concerning civil government-第18章

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chosen　for　that　time　by　the　people；　which　afterwards　return　into　the

ordinary　state　of　subjects；　and　have　no　share　in　the　legislative　but

upon　a　new　choice；　this　power　of　choosing　must　also　be　exercised　by

the　people；　either　at　certain　appointed　seasons；　or　else　when　they　are

summoned　to　it；　and；　in　this　latter　case；　the　power　of　convoking　the

legislative　is　ordinarily　placed　in　the　executive；　and　has　one　of

these　two　limitations　in　respect　of　time：…　that　either　the　original

constitution　requires　their　assembling　and　acting　at　certain

intervals；　and　then　the　executive　power　does　nothing　but　ministerially

issue　directions　for　their　electing　and　assembling　according　to　due

forms；　or　else　it　is　left　to　his　prudence　to　call　them　by　new

elections　when　the　occasions　or　exigencies　of　the　public　require　the

amendment　of　old　or　making　of　new　laws；　or　the　redress　or　prevention

of　any　inconveniencies　that　lie　on　or　threaten　the　people。

　　155。　It　may　be　demanded　here；　what　if　the　executive　power；　being

possessed　of　the　force　of　the　commonwealth；　shall　make　use　of　that

force　to　hinder　the　meeting　and　acting　of　the　legislative；　when　the

original　constitution　or　the　public　exigencies　require　it？　I　say；

using　force　upon　the　people；　without　authority；　and　contrary　to　the

trust　put　in　him　that　does　so；　is　a　state　of　war　with　the　people；

who　have　a　right　to　reinstate　their　legislative　in　the　exercise　of

their　power。　For　having　erected　a　legislative　with　an　intent　they

should　exercise　the　power　of　making　laws；　either　at　certain　set　times；

or　when　there　is　need　of　it；　when　they　are　hindered　by　any　force

from　what　is　so　necessary　to　the　society；　and　wherein　the　safety　and

preservation　of　the　people　consists；　the　people　have　a　right　to　remove

it　by　force。　In　all　states　and　conditions　the　true　remedy　of　force

without　authority　is　to　oppose　force　to　it。　The　use　of　force　without

authority　always　puts　him　that　uses　it　into　a　state　of　war　as　the

aggressor；　and　renders　him　liable　to　be　treated　accordingly。

　　156。　The　power　of　assembling　and　dismissing　the　legislative；

placed　in　the　executive；　gives　not　the　executive　a　superiority　over

it；　but　is　a　fiduciary　trust　placed　in　him　for　the　safety　of　the

people　in　a　case　where　the　uncertainty　and　variableness　of　human

affairs　could　not　bear　a　steady　fixed　rule。　For　it　not　being

possible　that　the　first　framers　of　the　government　should　by　any

foresight　be　so　much　masters　of　future　events　as　to　be　able　to

prefix　so　just　periods　of　return　and　duration　to　the　assemblies　of　the

legislative；　in　all　times　to　come；　that　might　exactly　answer　all　the

exigencies　of　the　commonwealth；　the　best　remedy　could　be　found　for

this　defect　was　to　trust　this　to　the　prudence　of　one　who　was　always　to

be　present；　and　whose　business　it　was　to　watch　over　the　public　good。

Constant；　frequent　meetings　of　the　legislative；　and　long　continuations

of　their　assemblies；　without　necessary　occasion；　could　not　but　be

burdensome　to　the　people；　and　must　necessarily　in　time　produce　more

dangerous　inconveniencies；　and　yet　the　quick　turn　of　affairs　might

be　sometimes　such　as　to　need　their　present　help；　any　delay　of　their

convening　might　endanger　the　public；　and　sometimes；　too；　their

business　might　be　so　great　that　the　limited　time　of　their　sitting

might　be　too　short　for　their　work；　and　rob　the　public　of　that

benefit　which　could　be　had　only　from　their　mature　deliberation。

What；　then；　could　be　done　in　this　case　to　prevent　the　community　from

being　exposed　some　time　or　other　to　imminent　hazard　on　one　side　or　the

other；　by　fixed　intervals　and　periods　set　to　the　meeting　and　acting　of

