战争与和平(上)-第263章

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ur　vanguard。　Seeing　the　enemy　unexpectedly；　the　French　were　thrown　into　confusion；　stopped　short　from　the　suddenness　of　the　fright；　but　then　ran　on　again；　abandoning　their　own　comrades　in　their　rear。　Then　for　three　days；　the　separate　parts　of　the　French　army　passed；　as　it　were；　through　the　lines　of　the　Russian　army：　first　the　viceroy’s　troops；　then　Davoust’s；　and　then　Ney’s。　They　all　abandoned　one　another；　abandoned　their　heavy　baggage；　their　artillery；　and　half　their　men；　and　fled；　making　semicircles　to　the　right　to　get　round　the　Russians　by　night。
Ney　was　the　last；　because　in　spite；　or　perhaps　in　consequence；　of　their　miserable　position；　with　a　child’s　impulse　to　beat　the　floor　that　has　bruised　it；　he　lingered　to　demolish　the　walls　of　Smolensk；　which　had　done　nobody　any　harm。　Ney；　who　was　the　last　to　pass　with　his　corps　of　ten　thousand；　reached　Napoleon　at　Orsha　with　only　a　thousand　men；　having　abandoned　all　the　rest；　and　all　his　cannons；　and　made　his　way　by　stealth　at　night；　under　cover　of　the　woods；　across　the　Dnieper。
From　Orsha　they　fled　on　along　the　road　to　Vilna；　still　playing　the　same　game　of　blindman　with　the　pursuing　army。　At　Berezina　again；　they　were　thrown　into　confusion；　many　were　drowned；　many　surrendered；　but　those　that　got　across　the　river；　fled　on。
Their　chief　commander　wrapped　himself　in　a　fur　cloak；　and　getting　into　a　sledge；　galloped　off　alone；　deserting　his　companions。　Whoever　could；　ran　away　too；　and　those　who　could　not—surrendered　or　died。


Chapter　18
ONE　MIGHT　have　supposed　that　the　historians；　who　ascribe　the　actions　of　the　masses　to　the　will　of　one　man；　would　have　found　it　impossible　to　explain　the　retreat　of　the　French　on　their　theory；　considering　that　they　did　everything　possible　during　this　period　of　the　campaign　to　bring　about　their　own　ruin；　and　that　not　a　single　movement　of　that　rabble　of　men；　from　their　turning　into　the　Kaluga　road　up　to　the　flight　of　the　commander　from　his　army；　showed　the　slightest　trace　of　design。
But　no！　Mountains　of　volumes　have　been　written　by　historians　upon　this　campaign；　and　in　all　of　them　we　find　accounts　of　Napoleon’s　masterly　arrangements　and　deeply　considered　plans；　of　the　strategy　with　which　the　soldiers　were　led；　and　the　military　genius　showed　by　the　marshals。
The　retreat　from　Maley　Yaroslavets；　when　nothing　hindered　Napoleon　from　passing　through　a　country　abundantly　furnished　with　supplies；　and　the　parallel　road　was　open　to　him；　along　which　Kutuzov　afterwards　pursued　him—this　wholly　unnecessary　return　by　a　road　through　devastated　country　is　explained　to　us　as　due　to　various　sagacious　considerations。　Similar　reasons　are　given　us　for　Napoleon’s　retreat　from　Smolensk　to　Orsha。　Then　we　have　a　description　of　his　heroism　at　Krasnoe；　when　he　is　reported　to　have　prepared　to　give　battle；　and　to　take　the　command；　and　coming　forward　with　a　birch　stick　in　his　hand；　to　have　said：
“Long　enough　I　have　been　an　emperor；　it　is　time　now　to　be　a　general！”
Yet　in　spite　of　this；　he　runs　away　immediately　afterwards；　abandoning　the　divided　army　in　the　rear　to　the　hazards　of　destiny。
Then　we　have　descriptions　of　the　greatness　of　some　of　the　marshals；　especially　of　Ney—a　greatness　of　soul　that　culminated　in　his　taking　a　circuitous　route　by　the　forests　across　the　Dnieper；　and　fleeing　without　his　flags；　his　artillery；　and　nine…tenths　of　his　men　into　Orsha。
And　lastly；　the　final　departure　of　the　great　Emperor　from　his　heroic　army　is　represented　by　the　historians　as　something　great—a　stroke　of　genius。
Even　that　final　act　of　running　away—which　in　homely　language　would　be　described　as　the　lowest　depth　of　baseness；　such　as　every　child　is　taught　to　feel　ashamed　of—even　that　act　finds　justification　in　the　language　of　the　historians。
