the science of right-第9章

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far　and　wide；　can　hardly　be　ascribed　to　any　other　than　the

prevailing　illusion　which　unconsciously　leads　to　the　personification

of　things；　and；　then；　as　if　they　could　be　bound　under　an　obligation　by

the　labour　bestowed　upon　them　to　be　at　the　service　of　the　person　who

does　the　labour；　to　regard　them　as　his　by　immediate　right。　Otherwise

it　is　probable　that　the　natural　question…　already　discussed…　would　not

have　been　passed　over　with　so　light　a　tread；　namely：　〃How　is　a　right

in　a　thing　possible？〃　For；　right　as　against　every　possible　possessor

of　a　thing　means　only　the　claim　of　a　particular　will　to　the　use　of

an　object　so　far　as　it　may　be　included　in　the　all…comprehending

universal　will；　and　can　be　thought　as　in　harmony　with　its　law。

　　As　regards　bodies　situated　upon　a　piece　of　ground　which　is　already

mine；　if　they　otherwise　belong　to　no　other　person；　they　belong　to　me

without　my　requiring　any　particular　juridical　act　for　the　purpose　of

this　acquisition；　they　are　mine　not　facto；　but　lege。　For　they　may　be

regarded　as　accidents　inhering　in　the　substance　of　the　soil；　and

they　are　thus　mine　jure　rei　meae。　To　this　category　also　belongs

everything　which　is　so　connected　with　anything　of　mine　that　it

cannot　be　separated　from　what　is　mine　without　altering　it

substantially。　Examples　of　this　are　gilding　on　an　object；　mixture　of　a

material　belonging　to　me　with　other　things；　alluvial　deposit；　or

even　alteration　of　the　adjoining　bed　of　a　stream　or　river　in　my　favour

so　as　to　produce　an　increase　of　my　land；　etc。　By　the　same

principles；　the　question　must　also　be　decided　as　to　whether　the

acquirable　soil　may　extend　farther　than　the　existing　land；　so　as

even　to　include　part　of　the　bed　of　the　sea；　with　the　right　to　fish

on　my　own　shores；　to　gather　amber　and　such　like。　So　far　as　I　have

the　mechanical　capability　from　my　own　site；　as　the　place　I　occupy；

to　secure　my　soil　from　the　attack　of　others…　and；　therefore；　as　far　as

cannon　can　carry　from　the　shore…　all　is　included　in　my　possession；　and

the　sea　is　thus　far　closed　（mare　clausum）。　But　as　there　is　no　site　for

occupation　upon　the　wide　sea　itself；　possible　possession　cannot　be

extended　so　far；　and　the　open　sea　is　free　（mare　liberum）。　But　in　the

case　of　men；　or　things　that　belong　to　them；　becoming　stranded　on　the

shore；　since　the　fact　is　not　voluntary；　it　cannot　be　regarded　by　the

owner　of　the　shore　as　giving　him　a　right　of　acquisition。　For　shipwreck

is　not　an　act　of　will；　nor　is　its　result　a　lesion　to　him；　and　things

which　may　have　come　thus　upon　his　soil；　as　still　belonging　to　some

one；　are　not　to　be　treated　as　being　without　an　owner　or　res　nullius。

On　the　other　hand；　a　river；　so　far　as　possession　of　the　bank

reaches；　may　be　originally　acquired；　like　any　other　piece　of　ground；

under　the　above　restrictions；　by　one　who　is　in　possession　of　both

its　banks。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROPERTY。



　　An　external　object；　which　in　respect　of　its　substance　can　be　claimed

by　some　one　as　his　own；　is　called　the　property　（dominium）　of　that

person　to　whom　all　the　rights　in　it　as　a　thing　belong…　like　the

accidents　inhering　in　a　substance…　and　which；　therefore；　he　as　the

proprietor　（dominus）　can　dispose　of　at　will　（jus　disponendi　de　re

sua）。　But　from　this　it　follows　at　once　that　such　an　object　can　only　be

a　corporeal　thing　towards　which　there　is　no　direct　personal

obligation。　Hence　a　man　may　be　his　own　master　（sui　juris）　but　not

the　proprietor　of　himself　（sui　dominus）；　so　as　to　be　able　to　dispose