the　legislative；　but　to　entrust　it　to　the　prudence　of　some　who；

being　present　and　acquainted　with　the　state　of　public　affairs；　might

make　use　of　this　prerogative　for　the　public　good？　And　where　else　could

this　be　so　well　placed　as　in　his　hands　who　was　entrusted　with　the

execution　of　the　laws　for　the　same　end？　Thus；　supposing　the　regulation

of　times　for　the　assembling　and　sitting　of　the　legislative　not　settled

by　the　original　constitution；　it　naturally　fell　into　the　hands　of

the　executive；　not　as　an　arbitrary　power　depending　on　his　good

pleasure；　but　with　this　trust　always　to　have　it　exercised　only　for　the

public　weal；　as　the　occurrences　of　times　and　change　of　affairs　might

require。　Whether　settled　periods　of　their　convening；　or　a　liberty　left

to　the　prince　for　convoking　the　legislative；　or　perhaps　a　mixture　of

both；　hath　the　least　inconvenience　attending　it；　it　is　not　my　business

here　to　inquire；　but　only　to　show　that；　though　the　executive　power　may

have　the　prerogative　of　convoking　and　dissolving　such　conventions　of

the　legislative；　yet　it　is　not　thereby　superior　to　it。

　　157。　Things　of　this　world　are　in　so　constant　a　flux　that　nothing

remains　long　in　the　same　state。　Thus　people；　riches；　trade；　power；

change　their　stations；　flourishing　mighty　cities　come　to　ruin；　and

prove　in　time　neglected　desolate　corners；　whilst　other　unfrequented

places　grow　into　populous　countries　filled　with　wealth　and

inhabitants。　But　things　not　always　changing　equally；　and　private

interest　often　keeping　up　customs　and　privileges　when　the　reasons　of

them　are　ceased；　it　often　comes　to　pass　that　in　governments　where　part

of　the　legislative　consists　of　representatives　chosen　by　the　people；

that　in　tract　of　time　this　representation　becomes　very　unequal　and

disproportionate　to　the　reasons　it　was　at　first　established　upon。　To

what　gross　absurdities　the　following　of　custom　when　reason　has　left　it

may　lead；　we　may　be　satisfied　when　we　see　the　bare　name　of　a　town；

of　which　there　remains　not　so　much　as　the　ruins；　where　scarce　so

much　housing　as　a　sheepcote；　or　more　inhabitants　than　a　shepherd　is　to

be　found；　send　as　many　representatives　to　the　grand　assembly　of

law…makers　as　a　whole　county　numerous　in　people　and　powerful　in

riches。　This　strangers　stand　amazed　at；　and　every　one　must　confess

needs　a　remedy；　though　most　think　it　hard　to　find　one；　because　the

constitution　of　the　legislative　being　the　original　and　supreme　act

of　the　society；　antecedent　to　all　positive　laws　in　it；　and　depending

wholly　on　the　people；　no　inferior　power　can　alter　it。　And；

therefore；　the　people　when　the　legislative　is　once　constituted；　having

in　such　a　government　as　we　have　been　speaking　of　no　power　to　act　as

long　as　the　government　stands；　this　inconvenience　is　thought　incapable

of　a　remedy。

　　158。　Salus　populi　suprema　lex　is　certainly　so　just　and　fundamental　a

rule；　that　he　who　sincerely　follows　it　cannot　dangerously　err。　If；

therefore；　the　executive　who　has　the　power　of　convoking　the

legislative；　observing　rather　the　true　proportion　than　fashion　of

representation；　regulates　not　by　old　custom；　but　true　reason；　the

number　of　members　in　all　places；　that　have　a　right　to　be　distinctly

represented；　which　no　part　of　the　people；　however　incorporated；　can

pretend　to；　but　in　proportion　to　the　assistance　which　it　affords　to

the　public；　it　cannot　be　judged　to　have　set　up　a　new　legislative；

but　to　have　restored　the　old　and　true　one；　and　to　have　rectified　the

disorders　which　succession　of　time　had　insensibly　as　well　as

inevitably　introduced；　for　it　being　the　interest　as　well　as

intention　of　the　people　to　have　a　fair　and　equal　representative；

whoever　brings　it　nearest　to　that　is　an　undoubted　friend　to　and

establisher　of　the　government；　and　cannot　miss　the　consent　and