When　it　is　impossible　to　stretch　the　elastic　thread　of　historical　argument　further；　when　an　action　is　plainly　opposed　to　what　all　humanity　is　agreed　in　calling　right　and　justice；　the　historians　take　refuge　in　the　conception　of　greatness。　Greatness　would　appear　to　exclude　all　possibility　of　applying　standards　of　right　and　wrong。　For　the　great　man—nothing　is　wrong。　There　is　no　atrocity　which　could　be　made　a　ground　for　blaming　a　great　man。
“C’est　grand！”　cry　the　historians；　and　at　that　word　good　and　bad　have　ceased　to　be；　and　there　are　only　“grand”　and　not　“grand。”　“Grand”　is　equivalent　to　good；　and　not　“grand”　to　bad。　To　be　grand　is　to　their　notions　the　characteristic　of　certain　exceptional　creatures；　called　by　them　heroes。　And　Napoleon；　wrapping　himself　in　his　warm　fur　cloak　and　hurrying　home　away　from　men；　who　were　not　only　his　comrades；　but　（in　his　belief）　brought　there　by　his　doing；　feels　que　c’est　grand；　and　his　soul　is　content。
“Du　sublime　au　ridicule　il　n’y　a　qu’un　pas；”　he　says　（he　sees　something　grand　in　himself）。　And　the　whole　world　has　gone　on　for　fifty　years　repeating：　Sublime！　Grand！　Napoleon　the　Great。
“Du　sublime　au　ridicule　il　n’y　a　qu’un　pas。”
And　it　never　enters　any　one’s　head　that　to　admit　a　greatness；　immeasurable　by　the　rule　of　right　and　wrong；　is　but　to　accept　one’s　own　nothingness　and　immeasurable　littleness。
For　us；　with　the　rule　of　right　and　wrong　given　us　by　Christ；　there　is　nothing　for　which　we　have　no　standard。　And　there　is　no　greatness　where　there　is　not　simplicity；　goodness；　and　truth。


Chapter　19
WHAT　RUSSIAN　READER　has　not　known　an　irksome　feeling　of　annoyance；　dissatisfaction；　and　perplexity；　when　he　reads　the　accounts　of　the　latter　period　of　the　campaign　of　1812？　Who　has　not　asked　himself：　How　was　it　all　the　French　were　not　captured　or　cut　to　pieces；　when　all　the　three　Russian　armies　were　surrounding　them　in　superior　numbers；　when　the　French　were　a　disorderly；　starving；　and　freezing　rabble；　and　the　whole　aim　of　the　Russians　（so　history　tells　us）　was　to　check；　to　cut　off；　and　to　capture　all　the　French？
How　was　it　that　the　Russian　army；　that　with　inferior　numbers　had　fought　the　battle　of　Borodino；　failed　in　its　aim　of　capturing　the　French；　when　the　latter　were　surrounded　on　three　sides？　Can　the　French　be　so　immensely　superior　to　us　that　we　are　not　equal　to　beating　them；　when　we　have　surrounded　them　with　forces　numerically　superior？　How　could　that　have　come　to　pass？　History　（what　passes　by　that　name）　answers　these　questions　by　saying　that　that　came　to　pass　because　Kutuzov；　and　Tormasov；　and　Tchitchagov；　and　this　general　and　that　failed　to　carry　out　certain　man？uvres。
But　why　did　they　fail　to　carry　them　out？　And　how　was　it；　if　they　really　were　responsible　for　not　attaining　the　aim　set　before　them；　that　they　were　not　tried　and　punished　for　their　shortcomings？　But　even　if　we　admit　that　Kutuzov　and　Tchitchagov　and　the　others　were　responsible　for　the　non…success　of　the　Russians；　it　is　still　impossible　to　understand　why；　in　the　position　the　Russian　troops　were　in　at　Krasnoe　and　the　Berezina；　on　both　occasions　with　numerically　superior　forces；　the　French　army　and　marshals　were　not　taken　prisoners；　if　that　really　was　the　aim　of　the　Russians。
The　explanation　of　this　phenomenon　given　by　the　Russian　military　historians—that　Kutuzov　hindered　the　attack—is　insufficient；　because　we　know　that　Kutuzov　was　not　able　to　restrain　the　troops　from　attacking　at　Vyazma　and　Tarutino。　Why　was　it　that　the　Russian　army；　that　with　inferior　forces　gained　a　victory　at　Borodino　over　the　enemy　in　full　strength；　was　unsuccessful　at　Krasnoe　and　the　Berezina；　when　fighting　in　superior　numbers　against　the　undisciplined　crowds　of　the　French？
