　contract　is　extended　so　as　to　include　the　whole　human

race；　acquisition　under　it　would　still　remain　but　provisional。



　　　　　　　　　16。　Exposition　of　the　Conception　of　a　Primary

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Acquisition　of　the　Soil。



　　All　men　are　originally　in　a　common　collective　possession　of　the　soil

of　the　whole　earth　（communio　fundi　originaria）；　and　they　have

naturally　each　a　will　to　use　it　（lex　justi）。　But　on　account　of　the

opposition　of　the　free　will　of　one　to　that　of　the　other　in　the

sphere　of　action；　which　is　inevitable　by　nature；　all　use　of　the　soil

would　be　prevented　did　not　every　will　contain　at　the　same　time　a　law

for　the　regulation　of　the　relation　of　all　wills　in　action；　according

to　which　a　particular　possession　can　be　determined　to　every　one　upon

the　common　soil。　This　is　the　juridical　law　（lex　juridica）。　But　the

distributive　law　of　the　mine　and　thine；　as　applicable　to　each

individual　on　the　soil；　according　to　the　axiom　of　external　freedom；

cannot　proceed　otherwise　than　from　a　primarily　united　will　a　priori…

which　does　not　presuppose　any　juridical　act　as　requisite　for　this

union。　This　Law　can　only　take　form　in　the　civil　state　（lex　justitiae

distributivae）；　as　it　is　in　this　state　alone　that　the　united　common

will　determines　what　is　right；　what　is　rightful；　and　what　is　the

constitution　of　Right。　In　reference　to　this　state；　however…　and

prior　to　its　establishment　and　in　view　of　it…　it　is　provisorily　a　duty

for　every　one　to　proceed　according　to　the　law　of　external　acquisition；

and　accordingly　it　is　a　juridical　procedure　on　the　part　of　the　will　to

lay　every　one　under　obligation　to　recognise　the　act　of　possessing

and　appropriating；　although　it　be　only　unilaterally。　Hence　a　provisory

acquisition　of　the　soil；　with　all　its　juridical　consequences；　is

possible　in　the　state　of　nature。

　　Such　an　acquisition；　however；　requires　and　also　obtains　the　favour

of　a　permissive　law　（lex　permissiva）；　in　respect　of　the

determination　of　the　limits　of　juridically　possible　possession。　For　it

precedes　the　juridical　state；　and　as　merely　introductory　to　it　is

not　yet　peremptory；　and　this　favour　does　not　extend　farther　than　the

date　of　the　consent　of　the　other　co…operators　in　the　establishment

of　the　civil　state。　But　if　they　are　opposed　to　entering　into　the　civil

state；　as　long　as　this　opposition　lasts　it　carries　all　the　effect　of　a

guaranteed　juridical　acquisition　with　it；　because　the　advance　from　the

state　of　nature　to　the　civil　state　is　founded　upon　a　duty。



　　　　　　　　　　　17。　Deduction　of　the　Conception　of　the　Original

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Primary　Acquisition。



　　We　have　found　the　title　of　acquisition　in　a　universal　original

community　of　the　soil；　under　the　conditions　of　an　external　acquisition

in　space；　and　the　mode　of　acquisition　is　contained　in　the　empirical

fact　of　taking　possession　（apprehensio）；　conjoined　with　the　will　to

have　an　external　object　as　one's　own。　It　is　further　necessary　to

unfold；　from　the　principles　of　the　pure　juridically　practical　reason

involved　in　the　conception；　the　juridical　acquisition　proper　of　an

object…　that　is；　the　external　mine　and　thine　that　follows　from　the　two

previous　conditions；　as　rational　possession　（possessio　noumenon）。

　　The　juridical　conception　of　the　external　mine　and　thine；　so　far　as

it　involves　the　category　of　substance；　cannot　by　〃that　which　is

external　to　me〃　mean　merely　〃in　a　place　other　than　that　in　which　I

am〃；　for　it　is　a　rational　conception。　As　under　the　conceptions　of

the　reason　only　intellectual　conceptions　can　be　embraced；　the

expression　in　question　can　only　signify　〃something　that　is　different

and　distinct　from　me〃　according　to　the　idea　of　a　non…empirical

possession　through；　as　it　were；　a　continuous　activity　in　taking

possession　of　an　external　object；　and　it　involves　only　the　notion　of

having　something　in　my　power；　which　indicates　the　connection　of　an

object　with　myself；　as　a　subjective　condition　of　the　possibility　of

making　use　of　it。　This　forms　a　purely　intellectual　conception　of　the

understanding。　Now　we　can　leave　out　or　abstract　from　the　sensible

conditions　of　possession；　as　relations　of　a　person　to　objects　which

have　no　obligation。　This　process　of　elimination　just　gives　the

rational　relation　of　a　person　to　persons；　and　it　is　such　that　he　can

bind　them　all　by　an　obligation　in　reference　to　the　use　of　things

through　his　act　of　will；　so　far　as　it　is　conformable　to　the　axiom　of

freedom；　the　postulate　of　right；　and　the　universal　legislation　of

the　common　will；　conceived　as　united　a　priori。　This　is　therefore　the

rational　intelligible　possession　of　things　as　by　pure　right；

although　they　are　objects　of　sense。



　　It　is　evident　that　the　first　modification；　limitation；　or

transformation　generally；　of　a　portion　of　the　soil　cannot　of　itself

furnish　a　title　to　its　acquisition；　since　possession　of　an　accident

does　not　form　a　ground　for　legal　possession　of　the　substance。

Rather；　conversely；　the　inference　as　to　the　mine　and　thine　must　be

drawn　from　ownership　of　the　substance　according　to　the　rule：

Accessarium　sequitur　suum　principale。　Hence　one　who　has　spent　labour

on　a　piece　of　ground　that　was　not　already　his　own；　has　lost　his　effort

and　work　to　the　former　owner。　This　position　is　so　evident　of　itself

that　the　old　opinion　to　the　opposite　effect；　that　is　still　spread

far　and　wide；　can　hardly　be　ascribed　to