战争与和平(上)-第193章

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“Soldiers！　This　is　the　battle　you　have　so　greatly　desired。　Victory　is　in　your　hands。　It　is　essential　for　us；　it　will　give　us　everything　we　need：　comfortable　quarters　and　a　speedy　return　to　our　own　country。　Behave　as　you　behaved　at　Austerlitz；　Friedland；　Vitebsk；　and　Smolensk。　May　posterity　recall　with　pride　your　achievement　on　this　day！　And　may　they　say　of　each　of　you：　he　was　at　the　great　battle　before　Moscow！”
“Before　Moscow；”　repeated　Napoleon；　and　inviting　M。　de　Beausset；　so　fond　of　travel；　to　accompany　him　on　his　ride；　he　went　out　of　the　tent　to　the　saddled　horses　awaiting　them　outside。
“Your　majesty　is　too　kind；”　said　Beausset；　in　response　to　the　invitation　to　accompany　the　Emperor。　He　was　very　sleepy。　He　could　not　ride　well；　and　was　afraid　of　horses。
But　Napoleon　nodded　to　the　traveller；　and　Beausset　had　to　mount。　When　Napoleon　came　out　of　the　tent　the　shouts　of　the　Guards　before　his　son’s　portrait　were　redoubled。　Napoleon　frowned。
“Take　him　away；”　he　said；　with　a　gracefully　majestic　gesture；　pointing　to　the　portrait。　“It　is　too　early　yet　for　him　to　look　upon　the　field　of　battle。”
Beausset；　dropping　his　eyelids；　and　bowing　his　head；　heaved　a　deep　sigh；　to　testify　how　well　he　was　able　to　appreciate　and　comprehend　the　Emperor’s　words。


Chapter　27
THE　WHOLE　of　that　day；　the　25th　of　August；　Napoleon　spent；　so　his　historians　relate；　on　horseback；　inspecting　the　locality；　criticising　the　plans　submitted　to　him　by　his　marshals；　and　giving　commands　in　person　to　his　generals。
The　original　line　of　the　Russian　disposition；　along　the　Kolotcha；　had　been　broken　through；　and；　in　consequence　of　the　taking　of　the　Shevardino　redoubt　on　the　previous　day；　part　of　that　line—the　left　flank—had　been　drawn　further　back。　That　part　of　the　line　had　not　been　strengthened；　was　no　longer　protected　by　the　river；　and　more　open　and　level　ground　lay　before　it。　It　was　obvious　to　any　man；　military　or　non…military；　that　it　was　that　part　of　the　line　that　the　French　should　attack。　One　would　have　thought　that　no　great　deliberation　would　be　necessary　to　reach　this　conclusion；　that　all　the　care　and　anxiety　of　the　Emperor　and　his　marshals　were　unnecessary；　and　that　there　was　absolutely　no　need　of　that　peculiar　high　degree　of　talent　called　genius；　which　they　are　so　fond　of　ascribing　to　Napoleon。　But　the　historians；　who　described　the　battle　afterwards；　and　the　men　surrounding　Napoleon　at　the　time；　and　he　himself；　thought　otherwise。
Napoleon　rode　about　the　field；　gazing　with　a　profound　air　at　the　country；　wagging　his　head　approvingly　or　dubiously　to　himself；　and　without　communicating　to　the　generals　around　him　the　profound　chain　of　reasoning　that　guided　him　in　his　decisions；　conveyed　to　them　merely　the　final　conclusions　in　the　form　of　commands。　Upon　the　suggestion　being　made　by　Davoust；　now　styled　Duke　of　Eckmühl；　for　turning　the　Russian　left　flank；　Napoleon　said　there　was　no　need　to　do　this；　without　explaining　why　there　was　no　need。　But　to　the　proposal　of　General　Compans　（who　was　to　attack　the　advanced　earthworks）；　to　lead　his　division　through　the　forest；　Napoleon　signified　his　assent；　although　the　so…called　Duke　of　Elchingen；　that　is；　Ney；　ventured　to　observe　that　to　move　troops　through　woodland　is　risky；　and　might　break　up　the　formation　of　the　division。
After　examining　the　nature　of　the　country　opposite　the　Shevardino　redoubt；　Napoleon　pondered　a　little　while　in　silence　and　pointed　to　the　spots　where　two　batteries　were　to　be　placed　by　the　morrow　for　action　against　the　Russian　fortifications；　and　the　spots　where；　in　a　line　with　them；　the　field　artillery　was　to　be　arranged。
After　giving　these　and　other　commands；　he　went　back　to　his　quarters；　and　the　disposition　of　the　troops　was　written　down　from　his　dictation。