approbation　of　the　community；　prerogative　being　nothing　but　a　power　in

the　hands　of　the　prince　to　provide　for　the　public　good　in　such　cases

which；　depending　upon　unforeseen　and　uncertain　occurrences；　certain

and　unalterable　laws　could　not　safely　direct。　Whatsoever　shall　be　done

manifestly　for　the　good　of　the　people；　and　establishing　the　government

upon　its　true　foundations　is；　and　always　will　be；　just　prerogative。

The　power　of　erecting　new　corporations；　and　therewith　new

representatives；　carries　with　it　a　supposition　that　in　time　the

measures　of　representation　might　vary；　and　those　have　a　just　right

to　be　represented　which　before　had　none；　and　by　the　same　reason；　those

cease　to　have　a　right；　and　be　too　inconsiderable　for　such　a　privilege；

which　before　had　it。　It　is　not　a　change　from　the　present　state

which；　perhaps；　corruption　or　decay　has　introduced；　that　makes　an

inroad　upon　the　government；　but　the　tendency　of　it　to　injure　or

oppress　the　people；　and　to　set　up　one　part　or　party　with　a　distinction

from　and　an　unequal　subjection　of　the　rest。　Whatsoever　cannot　but　be

acknowledged　to　be　of　advantage　to　the　society　and　people　in

general；　upon　just　and　lasting　measures；　will　always；　when　done；

justify　itself；　and　whenever　the　people　shall　choose　their

representatives　upon　just　and　undeniably　equal　measures；　suitable　to

the　original　frame　of　the　government；　it　cannot　be　doubted　to　be　the

will　and　act　of　the　society；　whoever　permitted　or　proposed　to　them

so　to　do。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XIV

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Prerogative



　　159。　WHERE　the　legislative　and　executive　power　are　in　distinct

hands；　as　they　are　in　all　moderated　monarchies　and　well…framed

governments；　there　the　good　of　the　society　requires　that　several

things　should　be　left　to　the　discretion　of　him　that　has　the

executive　power。　For　the　legislators　not　being　able　to　foresee　and

provide　by　laws　for　all　that　may　be　useful　to　the　community；　the

executor　of　the　laws；　having　the　power　in　his　hands；　has　by　the　common

law　of　Nature　a　right　to　make　use　of　it　for　the　good　of　the　society；

in　many　cases　where　the　municipal　law　has　given　no　direction；　till　the

legislative　can　conveniently　be　assembled　to　provide　for　it；　nay；　many

things　there　are　which　the　law　can　by　no　means　provide　for；　and

those　must　necessarily　be　left　to　the　discretion　of　him　that　has　the

executive　power　in　his　hands；　to　be　ordered　by　him　as　the　public

good　and　advantage　shall　require；　nay；　it　is　fit　that　the　laws

themselves　should　in　some　cases　give　way　to　the　executive　power；　or

rather　to　this　fundamental　law　of　Nature　and　government…　viz。；　that　as

much　as　may　be　all　the　members　of　the　society　are　to　be　preserved。　For

since　many　accidents　may　happen　wherein　a　strict　and　rigid　observation

of　the　laws　may　do　harm；　as　not　to　pull　down　an　innocent　man's　house

to　stop　the　fire　when　the　next　to　it　is　burning；　and　a　man　may　come

sometimes　within　the　reach　of　the　law；　which　makes　no　distinction　of

persons；　by　an　action　that　may　deserve　reward　and　pardon；　it　is　fit

the　ruler　should　have　a　power　in　many　cases　to　mitigate　the　severity

of　the　law；　and　pardon　some　offenders；　since　the　end　of　government

being　the　preservation　of　all　as　much　as　may　be；　even　the　guilty　are

to　be　spared　where　it　can　prove　no　prejudice　to　the　innocent。

　　160。　This　power　to　act　according　to　discretion　for　the　public

good；　without　the　prescription　of　the　law　and　sometimes　even　against

it；　is　that　which　is　called　prerogative；　for　since　in　some　governments

the　law…making　power　is　not　always　in　being　and　is　usually　too

numerous；　and　so　too　slow　for　the　dispatch　requisite　to　execution；　and