the idea of justice in political economy-第5章

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discern　moral　communities；　their　common　aims　and　the　human
qualities；　which　are　connected　with　these　aims。
　　　　The　most　primitive　barter　is　impossible；　unless。　between　the
parties　practising　it　regularly；　a　certain　moral　understanding
exists。　There　must　have　been　an　express　or　silent　mutual
agreement　to　preserve　peace。　The　barterers　must　have　common
conceptions　of　value；　must　recognize　a　common　law。　Every　seller
forms　with　the　purchaser；　who　stands　before　him　at　the　moment　of
the　transaction；　a　moral　union　of　confidence。
　　　　In　epochs　of　primitive　culture；　in　the　social　communities　of
families；　of　kinship；　of　tribes；　of　leagues；　there　exists　an
uncommonly　strong　feeling　of　solidarity　which　therefore　leads　to
very　far…reaching　demands　of　justice　within　these　circles；　as
well　as　to　a　complete　obtuseness　of　the　same　feeling　beyond　them。
With　a　higher　degree　of　culture　these　small　communities　lose；　the
individual　and　the　greater　communities　gain　in　importance。　Now
the　individual　and　now　the　community　appears　more　in　the
foreground；　and　accordingly　the　consciousness　of　the　community　of
interests　will　change　in　intensity。　In　the　periods　in　which　the
individual's　or　the　family's　technical　economic　life　still　forms；
without　more　extensive　intercourse；　without　more　elaborate
division　of　labor；　the　centre　of　gravity　in　economics；　the
feeling　of　community　in　economic　matters　will　recede。　The　further
the　division　of　labor　progresses；　the　more　inextricably　will　the
threads　of　intercourse　involve　the　individual　in　an　insoluble
social　community；　the　more　the　whole　production　will　assume　the
character　of　a　general；　not　an　individual　concern。　Then　the
common　functions　of　the　local　and　the　national　community　will
thrive；　individuals　will　be　more　and　more　dislodged　by　social
leaders。　Every　larger　undertaking；　whenever　it　unites
continuously　a　certain　number　of　men　for　a　common　economic
purpose；　reveals　itself　as　a　moral　community。　It　governs　the
external　and　internal　life　of　all　participants；　determines　their
residence；　school；　division　of　time；　family　life；　to　a　certain
degree　their　mental　horizon；　education　and　pleasure。　The
relations　of　those　concerned　necessarily　exchange　a　merely
economic　for　a　generally　moral　character。　And　therefrom　the
conception　arises；　here　a　common　production　exists；　hence　a　moral
community。　And　that　leads　to　the　question：　Is　the　relation
between　the　participants；　is　the　division　of　the　products　a　just
one？　And　similar　considerations　follow　for　whole　industries；　for
whole　social　classes；　and　this　all　the　more；　the　more　frequently
the　employers　and　the　laborers　are　organized　into　associations
and　societies。　They　also　result　for　whole　States　and　unions　of
States。
　　　　The　moral　communities；　which　play　a　part　in　economics；　follow
sometimes　purely　economic　purposes；　sometimes　other　purposes；　as
above　all　do　local　communities　and　the　State。　The　narrower　their
circle；　the　simpler　and　clearer　their　purpose；　the　more　evident
become　the　qualities；　according　to　which　moral　judgment　compares
and　classifies　men。　The　more　comprehensive　they　are；　the　more
manifold　their　purposes；　the　more　complicated　becomes　the
question　which　qualities　are　concerned；　the　more　fluctuating
becomes　the　judgment　of　what　is　just；　the　more　indispensable　for
customs　and　laws　become　conventional　presumptions　and　standards
in　order　to　attain　something　definite　at　all。
　　　　In　times　of　primitive　culture；　in　the　small　circles　of
economic　and　moral　communities　all　men；　or　at　least　all　men　able
to　bear　arms；　may　readily　appear　equal；　and　so　it　there　appears
just　to　give　each　the　same　allotment　of　land；　the　same　share　of
