a theologico-political treatise [part iv]-第2章

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men　must　necessarily　come　to　an　agreement　to　live　together　as　securely　and



well　as　possible　if　they　are　to　enjoy　as　a　whole　the　rights　which　naturally



belong　to　them　as　individuals；　and　their　life　should　be　no　more　conditioned



by　the　force　and　desire　of　individuals；　but　by　the　power　and　will　of　the



whole　body。　（25）　This　end　they　will　be　unable　to　attain　if　desire　be



their　only　guide　（for　by　the　laws　of　desire　each　man　is　drawn　in　a　different



direction）；　they　must；　therefore；　most　firmly　decree　and　establish　that　they



will　be　guided　in　everything　by　reason　（which　nobody　will　dare　openly　to



repudiate　lest　he　should　be　taken　for　a　madman）；　and　will　restrain　any



desire　which　is　injurious　to　a　man's　fellows；　that　they　will　do　to　all　as



they　would　be　done　by；　and　that　they　will　defend　their　neighbour's　rights　as



their　own。







（16：26）　How　such　a　compact　as　this　should　be　entered　into；　how　ratified　and



established；　we　will　now　inquire。







（27）　Now　it　is　a　universal　law　of　human　nature　that　no　one　ever　neglects



anything　which　he　judges　to　be　good；　except　with　the　hope　of　gaining　a



greater　good；　or　from　the　fear　of　a　greater　evil；　nor　does　anyone　endure　an



evil　except　for　the　sake　of　avoiding　a　greater　evil；　or　gaining　a　greater



good。　（28）　That　is；　everyone　will；　of　two　goods；　choose　that　which　he　thinks



the　greatest；　and；　of　two　evils；　that　which　he　thinks　the　least。　（29）　I　say



advisedly　that　which　he　thinks　the　greatest　or　the　least；　for　it　does　not



necessarily　follow　that　he　judges　right。　（30）　This　law　is　so　deeply



implanted　in　the　human　mind　that　it　ought　to　be　counted　among　eternal　truths



and　axioms。







（16：31）　As　a　necessary　consequence　of　the　principle　just　enunciated；　no　one



can　honestly　promise　to　forego　the　right　which　he　has　over　all　things



＇Endnote　26＇；　and　in　general　no　one　will　abide　by　his　promises；　unless　under



the　fear　of　a　greater　evil；　or　the　hope　of　a　greater　good。　（32）　An　example



will　make　the　matter　clearer。　（33）　Suppose　that　a　robber　forces　me　to



promise　that　I　will　give　him　my　goods　at　his　will　and　pleasure。　（34）　It　is



plain　（inasmuch　as　my　natural　right　is；　as　I　have　shown；　co…extensive　with



my　power）　that　if　I　can　free　myself　from　this　robber　by　stratagem；　by



assenting　to　his　demands；　I　have　the　natural　right　to　do　so；　and　to　pretend



to　accept　his　conditions。　（35）　Or　again；　suppose　I　have　genuinely　promised



someone　that　for　the　space　of　twenty　days　I　will　not　taste　food　or　any



nourishment；　and　suppose　I　afterwards　find　that　was　foolish；　and　cannot　be



kept　without　very　great　injury　to　myself；　as　I　am　bound　by　natural　law　and



right　to　choose　the　least　of　two　evils；　I　have　complete　right　to　break　my



compact；　and　act　as　if　my　promise　had　never　been　uttered。　（36）　I　say　that　I



should　have　perfect　natural　right　to　do　so；　whether　I　was　actuated　by　true



and　evident　reason；　or　whether　I　was　actuated　by　mere　opinion　in　thinking　I



had　promised　rashly；　whether　my　reasons　were　true　or　false；　I　should　be　in



fear　of　a　greater　evil；　which；　by　the　ordinance　of　nature；　I　should　strive



to　avoid　by　every　means　in　my　power。







（16：37）　We　may；　therefore；　conclude　that　a　compact　is　only　made　valid　by　its



utility；　without　which　it　becomes　null　and　void。　（38）　It　is；　therefore；



foolish　to　ask　a　man　to　keep　his　faith　with　us　for　ever；　unless　we　also



endeavour　that　the　violation　of　the　compact　we　enter　into　shall　involve　for



the　violator　more　harm　than　good。　（39）　This　consideration　should　have　very



