sophist-第8章

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it　has　no　soul　which　contains　them？

　　Theaet。　And　in　what　other　way　can　it　contain　them？

　　Str。　Or　that　being　has　mind　and　life　and　soul；　but　although

endowed　with　soul　remains　absolutely　unmoved？

　　　Theaet。　All　three　suppositions　appear　to　me　to　be　irrational。

　　Str。　Under　being；　then；　we　must　include　motion；　and　that　which　is

moved。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　Then；　Theaetetus；　our　inference　is；　that　if　there　is　

no　motion；

neither　is　there　any　mind　anywhere；　or　about　anything　or　belonging

to　any　one。

　　Theaet。　Quite　true。

　　Str。　And　yet　this　equally　follows；　if　we　grant　that　all　things　are

in　motion…upon　this　view　too　mind　has　no　existence。

　　Theaet。　How　so？

　　Str。　Do　you　think　that　sameness　of　condition　and　mode　and　subject

could　ever　exist　without　a　principle　of　rest？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　not。

　　Str。　Can　you　see　how　without　them　mind　could　exist；　or　come　into

existence　anywhere？

　　Theaet。　No。

　　Str。　And　surely　contend　we　must　in　every　possible　way　against　him

who　would　annihilate　knowledge　and　reason　and　mind；　and　yet　ventures

to　speak　confidently　about　anything。

　　Theaet。　Yes；　with　all　our　might。

　　Str。　Then　the　philosopher；　who　has　the　truest　reverence　for　these

qualities；　cannot　possibly　accept　the　notion　of　those　who　

say　that　the

whole　is　at　rest；　either　as　unity　or　in　many　forms：　and　he　will　be

utterly　deaf　to　those　who　assert　universal　motion。　As　children　say

entreatingly　〃Give　us　both。〃　so　he　will　include　both　the　moveable

and　immoveable　in　his　definition　of　being　and　all。

　　Theaet。　Most　true。

　　Str。　And　now；　do　we　seem　to　have　gained　a　fair　notion　of　being？

　　Theaet。　Yes　truly。

　　Str。　Alas；　Theaetetus；　methinks　that　we　are　now　only　beginning　to

see　the　real　difficulty　of　the　enquiry　into　the　nature　of　it。

　　Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　O　my　friend；　do　you　not　see　that　nothing　can　exceed　out

ignorance；　and　yet　we　fancy　that　we　are　saying　something　good？

　　Theaet。　I　certainly　thought　that　we　were；　and　I　do　not　at　all

understand　how　we　never　found　out　our　desperate　case。

　　Str。　Reflect：　after　having　made；　these　admissions；　may　we　not　be

justly　asked；　the　same　questions　which　we　ourselves　were　asking　of

those　who　said　that　all　was　hot　and　cold？

　　Theaet。　What　were　they？　Will　you　recall　them　to　my　mind？

　　Str。　To　be　sure；　I　will　remind　you　of　them；　by　putting　the　same

questions；　to　you　which　I　did　to　them；　and　then　we　shall　get　on。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Would　you　not　say　that　rest　and　motion　are　in　the　most　entire