booty。　The　guild　sought　to　secure　to　each　member　as　nearly　as
possible　an　equal　share　of　profit。　With　higher　culture　begins　the
necessary　discrimination。　Formerly　the　greater　allotments　were
often　given　to　the　bravest　soldier　and　to　the　noble　families；
distinctions　now　become　more　general。　All　inherited　preference　is
considered　just；　in　the　measure　in　which　public　sentiment　values
not　the　qualities　of　the　single　individual；　but　of　families　as　a
whole；　a　conception　which　decreases　more　and　more　with　higher
culture。　Inherited　wealth；　as　long　as　it　appears　necessarily　and
obviously　coupled　with　its　possessor；　is　under　some　conditions
regarded　as　a　just　standard　of　the　distribution　of　goods。　So　the
distribution　of　public　lands　according　to　the　possessions　in
cattle　and　real　estate　appeared　quite　just　to　many　a　day　laborer
and　〃kossaeth〃　in　the　eastern　provinces　of　Prussia；　while　to　one
who　knew　the　public　land　systems　in　France　or　southern　Germany　it
seemed　an　outrageous　injustice。
　　　　For　all　community　of　production；　labor　is　the　most　obvious
standard；　hence　perhaps　it　is　the　most　usual；　most　generally
comprehensible。　As　soon　as　it　becomes　necessary　to　compare　many
different　kinds　of　labor；　only　an　abstraction　totally　foreign　to
public　sentiment　will　conceive　the　idea　of　reducing　all　this
labor　to　mere　quantities　of　handiwork；　natural　public　sentiment
will　simply　value　more　highly　the　labor　which　requires　more
education　or　talent。
　　　　Those　qualities　will　always　be　most　highly　considered　which
serve　the　common　objects；　those　which　only　relate　to　the
individual　and　his　selfish　aims　are　less　esteemed。　Only　a
complete　misconception　therefore　could　establish　individual　needs
as　a　standard　of　distributing　justice。　Older　socialism　wisely
held　aloof　at　all　times　from　this　aberration。　Even　the　first
really　social…democratic　platform　in　Germany；　that　of　Eisenach　of
1869；　did　not　vet　venture　to　commit　such　a　folly。　The　progressive
victory　of　vulgarity　and　rudeness　first　demanded　in　the　Gotha
platform　of　1875　the　division　of　the　aggregate　labor　products
among　individuals　according　to　their　〃reasonable　needs。〃　The
proviso　of　reasonableness　was　intended　to　prevent　excesses；　it
does　not　remove　the　low　conception。　With　his　needs　a　man　serves
himself　only；　with　his　labor；　his　virtue；　his　accomplishments；　he
serves；　mankind；　and　these　determine　the　judgment　which　esteems
them　as　just。
　　　　When　the　great　social　communities　which　follow　the　most
various　interests　and　what　is　just　in　them　are　concerned；　the
attempt　will　always　be　made；　more　or　less；　to　weigh　the　different
qualities　and　accomplishments　of　men　in　their　result　and　in　their
connection　with　the　objects　of　the　community。　Talents　and
knowledge；　virtues　and　accomplishments；　merit　in　short　is
considered。　Moral　qualities　are　often　apparently　overlooked；
great　talents　whose　achievements　and　deeds　are　generally　visible
are　apparently　over…estimated。　But　only　because　one　is　more
noticed　than　the　other；　and　the　moral　judgment　which　values
individuals　according　to　what　they　are　to　the　whole　can　naturally
only　judge　by　what　it　sees。
　　　　And　therein　lies　the　contrast　between　moral　and　economic
value。　In　the　ordinary　economic　valuation　activities　and　products
have　value　in　the　same　measure；　as　individuals　covet　them　for　the
satisfaction　of　their　personal　needs。　In　the　moral　valuation；　on
which　the　judgment　as　to　justice　depends；　the　activities　of
individuals　receive　their　value；　according　as　they　serve　the
inherent　ends　of　the　whole。　True　justice；　says　Ihering；　is　a
balancing　between　consequences　and　acts；　which　is　weighed　equally
to　all　citizens　according　to　the　measure　of　the　value　of　these
acts　to　society。　Both　valuations　go　in　life　side　by　side；
combating　and　influencing　one　another。　The　one　rules　the　market；
