战争与和平(上)-第203章

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Only　by　assuming　an　infinitely　small　unit　for　observation—a　differential　of　history—that　is；　the　homogeneous　tendencies　of　men；　and　arriving　at　the　integral　calculus　（that　is；　taking　the　sum　of　those　infinitesimal　quantities）；　can　we　hope　to　arrive　at　the　laws　of　history。
The　first　fifteen　years　of　the　nineteenth　century　present　the　spectacle　of　an　extraordinary　movement　of　millions　of　men。　Men　leave　their　habitual　pursuits；　rush　from　one　side　of　Europe　to　the　other；　plunder；　slaughter　one　another；　triumph　and　despair；　and　the　whole　current　of　life　is　transformed　and　presents　a　quickened　activity；　first　moving　at　a　growing　speed；　and　then　slowly　slackening　again。　What　was　the　cause　of　that　activity；　or　from　what　laws　did　it　arise？　asks　the　human　intellect。
The　historians；　in　reply　to　that　inquiry；　lay　before　us　the　sayings　and　doings　of　some　dozens　of　men　in　one　of　the　buildings　of　the　city　of　Paris；　summing　up　those　doings　and　sayings　by　one　word—revolution。　Then　they　give　us　a　detailed　biography　of　Napoleon；　and　of　certain　persons　favourably　or　hostilely　disposed　to　him；　talk　of　the　influence　of　some　of　these　persons　upon　others；　and　then　say　that　this　it　is　to　which　that　activity　is　due；　and　these　are　its　laws。
But　the　human　intellect　not　only　refuses　to　believe　in　that　explanation；　but　flatly　declares　that　the　method　of　explanation　is　not　a　correct　one；　because　in　this　explanation　a　smaller　phenomenon　is　taken　as　the　cause　of　a　greater　phenomenon。　The　sum　of　men’s　individual　wills　produced　both　the　revolution　and　Napoleon；　and　only　the　sum　of　those　wills　endured　them　and　then　destroyed　them。
“But　whenever　there　have　been　wars；　there　have　been　great　military　leaders；　whenever　there　have　been　revolutions　in　states；　there　have　been　great　men；”　says　history。　“Whenever　there　have　been　great　military　leaders　there　have；　indeed；　been　wars；”　replies　the　human　reason；　“but　that　does　not　prove　that　the　generals　were　the　cause　of　the　wars；　and　that　the　factors　leading　to　warfare　can　be　found　in　the　personal　activity　of　one　man。”
Whenever；　looking　at　my　watch；　I　see　the　hand　has　reached　the　figure　x；　I　hear　the　bells　beginning　to　ring　in　the　church　close　by。　But　from　the　fact　that　the　watch　hand　points　to　ten　whenever　the　bells　begin　to　ring；　I　have　not　the　right　to　infer　that　the　position　of　the　hands　of　my　watch　is　the　cause　of　the　vibration　of　the　bells。
Whenever　I　see　a　steam…engine　move；　I　hear　the　whistle；　I　see　the　valve　open　and　the　wheels　turn；　but　I　have　no　right　to　conclude　from　that　that　the　whistle　and　the　turning　of　the　wheels　are　the　causes　of　the　steam…engine’s　moving。
The　peasants　say　that　in　the　late　spring　a　cold　wind　blows　because　the　oak…buds　are　opening；　and；　as　a　fact；　a　cold　wind　does　blow　every　spring　when　the　oak　is　coming　out。　But　though　the　cause　of　a　cold　wind’s　blowing　just　when　the　oaks　are　coming　out　is　unknown　to　me；　I　cannot　agree　with　the　peasants　that　the　cause　of　the　cold　wind　is　the　opening　of　the　oak…buds；　because　the　force　of　the　wind　is　altogether　outside　the　influence　of　the　buds。　I　see　in　this　simply　such　a　coincidence　of　events　as　is　common　in　every　phenomenon　of　life；　and　I　see　that　however　long　and　minutely　I　might　examine　the　watch　hand；　the　valve；　and　the　wheel　of　the　steam…engine　and　the　oak…bud；　I　shall　not　discover　the　cause　of　the　bells　ringing；　of　the　steam…engine　moving；　and　of　the　spring　wind。　To　do　that　I　must　completely　change　my　point　of　observation　and　study　the　laws　of　the　motion　of　steam；　of　the　bells；　and　of　the　wind。　History　must　do　the　same。　And　efforts　have　already　been　made　in　this　direction。