opposition　to　one　another？

　　Theaet。　Of　course。

　　Str。　And　yet　you　would　say　that　both　and　either　of　them　

equally　are？

　　Theaet。　I　should。

　　Str。　And　when　you　admit　that　both　or　either　of　them　are；　

do　you　mean

to　say　that　both　or　either；　of　them　are　in　motion？

　　Theaet。　Certainly　not。

　　Str。　Or　do　you　wish　to　imply　that　they　are　both　at　rest；　when　you

say　that　they　are？

　　Theaet。　Of　course　not。

　　Str。　Then　you　conceive　of　being　as　some　third　and　distinct　nature；

under　which　rest　and　motion　are　alike　included；　and；　observing　that

they　both　participate　in　being；　you　declare　that　they　are。

　　Theaet。　Truly　we　seem　to　have　an　intimation　that　being　is　

some　third

thing；　when　we　say　that　rest　and　motion　are。

　　Str。　Then　being　is　not　the　combination　of　rest　and　motion；　but

something　different　from　them。

　　Theaet。　So　it　would　appear。

　　Str。　Being；　then；　according　to　its　own　nature；　is　neither　in

motion　nor　at　rest。

　　Theaet。　That　is　very　much　the　truth。

　　Str。　Where；　then；　is　a　man　to　look　for　help　who　would　have　

any　clear

or　fixed　notion　of　being　in　his　mind？

　　Theaet。　Where；　indeed？

　　Str。　I　scarcely　think　that　he　can　look　anywhere；　for　that　which　is

not　in　motion　must　be　at　rest；　and　again；　that　which　is　not　at　rest

must　be　in　motion；　but　being　is　placed　outside　of　both　these

classes。　Is　this　possible？

　　Theaet。　Utterly　impossible。

　　Str。　Here；　then；　is　another　thing　which　we　ought　to　bear　in　mind。

　　Theaet。　What？

　　Str。　When　we　were　asked　to　what　we　were　to　assign　the　

appellation　of

not…being；　we　were　in　the　greatest　difficulty：…do　you　remember？

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure。

　　Str。　And　are　we　not　now　in　as　a　difficulty　about　being？

　　Theaes。　I　should　say；　Stranger；　that　we　are　in　one　which　is；　if

possible；　even　greater。

　　Str。　Then　let　us　acknowledge　the　difficulty；　and　as　being　and

not…being　are　involved　in　the　same　perplexity；　there　is　hope　

that　when

the　one　appears　more　or　less　distinctly；　the　other　will　equally

appear；　and　if　we　are　able　to　see　neither　there　may　still　be　a

chance　of　steering　our　way　in　between　them；　without　any　great

discredit。

　　Theaet。　Very　good。

　　Str。　Let　us　enquire；　then；　how　we　come　to　predicate　many　names　of

the　same　thing。

　　Theaet。　Give　an　example。

　　Str。　I　mean　that　we　speak　of　man；　for　example；　under　many　

names…that

we　attribute　to　him　colours　and　forms　and　magnitudes　and　virtues　and

vices；　in　all　of　which　instances　and　in　ten　thousand　others　we　not

only　speak　of　him　as　a　man；　but　also　as　good；　and　having　number…less

other　attributes；　and　in　the　same　way　anything　else　which　we

originally　supposed　to　be　one　is　described　by　us　as　many；　and　under

many　names。

　　Theaet。　That　is　true。

　　Str。　And　thus　we　provide　a　rich　feast　for　tyros；　whether　young　or

old；　for　there　is　nothing　easier　than　to　argue　that　the　one　cannot

be　many；　or　the　many　one；　and　great　is　their　delight　in　

denying　that　a

man　is　good；　for　man；　they　insist；　is　man　and　good　is　good。　

I　dare　say

that　you　have　met　with　persons　who　take…an　interest　in　such

matters…they　are　often　elderly　men；　whose　meagre　sense　is　thrown

into　amazement　by　these　discoveries　of　theirs；　which　they　believe　to

be　the　height　of　wisdom。

　　Theaet。　Certainly；　I　have。

　　Str。　Then；　not　to　exclude　any　one　who　has　ever　speculated　at　all

upon　the　nature　of　being；　let　us　put　our　questions　to　them　as　well

as　to　our　former　friends。

　　Theaet。　What　questions？

　　Str。　Shall　we　refuse　to　attribute　being　to　motion　and　rest；　or

anything　to　anything；　and　assume　that　they　do　not　mingle；　and　are

incapable　of　participating　in　one　another？　Or　shall　we　

gather　all　into

one　class　of　things　communicable　with　one　another？　Or　are　some

things　communicable　and　others　not？…Which　of　these　alternatives；

Theaetetus；　will　they　prefer？

　　Theaet。　I　have　nothing　to　answer　on　their　behalf。　Suppose　that　you

take　all　these　hypotheses　in　turn；　and　see　what　are　the　consequences

which　follow　from　each　of　them。

　　Str。　Very　good；　and　first　let　us　assume　them　to　say　that　nothing

is　capable　of　participating　in　anything　else　in　any　respect；　in　that

case　rest　and　motion　cannot　participate　in　being　at　all。

　　Theaet。　They　cannot。

　　Str。　But　would　either　of　them　be　if　not　participating　in　being？

　　Theaet。　No。

　　Str。　Then　by　this　admission　everything　is　instantly　overturned；　as

well　the　doctrine　of　universal　motion　as　of　universal　rest；　and　also

the　doctrine　of　those　who　distribute　being　into　immutable　and

everlasting　kinds；　for　all　these　add　on　a　notion　of　being；　some

affirming　that　things　〃are〃　truly　in　motion；　and　others　that　they

〃are〃　truly　at　rest。

　　Theaes。　Just　so。

　　Str。　Again；　those　who　would　at　one　time　compound；　and　at　another

resolve　all　things；　whether　making　them　into　one　and　out　of　one

creating　infinity；　or　dividing　them　into　finite　clements；　and

forming　compounds　out　of　these；　whether　they　suppose　the　processes

of　creation　to　be　successive　or　continuous；　would　be　talking

nonsense　in　all　this　if　there　were　no　admixture。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　Most　ridiculous　of　all　will　the　men　themselves　be　who　want　to