the　other　moral　judgments　and　conceptions。　They　approach　each
other　as　mankind　grows　more　perfect。　Through　what　mechanism　the
arising　conflicts　are　lessened　and　mitigated；　we　still　have　to
discuss。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV

　　　　If　in　the　economic　order　we　could　recognize　only　the　ruling
of　blind　forces；　of　selfish　interests；　natural　masses　and
mechanical　processes；　it　would　be　a　constant　battle；　a　chaotic
anarchy；　it　would　present　the　〃bellum　omnium　contra　omnes。〃　That
this　is　not　the　case　was　perceived　by　those　who　saw　in　the
exertion　of　egoism　the　only　motive　force　of　economic　life；　they
helped　themselves　over　the　inexplicable　conclusion　that　out　of
the　blind　struggle　of　selfish　individuals　peaceful　society　should
grow　out；　with　the　ideal　conception　of　a　pre…established　harmony
of　forces　as　in　the　conception　of　Leibnitz。　And　yet　any　impartial
glance　at　life　tells　us　that　this　harmony　does　not　exist；　but
that　it　is　striven　for　slowly　and　gradually。
　　　　No；　harmony　does　not　exist　per　se；　selfish　impulses　combat
each　other；　natural　masses　tend　to　destroy　each　other；　the
mechanical　action　of　natural　forces　interferes　relentlessly　still
to…day；　the　struggle　for　existence　is　to…day　still　carried　on　in
the　struggle　of　competition；　the　buoyancy　of　individual　activity
has　even　with　the　noblest　and　most　distinguished　men　a　flavor　of
egoism；　with　the　masses　it　is；　inwardly　curbed　indeed　by　the
moral　results　of　social　life；　the　potent　cause　of　most　actions。
While　struggle　and　strife　never　cease　they　do　not　preserve　the
same　character　throughout　the　course　of　history。　The　struggle
which　ended　in　annihilation；　in　subjugation；　turns　into　a
peaceful　contest　which　is　decided　by　an　umpire。　The　forms　of
dependence　grow　milder　and　more　human。　Class　government　grows
more　moderate。　Every　brutal　strength；　every　undue　assertion　of
superior　force　is　made　punishable　by　law。　Demand　and　supply；　as
they　confront　each　other　in　the　different　systems　of　custom　and
law；　are　quite　different　in　their　result。　In　short　all　emanations
of　egoism　are　moderated；　regulated　and　restrained　by　the　moral
cultivation　of　the　labor　of　many　thousand　years。　That　this　is　so
is　the　simple　consequence　of　those　ideal　conceptions　which
originate　in　social　life；　form　the　centre　of　all　religions；　all
systems　of　social　ethics；　all　morals　and　all　law。　And　in　the
realm　of　these　ideal　conceptions　the　idea　of　justice；　if　not　the
first　and　only　power；　is　none　the　less　one　of　the　most　important。
Others　of　equal　might　are　grouped　with　it。　Aside　from　the　idea　of
God；　of　immortality；　of　perfection　and　of　progress；　the　idea　of
justice　which　gives　each　one　his　share；　is　confronted　in　the
field　of　social　policy　by　some　other　ideas。　These　are　in　the
first　place　the　idea　of　community；　which　allots　to　the　whole　that
which　belongs　to　it；　which　regards　the　promotion　of　the　whole
more　than　the　rights　of　the　parts；　in　the　secund　place　the　idea
of　benevolence；　which　in　its　consciousness　of　community　gives
more　to　the　poor　man　than　he　can　justly　demand；　finally；　the　idea
of　liberty；　which　permits　each　part　to　act　freely；　placing
numerous　limits　upon　justice　and　the　community。　That　this　results
in　many　restrictions　upon　the　exercise　of　justice　we　will　here
only　suggest；　not　demonstrate。　But　the　fact　always　remains　that
the　constantly　growing　and　developing　conceptions　of　justice
extend　their　influence　daily　and　hourly　into　the　activity　of
practical　life；　that　in　the　form　of　moral　and　religious　sense　of
duty；　social　custom　and　actual　law；　they　regulate　and　modify　rude
forces　and　selfish　impulses。　The　conflict　between　interest　and
moral　ideas　will　of　course　never　cease；　but　only　be　moderated。
All　human　life　only　exists　under　the　pres