descartes’ reason discourse(笛卡尔的推理)-第4章
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lay within the pass of my powers。
Among the branches of philosophy； I had； at an earlier period； given
some attention to logic； and among those of the mathematics to
geometrical analysis and algebra； three arts or sciences which ought； as I
conceived； to contribute something to my design。 But； on examination； I
found that； as for logic； its syllogisms and the majority of its other
precepts are of avail… rather in the munication of what we already
know； or even as the art of Lully； in speaking without judgment of things
of which we are ignorant； than in the investigation of the unknown； and
although this science contains indeed a number of correct and very
excellent precepts； there are； nevertheless； so many others； and these either
injurious or superfluous； mingled with the former； that it is almost quite as
difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a
Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble。 Then as to the analysis
of the ancients and the algebra of the moderns； besides that they embrace
only matters highly abstract； and； to appearance； of no use； the former is
so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures； that it can exercise
the understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the imagination；
and； in the latter； there is so plete a subjection to certain rules and
formulas； that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity
calculated to embarrass； instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind。
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DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON； AND
SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES
By these considerations I was induced to seek some other method which
would prise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their
defects。 And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice； so that a
state is best governed when； with few laws； these are rigidly administered；
in like manner； instead of the great number of precepts of which logic is
posed； I believed that the four following would prove perfectly
sufficient for me； provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution
never in a single instance to fail in observing them。
The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly
know to be such； that is to say； carefully to avoid precipitancy and
prejudice； and to prise nothing more in my judgement than what was
presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of
doubt。
The second； to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as
many parts as possible； and as might be necessary for its adequate
solution。
The third； to conduct my thoughts in such order that； by mencing
with objects the simplest and easiest to know； I might ascend by little and
little； and； as it were； step by step； to the knowledge of the more plex；
assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their
own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence。
And the last； in every case to make enumerations so plete； and
reviews so general； that I might be assured that nothing was omitted。
The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which
geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult
demonstrations； had led me to imagine that all things； to the knowledge of
which man is petent； are mutually connected in the same way； and that
there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach； or so
hidden that we cannot discover it； provided only we abstain from
accepting the false for the true； and always preserve in our thoughts the
order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another。 And I had
little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to
mence； for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest
and easiest to know； and； considering that of all those who have hitherto
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sought truth in the sciences； the mathematicians alone have been able to
find any demonstrations； that is； any certain and evident reasons； I did not
doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations。 I
resolved to mence； therefore； with the examination of the simplest
objects； not anticipating； however； from this any other advantage than that
to be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth；
and to a distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound。 But I had no
intention on that account of attempting to master all the particular sciences
monly denominated mathematics： but observing that； however
different their objects； they all agree in considering only the various
relations or proportions subsisting among those objects； I thought it best
for my purpose to consider these proportions in the most general form
possible； without referring them to any objects in particular； except such as
would most facilitate the knowledge of them； and without by any means
restricting them to these； that afterwards I might thus be the better able to
apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately
applicable。 Perceiving further； that in order to understand these relations
I should sometimes have to consider them one by one and sometimes only
to bear them in mind； or embrace them in the aggregate； I thought that； in
order the better to consider them individually； I should view them as
subsisting between straight lines； than which I could find no objects more
simple； or capable of being more distinctly represented to my imagination
and senses； and on the other hand； that in order to retain them in the
memory or embrace an aggregate of many； I should express them by
certain characters the briefest possible。 In this way I believed that I could
borrow all that was best both in geometrical analysis and in algebra； and
correct all the defects of the one by help of the other。
And； in point of fact； the accurate observance of these few precepts
gave me； I take the liberty of saying； such ease in unraveling all the
questions embraced in these two sciences； that in the two or three months I
devoted to their examination； not only did I reach solutions of questions I
had formerly deemed exceedingly difficult but even as regards questions
of the solution of which I continued ignorant； I was enabled； as it appeared
to me； to determine the means whereby； and the extent to which a solution
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was possible； results attributable to the circumstance that I menced
with the simplest and most general truths； and that thus each truth
discovered was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones Nor in
this perhaps shall I appear too vain； if it be considered that； as the truth on
any particular point is one whoever apprehends the truth； knows all that on
that point can be known。 The child； for example； who has been
instructed in the elements of arithmetic； and has made a particular addition；
according to rule； may be assured that he has found； with respect to the
sum of the numbers before him； and that in this instance is within the
reach of human genius。 Now； in conclusion； the method which teaches
adherence to the true order； and an exact enumeration of all the conditions
of the thing 。sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of
arithmetic。
But the chief ground of my satisfaction with thus method； was the
assurance I had of thereby exercising my reason in all matters； if not with
absolute perfection； at least with the greatest attainable by me： besides； I
was conscious that by its use my mind was being gradually habituated
to clearer and more distinct conceptions of its objects； and I hoped also；
from not having restricted this method to any particular matter； to apply it
to the difficulties of the other sciences； with not less success than to those
of algebra。 I should not； however； on this account have ventured at once
on the examination of all the difficulties of the sciences which presented
themselves to me； for this would have been contrary to the order
prescribed in the method； but observing that the knowledge of such is
dependent on principles borrowed from philosophy； in which I found
nothing certain； I thought it necessary first of all to endeavor to establish
its principles。 。And because I observed； besides； that an inquiry of this
kind was of all others of the greatest moment； and one in which
precipitancy and anticipation in judgment were most to be dreaded； I
thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age
（being at that time but twenty…three）； and had first of all employed much
of my time in preparation for the work； as well by eradicating from my
mind all the erroneous opinions I had up to that moment accepted； as by
amassing variety of experience to afford materials for my reasonings； and
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by continually exercising myself in my chosen method with a view to
increased skill in its application。
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