For　the　investigation　of　the　laws　of　history；　we　must　completely　change　the　subject　of　observations；　must　let　kings　and　ministers　and　generals　alone；　and　study　the　homogeneous；　infinitesimal　elements　by　which　masses　are　led。　No　one　can　say　how　far　it　has　been　given　to　man　to　advance　in　that　direction　in　understanding　of　the　laws　of　history。　But　it　is　obvious　that　only　in　that　direction　lies　any　possibility　of　discovering　historical　laws；　and　that　the　human　intellect　has　hitherto　not　devoted　to　that　method　of　research　one　millionth　part　of　the　energy　that　historians　have　put　into　the　description　of　the　doings　of　various　kings；　ministers；　and　generals；　and　the　exposition　of　their　own　views　on　those　doings。


Chapter　2
THE　ARMED　FORCES　of　twelve　different　nationalities　of　Europe　invade　Russia。　The　Russian　army　and　population　fall　back；　avoiding　a　battle；　to　Smolensk；　and　from　Smolensk　to　Borodino。　The　French　army　moves　on　to　Moscow；　its　goal；　with　continually　increasing　impetus。　The　impetus　of　its　advance　is　increased　as　it　approaches　its　goal；　just　as　the　velocity　of　a　falling　body　increases　as　it　gets　nearer　the　earth。　Behind　them　thousands　of　versts　of　famine…stricken；　hostile　country；　before　them　some　dozens　of　versts　between　them　and　their　goal。　Every　soldier　of　Napoleon’s　army　feels　it；　and　the　expedition　advances　of　itself；　by　the　force　of　its　own　impetus。
In　the　Russian　troops　the　spirit　of　fury；　of　hatred　of　the　foe；　burns　more　and　more　fiercely　during　their　retreat；　it　gathers　strength　and　concentration　as　they　draw　back。　At　Borodino　the　armies　meet。　Neither　army　is　destroyed；　but　the　Russian　army；　immediately　after　the　conflict；　retreats　as　inevitably　as　a　ball　rebounds　after　contact　with　another　ball　flying　with　greater　impetus　to　meet　it。　And　just　as　inevitably　（though　parting　with　its　force　in　the　contact）　the　ball　of　the　invading　army　is　carried　for　a　space　further　by　the　energy；　not　yet　fully　spent；　within　it。
The　Russians　retreat　one　hundred　and　twenty　versts　beyond　Moscow；　the　French　reach　Moscow　and　there　halt。　For　five　weeks　after　this　there　is　not　a　single　battle。　The　French　do　not　move。　Like　a　wild　beast　mortally　wounded；　bleeding　and　licking　its　wounds；　for　five　weeks　the　French　remain　in　Moscow；　attempting　nothing；　and　all　at　once；　with　nothing　new　to　account　for　it；　they　flee　back；　they　make　a　dash　for　the　Kaluga　road　（after　a　victory；　too；　for　they　remained　in　possession　of　the　field　of　battle　at　Maley　Yaroslavets）；　and　then；　without　a　single　serious　engagement；　fly　more　and　more　rapidly　back　to　Smolensk；　to　Vilna；　to　the　Berezina；　and　beyond　it。
On　the　evening　of　the　26th　of　August；　Kutuzov　and　the　whole　Russian　army　were　convinced　that　the　battle　of　Borodino　was　a　victory。　Kutuzov　wrote　to　that　effect　to　the　Tsar。　He　ordered　the　troops　to　be　in　readiness　for　another　battle；　to　complete　the　defeat　of　the　enemy；　not　because　he　wanted　to　deceive　any　one；　but　because　he　knew　that　the　enemy　was　vanquished；　as　every　one　who　had　taken　part　in　the　battle　knew　it。
But　all　that　evening　and　next　day　news　was　coming　in　of　unheard…of　losses；　of　the　loss　of　one…half　of　the　army；　and　another　battle　turned　out　to　be　physically　impossible。
It　was　impossible　to　give　battle　when　information　had　not　yet　come　in；　the　wounded　had　not　been　removed；　the　ammunition　stores　had　not　been　filled　up；　the　slain　had　not　been　counted；　new　officers　had　not　been　appointed　to　replace　the　dead；　and　the　men　had　had　neither　food　nor　sleep。　And　meanwhile；　the　very　next　morning　after　the　battle；　the　French　army　of　itself　moved　down　upon　the　Russians；　carried　on　by　the　force　of　its　own　impetus；　accelerated　now　in　inverse　ratio　to　the　square　of　the　distance　from　its　goal。　Kutuzov’s　wish　was　to　attack　next　day；　and　all　the　army　shared　this　desire。　But　to　make　an　attack　it　is　not　sufficient　to　desire　to　do　so；　there　must　also　be　a　possibility　of　doing　so；　and　this　possibility　there　was　not。　It　was　impossible　not　to　retreat　one　day’s　march；　and　then　it　was　as　impossible　not　to　retreat　a　second　and　a　third　day’s　march；　and　finally；　on　the　1st　of　September；　when　the　army　reached　Moscow；　despite　the　force　of　the　growing　feeling　in　the　troops；　the　force　of　circumstances　compelled　those　troops　to　retreat　beyond　Moscow。　And　the　troops　retreated　one　more　last　day’s　march；　and　abandoned　Moscow　to　the　enemy。