This　disposition；　of　which　the　French　speak　with　enthusiasm；　and　other　historians　with　profound　respect；　consisted　of　the　following　instructions：
“Two　new　batteries；　to　be　placed　during　the　night　on　the　plain　occupied　by　the　Duke　of　Eckmühl；　will　open　fire　at　dawn　on　the　two　opposite　batteries　of　the　enemy。
“At　the　same　time　General　Pernetti；　in　command　of　the　artillery　of　the　1st　corps；　with　thirty　cannons　of　Compans’s　division；　and　all　the　howitzers　of　Desaix　and　Friant’s　division；　will　move　forward；　open　fire；　and　shower　shells　on　the　enemy’s　battery；　against　which　there　will　be　at　once　in　action：
24　cannons　of　the　artillery　of　the　Guards；
30　cannons　of　Compans’s　division；　and
8　cannons　of　Friant　and　Desaix’s　division
—
In　all　62　cannons。
“General　Fouché；　in　command　of　the　artillery　of　the　3rd　corps；　will　place　all　the　sixteen　howitzers　of　the　3rd　and　8th　corps　at　the　flanks　of　the　battery；　told　off　to　bombard　the　left　fortification；　making　forty　guns　in　all　aimed　against　it。
“General　Sorbier　is　to　be　in　readiness　to　advance　on　the　word　being　given；　with　all　the　howitzers　of　the　artillery　of　the　Guards　against　either　of　the　enemy’s　fortifications。
“During　the　cannonade　Prince　Poniatovsky　is　to　advance　to　the　village　in　the　wood；　and　to　turn　the　enemy’s　position。
“General　Compans　will　cross　the　wood　to　gain　possession　of　the　first　fortification。
“After　the　attack　has　begun　on　these　lines；　further　commands　will　be　given　in　accordance　with　the　enemy’s　movements。
“The　cannonade　on　the　left　flank　will　begin　as　soon　as　the　cannons　of　the　right　wing　are　heard。　The　sharpshooters　of　Morand’s　division　and　of　the　viceroy’s　division　will　open　a　hot　fire　on　seeing　the　beginning　of　the　attack　of　the　right　wing。
“The　viceroy　will　take　possession　of　the　village　of　Borodino；　and　cross　by　its　three　bridges；　advancing　to　the　same　height　with　Morand’s　and　Gérard’s　divisions；　which　under　his　leadership　will　advance　to　the　redoubt　and　come　into　line　with　the　other　troops　of　the　army。
“All　this　is　to　be　done　in　good　order　（le　tout　se　fera　avec　ordre　et　méthode）；　preserving　as　far　as　possible　troops　in　reserve。
“The　imperial　camp；　near　Mozhaisk；　September　6；　1812。”
These　instructions—which　strike　one　as　exceedingly　confused　and　obscure；　if　one　ventures　to　throw　off　the　superstitious　awe　for　Napoleon’s　genius　in　treating　of　his　disposition　of　his　troops—may　be　condensed　into　four　points—four　commands。　Not　one　of　those　instructions　was　or　could　be　carried　out。
In　the　first　place　the　instruction　is　given：　That　the　batteries　placed　on　the　spot　selected　by　Napoleon；　with　the　cannons　of　Pernetti　and　Fouché；　which　were　to　join　them；　in　all　one　hundred　and　two　cannons；　were　to　open　fire　and　shell　the　Russian　earthworks　and　redoubts。　This　could　not　be　done；　since　from　the　spots　fixed　on　by　Napoleon　the　shells　did　not　carry　so　far　as　the　Russian　earthworks；　and　these　one　hundred　and　two　cannons　fired　in　the　air　till　such　time　as　the　nearest　officer　in　command　ordered　them　to　advance；　in　opposition　to　Napoleon’s　instructions。
The　second　instruction　given　is　that　Poniatovsky；　advancing　to　the　village　in　the　wood；　should　turn　the　Russian　left　flank。　This　was　not；　and　could　not　be　done；　as　Poniatovsky；　on　advancing　to　the　village　in　the　wood；　found　Tutchkov　there　barring　his　way；　and　did　not；　and　could　not；　turn　the　Russian　position。
The　third　instruction　is：　General　Compans　will　move　into　the　wood　to　take　possession　of　the　first　Russian　fortification。　Compans’s　division　did　not　take　the　first　fortification；　but　was　beaten　back；　because；　as　it　came　out　of　the　wood；　it　had　to　form　under　a　fire　of　grapeshot；　of　which　Napoleon　knew　nothing。
