the idea of justice in political economy-第7章

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all　its　purposes；　nor　to　all　qualities　of　men。　In　every　ordinary
barter　two　persons；　whose　other　qualities　are　not　conceded　in
this　relation；　which　is　confined　to　this　one　barter；　meet　with
the　purpose　of　advancing　their　mutual　interests　by　the　exchange
of　certain　goods。　This　result　is　reached　if　they　exchange　values
essentially　equal；　if　both　sides　make　equal　profits。　〃The　giving
and　the　taking；〃　　Herbart　says；　〃everywhere　presupposes
compensation；　i。e。；　equality　of　the　given　and　the　taken。〃　
Conceding　the　standards　of　equality　only；　can　there　be　any
dissent。　The　savage　sees　equality　in　purely　external
circumstances；　in　the　fact　that　the　furs　just　fill　the　kettle　for
which　he　trades　them。　The　civilized　man　asks　for　equality　of
money　value；　the　formalist　for　the　equal　absence　of　fraud；　force
and　error。　The　principle　however；　always　remains　the　same。
Equality　measured　in　some　way　is　required。　And　if　the　equality　of
both　sides　required　by　the　conventional　standard　exists；　justice
is　secured　because　the　logical　judgment　and　the　moral　test　does
not　bring　the　single　agreement　into　relation　with　the　total
distribution　of　incomes；　with　the　total　worthiness　of　the
persons。　Only　a　fool　could　require　as　a　demand　of　justice；　that
the　grocer　grade　the　price　of　a　pound　of　coffee　according　to　the
wealth　of　each　customer；　or　that　in　a　publishing　contract　the
publisher　should　pay　to　the　author　of　an　unsalable　scientific
book　a　large　sum　because　it　is　a　work　of　great　labor　and　skill。
The　justice　of　a　single　bargain　is　the　so…called　exchanging
justice；　as　Trendelenburg　in　his　admirable　essays　on　Aristotle
has　proved　to　be　the　real　meaning　of　the　great　Stagaryte。　This
exchanging　justice　is　nevertheless　not　in　strict　contrast　to
distributive　justice；　it　is　only　one　of　its　subdivisions；　which
concerts　not　the　whole　society　and　all　its　purposes；　but　simply　a
part　of　them　and　an　especial　purpose。
　　　　As　long　as　the　value　of　every　good　thing　is　a　different　one
for　each　man；　so　long　a　certain　inequality　of　profits　will　not
seem　unjust。　Only　when　this　equality　oversteps　certain　bounds；
when　its　cause　is　not　the　free　decision　of　a　free　man；　does　a
lively　feeling　of　injustice　arise　and　seek　a　legal　remedy。　For
thousands　of　years　the　selfish　impulses　of　those　who　in　the
social　struggle　of　competition　are　the　stronger；　have　demanded
unconditional　freedom　of　contract；　and　this　demand　is　always
opposed　by　public　conscience　and　the　demand　of　the　weaker；　which
establishes　the　conception　of　justum　pretium；　which　requires　a
governmental　regulation　of　prices；　statutes　on　usury；
consideration　for　the　〃laesio　enormis；〃　　public　control　of　abuses
in　trade　and　traffic；　a　restriction　of　exploitation。　This
requirement　disappears　only　when　two　real　equals　meet；　who　as　a
rule　derive　equal　benefit　from　their　commercial　relations。
　　　　The　older　economic　school　of　Adam　Smith；　as　we　suggested　in
our　introduction；　had　found　its　ideal　of　justice　exclusively　in
the　freedom　of　contracts。　Presuming　that　all　men　are　by　nature
equal；　it　demanded　only　freedom　for　these　equal　men；　in　the　hope
that　this　would　result　in　agreements　about　equal　values　with
equal　profits　for　both　parties。　It　knew　neither　the　social
classes　nor　the　social　institutions　in　their　significance　for
economic　life；　for　it　the　social　mechanism　was　composed
exclusively　of　the　activity　of　individuals　and　their　single
agreements。　And　therefore　it　could　not　demand　any　other　kind　of
justice。　This　was　not　wrong；　but　it　was　only　a　part　of　the　〃just〃
which　it　demanded。
　　　　We　demand　to…day　above　all；　besides　a　just　system　of　barter；
just　economic　institutions；　i。e。；　we　demand　that　the　complexes　of
