sophist-第7章

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　　Str。　And　would　they　say　that　the　whole　is　other　than　the　one　that

is；　or　the　same　with　it？

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure　they　would；　and　they　actually　say　so。

　　Str。　If　being　is　a　whole；　as　Parmenides　sings；…



　　Every　way　like　unto　the　fullness　of　a　well…rounded　sphere；

　　Evenly　balanced　from　the　centre　on　every　side；

　　And　must　needs　be　neither　greater　nor　less　in　any　way；

　　Neither　on　this　side　nor　on　that…



then　being　has　a　centre　and　extremes；　and；　having　these；　must　also

have　parts。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Yet　that　which　has　parts　may　have　the　attribute　of　

unity　in　all

the　parts；　and　in　this　way　being　all　and　a　whole；　may　be　one？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　But　that　of　which　this　is　the　condition　cannot　be　absolute

unity？

　　Theaet。　Why　not？

　　Str。　Because；　according　to　right　reason；　that　which　is　truly　one

must　be　affirmed　to　be　absolutely　indivisible。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　But　this　indivisible；　if　made　up　of　many　parts；　will　

contradict

reason。

　　Theaet。　I　understand。

　　Str。　Shall　we　say　that　being　is　one　and　a　whole；　because　it　has

the　attribute　of　unity？　Or　shall　we　say　that　being　is　not　a　whole　at

all？

　　Theaet。　That　is　a　hard　alternative　to　offer。

　　Str。　Most　true；　for　being；　having　in　a　certain　sense　the　attribute

of　one；　is　yet　proved　not　to　be　the　same　as　one；　and　the　all　is

therefore　more　than　one。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　yet　if　being　be　not　a　whole；　through　having　the　attribute

of　unity；　and　there　be　such　a　thing　as　an　absolute　whole；　being

lacks　something　of　its　own　nature？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　Upon　this　view；　again；　being；　having　a　defect　of　being；　will

become　not…being？

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And；　again；　the　all　becomes　more　than　one；　for　being　and　the

whole　will　each　have　their　separate　nature。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　But　if　the　whole　does　not　exist　at　all；　all　the　previous

difficulties　remain　the　same；　and　there　will　be　the　further

difficulty；　that　besides　having　no　being；　being　can　never　have　come

into　being。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　Because　that　which　comes　into　being　always　comes　into　being

