concerning civil government-第24章

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the　people　do　not　think　themselves　concerned　in　it；　as　for　a　raving

madman　or　heady　malcontent　to　overturn　a　well…settled　state；　the

people　being　as　little　apt　to　follow　the　one　as　the　other。

　　209。　But　if　either　these　illegal　acts　have　extended　to　the

majority　of　the　people；　or　if　the　mischief　and　oppression　has　light

only　on　some　few；　but　in　such　cases　as　the　precedent　and

consequences　seem　to　threaten　all；　and　they　are　persuaded　in　their

consciences　that　their　laws；　and　with　them；　their　estates；

liberties；　and　lives　are　in　danger；　and　perhaps　their　religion　too；

how　they　will　be　hindered　from　resisting　illegal　force　used　against

them　I　cannot　tell。　This　is　an　inconvenience；　I　confess；　that

attends　all　governments　whatsoever；　when　the　governors　have　brought　it

to　this　pass；　to　be　generally　suspected　of　their　people；　the　most

dangerous　state　they　can　possibly　put　themselves　in；　wherein　they

are　the　less　to　be　pitied；　because　it　is　so　easy　to　be　avoided。　It

being　as　impossible　for　a　governor；　if　he　really　means　the　good　of　his

people；　and　the　preservation　of　them　and　their　laws　together；　not　to

make　them　see　and　feel　it；　as　it　is　for　the　father　of　a　family　not

to　let　his　children　see　he　loves　and　takes　care　of　them。

　　210。　But　if　all　the　world　shall　observe　pretences　of　one　kind；　and

actions　of　another；　arts　used　to　elude　the　law；　and　the　trust　of

prerogative　（which　is　an　arbitrary　power　in　some　things　left　in　the

prince's　hand　to　do　good；　not　harm；　to　the　people）　employed　contrary

to　the　end　for　which　it　was　given；　if　the　people　shall　find　the

ministers　and　subordinate　magistrates　chosen；　suitable　to　such　ends；

and　favoured　or　laid　by　proportionably　as　they　promote　or　oppose　them；

if　they　see　several　experiments　made　of　arbitrary　power；　and　that

religion　underhand　favoured；　though　publicly　proclaimed　against；　which

is　readiest　to　introduce　it；　and　the　operators　in　it　supported　as　much

as　may　be；　and　when　that　cannot　be　done；　yet　approved　still；　and　liked

the　better；　and　a　long　train　of　acting　show　the　counsels　all　tending

that　way；　how　can　a　man　any　more　hinder　himself　from　being　persuaded

in　his　own　mind　which　way　things　are　going；　or；　from　casting　about　how

to　save　himself；　than　he　could　from　believing　the　captain　of　a　ship　he

was　in　was　carrying　him　and　the　rest　of　the　company　to　Algiers；　when

he　found　him　always　steering　that　course；　though　cross　winds；　leaks　in

his　ship；　and　want　of　men　and　provisions　did　often　force　him　to　turn

his　course　another　way　for　some　time；　which　he　steadily　returned　to

again　as　soon　as　the　wind；　weather；　and　other　circumstances　would

let　him？

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Chapter　XIX

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Dissolution　of　Government



　　211。　HE　that　will；　with　any　clearness；　speak　of　the　dissolution　of

government；　ought　in　the　first　place　to　distinguish　between　the

dissolution　of　the　society　and　the　dissolution　of　the　government。　That

which　makes　the　community；　and　brings　men　out　of　the　loose　state　of

Nature　into　one　politic　society；　is　the　agreement　which　every　one

has　with　the　rest　to　incorporate　and　act　as　one　body；　and　so　be　one

distinct　commonwealth。　The　usual；　and　almost　only　way　whereby　this

union　is　dissolved；　is　the　inroad　of　foreign　force　making　a　conquest

upon　them。　For　in　that　case　（not　being　able　to　maintain　and　support

themselves　as　one　entire　and　independent　body）　the　union　belonging

to　that　body；　which　consisted　therein；　must　necessarily　cease；　and

so　every　one　return　to　the　state　he　was　in　before；　with　a　liberty　to

shift　for　himself　and　provide　for　his　own　safety；　as　he　thinks　fit；　in

some　other　society。　Whenever　the　society　is　dissolved；　it　is　certain

the　government　of　that　society　cannot　remain。　Thus　conquerors'