great　weight　in　forming　a　state。　（40）　However；　if　all　men　could　be　easily



led　by　reason　alone；　and　could　recognize　what　is　best　and　most　useful　for　a



state；　there　would　be　no　one　who　would　not　forswear　deceit；　for　everyone



would　keep　most　religiously　to　their　compact　in　their　desire　for　the　chief



good；　namely；　the　shield　and　buckler　of　the　commonwealth。　（41）　However；　it



is　far　from　being　the　case　that　all　men　can　always　be　easily　led　by　reason



alone；　everyone　is　drawn　away　by　his　pleasure；　while　avarice；　ambition；



envy；　hatred；　and　the　like　so　engross　the　mind　that；　reason　has　no　place



therein。　（42）　Hence；　though　men　make　…　promises　with　all　the　appearances　of



good　faith；　and　agree　that　they　will　keep　to　their　engagement；　no　one　can



absolutely　rely　on　another　man's　promise　unless　there　is　something　behind



it。　（43）　Everyone　has　by　nature　a　right　to　act　deceitfully。　and　to　break　his



compacts；　unless　he　be　restrained　by　the　hope　of　some　greater　good；　or　the



fear　of　some　greater　evil。







（16：44）　However；　as　we　have　shown　that　the　natural　right　of　the　individual



is　only　limited　by　his　power；　it　is　clear　that　by　transferring；　either



willingly　or　under　compulsion；　this　power　into　the　hands　of　another；　he　in



so　doing　necessarily　cedes　also　a　part　of　his　right；　and　further；　that　the



Sovereign　right　over　all　men　belongs　to　him　who　has　sovereign　power；



wherewith　he　can　compel　men　by　force；　or　restrain　them　by　threats　of　the



universally　feared　punishment　of　death；　such　sovereign　right　he　will



retain　only　so　long　as　he　can　maintain　his　power　of　enforcing　his　will；



otherwise　he　will　totter　on　his　throne；　and　no　one　who　is　stronger　than　he



will　be　bound　unwillingly　to　obey　him。







（16：45）　In　this　manner　a　society　can　be　formed　without　any　violation　of



natural　right；　and　the　covenant　can　always　be　strictly　kept　…　that　is；　if



each　individual　hands　over　the　whole　of　his　power　to　the　body　politic；　the



latter　will　then　possess　sovereign　natural　right　over　all　things；　that　is；



it　will　have　sole　and　unquestioned　dominion；　and　everyone　will　be　bound　to



obey；　under　pain　of　the　severest　punishment。　（46）　A　body　politic　of　this



kind　is　called　a　Democracy；　which　may　be　defined　as　a　society　which　wields



all　its　power　as　a　whole。　（47）　The　sovereign　power　is　not　restrained　by　any



laws；　but　everyone　is　bound　to　obey　it　in　all　things；　such　is　the　state　of



things　implied　when　men　either　tacitly　or　expressly　handed　over　to　it　all



their　power　of　self…defence；　or　in　other　words；　all　their　right。　（48）　For　if



they　had　wished　to　retain　any　right　for　themselves；　they　ought　to　have　taken



precautions　for　its　defence　and　preservation；　as　they　have　not　done　so；



and　indeed　could　not　have　done　so　without　dividing　and　consequently　ruining



the　state；　they　placed　themselves　absolutely　at　the　mercy　of　the　sovereign



power；　and；　therefore；　having　acted　（as　we　have　shown）　as　reason　and



necessity　demanded；　they　are　obliged　to　fulfil　the　commands　of　the　sovereign



power；　however　absurd　these　may　be；　else　they　will　be　public　enemies；　and



will　act　against　reason；　which　urges　the　preservation　of　the　state　as　a



primary　duty。　（49）　For　reason　bids　us　choose　the　least　of　two　evils。







（16：50）　Furthermore；　this　danger　of　submitting　absolutely　to　the　dominion



and　will　of　another；　is　one　which　may　be　incurred　with　a　light　heart：　for　we



have　shown　that　sovereigns　only　possess　this　right　of　imposing　their　will；



so　long　as　they　have　the　full　power　to　enforce　it：　if　such　power　be　lost



their　right　to　command　is　lost　also；　or　lapses　to　those　who　have　assumed　it



