a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第14章

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experienced；　to　say　nothing　of　the　multitude；　know　how　to　keep　silence。　（16）



Men's　common　failing　is　to　confide　their　plans　to　others；　though　there　be



need　for　secrecy；　so　that　a　government　would　be　most　harsh　which　deprived



the　individual　of　his　freedom　of　saying　and　teaching　what　he　thought；　and



would　be　moderate　if　such　freedom　were　granted。　（17）　Still　we　cannot　deny



that　authority　may　be　as　much　injured　by　words　as　by　actions；　hence；



although　the　freedom　we　are　discussing　cannot　be　entirely　denied　to



subjects；　its　unlimited　concession　would　be　most　baneful；　we　must；



therefore；　now　inquire；　how　far　such　freedom　can　and　ought　to　be　conceded



without　danger　to　the　peace　of　the　state；　or　the　power　of　the　rulers；　and



this；　as　I　said　at　the　beginning　of　Chapter　XVI。；　is　my　principal　object。



（18）　It　follows；　plainly；　from　the　explanation　given　above；　of　the



foundations　of　a　state；　that　the　ultimate　aim　of　government　is　not　to



rule；　or　restrain；　by　fear；　nor　to　exact　obedience；　but　contrariwise；　to



free　every　man　from　fear；　that　he　may　live　in　all　possible　security；　in



other　words；　to　strengthen　his　natural　right　to　exist　and　work　…　without



injury　to　himself　or　others。







（20：19）　No；　the　object　of　government　is　not　to　change　men　from　rational



beings　into　beasts　or　puppets；　but　to　enable　them　to　develope　their　minds



and　bodies　in　security；　and　to　employ　their　reason　unshackled；　neither



showing　hatred；　anger；　or　deceit；　nor　watched　with　the　eyes　of　jealousy　and



injustice。　（20）　In　fact；　the　true　aim　of　government　is　liberty。







（20：21）　Now　we　have　seen　that　in　forming　a　state　the　power　of　making　laws



must　either　be　vested　in　the　body　of　the　citizens；　or　in　a　portion　of　them；



or　in　one　man。　（22）　For；　although　mens　free　judgments　are　very　diverse；　each



one　thinking　that　he　alone　knows　everything；　and　although　complete　unanimity



of　feeling　and　speech　is　out　of　the　question；　it　is　impossible　to　preserve



peace；　unless　individuals　abdicate　their　right　of　acting　entirely　on　their



own　judgment。　＇20：3＇　（23）　Therefore；　the　individual　justly　cedes　the　right



of　free　action；　though　not　of　free　reason　and　judgment；　no　one　can　act



against　the　authorities　without　danger　to　the　state；　though　his　feelings　and



judgment　may　be　at　variance　therewith；　he　may　even　speak　against　them；



provided　that　he　does　so　from　rational　conviction；　not　from　fraud；　anger；　or



hatred；　and　provided　that　he　does　not　attempt　to　introduce　any　change　on　his



private　authority。







（20：24）　For　instance；　supposing　a　man　shows　that　a　law　is　repugnant　to　sound



reason；　and　should　therefore　be　repealed；　if　he　submits　his　opinion　to　the



judgment　of　the　authorities　（who；　alone；　have　the　right　of　making　and



repealing　laws）；　and　meanwhile　acts　in　nowise　contrary　to　that　law；　he　has



deserved　well　of　the　state；　and　has　behaved　as　a　good　citizen　should；　but　if



he　accuses　the　authorities　of　injustice；　and　stirs　up　the　people　against



them；　or　if　he　seditiously　strives　to　abrogate　the　law　without　their



consent；　he　is　a　mere　agitator　and　rebel。







（20：25）　Thus　we　see　how　an　individual　may　declare　and　teach　what　he



believes；　without　injury　to　the　authority　of　his　rulers；　or　to　the　public



peace；　namely；　by　leaving　in　their　hands　the　entire　power　of　legislation　as



it　affects　action；　and　by　doing　nothing　against　their　laws；　though　he



be　compelled　often　to　act　in　contradiction　to　what　he　believes；　and



openly　feels；　to　be　best。







（20：26）　Such　a　course　can　be　taken　without　detriment　to　justice　and