rules　of　morals　and　right　which　govern　groups　of　men　who　live　and
work　together　should　harmonize　in　their　results　with　those　ideal
conceptions　of　justice　which　on　the　basis　of　our　moral　and
religious　conceptions　are　prevalent　to…day；　or　which　are　gaining
recognition。　We　do　not　acknowledge　any　one　of　these　institutions
to　be　above　history；　as　having　always　existed　or　as　necessity
everlasting。　We　test　the　result　of　every　one　of　them；　and　ask　of
each：　How　did　it　originate；　what　conceptions　of　justice　have
generated　it；　what　necessity　exists　for　it　to…day？
　　　　To　be　sure　we　also　know　how　to　appreciate　the　value　of　the
institutions　transmitted　to　us；　we　know　that　the　sacred
traditions　of　the　past　fill　our　mind　with　awe；　that　even　the　form
of　traditional　law　has　a　restraining　effect　on　rough　characters；
that　a　lasting　condition　of　social　peace　is　based　on　the　greatest
possible　restriction　of　formal　breach　of　law。　We　admit　that
institutions　must　never　disappear　in　form　and　substance；　that
nations　can　never　create　anything　wholly　new；　but　must　always
build　on　what　exists。　In　this　lasting　continuity　of　the　whole　we
have　a　guarantee　that　the　struggle　for　that　which　is　good　and
just　will　not　expire　fruitlessly；　though　this　would　always
happen；　if　each　generation　had　to　begin　this　struggle　anew；　and
was　not　furnished　with　the　inheritance　of　tried　wisdom　and
justice；　contained　in　traditional　institutions。　We　admit　that
every　momentary　condition　of　peace　in　society；　as　it　is　preserved
by　an　existing　law　of　property；　inheritance　and　some　other
institutions；　is　more　valuable　than　a　dangerously　unsettling　war
for　a　juster　law　of　property　and　inheritance；　when　the
traditional　law　still　corresponds　to　the　equilibrium　of　the
forces　existing　in　society　and　to　the　prevalent　ideal
conceptions。　In　this　case　every　struggle　for　more　just　laws　is
for　the　time　being　hopeless　and　vain。　It　can　only　harm　and
destroy。　Even　the　most　violent　revolution　can　not　replace　the
mental　transformation　of　men　which　is　the　precondition　of　a
juster　law。　The　essential　point　is　always　that　the　forces
themselves　and　the　conceptions　of　justice　have　changed。　Then　only
can　a　struggle　succeed。
　　　　Because　this　will　always　be；　we　do　not　fear；　like　the
alarmists　and　the　pusillanimous　of　all　times；　every　struggle　for
juster　laws。　And　on　this　account　we　do　not　see　in　every
manifestation　of　the　self…esteem　of　the　lower　classes　a　simply
outrageous　revolt　against　the　doctrine　of　the　natural
aristocratic　organization　of　society。　Much　less　should　we　fall
into　the　mistake　of　all　aged　reformers　who；　because　they　have
achieved　something；　believe　that　the　world's　history　should　close
with　them　and　what　they　have　accomplished。　We　know　to…day　that
history　never　stands　still；　that　all　progress　of　history　is
gained　only　in　the　struggle　of　peoples　and　of　social　classes；　and
that　they　cannot　always　be　as　peaceful　as　in　a　nursery。　And　those
who　are　always　ready　to　dream　of　a　jolly　war　and　its　favorable
moral　consequences　should　not　forget　that　the　social　struggles
within　society　differ　from　wars　between　nations　only　in　degree；
not　in　kind。　Social　struggles　can　likewise　favorably　affect
peoples。　I　only　call　attention　to　the　struggles　between　the
plebeians　and　the　patricians。　There　can　be　no　progress　in
institutions　without　certain　social　struggles。　All　struggles
within　society　are　struggles　for　institutions；　and　that　for　the
progress　of　cultivation　the　individual　will　grow　enthusiastic；
will　even　sacrifice　his　life　for　that　for　which　classes　and
parties　fight；　is　so　inevitable；　so　salutary　that　now　and　then　we
do　not　find　fault　with　breaking　the　formal　law　in　such　contests。
　　　　There　is　no　worse　delusion　than　that　of　the　older　English