and　can　keep　it。　（51）　Thus　it　is　very　rare　for　sovereigns　to　impose



thoroughly　irrational　commands；　for　they　are　bound　to　consult　their　own



interests；　and　retain　their　power　by　consulting　the　public　good　and



acting　according　to　the　dictates　of　reason；　as　Seneca　says；　〃violenta



imperia　nemo　continuit　diu。〃　（52）　No　one　can　long　retain　a　tyrant's　sway。







（16：53）　In　a　democracy；　irrational　commands　are　still　less　to　be　feared：　for



it　is　almost　impossible　that　the　majority　of　a　people；　especially　if　it　be　a



large　one；　should　agree　in　an　irrational　design：　and；　moreover；　the　basis



and　aim　of　a　democracy　is　to　avoid　the　desires　as　irrational；　and　to　bring



men　as　far　as　possible　under　the　control　of　reason；　so　that　they　may　live　in



peace　and　harmony：　if　this　basis　be　removed　the　whole　fabric　falls　to　ruin。







（16：54）　Such　being　the　ends　in　view　for　the　sovereign　power；　the　duty　of



subjects　is；　as　I　have　said；　to　obey　its　commands；　and　to　recognize　no　right



save　that　which　it　sanctions。







＇16：4＇　（55）　It　will；　perhaps；　be　thought　that　we　are　turning　subjects　into



slaves：　for　slaves　obey　commands　and　free　men　live　as　they　like；　but　this



idea　is　based　on　a　misconception；　for　the　true　slave　is　he　who　is　led　away



by　his　pleasures　and　can　neither　see　what　is　good　for　him　nor　act



accordingly：　he　alone　is　free　who　lives　with　free　consent　under　the　entire



guidance　of　reason。







（16：56）　Action　in　obedience　to　orders　does　take　away　freedom　in　a　certain



sense；　but　it　does　not；　therefore；　make　a　man　a　slave；　all　depends　on　the



object　of　the　action。　（57）　If　the　object　of　the　action　be　the　good　of　the



state；　and　not　the　good　of　the　agent；　the　latter　is　a　slave　and　does



himself　no　good：　but　in　a　state　or　kingdom　where　the　weal　of　the　whole



people；　and　not　that　of　the　ruler；　is　the　supreme　law；　obedience　to　the



sovereign　power　does　not　make　a　man　a　slave；　of　no　use　to　himself；　but　a



subject。　（58）　Therefore；　that　state　is　the　freest　whose　laws　are　founded　on



sound　reason；　so　that　every　member　of　it　may；　if　he　will；　be　free　＇Endnote



27＇；　that　is；　live　with　full　consent　under　the　entire　guidance　of　reason。







（16：59）　Children；　though　they　are　bound　to　obey　all　the　commands　of　their



parents；　are　yet　not　slaves：　for　the　commands　of　parents　look　generally　to



the　children's　benefit。







（60）　We　must；　therefore；　acknowledge　a　great　difference　between　a　slave；　a



son；　and　a　subject；　their　positions　may　be　thus　defined。　（61）　A　slave　is　one



who　is　bound　to　obey　his　master's　orders；　though　they　are　given　solely　in



the　master's　interest：　a　son　is　one　who　obeys　his　father's　orders；　given



in　his　own　interest；　a　subject　obeys　the　orders　of　the　sovereign　power；



given　for　the　common　interest；　wherein　he　is　included。







（16：62）　I　think　I　have　now　shown　sufficiently　clearly　the　basis　of　a



democracy：　I　have　especially　desired　to　do　so；　for　I　believe　it　to　be　of　all



forms　of　government　the　most　natural；　and　the　most　consonant　with　individual



liberty。　（63）　In　it　no　one　transfers　his　natural　right　so　absolutely　that　he



has　no　further　voice　in　affairs；　he　only　hands　it　over　to　the　majority　of　a



society；　whereof　he　is　a　unit。　Thus　all　men　remain　as　they　were　in　the　state



of　nature；　equals。







（16：64）　This　is　the　only　form　of　government　which　I　have　treated　of　at



length；　for　it　is　the　one　most　akin　to　my　purpose　of　showing　the　benefits　of



freedom　in　a　state。







（65）　I　may　pass　over　the　fundamental　principles　of　other　forms　of



government；　for　we　may　gather　from　what　has　been　said　whence　their　right



arises　without　going　into　its　origin。　（66）　The　possess