dutifulness；　nay；　it　is　the　one　which　a　just　and　dutiful　man　would　adopt。



（27）　We　have　shown　that　justice　is　dependent　on　the　laws　of　the　authorities；



so　that　no　one　who　contravenes　their　accepted　decrees　can　be　just；　while　the



highest　regard　for　duty；　as　we　have　pointed　out　in　the　preceding　chapter；　is



exercised　in　maintaining　public　peace　and　tranquillity；　these　could　not　be



preserved　if　every　man　were　to　live　as　he　pleased；　therefore　it　is　no　less



than　undutiful　for　a　man　to　act　contrary　to　his　country's　laws；　for　if　the



practice　became　universal　the　ruin　of　states　would　necessarily　follow。







（20：28）　Hence；　so　long　as　a　man　acts　in　obedience　to　the　laws　of　his　rulers；



he　in　nowise　contravenes　his　reason；　for　in　obedience　to　reason　he



transferred　the　right　of　controlling　his　actions　from　his　own　hands　to



theirs。　（29）　This　doctrine　we　can　confirm　from　actual　custom；　for　in　a



conference　of　great　and　small　powers；　schemes　are　seldom　carried



unanimously；　yet　all　unite　in　carrying　out　what　is　decided　on；　whether　they



voted　for　or　against。　（30）　But　I　return　to　my　proposition。







（20：31）　From　the　fundamental　notions　of　a　state；　we　have　discovered　how　a



man　may　exercise　free　judgment　without　detriment　to　the　supreme　power：　from



the　same　premises　we　can　no　less　easily　determine　what　opinions　would　be



seditious。　（32）　Evidently　those　which　by　their　very　nature　nullify　the



compact　by　which　the　right　of　free　action　was　ceded。　（33）　For　instance；　a



man　who　holds　that　the　supreme　power　has　no　rights　over　him；　or　that



promises　ought　not　to　be　kept；　or　that　everyone　should　live　as　he　pleases；



or　other　doctrines　of　this　nature　in　direct　opposition　to　the　above…



mentioned　contract；　is　seditious；　not　so　much　from　his　actual　opinions



and　judgment；　as　from　the　deeds　which　they　involve；　for　he　who　maintains



such　theories　abrogates　the　contract　which　tacitly；　or　openly；　he　made　with



his　rulers。　（34）　Other　opinions　which　do　not　involve　acts　violating　the



contract；　such　as　revenge；　anger；　and　t　he　like；　are　not　seditious；　unless



it　be　in　some。　corrupt　state；　where　superstitious　and　ambitious　persons；



unable　to　endure　men　of　learning；　are　so　popular　with　the　multitude



that　their　word　is　more　valued　than　the　law。







（20：35）　However；　I　do　not　deny　that　there　are　some　doctrines　which；　while



they　are　apparently　only　concerned　with　abstract　truths　and　falsehoods；　are



yet　propounded　and　published　with　unworthy　motives。　（36）　This　question　we



have　discussed　in　Chapter　XV。；　and　shown　that　reason　should　nevertheless



remain　unshackled。　（37）　If　we　hold　to　the　principle　that　a　man's　loyalty　to



the　state　should　be　judged；　like　his　loyalty　to　God；　from　his　actions　only　…



namely；　from　his　charity　towards　his　neighbours；　we　cannot　doubt　that　the



best　government　will　allow　freedom　of　philosophical　speculation　no　less　than



of　religious　belief。　（38）　I　confess　that　from　such　freedom　inconveniences



may　sometimes　arise；　but　what　question　was　ever　settled　so　wisely　that　no



abuses　could　possibly　spring　therefrom？　（39）　He　who　seeks　to　regulate



everything　by　law；　is　more　likely　to　arouse　vices　than　to　reform　them。　（40）



It　is　best　to　grant　what　cannot　be　abolished；　even　though　it　be　in　itself



harmful。　（41）　How　many　evils　spring　from　luxury；　envy；　avarice；　drunkenness；



and　the　like；　yet　these　are　tolerated　…　vices　as　they　are　…　because　they



cannot　be　prevented　by　legal　enactments。　（42）　How　much　more　then　should　free



thought　be　granted；　seeing　that　it　is　in　itself　a　virtue　and　that　it　cannot