of　himself　at　will；　to　say　nothing　of　the　possibility　of　such　a

relation　to　other　men；　because　he　is　responsible　to　humanity　in　his

own　person。　This　point；　however；　as　belonging　to　the　right　of　humanity

as　such；　rather　than　to　that　of　individual　men；　would　not　be　discussed

at　its　proper　place　here；　but　is　only　mentioned　incidentally　for　the

better　elucidation　of　what　has　just　been　said。　It　may　be　further

observed　that　there　may　be　two　full　proprietors　of　one　and　the　same

thing；　without　there　being　a　mine　and　thine　in　common；　but　only　in

so　far　as　they　are　common　possessors　of　what　belongs　only　to　one　of

them　as　his　own。　In　such　a　case　the　whole　possession；　without　the

use　of　the　thing；　belongs　to　one　only　of　the　co…proprietors

（condomini）；　while　to　the　others　belongs　all　the　use　of　the　thing

along　with　its　possession。　The　former　as　the　direct　proprietor

（dominus　directus）；　therefore；　restricts　the　latter　as　the

proprietor　in　use　（dominus　utilis）　to　the　condition　of　a　certain

continuous　performance；　with　reference　to　the　thing　itself；　without

limiting　him　in　the　use　of　it。





　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。　Principles　of　Personal　Right。



　　　　　　　　18。　Nature　and　Acquisition　of　Personal　Right。



　　The　possession　of　the　active　free…will　of　another　person；　as　the

power　to　determine　it　by　my　will　to　a　certain　action；　according　to

laws　of　freedom；　is　a　form　of　right　relating　to　the　external　mine

and　thine；　as　affected　by　the　causality　of　another。　It　is　possible

to　have　several　such　rights　in　reference　to　the　same　person　or　to

different　persons。　The　principle　of　the　system　of　laws；　according　to

which　I　can　be　in　such　possession；　is　that　of　personal　right；　and

there　is　only　one　such　principle。

　　The　acquisition　of　a　personal　right　can　never　be　primary　or

arbitrary；　for　such　a　mode　of　acquiring　it　would　not　be　in

accordance　with　the　principle　of　the　harmony　of　the　freedom　of　my　will

with　the　freedom　of　every　other；　and　it　would　therefore　be　wrong。

Nor　can　such　a　right　be　acquired　by　means　of　any　unjust　act　of　another

（facto　injusti　alterius）；　as　being　itself　contrary　to　right；　for　if

such　a　wrong　as　it　implies　were　perpetrated　on　me；　and　I　could

demand　satisfaction　from　the　other；　in　accordance　with　right；　yet　in

such　a　case　I　would　only　be　entitled　to　maintain　undiminished　what　was

mine；　and　not　to　acquire　anything　more　than　what　I　formerly　had。

　　Acquisition　by　means　of　the　action　of　another；　to　which　I

determine　his　will　according　to　laws　of　right；　is　therefore　always

derived　from　what　that　other　has　as　his　own。　This　derivation；　as　a

juridical　act；　cannot　be　effected　by　a　mere　negative　relinquishment　or

renunciation　of　what　is　his　（per　derelictionem　aut　renunciationem）；

because　such　a　negative　act　would　only　amount　to　a　cessation　of　his

right；　and　not　to　the　acquirement　of　a　right　on　the　part　of　another。

It　is　therefore　only　by　positive　transference　（translatio）；　or

conveyance；　that　a　personal　right　can　be　acquired；　and　this　is　only

possible　by　means　of　a　common　will；　through　which　objects　come　into

the　power　of　one　or　other；　so　that　as　one　renounces　a　particular　thing

which　he　holds　under　the　common　right；　the　same　object　when　accepted

by　another；　in　consequence　of　a　positive　act　of　will；　becomes　his。

Such　transference　of　the　property　of　one　to　another　is　termed　its

alienation。　The　act　of　the　united　wills　of　two　persons；　by　which

what　belonged　to　one　passes　to　the　other；　constitutes　contract。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　19。　Acquisition　by　Contract。