swords　often　cut　up　governments　by　the　roots；　and　mangle　societies

to　pieces；　separating　the　subdued　or　scattered　multitude　from　the

protection　of　and　dependence　on　that　society　which　ought　to　have

preserved　them　from　violence。　The　world　is　too　well　instructed　in；　and

too　forward　to　allow　of　this　way　of　dissolving　of　governments；　to　need

any　more　to　be　said　of　it；　and　there　wants　not　much　argument　to

prove　that　where　the　society　is　dissolved；　the　government　cannot

remain；　that　being　as　impossible　as　for　the　frame　of　a　house　to

subsist　when　the　materials　of　it　are　scattered　and　displaced　by　a

whirlwind；　or　jumbled　into　a　confused　heap　by　an　earthquake。

　　212。　Besides　this　overturning　from　without；　governments　are

dissolved　from　within：

　　First。　When　the　legislative　is　altered；　civil　society　being　a

state　of　peace　amongst　those　who　are　of　it；　from　whom　the　state　of　war

is　excluded　by　the　umpirage　which　they　have　provided　in　their

legislative　for　the　ending　all　differences　that　may　arise　amongst

any　of　them；　it　is　in　their　legislative　that　the　members　of　a

commonwealth　are　united　and　combined　together　into　one　coherent　living

body。　This　is　the　soul　that　gives　form；　life；　and　unity　to　the

commonwealth；　from　hence　the　several　members　have　their　mutual

influence；　sympathy；　and　connection；　and　therefore　when　the

legislative　is　broken；　or　dissolved；　dissolution　and　death　follows。

For　the　essence　and　union　of　the　society　consisting　in　having　one

will；　the　legislative；　when　once　established　by　the　majority；　has

the　declaring　and；　as　it　were；　keeping　of　that　will。　The

constitution　of　the　legislative　is　the　first　and　fundamental　act　of

society；　whereby　provision　is　made　for　the　continuation　of　their　union

under　the　direction　of　persons　and　bonds　of　laws；　made　by　persons

authorised　thereunto；　by　the　consent　and　appointment　of　the　people；

without　which　no　one　man；　or　number　of　men；　amongst　them　can　have

authority　of　making　laws　that　shall　be　binding　to　the　rest。　When　any

one；　or　more；　shall　take　upon　them　to　make　laws　whom　the　people　have

not　appointed　so　to　do；　they　make　laws　without　authority；　which　the

people　are　not　therefore　bound　to　obey；　by　which　means　they　come　again

to　be　out　of　subjection；　and　may　constitute　to　themselves　a　new

legislative；　as　they　think　best；　being　in　full　liberty　to　resist　the

force　of　those　who；　without　authority；　would　impose　anything　upon

them。　Every　one　is　at　the　disposure　of　his　own　will；　when　those　who

had；　by　the　delegation　of　the　society；　the　declaring　of　the　public

will；　are　excluded　from　it；　and　others　usurp　the　place　who　have　no

such　authority　or　delegation。



　　213。　This　being　usually　brought　about　by　such　in　the　commonwealth；

who　misuse　the　power　they　have；　it　is　hard　to　consider　it　aright；

and　know　at　whose　door　to　lay　it；　without　knowing　the　form　of

government　in　which　it　happens。　Let　us　suppose；　then；　the

legislative　placed　in　the　concurrence　of　three　distinct　persons：…

First；　a　single　hereditary　person　having　the　constant；　supreme；

executive　power；　and　with　it　the　power　of　convoking　and　dissolving　the

other　two　within　certain　periods　of　time。　Secondly；　an　assembly　of

hereditary　nobility。　Thirdly；　an　assembly　of　representatives　chosen；

pro　tempore；　by　the　people。　Such　a　form　of　government　supposed；　it

is　evident：

　　214。　First；　that　when　such　a　single　person　or　prince　sets　up　his　own

arbitrary　will　in　place　of　the　laws　which　are　the　will　of　the

society　declared　by　the　legislative；　then　the　legislative　is

changed。　For　that　being；　in　effect；　the　legislative　whose　rules　and

laws　are　put　in　execution；　and　required　to　be　obeyed；　when　other