be　crushed！　（43）　Besides；　the　evil　results　can　easily　be　checked；　as　I　will



show；　by　the　secular　authorities；　not　to　mention　that　such　freedom



is　absolutely　necessary　for　progress　in　science　and　the　liberal　arts：　for　no



man　follows　such　pursuits　to　advantage　unless　his　judgment　be　entirely　free



and　unhampered。







（20：44）　But　let　it　be　granted　that　freedom　may　be　crushed；　and　men　be　so



bound　down；　that　they　do　not　dare　to　utter　a　whisper；　save　at　the　bidding　of



their　rulers；　nevertheless　this　can　never　be　carried　to　the　pitch　of　making



them　think　according　to　authority；　so　that　the　necessary　consequences　would



be　that　men　would　daily　be　thinking　one　thing　and　saying　another；　to　the



corruption　of　good　faith；　that　mainstay　of　government；　and　to　the　fostering



of　hateful　flattery　and　perfidy；　whence　spring　stratagems；　and　the



corruption　of　every　good　art。







（20：45）　It　is　far　from　possible　to　impose　uniformity　of　speech；　for　the　more



rulers　strive　to　curtail　freedom　of　speech；　the　more　obstinately　are



they　resisted；　not　indeed　by　the　avaricious；　the　flatterers；　and　other



numskulls；　who　think　supreme　salvation　consists　in　filling　their　stomachs



and　gloating　over　their　money…bags；　but　by　those　whom　good　education；　sound



morality；　and　virtue　have　rendered　more　free。　（46）　Men；　as　generally



constituted；　are　most　prone　to　resent　the　branding　as　criminal　of　opinions



which　they　believe　to　be　true；　and　the　proscription　as　wicked　of　that　which



inspires　them　with　piety　towards　God　and　man；　hence　they　are　ready　to



forswear　the　laws　and　conspire　against　the　authorities；　thinking　it　not



shameful　but　honourable　to　stir　up　seditions　and　perpetuate　any　sort　of



crime　with　this　end　in　view。　（47）　Such　being　the　constitution　of　human



nature；　we　see　that　laws　directed　against　opinions　affect　the　generous



minded　rather　than　the　wicked；　and　are　adapted　less　for　coercing　criminals



than　for　irritating　the　upright；　so　that　they　cannot　be　maintained　without



great　peril　to　the　state。







（20：48）　Moreover；　such　laws　are　almost　always　useless；　for　those　who　hold



that　the　opinions　proscribed　are　sound；　cannot　possibly　obey　the　law；



whereas　those　who　already　reject　them　as　false；　accept　the　law　as　a　kind　of



privilege；　and　make　such　boast　of　it；　that　authority　is　powerless　to　repeal



it；　even　if　such　a　course　be　subsequently　desired。







（20：49）　To　these　considerations　may　be　added　what　we　said　in　Chapter　XVIII。



in　treating　of　the　history　of　the　Hebrews。　（50）　And；　lastly；　how　many



schisms　have　arisen　in　the　Church　from　the　attempt　of　the　authorities　to



decide　by　law　the　intricacies　of　theological　controversy！　（51）　If　men　were



not　allured　by　the　hope　of　getting　the　law　and　the　authorities　on　their



side；　of　triumphing　over　their　adversaries　in　the　sight　of　an　applauding



multitude；　and　of　acquiring　honourable　distinctions；　they　would　not　strive



so　maliciously；　nor　would　such　fury　sway　their　minds。　（52）　This　is　taught



not　only　by　reason　but　by　daily　examples；　for　laws　of　this　kind　prescribing



what　every　man　shall　believe　and　forbidding　anyone　to　speak　or　write　to　the



contrary；　have　often　been　passed；　as　sops　or　concessions　to　the　anger　of



those　who　cannot　tolerate　men　of　enlightenment；　and　who；　by　such　harsh　and



crooked　enactments；　can　easily　turn　the　devotion　of　the　masses　into　fury　and



direct　it　against　whom　they　will。　（53）　How　much　better　would　it　be



to　restrain　popular　anger　and　fury；　instead　of　passing　useless　laws；



which　can　only　be　broken　by　those　who　love　virtue　and　the　liberal　arts；　thus



paring　down　the　state　till　it　is　too　small　to　harbour　men　of　talent。　（54）



What