as　a　whole；　so　that　he　who　does　not　give　whole　a　place　among　beings；

cannot　speak　either　of　essence　or　generation　as　existing。

　　Theaet。　Yes；　that　certainly　appears　to　be　true。

　　Str。　Again；　how　can　that　which　is　not　a　whole　have　any　

quantity？　For

that　which　is　of　a　certain　quantity　must　necessarily　be　the　whole　of

that　quantity。

　　Theaet。　Exactly。

　　Str。　And　there　will　be　innumerable　other　points；　each　of　them

causing　infinite　trouble　to　him　who　says　that　being　is　either；　one

or　two。

　　Theaet。　The　difficulties　which　are　dawning　upon　us　prove　this；　for

one　objection　connects　with　another；　and　they　are　always　involving

what　has　preceded　in　a　greater　and　worse　perplexity。

　　Str。　We　are　far　from　having　exhausted　the　more　exact　thinkers　who

treat　of　being　and　not…being。　But　let　us　be　content　to　leave　

them；　and

proceed　to　view　those　who　speak　less　precisely；　and　we　shall　find　as

the　result　of　all；　that　the　nature　of　being　is　quite　as　difficult　to

comprehend　as　that　of　not…being。

　　Theaet。　Then　now　we　will　go　to　the　others。

　　Str。　There　appears　to　be　a　sort　of　war　of　Giants　and　Gods　going　on

amongst　them；　they　are　fighting　with　one　another　about　the　nature　of

essence。

　　Theaet。　How　is　that？

　　Str。　Some　of　them　are　dragging　down　all　things　from　heaven　and

from　the　unseen　to　earth；　and　they　literally　grasp　in　their　hands

rocks　and　oaks；　of　these　they　lay　hold；　and　obstinately　

maintain；　that

the　things　only　which　can　be　touched　or　handled　have　being　

or　essence；

because　they　define　being　and　body　as　one；　and　if　any　one　else　says

that　what　is　not　a　body　exists　they　altogether　despise　him；　and　will

hear　of　nothing　but　body。

　　Theaet。　I　have　often　met　with　such　men；　and　terrible　fellows　they

are。

　　Str。　And　that　is　the　reason　why　their　opponents　cautiously　defend

themselves　from　above；　out　of　an　unseen　world；　mightily　contending

that　true　essence　consists　of　certain　intelligible　and　incorporeal

ideas；　the　bodies　of　the　materialists；　which　by　them　are　

maintained　to

be　the　very　truth；　they　break　up　into　little　bits　by　their

arguments；　and　affirm　them　to　be；　not　essence；　but　generation　and

motion。　Between　the　two　armies；　Theaetetus；　there　is　always　

an　endless

conflict　raging　concerning　these　matters。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Let　us　ask　each　party　in　turn；　to　give　an　account　of　

that　which

they　call　essence。

　　Theaet。　How　shall　we　get　it　out　of　them？

　　Str。　With　those　who　make　being　to　consist　in　ideas；　there　will　be

less　difficulty；　for　they　are　civil　people　enough；　but　there　will　be

very　great　difficulty；　or　rather　an　absolute　impossibility；　

in　getting

an　opinion　out　of　those　who　drag　everything　down　to　matter。　Shall　I

tell　you　what　we　must　do？

　　Theaet。　What？

　　Str。　Let　us；　if　we　can；　really　improve　them；　but　if　this　is　not

possible；　let　us　imagine　them　to　be　better　than　they　are；　and　more

willing　to　answer　in　accordance　with　the　rules　of　argument；　and　then

their　opinion　will　be　more　worth　having；　for　that　which　better　men

acknowledge　has　more　weight　than　that　which　is　acknowledged　by

inferior　men。　Moreover　we　are　no　respecters　of　persons；　but　seekers

after　time。

　　Theaet。　Very　good。

　　Str。　Then　now；　on　the　supposition　that　they　are　improved；　

let　us　ask

them　to　state　their　views；　and　do　you　interpret　them。

　　Theaet。　Agreed。

　　Str。　Let　them　say　whether　they　would　admit　that　there　is　such　a

thing　as　a　mortal　animal。

　　Theaet。　Of　course　they　would。

　　Str。　And　do　they　not　acknowledge　this　to　be　a　body　having　a　soul？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　they　do。

　　Str。　Meaning　to　say　the　soul　is　something　which　exists？

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And　do　they　not　say　that　one　soul　is　just；　and　another

unjust；　and　that　one　soul　is　wise；　and　another　foolish？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　that　the　just　and　wise　soul　becomes　just　and　wise　by　the

possession　of　justice　and　wisdom；　and　the　opposite　under　opposite

circumstances？

　　Theaet。　Yes；　they　do。

　　Str。　But　surely　that　which　may　be　present　or　may　be　absent　will　be

admitted　by　them　to　exist？

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And；　allowing　that　justice；　wisdom；　the　other　virtues；　and