The　fourth　instruction　is：　That　the　viceroy　will　take　possession　of　the　village　（Borodino）；　and　cross　by　its　three　bridges；　following　to　the　same　high　ground　as　Morand’s　and　Friant’s　divisions　（nothing　is　said　of　whence　and　when　they　were　to　advance）；　which　under　his　leadership　will　advance　to　the　redoubt　and　form　in　a　line　with　the　other　troops。　As　far　as　one　can　make　out；　not　so　much　from　this　confused　paragraph；　as　from　the　attempts　made　by　the　viceroy　to　carry　out　the　orders　given　him；　he　was　to　advance　through　Borodino　from　the　left　to　the　redoubt；　and　the　divisions　of　Morand　and　Friant　were　to　advance　simultaneously　from　the　front。　All　this；　like　the　other　instructions；　was　impossible　to　carry　out。　After　passing　through　Borodino　the　viceroy　was　beaten　back　at　the　Kolotcha；　and　could　advance　no　further。　The　divisions　of　Morand　and　Friant　did　not　take　the　redoubt；　but　were　driven　back；　and　at　the　end　of　the　day　the　redoubt　was　captured　by　cavalry　（in　an　action　probably　unforeseen　by　Napoleon；　and　not　heard　of　by　him）。
And　not　one　of　the　instructions　given　was；　or　could　be；　carried　into　effect。　But　in　the　disposition　was　the　statement；　that　after　the　battle　had　begun；　further　instructions　would　be　given　in　accordance　with　the　enemy’s　movements；　and　so　it　might　be　supposed　that　all　necessary　instructions　had　been　given　by　Napoleon　during　the　battle。　But　this　was　not；　and　could　not　be；　the　case；　because；　during　the　whole　battle　Napoleon　was　so　far　from　the　scene　of　action　that　（as　it　turned　out　later）　he　knew　nothing　of　the　course　of　the　battle；　and　not　a　single　instruction　given　by　him　during　the　fight　could　possibly　be　executed。


Chapter　28
MANY　HISTORIANS　assert　that　the　French　failed　at　Borodino　because　Napoleon　had　a　cold　in　his　head；　that　if　he　had　not　had　a　cold　the　orders　given　by　him　before　and　during　the　battle　would　have　been　even　more　remarkable　for　their　genius；　and　Russia　would　have　been　lost　and　the　face　of　the　world　would　have　been　changed。　To　historians；　who　can　maintain　that　Russia　was　transformed　at　the　will　of　one　man—Peter　the　Great—and　that　France；　from　a　republic；　became　an　empire；　and　that　the　French　army　marched　into　Russia　at　the　will　of　one　man—Napoleon—the　conclusion　that　Russia　has　remained　a　power　because　Napoleon　had　a　bad　cold　on　the　26th　of　August　may　seem　indisputable　and　convincing。　Had　it　depended　on　Napoleon’s　will　to　fight；　or　not　to　fight；　at　Borodino；　or　had　it　depended　on　his　will　whether　he　gave　this　order　or　that；　it　is　evident　that　a　cold；　affecting　the　manifestation　of　his　will；　might　be　the　saving　of　Russia；　and　consequently　the　valet；　who　forgot　to　put　on　Napoleon’s　waterproof　boots　on　the　24th；　would　be　the　saviour　of　Russia。　On　that　method　of　reasoning　such　a　deduction　is　inevitable；　as　inevitable　as　the　contention　which　Voltaire　maintains　in　jest　（unconscious　what　he　was　ridiculing）　that　the　Massacre　of　St。　Bartholomew　was　due　to　an　attack　of　dyspepsia　from　which　Charles　IX　was　suffering。　But　for　minds　that　cannot　admit　that　Russia　was　transformed　at　the　will　of　one　man—Peter　the　Great—and　the　French　empire　was　created；　and　the　war　with　Russia　begun；　at　the　will　of　one　man—Napoleon—such　a　contention　will　seem　not　merely　unsound　and　irrational；　but　contrary　to　the　whole　nature　of　humanity。　The　question；　What　constitutes　the　cause　of　historical　events？　will　suggest　to　them　another　answer；　resting　on　the　idea　that　the　course　of　earthly　events　is　predestined　from　on　high；　depends　on　the　combination　of　all　the　wills　of　the　men　taking　part　in　those　events；　and　that　the　predominant　influence　of　Napoleon　in　those　events　is　purely　external　and　fictitious。
Strange　at　first　sight　as　appears　the　proposition　that　the　Massacre　of　St。　Bartholomew；　the　order　for　which　was　given　by　Charles　IX。；　was　not　the　result　of　his　will；　and　that　it　wa