If　the　aim　of　the　Russians　really　was　to　cut　off　Napoleon　and　his　marshals；　and　to　take　them　prisoners；　and　that　aim　was　not　only　frustrated；　but　all　attempts　at　attaining　it　were　every　time　defeated　in　the　most　shameful　way；　this　last　period　of　the　war　is　quite　correctly　represented　by　the　French　as　a　series　of　victories　for　them；　and　quite　incorrectly　represented　by　the　Russians　as　redounding　to　our　glory。
The　Russian　military　historians；　so　far　as　they　recognise　the　claims　of　logic；　are　forced　to　this　conclusion；　and　in　spite　of　their　lyric　eulogies　of　Russian　gallantry　and　devotion；　and　all　the　rest　of　it；　they　are　reluctantly　obliged　to　admit　that　the　retreat　of　the　French　from　Moscow　was　a　series　of　victories　for　Napoleon　and　of　defeats　for　Kutuzov。
But　putting　patriotic　vanity　entirely　aside；　one　cannot　but　feel　that　there　is　an　inherent　discrepancy　in　this　conclusion；　seeing　that　the　series　of　French　victories　led　to　their　complete　annihilation；　while　the　series　of　Russian　defeats　was　followed　by　the　destruction　of　their　enemy；　and　the　deliverance　of　their　country。
The　source　of　this　discrepancy　lies　in　the　fact　that　historians；　studying　events　in　the　light　of　the　letters　of　the　sovereigns　and　of　generals；　of　narratives；　reports；　projects；　and　so　on；　have　assumed　quite　falsely　that　the　plan　of　that　period　of　the　campaign　of　1812　was　to　cut　off　and　capture　Napoleon　and　his　marshals　and　his　army。
Such　a　plan　never　was；　and　could　not　have　been；　the　aim　of　the　Russian　army；　because　it　had　no　meaning；　and　its　attainment　was　utterly　out　of　the　question。
There　was　no　object　in　such　a　plan。　In　the　first　place；　because　Napoleon’s　army　was　flying　in　disorder　at　its　utmost　possible　speed　out　of　Russia；　that　is　to　say；　doing　the　very　thing　that　every　Russian　most　desired。　What　object　was　there　in　conducting　all　sorts　of　operations　against　the　French　when　they　were　running　away　as　fast　as　they　could　already？　Secondly；　it　would　have　been　idle　to　stop　men　on　the　road；　whose　whole　energies　were　bent　on　flight。　Thirdly；　it　would　have　been　absurd　to　lose　men　in　destroying　the　French　army　when　it　was　already；　without　external　interference；　perishing　at　such　a　rate　that；　without　any　obstruction　of　their　road；　not　more　than　one　hundredth　of　its　original　number　succeeded　in　crossing　the　frontier　in　December。
Fourthly；　it　was　absurd　to　desire　to　take　prisoners　the　Emperor；　kings；　and　dukes；　since　the　possession　of　such　prisoners　would　have　greatly　enhanced　the　difficulty　of　the　Russian　position；　as　was　recognised　by　the　most　clear…sighted　diplomatists　of　the　time　（J。　Maistre　and　others）。　Still　more　absurd　would　have　been　the　desire　to　capture　the　French　army　when　it　had　dwindled　to　one…half　before　reaching　Krasnoe；　and　a　division　of　convoys　had　to　be　given　up　to　guard　a　corps　of　prisoners；　while　the　Russian　soldiers　themselves　had　not　always　full　rations；　and　the　prisoners　they　did　take　died　of　hunger。
Any　plan　of　cutting　off　and　capturing　Napoleon　and　his　army；　however　carefully　thought　out；　would　have　been　like　the　action　of　a　gardener　who；　after　driving　out　a　herd　of　cattle　that　had　been　trampling　his　beds；　should　run　out　to　belabour　the　cattle　about　the　head。　The　only　thing　that　could　be　said　in　justification　of　his　proceeding　would　be　that　he　was　greatly　incensed。　But　the　authors　of　this　supposed　plan　cannot　plead　even　this　excuse；　since　theirs　were　not　the　gardens　that　had　been　trampled。
And；　besides　being　absurd；　to　cut　off　the　retreat　of　Napoleon’s　army　was　also　impossible。
It　was　impossible；　in　the　first　place；　because；　since　experience　shows　that　the　movement　of　columns　in　a　single　battlefield　at　five　versts’　distance　never　coincides　with　the　plan　of　their　movements；　the　probability　that　Tchitchagov；　Kutuzov；　and　Wittgenstein　would　all　reach　an　appointed　spot　in　time　was　so　remote　th