their　opposites　exist；　as　well　as　a　soul　in　which　they　

inhere；　do　they

affirm　any　of　them　to　be　visible　and　tangible；　or　are　they　all

invisible？

　　Theaet。　They　would　say　that　hardly　any　of　them　are　visible。

　　Str。　And　would　they　say　that　they　are　corporeal？

　　Theaet。　They　would　distinguish：　the　soul　would　be　said　by　them　to

have　a　body；　but　as　to　the　other　qualities　of　justice；　

wisdom；　and　the

like；　about　which　you　asked；　they　would　not　venture　either　to　deny

their　existence；　or　to　maintain　that　they　were　all　corporeal。

　　Str。　Verily；　Theaetetus；　I　perceive　a　great　improvement　in　

them；　the

real　aborigines；　children　of　the　dragon's　teeth；　would　have　been

deterred　by　no　shame　at　all；　but　would　have　obstinately　asserted

that　nothing　is　which　they　are　not　able　to　squeeze　in　their　hands。

　　Theaet。　That　is　pretty　much　their　notion。

　　Str。　Let　us　push　the　question；　for　if　they　will　admit　that　

any；　even

the　smallest　particle　of　being；　is　incorporeal；　it　is　enough；　they

must　then　say　what　that　nature　is　which　is　common　to　both　the

corporeal　and　incorporeal；　and　which　they　have　in　their　mind's　eye

when　they　say　of　both　of　them　that　they　〃are。〃　Perhaps　they　may　be

in　a　difficulty；　and　if　this　is　the　case；　there　is　a　possibility

that　they　may　accept　a　notion　of　ours　respecting　the　nature　of

being；　having　nothing　of　their　own　to　offer。

　　Theaet。　What　is　the　notion？　Tell　me；　and　we　shall　soon　see。

　　Str。　My　notion　would　be；　that　anything　which　possesses　any　sort　of

power　to　affect　another；　or　to　be　affected　by　another；　if　only　for　a

single　moment；　however　trifling　the　cause　and　however　slight　the

effect；　has　real　existence；　and　I　hold　that　the　definition　

of　being　is

simply　power　of

　　Theaet。　They　accept　your　suggestion；　having　nothing　better　of

their　own　to　offer。

　　Str。　Very　good；　perhaps　we；　as　well　as　they；　may　one　day　change

our　minds；　but；　for　the　present；　this　may　be　regarded　as　the

understanding　which　is　established　with　them。

　　Theaet。　Agreed。

　　Str。　Let　us　now　go　to　the　friends　of　ideas；　of　their　opinions；

too；　you　shall　be　the　interpreter。

　　Theaet。　I　will。

　　Str。　To　them　we　say…You　would　distinguish　essence　from　generation？

　　Theaet。　〃Yes；〃　they　reply。

　　Str。　And　you　would　allow　that　we　participate　in　

generation；　with　the

body；　and　through　perception；　but　we　participate　with　the　

soul　through

in　true　essence；　and　essence　you　would　affirm　to　be　always　the　same

and　immutable；　whereas　generation　or　becoming　varies？

　　Theaet。　Yes；　that　is　what　we　should　affirm。

　　Str。　Well；　fair　sirs；　we　say　to　them；　what　is　this　participation；

which　you　assert　of　both？　Do　you　agree　with　our　recent　definition？

　　Theaet。　What　definition？

　　Str。　We　said　that　being　was　an　active　or　passive　energy；　

arising　out

of　a　certain　power　which　proceeds　from　elements　meeting　with　one

another。　Perhaps　your　cars；　Theaetetus；　may　fail　to　catch　their

answer；　which　I　recognize　because　I　have　been　accustomed　to　hear　it。

　　Theaet。　And　what　is　their　answer？

　　Str。　They　deny　the　truth　of　what　we　were　just　now；　saying　to　the

aborigines　about　existence。

　　Theaet。　What　was　that？

　　Str。　Any　power　of　doing　or　suffering　in　a　degree　however　slight

was　held　by　us　to　be　a　sufficient　definition　of　being？

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　They　deny　this；　and　say　that　the　power　of　doing　or　

suffering　is

confined　to　becoming；　and　that　neither　power　is　applicable　to　being。

　　Theaet。　And　is　there　not　some　truth　in　what　they　say？

　　Str。　Yes；　but　our　reply　will　be　that　we　want　to　ascertain　from

them　more　distinctly；　whether　they　further　admit　that　the　soul

knows；　and　that　being　or　essence　is　known。

　　Theaet。　There　can　be　no　doubt　that　they　say　so。

　　Str。　And　is　knowing　and　being　known；　doing　or　suffering；　

or　both；　or

is　the　one　doing　and　the　other　suffering；　or　has　neither　any　share

in　either？

　　Theaet。　Clearly；　neither　has　any　share　in　either；　for　if　they　say

anything　else；　they　will　contradict　themselves。

　　Str。　I　understand；　but　they　will　allow　that　if　to　know　is　active；

then；　of　course；　to　be　known　is　passive。　And　on　this　view　

being；　in　so

far　as　it　is　known；　is　acted　upon　by　knowledge；　and　is　therefore　in

motion；　for　that　which　is　in　a　state　of　rest　cannot　be　acted　upon；

as　we　affirm。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　And；　O　heavens；　can　we　ever　be　made　to　believe　that　motion

and　life　and　soul　and　mind　are　not　present　with　perfect　being？　Can

we　imagine　that；　being　is　devoid　of　life　and　mind；　and　

exists　in　awful

unmeaningness　an　everlasting　fixture？

　　Theaet。　That　would　be　a　dreadful　thing　to　admit；　Stranger。

　　Str。　But　shall　we　say　that　has　mind　and　not　life？

　　Theaet。　How　is　that　possible？

　　Str。　Or　shall　we　say　that　both　inhere　in　perfect　being；　but　that

it　has　no　soul　which　contains　them？

　　Theaet。　And　in　what　other　way　can　it　contain　them？

　　Str。