Persons　who　are　accustomed　to　suppose　that　plans　of　campaigns　and　of　battles　are　made　by　generals　in　the　same　way　as　any　of　us　sitting　over　a　map　in　our　study　make　plans　of　how　we　would　have　acted　in　such　and　such　a　position；　will　be　perplexed　by　questions　why　Kutuzov；　if　he　had　to　retreat；　did　not　take　this　or　that　course；　why　he　did　not　take　up　a　position　before　Fili；　why　he　did　not　at　once　retreat　to　the　Kaluga　road；　leaving　Moscow；　and　so　on。　Persons　accustomed　to　think　in　this　way　forget；　or　do　not　know；　the　inevitable　conditions　which　always　limit　the　action　of　any　commander…in…chief。　The　action　of　a　commander…in…chief　in　the　field　has　no　sort　of　resemblance　to　the　action　we　imagine　to　ourselves；　sitting　at　our　ease　in　our　study；　going　over　some　campaign　on　the　map　with　a　certain　given　number　of　soldiers　on　each　side；　in　a　certain　known　locality；　starting　our　plans　from　a　certain　moment。　The　general　is　never　in　the　position　of　the　beginning　of　any　event；　from　which　we　always　contemplate　the　event。　The　general　is　always　in　the　very　middle　of　a　changing　series　of　events；　so　that　he　is　never　at　any　moment　in　a　position　to　deliberate　on　all　the　bearings　of　the　event　that　is　taking　place。　Imperceptibly；　moment　by　moment；　an　event　takes　shape　in　all　its　bearings；　and　at　every　moment　in　that　uninterrupted；　consecutive　shaping　of　events　the　commander…in…chief　is　in　the　centre　of　a　most　complex　play　of　intrigues；　of　cares；　of　dependence　and　of　power；　of　projects；　counsels；　threats；　and　conceptions；　with　one　thing　depending　on　another；　and　is　under　the　continual　necessity　of　answering　the　immense　number　of　mutually　contradictory　inquiries　addressed　to　him。
We　are；　with　perfect　seriousness；　told　by　those　learned　in　military　matters　that　Kutuzov　ought　to　have　marched　his　army　towards　the　Kaluga　road　long　before　reaching　Fili；　that　somebody　did；　indeed；　suggest　such　a　plan。　But　the　commander　of　an　army　has　before　him；　especially　at　a　difficult　moment；　not　one；　but　dozens　of　plans。　And　each　of　those　plans；　based　on　the　rules　of　strategy　and　tactics；　contradicts　all　the　rest。　The　commander’s　duty　would；　one　would　suppose；　be　merely　to　select　one　out　of　those　plans；　but　even　this　he　cannot　do。　Time　and　events　will　not　wait。　It　is　suggested　to　him；　let　us　suppose；　on　the　28th　to　move　towards　the　Kaluga　road；　but　at　that　moment　an　adjutant　gallops　up　from　Miloradovitch　to　inquire　whether　to　join　battle　at　once　with　the　French　or　to　retire。　He　must　be　given　instructions　at　once；　at　the　instant。　And　the　order　to　retire　hinders　us　from　turning　to　the　Kaluga　road。　And　then　after　the　adjutant　comes　the　commissariat　commissioner　to　inquire　where　the　stores　are　to　be　taken；　and　the　ambulance　director　to　ask　where　the　wounded　are　to　be　moved　to；　and　a　courier　from　Petersburg　with　a　letter　from　the　Tsar；　not　admitting　the　possibility　of　abandoning　Moscow；　and　the　commander’s　rival；　who　is　trying　to　cut　the　ground　from　under　his　feet　（and　there　are　always　more　than　one　such）　proposes　a　new　project；　diametrically　opposed　to　the　plan　of　marching　upon　the　Kaluga　road。　The　commander’s　own　energies；　too；　require　sleep　and　support。　And　a　respectable　general；　who　has　been　overlooked　when　decorations　were　bestowed；　presents　a　complaint；　and　the　inhabitants　of　the　district　implore　protection；　and　the　officer　sent　to　in