　　In　every　contract　there　are　four　juridical　acts　of　will　involved；

two　of　them　being　preparatory　acts；　and　two　of　them　constitutive　acts。

The　two　preparatory　acts；　as　forms　of　treating　in　the　transaction；　are

offer　（oblatio）　and　approval　（approbatio）；　the　two　constitutive

acts；　as　the　forms　of　concluding　the　transaction；　are　promise

（promissum）　and　acceptance　（acceptatio）。　For　an　offer　cannot

constitute　a　promise　before　it　can　be　judged　that　the　thing　offered

（oblatum）　is　something　that　is　agreeable　to　the　party　to　whom　it　is

offered；　and　this　much　is　shown　by　the　first　two　declarations；　but

by　them　alone　there　is　nothing　as　yet　acquired。

　　Further；　it　is　neither　by　the　particular　will　of　the　promiser　nor

that　of　the　acceptor　that　the　property　of　the　former　passes　over　to

the　latter。　This　is　effected　only　by　the　combined　or　united　wills　of

both；　and　consequently　so　far　only　as　the　will　of　both　is　declared

at　the　same　time　or　simultaneously。　Now；　such　simultaneousness　is

impossible　by　empirical　acts　of　declaration；　which　can　only　follow

each　other　in　time　and　are　never　actually　simultaneous。　For　if　I

have　promised；　and　another　person　is　now　merely　willing　to　accept；

during　the　interval　before　actual　acceptance；　however　short　it　may　be；

I　may　retract　my　offer；　because　I　am　thus　far　still　free；　and；　on

the　other　side；　the　acceptor；　for　the　same　reason；　may　likewise　hold

himself　not　to　be　bound；　up　till　the　moment　of　acceptance；　by　his

counter…declaration　following　upon　the　promise。　The　external

formalities　or　solemnities　（solemnia）　on　the　conclusion　of　a　contract…

such　as　shaking　hands　or　breaking　a　straw　（stipula）　laid　hold　of　by

two　persons…　and　all　the　various　modes　of　confirming　the

declarations　on　either　side；　prove　in　fact　the　embarrassment　of　the

contracting　parties　as　to　how　and　in　what　way　they　may　represent

declarations；　which　are　always　successive；　as　existing

simultaneously　at　the　same　moment；　and　these　forms　fail　to　do　this。

They　are；　by　their　very　nature；　acts　necessarily　following　each

other　in　time；　so　that　when　the　one　act　is；　the　other　either　is　not

yet　or　is　no　longer。

　　It　is　only　the　philosophical　transcendental　deduction　of　the

conception　of　acquisition　by　contract　that　can　remove　all　these

difficulties。　In　a　juridical　external　relation；　my　taking　possession

of　the　free…will　of　another；　as　the　cause　that　determined　it　to　a

certain　act；　is　conceived　at　first　empirically　by　means　of　the

declaration　and　counter…declaration　of　the　free…will　of　each　of　us

in　time；　as　the　sensible　conditions　of　taking　possession；　and　the

two　juridical　acts　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　following　one

another　in　time。　But　because　this　relation；　viewed　as　juridical；　is

purely　rational　in　itself；　the　will　as　a　law…giving　faculty　of

reason　represents　this　possession　as　intelligible　or　rational

（possessio　noumenon）；　in　accordance　with　conceptions　of　freedom　and

under　abstraction　of　those　empirical　conditions。　And　now；　the　two　acts

of　promise　and　acceptance　are　not　regarded　as　following　one　another　in

time；　but；　in　the　manner　of　a　pactum　re　initum；　as　proceeding　from　a

common　will；　which　is　expressed　by　the　term　〃at　the　same　time；〃　or

〃simultaneous；〃　and　the　object　promised　（promissum）　is　represented；

under　elimination　of　empirical　conditions；　as　acquired　according　to

the　law　of　the　pure　practical　reason。



　　That　this　is　the　true　and　only　possible　deduction　of　the　idea　of

acquisition　by　contract　is　sufficiently　attested　by　the　laborious

yet　always　futile　striving　of　writers　on　jurisprudence　such　as　Moses

Mendelssohn　in　his　Jerusalem…　to　adduce　a　proof　of　its　rational

possibility。　The　question　is　put　thus：　〃Why　ought　I　to　keep　my

Promise？〃　For　it　is　assumed　as　understood　by　all　that　I　ought　to　do

so。　It　is；　however；　absolutely　impossible　to　give　any　further　proof　of

the　categorical　imperative　implied；　just　as　it　is　impossible