economists　that　there　are　a　number　of　simple　and　natural　legal
and　economic　institutions　which　have　always　been　as　they　are　and
will　always　remain　so；　that　all　progress　of　civilization　and
wealth　is　simply　an　individual　or　technical　one；　that　this　is
simply　a　question　of　increased　production　or　consumption　which
will　and　can　be　accomplished　on　the　basis　of　the　same　legal
institutions。　This　faith　in　the　stability　of　economic
institutions　was　the　result　of　the　naive　overweening　confidence
of　the　older　economists　in　the　omnipotence　of　the　individual　and
of　the　individual　life。　Socialism　then　has　perhaps　over…estimated
the　significance　of　social　institutions。　Historical　economics　and
the　modern　philosophy　of　law　have　given　them　their　due　position
by　showing　us　that　the　great　epochs　of　economic　progress　are
primarily　connected　with　the　reform　of　social　institutions。　The
great　messages　of　salvation　to　humanity　were　all　aimed　at　the
injustice　of　outworn　institutions；　by　higher　justice　and　better
institutions　humanity　is　educated　up　to　higher　forms　of　life。
　　　　As　little　as　the　social　institutions　of　antiquity　have
governed　modern　history；　as　certainly　as　slavery　and　serfdom　have
vanished；　as　certainly　as　all　past　progress　of　institutions　was
connected　with　apparent　success　in　distributing　wealth　and
incomes　in　a　more　just　way　and　in　adapting　it　more　and　more　to
personal　virtues　and　accomplishments；　as　certainly　as　this
increased　more　and　more　the　activity　of　all　individuals；　as
certain　as　all。this　is　it；　that　the　future　will　also　see　new
improvements　in　this　direction；　that　the　institutions　of　coming
centuries　will　be　more　just　than　those　of　to…day。　The　decisive
ideal　conceptions　will　be　influenced　not　exclusively　but
essentially　by　distributive　justice。　Institutions　which　govern
whole　groups　of　human　beings　and　the　entire　distribution　of
wealth　and　incomes　necessarily　call　forth　a　judgment　upon　their
total　effects。　Inasmuch；　indeed；　as　single　institutions　concern
only　single　men　and　single　phases　of　life；　the　justice　required
will　only　be　a　partial　one。　Naturally　this　is　always　easy　to
attain。　A　just　assessment　of　taxes；　a　just　distribution　of　the
burdens　for　the　improvement　of　highways；　of　the　duty　of　military
service；　a　just　gradation　of　wages　are　much　easier　to　attain　than
a　just　distribution　of　the　total　incomes　and　wealth。　But　an
endeavor　towards　these　ends　will　never　cease；　all　partially　just
regulations　have　significance　only　in　a　system　of　the　just
distribution　of　the　total。　And　with　this　we　finally　come　to　the
question　what　can　be　and　what　should　the　State　do　in　this　matter？
　　　　In　our　view　it　will　obviously　not　be　a　body　confined　to　the
extension　of　justice　in　criminal　law；　in　the　jurisdiction　upon
contracts　and　further；　perhaps；　in　the　assessment　of　taxes；　but
ignoring　the　just　distribution　of　goods。　What　sense　is　there　in
warming　up　in　the　legislatures　over　the　hundredth　part　of　a　cent；
which　a　quart　of　beer　or　a　yard　of　cloth　is　raised　in　price　for
the　poor　man；　when　one　takes　the　standpoint　on　principle；　that
his　wages　are　to　be　regarded　as　something　indifferent　and　remote
from　all　human　intervention。　Our　modern　civilized　commonwealth
indeed　cannot　remove　every　injustice；　because　primarily　it
operates　and　has　to　operate　by　means　of　law。　But　it　should　not
therefore　be　indifferent　to　the　moral　sentiments　of　men　who　ask
for　justice　in　distributing　wealth　and　incomes　for　the　grand
total　of　human　society。　The　State　is　the　centre　and　the　heart　in
which　all　institutions　empty　and　unite。　It　also　has　a　strong
direct　influence　on　the　distribution　of　incomes　and　wealth　as　the
greatest　employer　of　labor；　the　greatest　property　holder；　or　the
administrator　of　the　greatest　undertakings。　Above　all　it
exercises　as　legisla