carry　out　the　argument　and　yet　forbid　us　to　call　anything；　because

participating　in　some　affection　from　another；　by　the　name　of　that

other。

　　Theaet。　Why　so？

　　Str。　Why；　because　they　are　compelled　to　use　the　words　〃to　be；〃

〃apart；〃　〃from　others。　〃in　itself；〃　and　ten　thousand　more；　which

they　cannot　give　up；　but　must　make　the　connecting　links　of

discourse；　and　therefore　they　do　not　require　to　be　refuted　by

others；　but　their　enemy；　as　the　saying　is；　inhabits　the　same　house

with　them；　they　are　always　carrying　about　with　them　an　

adversary；　like

the　wonderful　ventriloquist；　Eurycles；　who　out　of　their　own　bellies

audibly　contradicts　them。

　　Theaet。　Precisely　so；　a　very　true　and　exact　illustration。

　　Str。　And　now；　if　we　suppose　that　all　things　have　the　power　of

communion　with　one　another　…what　will　follow？

　　Theaet。　Even　I　can　solve　that　riddle。

　　Str。　How？

　　Theaet。　Why；　because　motion　itself　would　be　at　rest；　and　rest

again　in　motion；　if　they　could　be　attributed　to　one　another。

　　Str。　But　this　is　utterly　impossible。

　　Theaet。　Of　course。

　　Str。　Then　only　the　third　hypothesis　remains。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　For；　surely；　either　all　things　have　communion　with　all；　or

nothing　with　any　other　thing；　or　some　things　communicate　with　some

things　and　others　not。

　　Theaet。　Certainly。

　　Str。　And　two　out　of　these　three　suppositions　have　been　found　to　be

impossible。

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　Every　one　then；　who　desires　to　answer　truly；　will　adopt　the

third　and　remaining　hypothesis　of　the　communion　of　some　with　some。

　　Theaet。　Quite　true。

　　Str。　This　communion　of　some　with　some　may　be　illustrated　

by　the　case

of　letters；　for　some　letters　do　not　fit　each　other；　while　others　do。

　　Theaet。　Of　course。

　　Str。　And　the　vowels；　especially；　are　a　sort　of　bond　which　pervades

all　the　other　letters；　so　that　without　a　vowel　one　consonant　

cannot　be

joined　to　another。

　　Theaet。　True。

　　Str。　But　does　every　one　know　what　letters　will　unite　with　what？　Or

is　art　required　in　order　to　do　so？

　　Theaet。　What　is　required。

　　Str。　What　art？

　　Theaet。　The　art　of　grammar。

　　Str。　And　is　not　this　also　true　of　sounds　high　and　low？…Is　

not　he　who

has　the　art　to　know　what　sounds　mingle；　a　musician；　and　he　who　is

ignorant；　not　a　musician？

　　Theaet。　Yes。

　　Str。　And　we　shall　find　this　to　be　generally　true　of　art　or　the

absence　of　art。

　　Theaet。　Of　course。

　　Str。　And　as　classes　are　admitted　by　us　in　like　manner　to　be　some

of　them　capable　and　others　incapable　of　intermixture；　must　not　he

who　would　rightly　show　what　kinds　will　unite　and　what　will　not；

proceed　by　the　help　of　science　in　the　path　of　argument？　And　will　he

not　ask　if　the　connecting　links　are　universal；　and　so　capable　of

intermixture　with　all　things；　and　again；　in　divisions；　whether　there

are　not　other　universal　classes；　which　make　them　possible？

　　Theaet。　To　be　sure　he　will　require　science；　and；　if　I　am　not

mistaken；　the　very　greatest　of　all　sciences。

　　Str。　How　are　we　to　call　it？　By　Zeus；　have　we　not　lighted　

unwittingly

upon　our　free　and　noble　science；　and　in　looking　for　the　Sophist　have

we　not　entertained　the　philosopher　unawares？

　　Theaet。　What　do　you　mean？

　　Str。　Should　we　not　say　that　the　division　according　to　

classes；　which

neither　makes　the　same　other；　nor　makes　other　the　same；　is　the

business　of　the　dialectical　science？

　　Theaet。　That　is　what　we　should　say。

　　Str。　Then；　surely；　he　who　can　divide　rightly　is　able　to　see

clearly　one　form