laws　are　set　up；　and　other　rules　pretended　and　enforced　than　what

the　legislative；　constituted　by　the　society；　have　enacted；　it　is　plain

that　the　legislative　is　changed。　Whoever　introduces　new　laws；　not

being　thereunto　authorised；　by　the　fundamental　appointment　of　the

society；　or　subverts　the　old；　disowns　and　overturns　the　power　by　which

they　were　made；　and　so　sets　up　a　new　legislative。

　　215。　Secondly；　when　the　prince　hinders　the　legislative　from

assembling　in　its　due　time；　or　from　acting　freely；　pursuant　to　those

ends　for　which　it　was　constituted；　the　legislative　is　altered。　For

it　is　not　a　certain　number　of　men…　no；　nor　their　meeting；　unless

they　have　also　freedom　of　debating　and　leisure　of　perfecting　what　is

for　the　good　of　the　society；　wherein　the　legislative　consists；　when

these　are　taken　away；　or　altered；　so　as　to　deprive　the　society　of

the　due　exercise　of　their　power；　the　legislative　is　truly　altered。　For

it　is　not　names　that　constitute　governments；　but　the　use　and

exercise　of　those　powers　that　were　intended　to　accompany　them；　so　that

he　who　takes　away　the　freedom；　or　hinders　the　acting　of　the

legislative　in　its　due　seasons；　in　effect　takes　away　the

legislative；　and　puts　an　end　to　the　government。

　　216。　Thirdly；　when；　by　the　arbitrary　power　of　the　prince；　the

electors　or　ways　of　election　are　altered　without　the　consent　and

contrary　to　the　common　interest　of　the　people；　there　also　the

legislative　is　altered。　For　if　others　than　those　whom　the　society　hath

authorised　thereunto　do　choose；　or　in　another　way　than　what　the

society　hath　prescribed；　those　chosen　are　not　the　legislative

appointed　by　the　people。

　　217。　Fourthly；　the　delivery　also　of　the　people　into　the　subjection

of　a　foreign　power；　either　by　the　prince　or　by　the　legislative；　is

certainly　a　change　of　the　legislative；　and　so　a　dissolution　of　the

government。　For　the　end　why　people　entered　into　society　being　to　be

preserved　one　entire；　free；　independent　society　to　be　governed　by

its　own　laws；　this　is　lost　whenever　they　are　given　up　into　the　power

of　another。

　　218。　Why；　in　such　a　constitution　as　this；　the　dissolution　of　the

government　in　these　cases　is　to　be　imputed　to　the　prince　is　evident；

because　he；　having　the　force；　treasure；　and　offices　of　the　State　to

employ；　and　often　persuading　himself　or　being　flattered　by　others；

that；　as　supreme　magistrate；　he　is　incapable　of　control；　he　alone　is

in　a　condition　to　make　great　advances　towards　such　changes　under

pretence　of　lawful　authority；　and　has　it　in　his　hands　to　terrify　or

suppress　opposers　as　factious；　seditious；　and　enemies　to　the

government；　whereas　no　other　part　of　the　legislative；　or　people；　is

capable　by　themselves　to　attempt　any　alteration　of　the　legislative

without　open　and　visible　rebellion；　apt　enough　to　be　taken　notice

of；　which；　when　it　prevails；　produces　effects　very　little　different

from　foreign　conquest。　Besides；　the　prince；　in　such　a　form　of

government；　having　the　power　of　dissolving　the　other　parts　of　the

legislative；　and　thereby　rendering　them　private　persons；　they　can

never；　in　opposition　to　him；　or　without　his　concurrence；　alter　the

legislative　by　a　law；　his　consent　being　necessary　to　give　any　of　their

decrees　that　sanction。　But　yet　so　far　as　the　other　parts　of　the

legislative　any　way　contribute　to　any　attempt　upon　the　government；　and

do　either　promote；　or　not；　what　lies　in　them；　hinder　such　designs；

they　are　guilty；　and　partake　in　this；　which　is　certainly　the

greatest　crime　men　can　be　guilty　of　one　towards　another。

　　219。　There　is　one　way　more　whereby　such　a　government　may　be

dissolved；　and　that　is：　When　he　who　has　the　supreme　executive　power

neglects　and　aba